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and bring up to date the information published in the Commission's annual economic surveys. 
Apart from this summary, which is to appear in every issue, special articles on different subjects 
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INTRODUCTORY NOTE 
In connexion with the second session of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (New Delhi, 1 February to 29 March 1968), the 
ECLA secretariat felt that it might usefully help to spread knowledge of the 
topics discussed at the Conference by reproducing in the present issue of 
the Bulletin the report it had presented under the title of "Latin America and 
the second session of UNCTAD" (E/CN.12/803). In the version of the text 
given here, chapter I, analysing recent trends in Latin America's foreign 
trade, is omitted, since fuller and more up-to-date information on the subject 
can be found in the Economic Survey of Latin America for 1966 and 1967. 
The report is supplemented by two other documents which represent 
milestones on the road towards an international trade policy: the Charter 
of Tequendama, adopted by the Latin American countries members of the 
Special Committee on Latin American Co-ordination (CECLA) at its Fourth 
Meeting at the Expert Level (Bogotá, September 1967); and the Charter of 
Algiers, adopted by the developing countries members of the Group of 77 
(Algiers, October 1967). 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE SECOND SESSION OF UNCTAD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This report, which the ECLA secretariat pre- second session of the Conference, and to take 
sented to the second session of the United such steps as may be feasible to extend their 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development full co-operation in ensuring its success". In 
(UNCTAD), was prepared in compliance with ECLA resolution 264 (XII ) , the Commission, 
ECLA resolution 264 (XII) and General As- "having studied the report submitted by the 
sembly resolution 2206 (XXI ) . secretariat of the Commission on Latin America 
In this last resolution, the General Assembly and international trade policy (E/CN.12/773), 
invited United Nations agencies and the regional a provisional version of the study which it is 
economic commissions "to pay special attention, preparing for the second session of the Con-
in their programmes, to preparations for the ference on Trade and Development as part of 
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its continuing work of analysis and elucidation 
of the Latin American countries' external sector 
problems, and also in compliance with resolu-
tion 262 (AC.58)i of the Committee of the 
Whole of this Commission", requested the sec-
retariat "to revise and update that document, 
with due regard to the comments, statements 
and recommendations made during the pro-
ceedings of the present session and such new 
developments bearing on foreign trade and trade 
policy as are of particular concern to the Latin 
American countries, for the purposes set forth 
in resolution 262 (AC.58), and for presentation 
to the second session of the Conference". It 
added that "the secretariat shall transmit the 
document to all the States members of the Com-
mission and consult the Governments of the 
developing countries members of the Com-
mission as and when appropriate, with a view 
to convening a meeting of government experts 
to consider the document before the second 
session of UNCTAD", subsequently listing sev-
eral aspects to be taken into account by the 
secretariat in its revision and updating of the 
document in question. 
In accordance with these provisions, the 
ECLA secretariat prepared several reports on 
such topics as commodity trade problems and 
policies, expansion and diversification of exports 
of manufactures and semi-manufactures, and 
problems stemming from the unilateral use of 
escape clauses, which served as a basis for the 
discussions of the Special Committee on Latin 
American Co-ordination (CECLA) at its Fourth 
Meeting at the Expert Level (Bogotá, September 
1967). The conclusions reached during these 
discussions were set forth in the Charter of 
Tequendama, in which the countries members 
of CECLA adopted a common stand on some 
of the substantive aspects of the agenda of the 
second session of UNCTAD, with a view to 
communicating their position to the participants 
in the Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 
(Algiers, October 1967). 
l l n this resolution, the ECLA Committee of the 
Whole requested the secretariat "to accord the Latin 
American countries the co-operation and advice needed, 
on an individual or collective basis, for the purpose of 
defining possible lines of joint action in the field of 
trade policy, especially in relation to . . . questions of 
special interest for those countries that it is decided to 
consider at the second session of UNCTAD". In ac-
cordance with this resolution, the Special Committee 
on Latin American Co-ordination (CECLA) requested 
the ECLA secretariat, in a resolution adopted at its 
Third Meeting at the Expert Level (Mexico, July 1966), 
to prepare a basic draft document defining the position 
to be taken by Latin America at the second session of 
UNCTAD. 
After this Meeting the ECLA secretariat pre-
pared, in accordance with resolution 264 (XII) , 
a preliminary version of this document taking 
into account, inter alia, the provisions of the 
Charter of Tequendama and the Charter of 
Algiers, and submitted it for consideration to 
the Meeting of Government Experts of the De-
veloping Countries Members of the Commission 
held at the Commission's headquarters from 11 
to 15 December 1967. 
1. THE SECOND SESSION OF U N C T A D 
The second session of UNCTAD is of far-
reaching importance for the developing coun-
tries. There is a need for fundamental changes 
in international economic and financial policy 
and this Conference provides an exceptional op-
portunity for determined joint action on the 
part of the Latin American countries and other 
developing regions, with a view to securing the 
adoption of specific decisions conducive to the 
establishment, on the international plane, of 
new conditions that will promote the expansion 
of trade, and to the provision of instruments 
for implementing the technical and financial co-
operation programmes needed by these countries. 
The vicissitudes of Latin American develop-
ment in the last few years demonstrate that if 
these institutional and policy changes are not 
made, at both the domestic and the international 
levels, it will be impossible to ensure a satis-
factory rate of economic growth and develop-
ment. As the problems besetting these countries 
are becoming ever more urgent, far-reaching 
decisions are required to overcome them. It 
must be hoped that the economically more ad-
vanced countries, in which wealth, well-being 
and technical progress are being concentrated, 
in contrast with the stagnation and weakness 
prevalent in the developing countries, will de-
cide—for reasons of equity and in view of the 
responsibility they assume in the international 
community—to promote these economic and 
financial policy changes. 
There are many institutional, economic and 
social factors which combine together to limit 
the growth possibilities of the Latin American 
economies and have much to do with the insta-
bility to which they are prey. The external 
sector bottleneck not only curtails or impedes 
economic growth, but also makes it difficult to 
introduce structural changes and overcome other 
restrictive factors of an internal nature. 
The rigidity of Latin America's external trans-
actions and the lack of dynamism in the export 
sector will nullify the efforts that should be 
made to increase the national saving needed 
to raise production capacity. Without external 
financial co-operation, supplemented by expan-
sion and diversification of exports, it will be 
practically impossible to speed up capital forma-
tion and raise the level of income. The process 
of integration itself, which is the cornerstone of 
Latin American development strategy, will be 
seriously threatened if the blockage in the re-
gion's economic and financial relations with the 
rest of the world is not eliminated. 
2 . THE EXTERNAL SECTOR BOTTLENECK AND THE 
WEAKNESS OF THE ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE 
The increased export earnings of the Latin 
American countries in recent years aroused a 
certain amount of optimism that more favour-
able trends in the export sector might eliminate 
the bottleneck which was holding up economic 
development in those countries. Export earnings, 
which by 1955 had increased at a rate of 
scarcely 1.5 per cent annually and which had 
remained relatively stationary for the non-
petroleum-exporting countries as a whole, began 
to pick up and grew at an annual rate of more 
than 5 per cent from 1960 onwards. 
Other factors which helped to raise the growth 
rate of income in Latin America in the space 
of a few years and to strengthen the more 
favourable outlook for Latin American devel-
opment included certain external financing fa-
cilities, the implementation of regional financial 
co-operation programmes, progress in national 
planning—which led in particular to a better 
allocation of public resources—, a greater will-
ingness to tackle the structural problems relating 
to agrarian reform, the modernization of public 
administration, tax reforms and the groimd 
gained in the integration process. 
The outlook was further strengthened by the 
principles and recommendations adopted at the 
first session of UNCTAD and by the statements, 
objectives and standards formulated in GATT, 
particularly with the initiation of the Kennedy 
Round. In short, there was room to believe 
that a start had been made on preparing a new 
international trade and financing policy which 
would enable the developing countries to em-
bark on a period of more stable and satisfactory 
economic growth. 
Events were, however, to fall far short of 
these hopes. The relative position of Latin 
America as regards production and economic 
development continued to deteriorate, and the 
commitments, principles and recommendations 
designed to build a new structure fof the world 
market and development financing were not 
effectively implemented. 
The annual economic growth rate of Latin 
America as a whole was not even 5 per cent 
and was well below the targets established in 
the regional co-operation programmes. From 
1960 to 1966 the average annual growth rate 
of income was less than 4.5 per cent. Estimates 
indicate that it did not exceed that in 1967 and 
may even have been lower, as a result of the 
marked deterioration in the terms of trade. 
These rates reveal that the development of 
the economy has been very unsatisfactory, the 
more so as population in Latin America has 
an annual growth rate approaching 3 per cent. 
Therefore, there is insufiicient economic growth 
to occupy the labour force productively or to 
improve the levels of living of the population, 
since average per capita income is growing at 
an annual rate of scarcely 1.5 per cent. 
An over-all growth rate of 5 per cent was 
achieved only in two years for the region as a 
whole, and it can be seen that there has been 
a continued weakening of the economic growth 
rate, in line with a long-term trend which has 
been apparent since 1955, although some Latin 
American countries have experienced a more 
favourable development. 
The increase in export earnings in the first 
six years of the nineteen-sixties was not a prod-
uct of changes in the structural conditions 
which have long proved an obstacle to the 
expansion and diversification of Latin American 
exports. It was more the result of a combination 
of circumstances likely to disappear over the 
short term, and this is, in fact, what happened. 
While it is true that the increase in foreign 
exchange earnings was in part due to greater 
demand in the industrialized countries, spurred 
by their extraordinary economic growth, it was 
no less attributable to other kinds of factors, 
such as reduced supply of certain products in 
other producer areas, because of adverse weather 
conditions, trade union conflicts and delays in 
production programmes, which brought about 
a rise in prices and an increase in the volume 
of exports. 
An examination of the destination of Latin 
American exports in the last few years shows 
that exports to other Latin American countries 
and to the socialist area displayed greater dyna-
mism. These exports have a relatively minor 
effect on absolute export earnings, since their 
share of total exports is still small (less than 
20 per cent, even including Cuba's exports). In 
contrast, exports to the industrialized countries 
grew at a slower rate. 
The disappearance of those temporary factors 
and reduced demand in the industrialized coun-
tries, whose rate of economic growth declined 
in 1967, limited Latin America's exports and 
brought about an almost general drop in world 
market prices for staple commodities. This move-
ment, which was already apparent in 1966, 
spread in 1967 to coffee, meat, maize, fish meal, 
wool, copper, tin, lead and zinc, which lost all 
the ground they had gained with the rise in 
prices in 1964 and 1965. Thus, the value of 
exports in 1967 tended to remain stationary or 
to decline in several countries, and for Latin 
America as a whole it is unlikely that export 
earnings in dollars will top the figure of 10,700 
million reached in 1966. 
This deterioration in the terms of trade is 
extremely serious at the present stage of eco-
nomic development in Latin America. Import 
substitution is tending to reach its limits, the 
export structure is extremely inflexible, imports 
have for many years been held down, and the 
resultant tensions in the balance of payments 
are accentuated by the heavy burden of servicing 
investment and the external debt. Between 1960 
and 1966 financial services—for amortization, 
profits and interest on investment and external 
loans—increased far more than export earnings. 
While the latter increased by 35 per cent, remit-
tances of profits and interest rose 67 per cent 
and amortization payments on autonomous loans 
by 41 per cent. In short, these financial services 
in 1966 absorbed a third of the total value of 
income from exports of goods. 
For this reason, imports have been unable to 
grow at the same pace as export earnings. The 
countries were obliged to meet the service pay-
ments on the accumulated debt and to replenish 
to some extent the monetary reserves, which had 
fallen to a dangerously low level. In these cir-
cumstances, any reduction imposed on imports 
would inevitably lead to a shortage of essential 
supplies, thus affecting the levels of economic 
activity and capital formation. 
Moreover, past experience has shown that a 
deterioration in the terms of trade cancels out 
the possible effects of foreign capital and financ-
ing on investment and production, and worsens 
the balance-of-payments situation, because in 
addition to the increase in financial services 
the developing countries are making a free and 
direct transfer of resources to the economically 
more advanced countries as a result of the de-
terioration in export prices. 
3 . PROSPECTS FOR LATIN AMERICA'S EXPORTS 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
What has been said of the external-sector bot-
tleneck implies that the future development of 
trade and external financing in relation to the 
economic growth of Latin America will en-
counter serious diificulties, and in the end will 
prove definitely unsatisfactory, unless there is 
a change in the existing situation as regards 
both trade and international economic and finan-
cial policy. This view is corroborated by the 
technical studies on long-term projections car-
ried out in recent years, in particular since the 
first session of UNCTAD. Moreover, Latin 
America's experience since 1955 has once again 
testified to the external sector's vital importance 
for the development process, and to the neces-
sity of rapidly stepping up export earnings and 
available external financing so that the growth 
rate can be increased in consonance with the 
expansion of production capacity. 
Latin America's economic growth rate should 
average over 6 per cent, to enable the region to 
absorb its labour force, improve levels of living 
—especially in the lower income groups—, 
facilitate the implementation of structural re-
forms and launch far-reaching programmes for 
the education and training of human resources. 
If this development process is to be conducted 
with a reasonable degree of efficiency, and if 
income trends are really to improve sufficiently 
for the above-mentioned target to be attained, 
imports should expand at much the same rate 
as income to permit the satisfaction of require-
ments in respect of essential goods, in particular 
the capital goods needed for increased invest-
ment in the expansion of production capacity. 
This does not mean that the import substitution 
process should not continue. 
The projections with respect to the evolution 
of exports in existing conditions show that it 
is impossible for the target growth rate to be 
attained, because of the considerable potential 
deficit deriving from the gap between projected 
exports and import requirements and from the 
scale of returns and interest on the foreign 
investment and loans that would be needed. 
The outlook is similar, although the deficit is 
smaller, when the technical study postulates 
more modest development objectives (for exam-
ple, an annual growth rate of a little over 
5 per cent). 
From the short-term standpoint, the follow-
ing highly significant facts bear out this some-
what gloomy view of external-sector develop-
ment prospects in the Latin American region: 
(a) The basic principles and recommenda-
tions adopted at the first session of UNCTAD, 
with the aim of establishing a new organizational 
pattern of international trade and promoting 
the financial co-operation required by the de-
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veloping countries, were related to the need to 
refrain from setting up new barriers against 
primary commodities produced by the develop-
ing countries, to eliminate or reduce internal 
and external taxes and restrictions which hamper 
trade in such products and in semi-manufactures 
and manufactures, to concert agreements or ar-
rangements of other kinds designed to ensure the 
expansion of exports and to guarantee remunera-
tive and stable prices, to adopt the shipping meas-
ures proposed and to pursue the objectives estab-
lished with respect to the availability of external 
financing and to policy in this field. They have 
hardly been reflected at all in specific decisions, 
however, and the quantitative objectives postu-
lated on that occasion are still a long way off. It 
may even be asserted that in many important 
respects the over-all situation has deteriorated 
as far as the Latin American countries are 
concerned; 
(b) The results of the Kennedy Round have 
fallen short of expectations aroused, especially 
in the light of the objectives and principles 
originally established with a view to solving 
the problems of the developing coimtries. Ad-
mittedly, tariff concessions or reductions were 
negotiated for some of the products of the 
developing countries, but nothing was done to 
remove the basic obstacles that prevent these 
products from gaining access to the developed 
countries' markets on satisfactory terms. What is 
more, the concessions will lead to the expansion 
of trade among the developed countries and will 
undermine the position of the countries at less 
advanced stages of development, although in-
directly they may also afford incentives to de-
mand for certain Latin American export items; 
(c) It is all too well-known that the weak-
ness of commodity prices adversely affects the 
terms of trade, and ultimately aggravates the 
sluggishness and instability of the rate of econo-
mic development in the Latin American coun-
tries; 
{d) Restrictive measures are being adopted 
in the industrialized countries that will be re-
flected—as has already been the case in 1967— 
in a contraction of demand or a fall in prices 
for imports of the developing countries' prod-
ucts; 
(e) The discriminatory policy of protection 
and expansion which the industrialized coun-
tries are pursuing with regard to primary prod-
ucts which constitute some of Latin America's 
traditional exports is even carried so far as to 
include the granting of export subsidies, with 
obviously damaging effects on sales and prices 
of Latin American products. It is likely to be 
strengthened, and more widely applied, if other 
industrialized countries join the communities 
or areas concerned; 
( / ) There is a danger that the geographical 
area of application of the system of special 
preferences may be broadened and that new 
products may be incorporated, to the detriment 
of the Latin American countries' export trade; 
ig) Proposals are again being mooted in the 
United States for the imposition of restrictions 
on important Latin American export items, a 
proceeding which might seriously jeopardize the 
favourable intentions expressed by the United 
States Government—^particularly in the Declara-
tion of the Presidents of America—with respect 
to co-ordinating efiforts and supporting solutions 
in favour of the less advanced countries in sub-
stantive aspects of economic and financial 
policy; 
(h) Competition from substitutes and synthe-
tics continues to affect exports of natural 
products; 
(i) Certain financial provisions which—for 
balance-of-payments reasons or on account of 
monetary policy patterns—are being applied in 
the industrialized countries are tending to re-
strict financial co-operation, reduce the volume 
of aid and raise the costs of financial assistance 
through higher rates of interest and through 
tied loans. 
To sum up, as regards the expansion of trade 
and external financing facilities, the objectives 
proposed by the developing countries at the first 
session of UNCTAD, which on that occasion 
began to be translated into terms of resolu-
tions, commitments or recommendations, are 
still, in essence, targets on the horizon, despite 
the time that has elapsed and the commitments 
assumed by the developed countries. The ex-
perience acquired since then shows how justifi-
able were those proposals and how pressing 
is the need for radical changes in the field of in-
ternational trade and financing, in order to open 
up possibilities for the expansion of the econo-
mically less developed countries' production and 
trade. 
4 . SCOPE AND MAIN AGENDA ITEMS OF THE 
NEW DELHI CONFERENCE 
It has already been pointed out that the New 
Delhi Conference will afford an exceptional 
opportunity of translating into terms of specific 
decisions the commitments, principles and 
recommendations agreed upon at the first session 
of UNCTAD and in other international forums, 
or of concerting specific action programmes and 
practical procedures through which the various 
commitments assumed may find immediate ex-
pression in government decisions. 
Obviously, at the forthcoming session of 
UNCTAD it will not be possible to embark 
upon detailed negotiations with respect to every 
single one of the agenda items. But at least 
approval may be secured for guiding principles 
on which such negotiations can be based, and 
for appropriate suggestions as to the technical 
studies that should be carried out, the meetings 
of experts that should be convened, and the 
terms of reference and deadlines that should be 
complied with in the various stages of the work 
up to the application of final decisions. 
A very sensible proposal in this connexion 
seems to be that of identifying the essential 
questions of interest to the developing countries 
on which basic studies are available or which 
have been sufficiently clarified. In respect of 
these, negotiations could be undertaken without 
further delay, or specific bases for that purpose 
discussed. 
Some of the principal items on the agenda 
for New Delhi which are ripe for negotiation 
or discussion with a view to arriving at prac-
tical decisions are summarized below. 
(a) Commodity trade 
Where commodity trade is concerned, the con-
sensus of opinion is that the developing coun-
tries will be able to expand their exports at a 
satisfactory rate only in so far as the developed 
countries adopt policies designed to improve 
conditions of access to their markets. With all 
due regard to the cases in which the sluggish-
ness of export growth rates is imputable to 
limitations on the supply side, it is generally 
concluded that the development of Latin 
America's exports is chiefly determined by the 
fluctuations of external demand, and that the 
demand in question might increase more rapidly 
if better conditions of access to markets were 
established. A sine qua non for the attainment 
of this objective is the adoption, at the forth-
coming session of UNCTAD, of specific deci-
sions and measures such as the following: 
(i) Setting of ceilings on self-sufficiency in 
the developed countries, in order to guarantee 
the developing countries' exports a specified 
minimum share in total supplies for the de-
veloped countries. The maintenance of this mini-
mum share would entail an undertaking on the 
part of the developed countries to refrain from 
encouraging anti-economic production, through 
measures to protect agriculture, in activities 
competing with the export lines of developing 
countries; 
(ii) Reduction and elimination of customs 
duties, internal rates and taxes and non-tariiF 
restrictions applied to imports of commodities 
produced solely or mainly by the developing 
countries. An indispensable requisite for the 
general liberalization of conditions of access 
for items produced only by the developing 
countries is that appropriate procedures be de-
vised for the gradual elimination of the discrimi-
natory preferences granted by some of the 
developed countries in favour of certain develop-
ing countries. By this means the developing 
countries could attain a higher degree of solida-
rity and community of interests; 
(iii) Adoption of measures which will help 
to improve the competitive position of certain 
natural products in whose case world consump-
tion has been declining as a result of competi-
tion from substitutes or synthetics. This could 
be done through programmes at the interna-
tional level covering the improvement of pro-
ductivity, research on new uses of natural 
products and, in general, promotion of con-
sumption of the commodities concerned. The 
same end would be served by any measures 
that the developed countries might adopt to 
discourage over-protection of the production of 
synthetic substitutes. 
It is unanimously agreed that in dealing 
with world commodity trade problems the 
product-by-product approach should be adopted, 
not only in relation to the liberalization of 
conditions of access, but also for the purposes 
of establishing prices that will be remunerative 
for the developing exporter countries and will 
help to increase their export earnings. In this 
sense, agreements and other international ar-
rangements respecting commodities constitute 
a technique for the orderly regulation of mar-
kets which can be turned to useful account in 
the case of various products of importance to 
the developing countries, especially in so far as 
their terms cover not only the traditional export 
regulation machinery and multilateral sale-and-
purchase commitments, but also other proce-
dures, such as the operation of buffer stocks and 
the financing of programmes to promote diversi-
fication of production and exports. 
Little progress has been made in the negotia-
tion of international commodity agreements 
since the first session of UNCTAD, despite the 
participants' unanimous recognition of the op-
portunities they afford for overcoming some of 
the most serious obstacles to the expansion of 
the developing countries' trade. For that very 
reason it is to be hoped that substantive deci-
sions may be adopted at the New Delhi Con-
ference which will help to create an atmosphere 
of closer co-operation between developed and 
developing countries, in respect of negotiations 
of this kind. 
(b) Manufactures and semi-manufactures 
One of the most urgent of the objectives pro-
posed for the second session of UNCTAD is the 
establishment by the developed countries of a 
system of general preferences in favour of manu-
factures and semi-manufactures exported by the 
developing countries. The suggestions formu-
lated in the present document on principles 
that should be agreed upon at the second session 
of UNCTAD as a basis for this system, which 
are much the same as those propounded in the 
Charters of Tequendama and of Algiers, are as 
follows: the preferences should be general, non-
discriminatory and without reciprocity; they 
should take the form of free access to markets 
through the complete elimination of import 
duties and non-tariff restrictions, although 
quotas might be established for certain "critical" 
or "sensitive" products; with a very few ex-
ceptions, they should cover all manufactures 
and semi-manufactures produced in developing 
countries, without restrictions on volume or 
value. Another measure envisaged is the estab-
lishment of permanent machinery for the super-
vision and evaluation of the system, for consulta-
tion purposes and for the identification of such 
problems as might arise. At the close of a mini-
mum initial period, the system would be 
reviewed so that any necessary measures or 
amendments could be adopted. 
Lists of exceptions would have to be prepared 
subject to consultation and negotiation with the 
developing countries, not established unilater-
ally. Should it prove impossible to avoid the 
inclusion of products of particular interest to 
the developing countries in the lists of excep-
tions, reductions of duties or free quotas should 
be obtained for the products concerned. 
It should be stressed that escape clauses 
should in no case be freely interpreted and 
unilaterally applied by the developed countries. 
Recourse to them should be subject to a multi-
lateral consultation procedure designed to ascer-
tain whether their application is really justified. 
It would also be essential for the developed 
countries to undertake to adopt internal meas-
ures which would facilitate any adjustments 
that might be rendered necessary by competition 
from similar lines of production in developing 
countries. The duration of the preferential sys-
tem would have to be long enough to ensure that 
its aims were fulfilled and that all the develop-
ing countries were able to benefit by it. 
Besides determining the bases for such a 
preferential system, the New Delhi Conference 
would have to issue a pronouncement on the 
date of its entry into force. It might be brought 
into operation on 1 January 1969, even if every 
detail of the machinery had not yet been ap-
proved. 
(c) Development financing and monetary 
problems 
The question of development financing has 
four basic and interdependent aspects: 
(i) The problem of the institutional organi-
zation and the co-ordination of financial policy 
measures is not easy to tackle as a whole, in 
default of prior studies. However, some head-
way can and must be made forthwith in respect 
of certain specific questions that should be 
discussed at the New Delhi Conference. These 
include the current proposals for turning the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (IBRD) into a specialized develop-
ment bank for the under-developed countries; 
for strengthening regional financial institutions; 
for providing the International Development 
Association (IDA) with additional resources; 
for liberalizing the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) system of compensatory financ-
ing; and for introducing a supplementary fi-
nancing scheme. A good deal of progress has 
been made in the study of the technical and 
practical aspects of this last measure. Specific 
recommendations on all these proposals, particu-
larly the last two, are contained in the Charters 
of Tequendama and of Algiers; 
(ii) It is urgently necessary for the New 
Delhi Conference to undertake positive com-
mitments with respect to the policy and ma-
chinery required to expand the net inflow of 
resources into the developing countries and en-
sure that it represents the target proportion of 
the gross product of the industrialized countries 
(1 per cent). A substantial increase in the rela-
tive contribution of public funds and grants-in-
aid is an outstanding need in this connexion. 
Changes in IBRD's policy are also indispensable. 
Its funds should be diverted towards the devel-
oping countries, and to that end the developed 
countries should pay off their debit balances 
on IBRD loans before maturity. This would be 
one way of increasing IBRD's available re-
sources and supplying IDA with additional 
funds, although it would not preclude the 
provision of extra resources for IDA by 
developed countries members of IBRD; 
(iii) In connexion with the general terms and 
patterns of external financing, attention should 
be drawn to three sets of proposals: those spe-
cifically formulated in the Charter of Algiers 
to the effect that all development loans should 
be extended on the terms currently applied by 
IDA; those relating to the establishment of a 
multilateral interest equalization fund; and those 
concerning a study of the restrictive practices 
and high costs characterizing suppliers' credits 
and tied loans; 
(iv) In the framework of this reorganization 
of development financing, everything possible 
should be done to consolidate or re-schedule 
the accumulated debts of developing countries. 
Lastly, in connexion with the decisions taken 
at the most recent IMF meeting on the estab-
lishment of new special drawing rights, recom-
mendations or decisions should be adopted at 
the second session of UNCTAD to enable the 
developing countries to use those rights in a 
proportion exceeding that corresponding to 
their quotas. If the regulations were uniformly 
applied, the additional sums available to the 
developing countries would be very small. 
(d) Shipping 
At the most recent meetings of the Trade and 
Development Board, and at the second session 
of the Committee on Shipping, it was advocated 
that in this field too attention should be focused 
at the second session of UNCTAD on those 
questions which lent themselvés to the adoption 
of specific measures. Cases in point would seem 
to be the establishment of consultation ma-
chinery and the expansion of the developing 
countries' merchant marines. 
The proposals on shipping formulated by the 
developing countries at the first session of 
UNCTAD were almost identical with the con-
clusions and recommendations incorporated in 
the Charters of Tequendama and of Algiers. 
The inference is that the problems put forward 
four years ago are still unsolved. 
The lack of long and complex studies should 
be no bar to the adoption of certain significant 
decisions on this occasion, in relation, for 
example, to freight rates and shipping confer-
ence practices. In this context, the present docu-
ment contains the following suggestions, which 
are also included in the Charter of Tequendama: 
(i) the application of incentive freight rates 
to facilitate exports, especially of manufactured 
goods; (ii) the elimination of the so-called gen-
eral cargo rates and similar types of tariffs; (iii) 
the abolition of certain shipping conference 
practices, such as the "closed" nature of many 
conferences, the fact that they are not effectively 
represented in a number of major ports in the 
developing countries, and the insufiicient pub-
licity given to shipping rates and other condi-
tions of carriage. 
Renewed emphasis should be laid on the right 
of developing countries to establish and expand 
merchant marines of their own. To this end, 
measures will need to be adopted to facilitate 
the provision of financing and technical assist-
ance. Similarly, efforts must be made to secure 
acceptance of the principle that a substantial 
proportion of cargo should be reserved for car-
riage under the national flags of the developing 
countries, without measures of reprisal on the 
developed countries' part. 
Among the other recommendations discussed 
in the present report and contained in the Char-
ters of Tequendama and of Algiers, mention 
may be made of those relating to the establish-
ment of a system for consultation between ship-
ping conferences and shippers' councils. The 
resolution adopted on this point at the second 
session of the Committee on Shipping represents 
an important step forward, but it is essential 
that agreement be reached on a programme of 
action to ensure that the terms of the resolution 
are implemented all over the world. 
(e) Trade expansion and economic integration 
among developing countries 
There is widespread agreement in Latin Amer-
ica on the vital importance of integration in ac-
celerating the region's development. Despite the 
difficulties facing economic integration because 
of the conditions peculiar to the Latin American 
countries, the results have been very encourag-
ing, particularly in Central America. Recently, 
efforts have been made to extend and accelerate 
the integration process, as is clear from the 
practical steps being taken by the group of 
Andean countries and in the Caribbean area. 
Furthermore, the Declaration of the Presidents 
of America contains provisions and very precise 
objectives, which constitute a veritable far-reach-
ing action programme for the gradual establish-
ment of a common market for the whole Latin 
American region. 
The Charter of Tequendama puts forward 
several proposals on the expansion of trade with 
other developing countries, which should be the 
subject of consideration at New Delhi. Particu-
larly noteworthy are those relating to the non-
extension to the developed countries of the spe-
cial advantages negotiated by the developing 
countries; the need for those developed coun-
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tries which grant tied loans to agree to the use 
of such credits for purchases in other develop-
ing countries, especially in the same region; and 
the renunciation by the developed countries of 
trade preferences which discriminate against 
other developing countries, or at least the uni-
lateral extension of such preferences to all de-
veloping countries. 
In the Charter of Algiers, it is suggested that 
at the second session of UNCTAD a special 
working group should be set up to study various 
questions relating to trade expansion and eco-
nomic integration among developing countries, 
and that a decision should be taken regarding 
the establishment of a permanent committee for 
dealing with such questions. 
( f ) Special measures in favour of the relatively 
less developed countries 
The international community has accepted the 
principle that measures to improve external sec-
tor conditions in the developing countries should 
include special treatment for the economically 
relatively less developed of those countries. This 
principle has also been accepted by the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and 
is included in the Declaration of the Presidents 
of America as a basic principle of Latin Amer-
ican integration. 
The practical application of this principle at 
the international level raises a number of difficul-
ties that require careful consideration. For ex-
ample, criteria must be established for determin-
ing which are the relatively less developed coun-
tries and what type of measures would constitute 
more favourable treatment in matters of trade, 
financing and technical co-operation. 
With regard to the second point, a number 
of proposals are set forth in the Charter of Al-
giers on commodity trade, manufactures and 
semi-manufactures, and on technical and finan-
cial assistance. The Charter also lists several 
spheres of action in which policy measures in 
favour of these countries should converge, and 
records the decision to establish a working group 
to formulate recommendations for submission to 
the second session of UNCTAD. 
(g) Trade with the socialist countries 
Latin American exports to the socialist coun-
tries have expanded considerably in recent years, 
particularly in the period 1964-66, although in 
absolute terms the quantities involved are still 
relatively small, except in the case of Cuba. 
Generally speaking, this trade is based on short-
and medium-term bilateral agreements, with in-
dicator lists of products and a bilateral payments 
mechanism under which balances can only be 
spent in the debtor country. However, there 
have been, in addition, a number of convertible-
currency transactions, mostly in trade with main-
land China and Czechoslovakia and exports of 
cereals from Argentina to the Soviet Union. 
In the most recent period, the Soviet Union 
has signed trade agreements with two Latin 
American countries (Brazil and Chile), provid-
ing credit over a longer term and allowing the 
beneficiary countries to repay 25 and 30 per 
cent of their respective loans in the form of ex-
ports of manufactures. These agreements provide 
for the use of convertible currency in reciprocal 
accounts, and the transfer of trade balances to 
third countries, subject to the agreement of the 
contracting parties. 
There is considerable potential for the growth 
of trade between the Latin American and so-
cialist countries. The Charter of Tequendama 
reaffirmed the interest of the Latin American 
countries in promoting greater mutual trade and 
listed some of the principles and bases for at-
taining that objective. Among the measures pro-
posed in the Charter, particular importance is 
attached to the inclusion in the purchasing plans 
of the socialist countries of increasing volumes 
of products from developing countries; the 
adoption of measures to reduce excessive mar-
gins between the import prices and domestic 
selling prices of those products; greater flexi-
bility in reciprocal payments agreements, both 
within and outside the socialist area; an in-
crease in the proportion of trade paid for in 
convertible currency; and the granting of trade 
preferences roughly equivalent to the free access 
conditions which the developing countries are 
requesting from the market-economy countries. 
I I . T H E M A I N L I N E S O F I N T E R N A T I O N A L T R A D E P O L I C Y 
A . THE POLICIES OF THE MAJOR CENTRES IN THEIR TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICA 
1. TRADE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITY 
During the past three years the European 
Economic Community (EEC) has achieved con-
siderable progress in the preparation and im-
plementation of its trade and agricultural policy. 
There are strong reasons for concluding that 
there is a link between these institutional achieve-
ments and the growing difficulties that the Latin 
American countries are experiencing in their 
efforts to increase their trade with that region. 
As the EEC countries constitute the second 
largest purchasing centre for Latin American 
products, second only to the United States, the 
Latin American Governments have understand-
ably been very concerned about this situation 
and have tried, thus far unsuccessfully, to ob-
tain certain guarantees for their exports.^ 
The Latin American countries are especially 
concerned about prospects for exports of the 
temperate zone, meats and cereals in particular, 
since these products compete directly with ouput 
of the Community and therefore are subject 
to a very protectionist régime. 
At the end of 1967 almost half of the Com-
munity's agricultural production (in terms of 
value) was subject to the common market régime, 
which means free circulation of products, ap-
plication of Community prices and the inter-
vention of the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) in questions of 
export subsidies and regulation of internal 
markets. The products which have become sub-
ject to this régime are cereals, pork, rice and 
oilseeds. On 1 July 1967 the single market for 
cereals (wheat, corn and barley) came into effect 
on the basis of common prices previously agreed 
upon and adjustable customs duties for third 
country imports. 
The single market for beef is expected to go 
into effect on 1 April 1968, but the common price 
system and variable levies have been in effect 
since 1964. Since that year meat of Latin Amer-
ican origin has been subject to a duty equal 
to the difference between its c.i.f. value and the 
guide prices of the importing member country,® 
and this cancels out its price advantage. There 
is no doubt that this arrangement has had a 
negative effect on the volume of exports of 
Latin American meat to the EEC market com-
pared with the previous period. If it were not 
for the fact that the Community does not pro-
duce enough meat, particularly beef,^ there 
would have been even more unfavourable reper-
2 The EEC/Latin American liaison group which has 
been holding informative meetings in Brussels since 
mid-1964 presented a memorandum to the European 
Economic Commission on 4 February 1966 which sum-
marized the joint conclusions of the seven working 
groups among which the liaison group distributed its 
work. 
3 Before a single community price is adopted in 1968 
each country will fix national guide prices within cer-
tain limits determined by the Council of Ministers. 
4 Total EEC production of beef and veal provides 
for 85 per cent of total consumption of the region and 
the only country that produces more than it consumes 
is the Netherlands. 
cussions for foreign producers. However, the 
policy of increasing Community supply by de-
veloping livestock production and progressively 
eliminating foreign competition is a threat to 
Latin America's meat export prospects. 
An important element of this common agri-
cultural policy is the establishment of common 
prices by the Council of Ministers which will 
greatly influence the relative share of foreign 
producers in the total supply of EEC. It is, there-
fore, of interest to consider the decisions taken 
by the Council of Ministers in November 1967 
on prices that will go into effect with the 1968 
harvests. 
In general, the prices adopted are higher than 
those of the preceding crop-years, with the ex-
ception of wheat prices, in which there was no 
change; maize showed an increase of 4.75 per 
cent, rice and barley 4 per cent, and beef 2.8 
per cent. Although the EEC Commission had 
actually proposed larger increases (10 per cent 
in the case of maize, which is in short supply 
in the Community, and 5.5 per cent for meat) 
the decisions adopted clearly reflect a trend to-
wards increasing the prices of the Community's 
main agricultural products,, which is likely to 
continue in the next few years. ' 
This policy constitutes an obstacle to the ex-
pansion of agricultural imports by the Com-
munity: in the first place, by guaranteeing high 
prices it stimulates internal production and may 
even make the member countries self-sufiicient; 
and, in the second place, it raises higher tariff 
walls against foreign products, since each price 
increase is translated into a corresponding ex-
pansion of the variable levy to be paid on these 
products at the Community's frontiers. 
The common agricultural price policy is in-
tended to improve the position of a socio-eco-
nomic group whose income is still lower than 
that of other sectors of the population, and to 
develop certain branches of agriculture in which 
production is deficient, by taking advantage of 
the potential resources of some member coun-
tries. Other countries, particularly those of 
Latin America, cannot but recognize the political 
and economic importance of these considera-
tions, even though they may sometimes lead to 
the protection of inefficient agricultural sectors. 
The establishment of quite legitimate goals 
cannot be allowed, however, to lead to the pro-
gressive closing of the EEC market to some of 
the exports of the developing countries, es-
pecially those of Latin America. In order to 
prevent this, the Governments of the Community 
should reserve a share of their total market for 
the main export products of the developing 
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countries. This might be achieved through es-
tablishing duty-free import quotas and placing 
ceilings on the Community's self-sufficiency in 
certain products. This would make it possible to 
reserve a share, not only of the Community's 
present market, in absolute terms, but also of 
its future growth for the developing countries. 
In their present form, the Community's reg-
ulations relating to agriculture not only make 
EEC increasingly self-sufficient in a nimiber of 
products of special interest for Latin America,® 
but also stimulate, through the European Agri-
cultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, competi-
tion between the Community's agricultural pro-
ducts and those of other regions, particularly 
Latin America. One of the special functions of 
the Fund is to finance exports of EEC's agricul-
tural surpluses, paying producers the difference 
between the internal market price and the world 
price, which is frequently lower. Since a high 
proportion—about 50 per cent—of the Fund's 
resources comes from variable levies on imports 
of agricultural products from other countries, 
the latter are placed in the position of helping to 
finance exports of the Community which in some 
cases are in direct competition with their own 
products on markets in third countries. The 
lower the price of the foreign product imported 
into EEC (i.e., the more efficiently it is pro-
duced), the higher the variable levy and the 
corresponding payment to the Fund will be, and 
the Fund will be able to intervene all the more, 
not only in financing the Community's agricul-
tural exports but also to support internal prices, 
this being another of its important functions. 
There is reason to question the soundness of an 
arrangement that shifts part of the cost of 
certain structural defects of the agricultural 
sector in a group of developed countries on to 
the shoulders of developing countries. 
The EEC Commission has reacted to the con-
cern of the Latin American countries over 
prospects for their sales of temperate zone pro-
ducts to the Community by stating that, as a 
rule, the implementation of the common agri-
cultural policy should not damage these pros-
pects, since it has to do with products that are 
in short supply in the Community (cereals, fod-
der, hard wheat, oil-seeds, vegetable oils, wool, 
cotton, leather and beef). During the Kennedy 
Round, the EEC Commission had suggested a 
pact to Argentina containing the bases for a 
general agreement on frozen beef. The proposal 
5 There is already a high degree of self-sufficiency in 
certain products; i.e., beef, 85 per cent; wheat, 110 per 
cent (France, 146 per cent); other cereals, 66 per cent 
(France, 130 per cent) ; sugar, 97 per cent (France, 
136 per cent). 
was accepted by Argentina, and the agreement 
was signed on 14 May 1967. However, in spite 
of the fact that this country gave all the neces-
sary guarantees to avoid disruptions of the Com-
munity market, the following month the Council 
of Ministers introduced unacceptable changes 
which completely distorted the basis of the agree-
ment and prevented its final acceptance. 
Another aspect of the Community's policy to 
which the Latin American countries, have ob-
jected is related to their exports of tropical pro-
ducts and the granting of discriminatory prefer-
ences to a growing number of countries. Latin 
American concern is focused mainly on three 
products, coffee, cocoa and bananas, and on the 
problems likely to arise in connexion with these 
products as a result of the preferential treatment 
granted by the Community to other developing 
countries. Moreover, some Latin American pro-
ducers have had to lower their export prices in 
order to meet the growing competition from the 
tropical products of the Associated States of 
EEC, with the result that the discriminatory 
system also interferes with the world stabiliza-
tion of primary commodity markets, an objective 
advocated by EEC itself. 
While continuing to insist on the elimination 
of tariff and non-tariff barriers and of prefer-
ences, the Latin American countries proposed to 
the Community that an attempt should be made 
to arrive at understandings on specific products 
through agreements which would enable them 
to preserve their traditional share of the Com-
munity's market. In reply, the EEC Commission 
stated in a report addressed to the Council of 
Ministers in December 1966 that discriminatory 
preferences in favour of the African Associated 
States of EEC had not thus far prejudiced 
Latin American exports of the same products. 
It was pointed out that Latin American exports 
of coffee had continued to increase whereas those 
of the African countries had diminished; the 
favourable development of banana shipments 
continued to enjoy a duty-free quota in the 
German market; and the smaller share of the 
cocoa market was due to problems of quality, 
particularly in the case of Brazilian cocoa. 
So far as preferences were concerned, the re-
port indicated only that this was a very delicate 
problem which had to be solved at the political 
level; whereas the Latin American countries 
sought their abolition, on the basis of UNCTAD 
recommendations, the developing countries fa-
voured by such preferences were disposed to 
renounce them only if they could obtain prior 
compensation in the form of equivalent ad-
vantages at the international level. Nevertheless 
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the EEC Commission appears to be prepared 
to examine this problem, first in UNCTAD and 
later in the framework of future relations with 
the African Associated States (revision of the 
Yaounde Convention in 1968/69). 
The concern of the Latin American countries 
appears even more justified now that the Com-
munity is showing a tendency to extend the 
geographical area of its preferences. Thus the 
Lagos agreement, signed on 16 July 1966, es-
tablished an associate relationship with the Re-
public of Nigeria, extending the influence of 
the Community to a country that has not been 
linked traditionally to the economic and political 
complex of continental Europe. Except for cocoa 
and certain oil-seeds, subject to duty-free quotas 
which increase by 3 per cent per year, Nigerian 
products enter the Community duty-free and, in 
compensation, Nigeria grants tariff preferences 
to certain EEC manufactures. The Community 
has been discussing possible association with 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, but this has not 
yet come about since these countries have re-
fused to grant preferential treatment to Com-
munity products. Other negotiations have been 
carried on with the Maghreb countries (Algeria, 
Tunisia and Morocco) with the main objec-
tive, here also, of obtaining favourable treat-
ment for the products of this region. This policy 
suggests that, over the short or medium term, 
this type of special relationship between the 
Community and Africa will probably be pro-
gressively extended, to the detriment of the posi-
tion of the other developing regions in the EEC 
market. At its second session, UNCTAD will 
have to take decisions to prevent the progressive 
division of the world into economic blocs, 
which would not be in the interests of the de-
veloping countries. 
In a memorandum of 4 February 1966 the 
Latin American delegations in Brussels presented 
a list of 102 manufactured and semi-manufact-
ured products for which the countries of the 
region were interested in obtaining reductions 
in customs duties, the lifting of restrictions, or 
special treatment through customs quotas, or 
the establishment of tariff sub-items. So far the 
EEC Commission has not shown any willingness 
to heed the Latin American claims. The tariff 
concessions granted by EEC during the Ken-
nedy Round relate to only a small number of 
these products and do not include any prefer-
ences for Latin America. The Community in-
dicated that it did not wish to commit itself 
with respect to products for which Latin Amer-
ica was not its main supplier, but it was more 
receptive concerning certain processed agricul-
tural products of which the Latin American 
countries are the main suppliers.® In general, all 
the proposals regarding manufactured products 
contained in the memorandum of 4 February 
1966 are still valid. 
2. THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES IN ITS 
TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICA 
It has already been pointed out that there has 
been quite a sharp contraction, in relative terms, 
in the United States market for Latin American 
exports, particularly for certain types of pro-
ducts, a development which is a matter of con-
cern to the Governments of those countries, as 
is the fact that their exports to a country which 
is still their principal customer are not growing 
fast enough. 
In seeking an explanation of this contraction, 
the most recent changes in United States trade 
policy must be considered, although other fac-
tors, such as the competition of products from 
other regions of the world, may have contributed 
to it. 
Of particular significance is the fact that the 
United States was one of the signatories of the 
Declaration of the Presidents of America, which 
recognizes the adverse conditions existing for 
Latin America's foreign trade and the need to 
correct them through both individual and joint 
efforts on the part of the members of the Or-
ganization of American States (OAS). 
In chapter III of this Declaration it is agreed 
that measures to improve the condition of the 
Latin American export trade are required. These 
include co-ordination in multilateral negotiations 
to achieve the greatest possible reduction or the 
elimination of tariffs and other restrictions that 
impede the access of the Latin American coun-
tries to world markets (to this end, the Govern-
ment of the United States intends to make efforts 
in accordance with the provisions of article 37 
(a) of the Buenos Aires Protocol'^), and of en-
suring fulfilment of international commitments 
with respect to the maintenance of the status quo. 
®Fish meal, castor oil, meat extract and meat meal, 
for which either reductions of tariff duties or elimina-
tion of quantitative restrictions might be forthcoming. 
^ The provision referred to establishes that the Mem-
ber States of the OAS should make individual and 
united efforts with the aim of achieving the "reduction 
or elimination, by importing countries, of tariff and non-
tariff barriers that affect the exports of the Members 
of the Organization, except when such barriers are ap-
plied in order to diversify the economic structure, to 
speed up the development of the less-developed Member 
States or to intensify their process of economic integra-
tion, or when they are related to national security or to 
the needs for economic balance". 
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It likewise establishes the commitment to give 
joint consideration to possible systems of general 
non-reciprocal preferential treatment for the ex-
ports of manufactures and semi-manufactures of 
the developing countries, with a view to improv-
ing the conditions of Latin America's export 
trade. This implies an appreciable change in the 
previous opposition of the United States Govern-
ment to the establishment of such a preferential 
system. 
With the exception of the provision just re-
ferred to, the measures laid down in chapter 
III of the Declaration of the Presidents do not 
signify a conceptual advance but merely reaffirm 
aims that had already been established in various 
recommendations adopted at the first session of 
UNCTAD, and in commitments assumed by the 
developed countries in the framework of GATT. 
The measures included in chapter III were un-
doubtedly selected because they seemed to be 
the ones that best lent themselves to joint con-
sideration and decision at the highest policy 
level and offered the greatest possibility of im-
plementation. 
The first step in initiating the joint action 
referred to in chapter III of the Declaration 
would be to define the meaning and scope of the 
commitments undertaken and to identify specific 
areas or points where they would lend them-
selves best to immediate- or short-term action. 
Moreover, it would be necessary to consider what 
institutional machinery would be suitable for 
effectively implementing those measures and for 
carrying out the task, individually or jointly. 
For this purpose a distinction should be made 
between the machinery required for applying 
measures within the inter-American system and 
the machinery for joint or co-ordinated action 
by the Latin American countries and the United 
States vis-a-vis third countries or groups of 
countries or in international organizations, in 
defence of Latin America's foreign trade in-
terests. 
In other words, it appears to be essential that, 
in accordance with the letter and the spirit of 
the Declaration, the United States should set 
an example and point the way to the rest of 
the developed countries by taking the steps that 
they would be required to take to carry out 
such joint action. 
Statements by various high-level oflEcials in-
dicate that the United States Executive is in-
tending to continue along the path of tariff 
liberalization started at the Geneva negotiations, 
despite the repercussions that such a policy may 
have on national economic structures. According 
to these statements, the United States economy 
should abandon its previous tendency to adopt 
protectionist measures despite the market disrup-
tions that would result from increased imports 
of certain products, and should apply a policy 
of adapting to foreign competition. This attitude 
is of great significance, since it means that in 
United States official circles it is admitted that 
the possible repercussions of trade liberalization 
measures should not constitute an obstacle to 
their adoption. Interest has likewise been shown 
by the Senate in improving and broadening the 
provisions of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act 
in order to provide Federal aid to American 
firms affected by the tariff concessions to other 
countries. 
The scope of the proposed amendments to the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962,® however, ex-
tends far beyond the objective of facilitating the 
adoption of adjustment assistance measures on 
8 Title III of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 estab-
lishes that, upon the filing of a petition by any firm or 
group of workers, the Tariff Commission shall make an 
investigation to determine whether "as a result in major 
part of concessions granted under trade agreements, an 
article is being imported into the United States in such 
increased quantities as to cause, or threaten to cause, 
serious injury to the domestic industry producing an 
article which is like or directly competitive with the 
imported article". In carrying out this investigation, the 
Tariff Commission "shall take into account all economic 
factors which it considers relevant, including idling of 
productive facilities, inability to operate at a level of a 
reasonable profit, and unemployment or under-employ-
ment". However, in order to determine the eligibility of 
firms or groups of workers to apply to the Government 
for adjustment assistance, the investigation made by 
the Tariff Commission must show (a) that tariff con-
cessions are the major cause of the increased imports, 
and (6) that such increased imports have been the 
major factor in causing the alleged damage or injury. 
In practice, the conditions of eligibility have proved 
to be unduly stringent, owing to the diÉEculty of sin-
gling out tariff concessions as the major cause of the 
increased imports, and these increased imports in their 
turn as the major cause of injury to the industry con-
cerned. Consequently, consideration is being given to 
the desirability of amending the Act so as to facilitate 
recourse to Government assistance on the part of firms 
or workers affected by tariff concessions. To that end, it 
is proposed that the Tariff Commission shall determine 
that serious injury or threat of injury exists: 
(a) In the case of a firm, when "increased imports 
have contributed or are contributing in any substantial 
degree to a declining volume of domestic production, 
regardless of other influencing factors"; or when "the 
ratio of imports to domestic production exceeds 10 per 
cent during the calendar year immediately preceding the 
initiation of the Tariff Commission investigation"; 
(b) In the case of workers in a firm or sub-division 
thereof, when the condition mentioned in the foregoing 
paragraph is fulfilled, or when "increased imports have 
contributed or are contributing in any substantial de-
gree to a decline amounting to 5 per cent or more (in 
man-hours or wages paid) of direct labour employed by 
such firm or sub-division". 
13 
behalf of firms or groups of workers injured 
by increased imports effected under the £egis 
of tariff concessions. 
In the specific measures adopted by the United 
States in the trade policy field positive provision 
has been made for greater liberalization of in-
ternational commodity trade, and at the same 
time decisions have been taken that represent a 
setback for the standstill principle. 
Among the initiatives that might help to pro-
duce some improvement in the market for primary 
products are provisions designed to facilitate 
conditions of access to United States territory 
for certain raw materials. Thus in October 1966 
import quotas for lead and zinc ores and con-
centrates, which had first been imposed in 1958, 
were abolished. In the same year the Government 
of the United States reduced import controls and 
duties on some oil-seeds and various ores and 
eliminated the 2 per cent duty on soluble coffee.® 
Note should also be taken of the support given 
by the United States authorities to the fulfilment 
of the provisions of the International Coffee 
Agreement, particularly as it concerns the obliga-
tions of consumer countries. Moreover, with the 
aim of contributing, at the international level, 
towards a solution of the over-production prob-
lem that chronically threatens the world coffee 
market, the United States Government has de-
clared itself in favour of the establishment of a 
The proposed amendments to the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962 go much further, however, than merely seeking 
to facilitate the adoption of measures to assist firms or 
groups of workers affected by increased imports due to 
tariff concessions. Under the 1962 Act, the President of 
the United States is not bound by the resuk of the 
Tariff Commission's investigation to take any specific 
action, but the amendment provides that, within sixty 
days of his receiving a report of the Tariff Commission 
which establishes that the import of any article is caus-
ing or is likely to cause serious prejudice to an indus-
try, the President shall impose a duty, increase an 
existing duty, or impose any other restriction on imports 
of the article or product concerned. 
® While not directly linked with the elimination of 
this duty, the expansion of exports of soluble coffee 
from Brazil to the United States in 1967 has resulted in 
a serious controversy within the International Coffee 
Organization, reaching a point where the United States 
Department of State declared that it would not be able 
to support the renewal of the International Agreement if 
this problem could not be satisfactorily solved. The 
United States position, subsequently adopted by the 
Committee of European Coffee Associations, is based on 
the argument that Brazilian exports of soluble coffee 
receive an indirect subsidy through exemption from the 
export taxes which are imposed on coffee beans. (See 
G. Gordon Paton, Complete Co§ee Coverage, New York, 
September 22, October 31 and November 15, 1967.) It 
should be pointed out that exports of soluble coffee are 
included in the quotas of producer countries (each 
pound of soluble coffee is considered to be equivalent 
to three pounds of coffee beans). 
diversification fund within the framework of the 
Agreement. In the Punta del Este meeting of 
April 1967 the President of the United States 
proposed a loan of 15 million dollars for initial 
financing of such a fund. 
More recently, the United States has applied 
a new policy with respect to cotton which has 
had an appreciable effect on the world market 
for this product and is of direct interest to 
various Latin American countries. Under the 
general law on food and agriculture promulgated 
in November 1965, a programme was set up to 
restrict United States cotton production in order 
to reduce the surplus which has long been 
typical of this market. A decision was taken 
to reduce the acreage planted by 30 per cent, 
starting with the 1966/67 crop year, and to 
authorize direct subsidies and price guarantees 
only to producers who would grow other crops 
on part of their land. This policy brought 
about a marked decrease in United States pro-
duction—from 15 to 9 million bales between 
1965 and 1967—and therefore of world produc-
tion, and of stocks, of which the United States 
holds approximately half. It has apparently re-
sulted in a better balance between world supply 
and demand, and in 1967 led to a slight recovery 
in prices, which in general had fallen in 1965/ 
66. 
The measures adopted by the United States 
with respect to sugar appear, on the other hand, 
to have been more unfavourable to the interests 
of the Latin American countries. In October 
1965 an amendment to the 1948 Sugar Act was 
passed (to be in force from 1967 to 1971), re-
ducing the relative share of foreign producers 
in the domestic market. 
The new legislation raised from 5.81 to 6.39 
million tons the part reserved for national pro-
ducers in relation to a consumption of 9.7 mil-
lion tons, at the same time reducing from 2.84 
to 2.26 million tons the quota open to foreign 
producers, which had already been decreased 
from 3.53 million tons, or by as much as 
526,000 tons. Even if it is taken into account 
that the new legislation reserves for imported 
sugar all domestic demand in excess of 9.7 mil-
lion tons and up to 10,4 million tons (level of 
total consumption of the country in 1966) in-
stead of only 35 per cent, as previously, the 
relative participation of the foreign suppliers 
has fallen from 39.8 to 38.6 per cent of total 
sugar consumption in the United States. 
If a comparison is made with the pre-1962 
situation, this development appears to be very 
unfavorable for foreign producers and in par-
ticular for Latin American producers, since it 
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reflects a tendency toward self-sufficiency in the 
United States market. In 1948 domestic produc-
tion satisfied only 28.5 per cent of national con-
sumption, a proportion that rose to 36.5 in 
1962 and 42.5 in 1965. The relative share of 
Latin America in the main world sugar market 
declined during this period from 36.3 to 21 
per cent, since the quota which had previously 
been reserved for Cuba has been only partially 
absorbed by the other producers of the region. 
It is clear that this policy, which tends through 
greater quantitative restrictions, to increase the 
share of national production to the detriment of 
the developing countries, conflicts with previous 
commitments undertaken by the industrialized 
countries, and the United States in particular, in 
both GATT and UNCTAD, with a view to facili-
tating access to their markets for products of 
special interest to developing countries. 
Certain measures relating to meat imports 
are also contrary to the spirit of the commit-
ments previously undertaken by the United 
States. In accordance with Act 88-442, in effect 
since 1 August 1967, imports of meat are subject 
to quotas restricting their volume to the 1959-63 
levels. As it was considered that this legislation 
did not ensure suflicient protection for the na-
tional cattle industry, a member of the United 
States Senate presented a bill in October 1967 
strengthening the controls applied to foreign 
meat. Particularly serious is the provision for 
extending these controls to other types of meat 
not covered by the present legislation. 
This proposal was but one example of the new 
protectionist tendency that recently became ap-
parent among private interests and representa-
tives in the United States Congress, in total op-
position to previous commitments and to the 
favourable attitude shown by the Government. 
In October 1967 the Senate considered various 
bills designed to limit imports of a whole series 
of products, including textiles, lead, zinc, petro-
leum products and steel. Another bill provides 
for the application of import quotas in all cases 
where customs duties may not be sufficient to 
ensure just protection for a United States in-
dustry. The restrictive provisions would go into 
effect almost automatically whenever there might 
be either a price difference between an im-
ported and a United States product or a certain 
increase in imports of the product. The adoption 
of such legislation would constitute a dangerous 
threat to Latin American exports and a serious 
breach of commitments assumed by the United 
States within the framework of UNCTAD and 
GATT, and also of some of the concessions made 
in the Kennedy Round. 
It is to be hoped that the United States Con-
gress, with the support of the Government, will 
reject bills which, if adopted, would mean a 
return to a form of protectionism completely 
opposed to the present orientation of interna-
tional trade policy. In any event, should the 
United States be forced in the future to impose 
import controls for balance of payments reasons, 
it would also have to ensure that such restric-
tions would not prejudice the trade interests 
of the developing countries. 
The United States seems to have recognized 
that it is vital for this group of countries to in-
crease their export earnings in order to speed 
up their economic growth, and that, in this 
respect, external aid can only be a supplementary 
factor. However the effective fulfilment of the 
general aims reaffirmed on various occasions by 
the United States authorities requires not only 
that they should do everything possible to 
prevent the adoption of legislation of the type 
now being submitted to Congress, but also that 
they should progressively eliminate the many 
and various obstacles still in the way of the 
expansion of Latin American products in the 
United States market. 
The change in recent months in the attitude 
of the United States Government with regard to 
the essential problems of international trade 
might be the forerunner of a favourable and 
constructive attitude in the negotiations at the 
second session of UNCTAD, an attitude which 
is essential if the bases for a foreign trade that 
is more equitable and more beneficial for the 
developing countries are to be established. 
3. T H E POLICY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND 
OTHER DEVELOPED MARKET-ECONOMY COUNTRIES 
The particularly unfavourable development of 
Latin American sales to the United Kingdom, 
which decreased slightly each year between 1963 
and 1966, appears to be due, on the one hand to 
balance-of-payments difficulties and the slack-
ening of the pace of economic growth in the 
United Kingdom which led to sluggishness in 
purchases from abroad and, on the other hand, 
to the effects of the institutional consolidation 
of the European Free-Trade Association (EFTA) 
which undoubtedly caused a shift away from 
purchases previously made in Latin American 
countries. 
With regard to the United Kingdom's imports 
of meat from Latin America, the National Plan 
for 1965-70 could threaten the medium- and 
long-range export prospects, since it aims at an 
appreciable increase in the domestic supply of 
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meat over the next five years in order to meet a 
greater proportion of demand in 1970. The ex-
pansion of the production of cereals for fodder 
also figures in the Plan, and could likewise 
aifect certain Latin American exports. In fact, 
this has already happened as a result of the 
increase in the United Kingdom's output of 
cereals in 1965 and 1966, which affected the 
implementation of the bilateral agreements con-
cluded between the United Kingdom and its 
leading suppliers. It would be advisable for the 
United Kingdom Government to continue the 
meetings of the Meat Study Group—of which 
all the meat-exporting countries are members— 
in order to give those countries an opportunity 
to express their points of view and to prevent the 
new United Kingdom policy from damaging 
their trade interests too much. Action of this 
type would have helped to avert the application 
of unilateral restrictions, such as those which 
have recently been adopted against certain meat 
exports in consequence of outbreaks of foot-and-
mouth disease in the United Kingdom, and 
which are damaging the traditional trade flows 
between Argentina and Uruguay and the British 
market. 
The prospect of the entry of the United King-
dom into the European Economic Community 
is a further cause of concern for the Latin 
American countries, in view of the policy 
changes which that country would have to 
make should it be accepted as a full member. 
The most unfavourable effect would be a further 
reduction of export prospects for temperate-zone 
products which compete directly with Community 
products. A prerequisite for the success of the 
negotiations appears to be acceptance by the 
United Kingdom of the Community agricultural 
policy almost in its entirety. There is no doubt 
that in this case it would progressively increase 
its purchases from the Community. Moreover 
it can be expected that if there should be any 
possibilities of granting certain exceptions to 
the common rules, these would benefit the Com-
monwealth countries and not those of Latin 
America. Other negative effects for Latin Amer-
ica arising out of the entry of the United King-
dom into EEC could stem from the possible 
granting by the United Kingdom of the prefer-
ences now extended by the Community to cer-
tain African countries and from the concession 
of advantages to the Commonwealth countries 
as compensation in case of total loss of the Ot-
tawa preferences. 
Ahhough it may be difiScult to evaluate with 
precision the effects on the United Kingdom's 
trade with Latin America, it can be estimated 
that the recent devaluation of sterling will have 
a negative effect on the exports of some Latin 
American countries, especially if account is 
taken of the decision of certain Commonwealth 
countries to devalue to the same extent. Thus 
the devaluation already decided upon by New 
Zealand will not fail to create disadvantageous 
conditions for Argentine and Uruguayan meats 
and wools in the British market. 
While the position of Japan in recent years 
would appear to have been somewhat more fa-
vourable with respect to its trade with developing 
countries, this attitude has not had significant 
repercussions on Latin America owing to various 
problems, particularly shipping and insurance 
costs, which affect expansion of this traffic. The 
maintenance of some import restrictions, and 
in particular the State trade régime for certain 
agricultural products, has likewise limited growth 
possibilities for some Latin American exports. 
Trade with Canada has been characterized 
by a very substantial increase, having more than 
doubled in the last five years, but it has not yet 
reached a level of real significance within the 
total trade of the region. Only a few Latin Amer-
ican countries have taken advantage of the pos-
sibilities of the Canadian market which are 
promising, taking into consideration the policy 
of this country and the concessions made in the 
Kennedy Round. 
The Scandinavian countries have been those 
which, since the first session of UNCTAD, have 
shown most willingness to put the UNCTAD 
recommendations into practice. In recent years 
they have substantially liberalized trade in pro-
ducts which are of fundamental interest to the 
developing countries, not only by reducing im-
port duties but also by reducing domestic taxes 
on certain consumer goods. Similarly, in the 
GATT negotiations, this group of countries was 
outstanding for its liberal attitude and under-
standing of the problems of the less developed 
countries. 
The action taken by Australia in relation to 
the problems of the developing countries may 
likewise be described as highly positive, starting 
with the waiver it obtained in GATT so that it 
could establish a system of preferences in favour 
of the developing countries for a preliminary list 
of manufactures and semi-manufactures, the ex-
pansion of which has just been announced.^ ** 
The heterogeneous attitudes and policies which 
the industrialized countries have been assuming, 
without being linked to development levels or 
I"' Report of the Working Group adopted in 28 March 
1966 (GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Docu-
ments, Supplement No. 14, pp. 172 to 188). 
Ifi 
balance-of-payments or other problems, demon-
strate the importance of joint persuasive action 
by the developing world in order to open up new 
possibilities and create a favourable atmosphere 
for negotiations between both groups of coun-
tries. This moreover reaffirms the validity of 
the basic principles arrived at in UNCTAD and 
in GATT, and points to the ground still to be 
covered before their full acceptance and effective 
implementation can be achieved. 
B. FULFILMENT BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES OF COMMITMENTS ASSUMED IN RELATION TO THEIR 
TRADE WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
When the secretariat document "Latin Amer-
ica and international trade policy" (E/CN.12/ 
773) was considered at the twelfth session of 
ECLA (Caracas, May 1967), the secretariat was 
asked to list as many as possible of the cases 
of failure by the developed countries to comply 
with the principles and recommendations of 
UNCTAD and to meet commitments they had un-
dertaken in GATT in relation to their trade 
with developing countries, with special reference 
to the commitments that directly affected the 
Latin American countries. 
The preparation of such a list is actually a 
very complex and long-range task, the scope of 
which must be determined in the light of various 
aspects and problems, such as the definition of 
non-compliance; the nature and scope of the 
principles, commitments, recommendations, re-
solutions and declarations; their forms of im-
plementation; and their total or conditional 
acceptance by all or some of the developed coun-
tries. Consequently, without prejudice to the 
possibility of carrying out a more detailed inves-
tigation at a later stage, it has been deemed 
necessary to examine those aspects and to point 
out cases which may be regarded as constituting 
a failure on the part of the developed countries 
to meet formal commitments with respect to 
products of interest to the Latin American coun-
tries, in the strictest sense of what may be under-
stood to constitute non-compliance, namely, re-
strictions applied by the developed countries to 
those products which are contrary to the provi-
sions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade and are not covered by waivers, based 
upon notification of the GATT secretariat by 
the countries in question (see table 1). 
The first problem to be considered is the 
nature, scope and binding power of the various 
forms that the commitments may assume. In 
general, the developed countries take the posi-
tion that, in their trade relations with the devel-
oping countries, they are bound only by the 
legal commitments they assume under a treaty 
(i.e., under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade) and that even then the binding 
force of the commitments is limited by the 
escape clauses to which they are usually subject. 
On the other hand, they maintain that the com-
mitments which they have accepted in the form 
of principles, recommendations, declarations and 
resolutions, etc., are not mandatory, and that 
therefore their non-observance cannot be quali-
fied as non-compliance. 
However, the difference between one type 
of commitment and the other is more formal 
than substantive. When the developed and the 
developing countries agree that certain prob-
lems and obstacles are adversely affecting the 
latter's international trade and economic devel-
opment, and have further stated that they are 
prepared to co-operate and to take active steps 
to contribute towards the solution or elimination 
of those problems and obstacles—as all the de-
veloped countries have done without exception—, 
they are in fact assuming a political respon-
sibility and commitment, although they may not 
be solemnly bound by law to honour it. 
For political commitments of this kind to be 
operative, they must, of course, be implemented 
through measures involving specific action pro-
grammes; in fact it is only through such pro-
grammes that the developed countries may fulfil 
their general commitments of a political nature 
to contribute effectively to solving the problems 
that impede the expansion of exports and the 
economic growth of the developing countries. 
This was fully recognized in the Ministerial 
Declaration made by the member countries of 
GATT in May 1961, in which it was agreed 
that the industrialized Contracting Parties 
should adopt a series of measures in relation to 
the trade problems of the dveloping countries 
(reduction to the minimum or elimination of 
the tariff and quantitative restrictions impeding 
access to markets as well as of the internal fiscal 
charges which affect the developing countries' 
exports limitations on the use of subsidies for 
the production or export of primary products, 
compliance with the principles and lines of ap-
proach already accepted in earlier resolutions 
of GATT and in FAO with respect to the sale 
of agricultural surpluses, etc.); that immediate 
measures would be taken to establish specific 
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Table 
IMPORT RESTRICTIONS APPLIED BY DEVELOPED COUNTRIES INCONSISTENTLY 

































Products States France 
Meat and edible offals of animals — — — 
A Meat of bovine animals . . . — — — 
B Meat of sheep and goats . . — — GQ or BQ" 
C Meat of swine — —• •— 
D Meat of horses, etc —• — — 
E Offals - GQ or BQb 
Poultry and edible offals thereof — — — 
Unrendered pig and poultry fat — — — 
Unrendered pig fat alone — — — 
Meat and edible meat offals of 
aU kinds — — 
Ham, except tinned — — — 
Pig meat and edible offals, 
dried or smoked — —• — 
Of sheep — — GQ or BQb 
Crustaceans and molluscs — — — 
Milk and cream, fresh — — 
Milk and cream, preserved, con-
centrated or sweetened — — — 
Butter — — — 
Cheese and curd — — — 
"Cheddar" and "Colby" types — — — 
Birds' eggs — ex R — 
Natural honey — — — 
Dried shrimp — — GQ or BCf 
Dried leguminous vegetables . . — — — 
Manioc, arrowroot, sweet pota-
toes, and similar roots and 
tubers — — — 
Bananas, fresh — R — 
Pineapples, fresh and dried . . . —• R — 
Citrus fruit, fresh or dried — — — 
Oranges, tangerines, and grape-
fruit — — — 
Apples and pears, fresh — — GQ or BQ 
Apples — — 
Pears — — — 
Fruit preserved by freezing, not 
containing added sugar — — — 
Pineapple — — — 
Coffee, whether or not roasted, 
excluding unroasted grain . . . — R — 
Wheat, etc.: 
Wheat GQ" — — 
Meslin — — — 
Rye — — — 
Barley — — — 
Oats — — — 
Maize — — — 
Rice — — — 
Cereal flours excluding rice —• — — 
Of wheat G(y> — — 
Cereal groats and cereal meal . . — — — 
Of wheat — — — 
Of rine _ _ _ 
Italy 
GQ or BQb { 
GQa 
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WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE 












_ GQ (DA) 
- 5 GQ (DA) 
- I BQ (Cuba) 
SRa (-EEC) GQ (-STA) 
Austria Sweden Norway Denmark Canada Japan 
__ GQ, DL — 
GQ DLa — DL, MP — — 
DLa DL, MP • — — — 
DLa La DL, MP — — GQ 
La DL — — — 
DLa La DL, MP — — — 
La DL DL — — 
DLa DL DL — — 
— — — — GQ 
DLa — DL ex GQ, DL z 
ex GQ 
La _ _ — 
__ — — — 
— — — DL — GQ 
DLa — A — — ex GQ 
DLa La A LL, DL ex GQ 
DLa — DL, GQ DL PPa — 
_ _ A, GQ — — ex GQ 
— PPa — 
ex La ex DL, MP DL — — 
— — DL GQ — — 
— — — — — GQ 
DL DL GQ 
— — — — — 
— 
— — — — 
— — — — — • 
_ GQ 
DL — LL, DL — — 
DL, MP — — GQ 
— — DL, MP, SR — — 
DL ex DL 
— — — — — 
GQ 
— — — Q — GQ 
DLa _ LL, DL Lb — 
DLa — LL, DL — — 
DLa .—. LL, DL — — 
DLa — LL, DL Lb — 
DLa — LL, DL Lb — 
DLa — — LL — — 
DL, GQ — — 
ex GQ DLa — LL, DL — 
ex Lb — 
ex DLa — ex LL, DL ex Lb — 
— GQ 







of Germany Italy 
1105 Flour, meal and flakes of potato 




Soya and others 
1501 Lard and other rendered pig fat; 
rendered poultry fat 
Pig fat 
ex 1502 Other unrendered fats and tallow-
ex 1503 Lard stearin, oleostearin, lard oil 
1507 Vegetable oils: 
C Groundnut oil 
B Soya oil 
Others 
1601 Sausages and the like, of meat 
Of sheep meat 
1502 Other prepared or preserved meat 
Of sheep 
Excluding poultry 
Of pig and poultry meat 
Of bovine animals and pigs . . 
1603 Meat extracts and meat juices 
1701 Beet sugar and cane sugar, solid 
1702 Other sugars 
ex 1703 Molasses 
ex 1705 Flavoured molasses 
2001 Vegetables and fruit, prepared 
or preserved by vinegar 
2002 Vegetables prepared or preserved 
otherwise than by vinegar . . . 
Tomato puree, canned 
2003 Fruit preserved by freezing, con-
taining added sugar 
2005 Fruit puree and fruit pastes . . 
Fruit otherwise prepared or pre-
2006 served 
Canned grapefruit 
2007 Fruit juices and vegetable juices 
Fruit juices 
Tomato juice 
2102 Instant coffee 
ex 2104 Tomato sauce 
ex 2107 Other food preparations 
2205 Wine of fresh grapes 
2206 Vermouths and other wines . . . 
ex 2301 Flours and meals of meat, offals, 
fish and the like, unfit for 
human consumption 
2401 Unmanufactured tobacco 
2402 Manufactured tobacco 
A Cigars and cheroots 
ex 2601 Tungsten ore 
ex 2710 Gas oil, fuel oil and raw oil, in 
containers of less than 300 1. 
Qb 
BQa 



















GQ or BQb 
GQ or BQb 
GQ or BQb 
ex GQ or BQb 
GQ or BQb 
GQ or BQb 
ex GQ or BQ (—EEC) 





ex GQ or BQ (-EEC) ex DL (-EEC) 
GQ or BQ — 
ex GQ or BQ (-EEC) 
GQ or BQ 




GQ (EEC) ) 
20 
1 (^continued} 
United Denmark Canada Japan 




Pr (—STA) — — — ex GQ 
_ DLa — — 




DL LL, DL — GQ 
DL LL, DL — GQ 
_ GQ — — 
_ - GQ 





DL GQ - GQ 
GQ 
_ DL® — ex DL — ~ ^ 
GQ LL - LL. DL - GQ 
ex . - ex GQ - - LL, DL _ ex^GQ 
~ _ _ _ — LL, DL - GQ 
_ — — ex DL — _ _ 
_ _ — ex DL — — — 
_ _ _ DL _ _ GQ 
_ _ _ DL ex GQ — GQ 
— _ — ex DL — _ GQ 
_ _ — ex DL ex GQ — GQ 
GQ (DA) _ _ _ __ _ _ 
_ _ _ — ex GQ — — 
ex GQ (DA) ex GQ — DL, GQ — _ GQ 
_ _ _ _ _ _ GQ 
Z Z Z Z Z Z ¿^ 
— _ — A, GQ - — ex GQ 
- ex GQ — — Q _ GQ 
- ex GQ - - Q _ GQ 
_ _ _ _ _ _ GQ 
fGQ (DA) 1 _ _ _ - - -
IBQ (Cuba) ) _ _ _ _ _ GQ 


























Casein, caseinates and other ca-
sein derivatives; casein glues 
Unhardened casein for use in 
food production 
Bovine cattle leather and equine 
leather 
Sheep and lamb skin, leather . . 
Patent leather and metallised 
leather 
Plywood 
Paper and paperboard 
Sheep's or lambs' wool or other 
animal hair, carded or combed 
Woollen yarn, not put up for 
retail sale 
Excluding stiffened yarn . . . . 
Woollen yam, put up for retail 
sale 
Woven fabrics of wool or fine 
animal hair 
Cotton, not carded or combed . . 




Cotton, carded or combed . . . . 
Other woven fabrics of cotton . . 
Woven fabrics or jute 
Gloves, socks, woollen garments, 
knitted 
Outer and under garments . . "j 
Collars and scarves, except r 
6106 and 6110 knitted J 
ex 6402 Footwear with leather soles . . . . 
ex 6405 Parts of footwear 
7301 Pig iron, cast iron and spiege-
leisen, in pigs, blocks, lumps 
and similar forms 
ex 8441 Sewing machines, not for do-
mestic use 





















Sources-. GATT, Notifications of import restrictions 
applied inconsistently mth the provisions of GATT and 
not covered by waivers on products of export interest 
to developing countries (COM.TD/W/60), July 1967. 
Information for the United States was obtained from 
GATT document L/256B, Add. 6 (March 1966); for 
France, from GATT documents COM.TD/W/19 (March 
1966) and L/2817 (July 1967). 
Symbols-. A : Administrative restriction; L: Licensing; 
DL: Discretionary licensing; LL: Liberal licensing; 
MP: Minimum price system; Pr: Prohibited; Q: Quota; 
GQ: Global quota; BQ: Bilateral quota; R: Restriction 
(method unspecified); SP: Special price permit re-
quired; SR: Seasonal restriction; ( -STA): Applicable 
to imports from other than sterling area countries; 
(DA) : Applicable to imports from the dollar area. 
Note-. This list of restrictions is not complete, since 
it covers only restrictions reported in the sources 
mentioned. In addition, the list refers only to some 
products of special export interest for Latin America 
which were selected on the basis of the following 
documents: UNCTAD, Informe sobre artículos cuya 
exportación ofrece interés para los países en desarrollo 
(TD/B/C/2/20, March 1967); GATT, Products notified 
as being of export interest to less-developed countries 
—Note by the Secretariat (COM.TD/23, June 1966); 
Memorándum de las Misiones Latinoamericanas ante la 
CEE (February 1966). 
FOOTNOTES BY COUNTRIES : 
United States: 
"Justified by the provisional protocol, 
b Justified by article XI, 2 (c) of the General Agree-
ment. 
Federal Republic of Germany: 
"Applies to all countries, except the European, EEC 
Associate countries (Cyprus, Kenya, Malta, Sierra 
















•> According to the Federal Republic of Germany, 
these restrictions are justified by the provisions of the 
Torquay protocol. 
«According to the Government of the Federal Re-
public of Germany, this restriction falls under the 
provisions of article XI, 2 (c) (i) of the Agreement. 
fl Refers to knitted garments made of wool or 
synthetic fibres (ex 6005). 
Italy. 
® Temporary restriction. 
•> Applies only to Latin American countries, Middle 
Eastern countries. United States, Korea, Japan and the 
socialist countries. 
Benelux-. 
® Justified because of a decision of the GATT con-
tracting parties on the agricultural products of Luxem-
bourg (December 1955). 
Restrictions applied by Belgium and Luxembourg 
only. 
«Restrictions applied by the Netherlands only. 
United Kingdom: 
® Applies to all countries except those of the dollar 
area, socialist countries and Japan. 
I' Does not apply to India, Pakistan and some other 
countries. 
Austria-. 
® Products falling under the Austrian law on market-
ing of agricultural products; according to the Austrian 
Government such restrictions are justified by the 
Torquay protocol. 
Sweden -. 
® Applies only to products from North, Central and 
South America. 
Applies only to products of item 6005. 
Canada: 
«Imports allowed only when they are for personal 
consumption. 
Restriction justified by the provisional protocol. 
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action programmes and, where feasible, final 
dead-lines for the progressive reduction and 
elimination of obstacles to exports of the devel-
oping countries; and that procedures would be 
established for notifying and revising action 
taken by the Contracting Parties to implement 
the programmes agreed upon. 
The Programme of Action, adopted at the 
GATT ministerial meeting held in May 1963, 
was precisely oriented in this way, establishing 
various measures in favour of the products of 
interest to the developing countries which the 
industrialized countries had to take (maintain-
ing the standstill, gradual reduction of customs 
barriers which had to be lowered by at least 
50 per cent over the next three years, complete 
liberalization of tropical products by 31 Decem-
ber 1963, elimination of quantitative restrictions 
within a period of one year, or before 31 Decem-
ber 1965 at the latest, and reduction and elimina-
tion of internal fiscal charges, likewise by 31 
December 1965). However, the conclusions and 
resolutions of this ministerial meeting did not 
have the full support of the Ministers of the 
industrialized countries; those of the European 
Economic Community approved in principle the 
general aims of the Programme of Action and 
declared that they were prepared to do all they 
could to further the growth of the developing 
countries' trade but did not support the Pro-
gramme itself on the grounds that it was insuffi-
cient. The Ministers of most of the other indus-
trialized countries, in their turn, made various 
reservations and gave various interpretations of 
the Programme of Action which considerably 
limited the scope of its measures. 
Apart from disregarding the commitment as-
sumed in the Ministerial Declaration of May 
1961,^ ^ their attitude shows that when an at-
tempt is made to translate general commitments 
to the developing countries into action pro-
grammes which set up goals to be reached within 
specified periods of time, conflicts of interest 
between the developed countries generally pre-
vent them from reaching an agreement. When, 
11 Nor does the new part IV of the General Agree-
ment provide for an action programme or programmes 
to be set up in accordance with the Ministerial Decla-
ration; basically it does little more than reiterate some 
of the aims and measures of a general nature agreed 
upon in the Declaration, without indicating concrete 
steps or goals that would guarantee their implementa-
tion. In article XXXVII of part IV, wherein certain 
commitments are given legal force (although subject to 
an escape clause that makes them for the most part 
inoperative), consultative procedure is established as 
specified in the Declaration, for Contracting Parties 
which may consider that some of the provisions of the 
article have not been complied with. 
on the other hand, the trade problems and 
obstacles are those of the industrialized coun-
tries themselves, they generally find a way of 
settling their differences and coming to an 
agreement, as in the case of the Kennedy nego-
tiations, when the "package deal" permitted a 
last-minute solution of serious differences of 
opinion between the developed countries that 
threatened to wreck the negotiations. In addi-
tion, before adopting concrete measures and 
specific action programmes involving their trade 
with the developing countries, they usually insist 
on these measures being accepted by the other 
countries (or the fulfilment of certain conditions 
by the other developed countries). Faced with 
the diflBculty of taking joint action in this field, 
in the vast majority of cases the countries are 
unwilling to act unilaterally. 
Among the commitments of a political type 
in the field of international economic relations, 
those that are outstanding are the principles 
and recommendations adopted at the first session 
of UNCTAD, which are binding on the devel-
oped countries that accepted them. Since most 
of these recommendations, including some which, 
by virtue of their scope, are extremely impor-
tant,^ ^ were adopted without opposition, all the 
developed countries are bound by them and their 
non-observance consequently implies non-com-
pliance with a commitment.^® 
The assumption that such recommendations 
constitute commitments for the countries that 
accepted them is confirmed by the very fact that 
some developed countries (and in certain cases 
developing countries as well) abstained from 
voting or voted against numerous principles and 
several recommendations, obviously because they 
were not prepared to assume the commitments 
that such principles and recommendations en-
tailed. It follows that they entered into the com-
mitments involved in the principles and recom-
mendations to which they assented and therefore 
accepted the obligation to carry them out. 
No time-limits, goals or other concrete forms 
of implementation are established for the meas-
ures that the developed countries would have to 
take in accordance with such recommendations, 
that is to say that there are no specific action 
12 Recommendations A.II.l, relating to international 
commodity arrangements and removal of obstacles and 
expansion of trade, and A.III.4, on guidelines for tariff 
and non-tariff policies in respect of manufactures and 
semi-manufactures from developing countries. 
In the same way the Declaration of the Presidents 
of America constitutes a political commitment to fulfil 
its aims and implement the measures specified in it. In 
this case the commitment is all the stronger for having 
been undertaken by Chiefs of State. 
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programmes and that, on the contrary, it is 
stated that the measures should be adopted or 
applied "at the earliest possible date", "as far 
as possible", "if possible", etc. Without these 
limitations and safeguards, many recommenda-
tions would probably not have been accepted by 
an appreciable number of developed countries 
—as in the case of the GATT Programme of 
Action in May 1963—and there would have 
been even less likelihood of their acceptance if 
an attempt had been made to fix time-limits and 
establish a real action programme. However this 
does not detract from the binding nature of 
these recommendations or the obligation to 
comply with them. It may be assumed that if 
they were accepted, it was with the intention 
to comply with them effectively "to the fullest 
extent possible". The question is, therefore, not 
whether such recommendations constitute legal 
commitments but rather of verifying to what 
extent they were complied with and if everything 
possible was actually done in this regard. If not, 
this would mean that there has not been com-
pliance, at least with the spirit of the commit-
ment assumed in accepting the recommendation. 
This situation repeats itself in a very similar 
way in the new part IV of the General Agree-
ment since the fact that the principles, aims and 
commitments provided in it have a formal legal 
framework makes little difference. In effect, just 
as in the case of the UNCTAD recommenda-
tions, the measures or provisions that must be 
complied with by the developed Contracting 
Parties in accordance with article XXXVII of 
part IV do not make up, as already pointed out, 
a specific action programme. The obligation 
assumed by these parties is that of complying 
with such provisions "to the fullest extent pos-
sible"—and although this is explained as mean-
ing "except when compelling reasons, which may 
include legal reasons, make it impossible", it 
may be supposed that only the existence of 
"compelling reasons" justifies non-compliance 
with the recommendations which, with similar 
safeguards, have been accepted by the developed 
countries in UNCTAD. There remains, of course, 
the problem of defining what is to be understood 
by "compelling reasons", and of verifying their 
existence in specific cases. 
Until such time as specific action programmes 
are established to implement the political and 
legal commitments^^ assumed by the developed 
i^As will be indicated later, the establishment of 
these programmes through multilateral negotiations fie-
tween developed and developing countries should be 
the main aim sought by the latter in the various forums 
in which they participate. This is the only way of en-
suring effective compliance with the different conunit-
countries in UNCTAD, GATT, or other inter-
national forums, it will be very difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify concrete cases of non-
compliance. 
Such non-compliance may be identified with-
out much difficulty when the cormnitment 
consists in refraining from adopting certain 
measures, as in the case of the standstill commit-
ment. It can also be identified where a provision 
exists prohibiting the maintenance of any type 
of restriction (e.g., article XI of the General 
Agreement, on the "general elimination of 
quantitative restrictions"). In those cases, it is 
feasible to identify and list the measures that 
have been adopted or that continue in force 
despite those commitments. But when the com-
mitment is to adopt certain measures, non-
compliance takes the form of omission; and 
unless those commitments are sufficiently speci-
fic, as in article XI, or time-limits and other 
procedures have been established for their im-
plementation, it is impossible to determine and 
list specific cases of non-compliance, particu-
larly if the commitment is to comply with certain 
provisions "to the fullest extent possible". 
Such is the case with the commitments estab-
lished in the UNCTAD recommendations and in 
article XXXVII of the General Agreement 
whereby the developed countries would—to the 
fullest extent possible—reduce or eliminate tariff 
and non-tariff restrictions on trade in products 
of interest to developing countries, internal 
fiscal charges which adversely affect consump-
tion of those products, etc. In order to list cases 
of non-compliance, it would be necessary to de-
termine, for each commodity, what charges and 
other restrictions on imports or consumption 
imposed by the developed countries were in 
force at the time of accepting the commit-
ment, and compare them with those in foroe 
at the present time. To obviate this problem, 
it might be possible to identify cases in 
which developed countries have reduced or 
abolished charges and other restrictions or in-
ternal taxes on some of those products and to 
consider that, since those were the cases in 
which measures had, in fact, been adopted in 
accordance with the provisions of the commit-
ment, there had been non-compliance with the 
remainder. 
There would still be the problem of verifying 
whether or not such non-compliance was justi-
fied, that is, whether the countries had really 
complied "to the fullest extent possible" or 
ments already assumed by the former or the realization, 
in the form of concrete measures, of other aspirations of 
the developing countries. 
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whether, in the words of article XXXVII of the 
General Agreement, "compelling reasons" had 
actually prevented them from reducing or elimi-
nating charges and other restrictions in every 
case where they had failed to do so. This would 
require machinery for consultation and com-
parison, which is envisaged in the same article. 
Another problem involved in identifying actual 
cases of non-compliance with the commitments 
assumed by developed countries in relation to 
their trade with developing countries is how to 
distinguish between non-compliance as such, in 
the strict sense of the term, where a waiver^® 
has been obtained previously, and cases where 
non-compliance would be justified by recourse 
to some explicit or implict escape clause (e.g., 
restrictions imposed on the grounds of market 
disruption). 
The first group includes import restrictions 
imposed in opposition to GATT provisions and 
not covered by waivers, normally called 
"residual" restrictions. Those restrictions there-
fore constitute well defined and identified cases 
of non-compliance with commitments; they are 
indicated in documents prepared periodically by 
the secretariat of GATT on the basis of notifica-
tions from the Governments of the countries 
actually applying them, and are limited to 
those indicated in table 1 (affecting products 
considered to be of special interest to the Latin 
15 A waiver is used in GATT to exempt a Contracting 
Party from complying with one or several of the obliga-
tions it has assumed by virtue of the provisions of the 
General Agreement, e.g., to maintain or adopt certain 
quantitative restrictions or to impose higher customs 
duties than those agreed on in the negotiations. It is 
granted for limited periods—^though frequently renewed 
on expiry—and is subject to certain other conditions. 
An example which might be cited is that of the restric-
tions imposed by the United States on imports of cer-
tain agricultural commodities, in respect of which it 
obtained a waiver by the Decision of the Contracting 
Parties of 5 March 1955. In accordance with this de-
cision, the Government of the United States must pre-
sent an annual report on those restrictions, for consid-
eration by a working group of the Contracting Parties, 
which decides whether or not the waiver is to be re-
newed. The report must indicate any change or elimina-
tion in respect of restrictions imposed the previous 
year, the restrictions in force, the reasons -why they are 
still applied (including restrictions not covered by the 
waiver) and the steps taken to solve the problem of 
agricultural surpluses. Such restrictions, in the form of 
import regulations, affect various products such as wheat 
and products thereof, cotton with a certain length of 
fibre, groundnuts and some processed milk products. 
Other products, such as American-type cheese and frozen 
cream, were added on 30 June 1967. As can be seen 
this waiver has been in force for twelve years despite all 
efforts to end it; in other words the waiver has in fact 
become a means of maintaining restrictions indefinitely, 
and in some cases of intensifying and extending them 
to new products, although many of the original restric-
tions have been eliminated or reduced. 
American countries). However, there may be 
compelling reasons for certain Governments to 
maintain those residual restrictions, and a group 
of experts might objectively examine those prob-
lems, thereby making it possible to identify 
suitable forms of collaboration with a view to 
abolishing such restrictions. 
Therefore, the list of restrictions in table 1 
covers a very limited field, which would be con-
siderably extended if it were to include other 
restrictions imposed by developed countries on 
imports of commodities of interest to the Latin 
American countries, which are authorized by 
waivers or "legitimized" through recourse to 
safeguard clauses interpreted and applied uni-
laterally by the developed countries (whose 
justification should therefore be examined on a 
multilateral basis). But besides this, there are 
other vast fields that should be examined in 
relation to the non-compliance with commit-
ments assumed by the developed countries, 
which would entail long and complex work, 
e.g., non-compliance with the standstill com-
mitment and, in particular, non-compliance 
through failure to adopt measures which the 
developed countries had undertaken to adopt 
in relation to the reduction and elimination of 
tariff and non-tariíF restrictions and internal 
taxes, abolition of production or éxport sub-
sidies, disposal of surpluses and reserves, etc., 
affecting products of interest to developing 
countries. The basic problem here is to deter-
mine what justification there is for recourse to 
the various escape or safeguard clauses which in 
one way or another qualify those commitments. 
As a first step in the process of consultation 
and comparison required for more accurate 
identification of cases of non-fulfilment of com-
mitments on the part of the developed countries, 
especially undertakings to reduce and eliminate 
as far as possible import barriers against prod-
ucts of special export interest for developing 
countries, the appended table indicates the 
various tariff and non-tariff restrictions applied 
by the major industrialized countries to products 
regarded as currently or potentially of interest 
to the countries of Latin America. These restric-
tions should be jointly examined, product by 
product, by the two groups of countries with a 
view to determining whether "compelling rea-
sons" have existed and still do exist for not re-
ducing or eliminating them, and to reaching 
agreement upon a procedure for ensuring the 
attainment of the objective in question. 
In making this examination, priority should 
be given to restrictions established or increased 
after the adoption of the standstill commitment. 
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With regard to the residual restrictions shown in 
table 1 a commitment should be adopted to eli-
minate them within a fixed and relatively short 
period of time, except in cases where, prior to 
the expiry of the time limit, a waiver is granted 
on the grounds that their elimination is ad-
mitted to present basic difficulties.^® 
In respect of the commitments assumed by 
developed countries vis-a-vis the countries with 
centrally planned economies, in particular those 
based on the recommendations of the first ses-
sion of UNCTAD, it is still harder to identify 
specific cases of non-fulfilment. The difficulty 
is due mainly to the nature of the instruments 
used by the socialist countries for the control 
of their foreign trade, and therefore to the type 
of measures it was recommended that they 
should adopt to promote trade with developing 
countries, and also to the kind of information 
that would be needed for a satisfactory evalua-
tion of the extent to which such measures have 
been implemented. 
For example, recommendation A.II.l, adopted 
at the first session of UNCTAD, provides that 
the developed centrally planned economies 
should, inter alia, "refrain from taking any 
measures which would adversely affect the ex-
pansion of imports from the developing coun-
tries", and should "take duly into consideration 
the trade needs of the developing countries 
when fixing the quantitative targets in their long-
term economic plans and concluding long-term 
agreements and contracts", so that "their imports 
of primary products and semi-processed prod-
ucts from the developing countries" should 
steadily increase, and "should constitute a pro-
portion of growing importance in their total 
imports". Clearly, it is extremely difficult to 
ascertain whether these recommendations have 
been complied with, unless such background 
information is available as the development 
A similar proposal, relating to residual restrictions, 
was presented by New Zealand at the twenty-fourth 
session of the Contracting Parties of GATT (November 
1967). 
programmes and import plans of a large num-
ber of countries, a list of the agreements they 
have drawn up with developing countries, an 
account of the patterns and terms of those agree-
ments, etc. 
For want of such information, and of suf-
ficiently detailed statistical data for a product-
by-product evaluation of trends in the socialist 
countries' imports from developing countries, 
the ECLA secretariat has been unable to em-
bark upon a substantive analysis of the degree 
of compliance with those or other recommenda-
tions. In the circumstances, all that can be done 
is to echo the concern expressed by the develop-
ing countries in the introduction to the Charter 
of Algiers with respect to the following points: 
(a) "no progress has been made by developed 
socialist countries on the recommended trans-
ferability of credit balances held with them by 
developing countries"; (6) "the wide disparity 
between domestic selling prices of goods im-
ported by socialist countries from developing 
countries and the import price of such goods 
creates unfavourable conditions for increases 
in consumption and import of such goods from 
developing countries". 
For effective evaluation of the degree of ful-
filment of commitments assumed by the socialist 
countries, a multilateral consultation procedure 
would be even more necessary than in the case 
of the developed market economy countries for 
the purposes of regularly reviewing the meas-
ures adopted by the centrally planned economies 
in order to increase and diversify their imports 
from developing countries, improve the prices 
and encourage the consumption of developing 
countries' products, facilitate the transfer of 
credit balances held by developing countries, 
etc. To that end, the socialist countries should 
furnish full first-hand information on the various 
matters to be reviewed, and the proceedings 
should be directed not so much towards consid-
eration of the actual measures themselves as 
towards evaluation of the results achieved. 
C. PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM PROCEDURES FOR APPLYING ESCAPE CLAUSES 
In the previous section it was pointed out that 
substantial progress in the fulfilment of legal 
or political obligations assumed by the de-
veloped countries in their trade relations with 
the developing countries cannot be expected 
until the international community establishes 
specific action programmes. It was also stated 
that escape or safeguard clauses which explicitly 
or implicitly condition the scope and degree 
of obligation of such commitments often made 
it easier for countries not to comply with them. 
Hence, independently of, or parallel with, the 
establishment of action programmes, or in 
the programmes themselves, it is necessary to 
define the circumstances in which the clauses 
may be invoked and to modify procedures for 
applying them, in order that they may cease 
to impede access of products of the developing 
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countries to the markets of the developed 
countries. 
It is useful here to examine two types of 
escape clauses.^'' On the one hand, there are 
the escape clauses provided in connexion with 
contractual obligations and referring to con-
crete situations, the utilization of which may 
require a waiver or authorization of the other 
interested parties in each case, involving a 
specific and temporary abolition of the commit-
ment assumed, or some procedure for prior 
notification or consultation, or other provisions. 
Such are the escape clauses contained in ar-
ticles XI, XII and XIX of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade, which relate to 
import restrictions on agricultural commodities 
as a means of protecting domestic production, 
to restrictions for balance of payments reasons, 
and to the total or partial suspension by a 
Contracting Party of a tariff concession granted 
on a product when imports of that product 
cause internal market disruption (i.e., when 
they take place in quantities or under conditions 
that may cause, or threaten to cause, serious 
injury to national producers of similar or com-
petitive products). 
Although there have been cases of abuse in 
the application of these escape clauses, which 
affect possibilities of access to the markets of 
the developed countries for products of special 
interest to the developing countries, these are 
the exception rather than the rule. 
On the other hand, much more serious prob-
lems result from another type of escape clause 
which is in more general use, since such clauses 
condition compliance with almost all commit-
ments entered into by the developed countries 
in various forums in connexion with their trade 
relations with the developing countries. These 
clauses tend to be formulated vaguely and in 
general terms, such as the obligation to comply 
with commitments "to the fullest extent pos-
sible" or "as soon as possible". Since their 
application depends on unilateral interpretation 
and application by the developed countries, 
even in cases where more or less concrete situa-
tions are referred to—such as existing or po-
The types and cases of escape clauses mentioned 
here do not cover every situation in which recourse is 
had to escape measures. For example, restrictions have 
been imposed on imports on the grounds that "social 
dumping" would result from the low wage levels and 
other labour conditions in exporting countries. It would 
also be necessary to determine whether the unwarranted 
application of health, security and other provisions such 
as those mentioned in articles XX and XXI of the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade actually implied 
recourse to an escape clause, on account of being dis-
guised restrictions. 
tential market disruption—, it is a prerogative 
of the importing country to judge whether these 
situations actually exist, and to decide on the 
nature and scope of the restrictions that should 
be imposed in order to correct them. Although 
the clauses themselves may constitute the in-
dispensable means of safeguarding legitimate 
economic interests, their most questionable 
aspect is precisely their unilateral character, 
since it gives the industrialized countries the 
opportunity of taking independent action not 
subject to any controls. 
Under these conditions, the escape clauses 
may be used for the purpose of evading or 
considerably limiting compliance with the com-
mitments, thereby losing a large measure of 
their effective value and in many cases even 
becoming inoperative. This problem is par-
ticularly serious in connexion with commit-
ments to improve conditions of access for 
products of interest to developing countries. An 
example of this is provided when the commit-
ment is to reduce and eliminate "to the fullest 
extent possible" or "as soon as possible" the 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to imports of those 
products in the developed countries, as estab-
lished in article XXXVII of part IV of the 
General Agreement and part II of recommen-
dation A.l l . l adopted at the first session of 
UNCTAD. In these cases, the failure to adopt 
such measures implies tacit use of the escape 
clause, and, despite the fact that such an act 
of omission is less obvious than the use of other 
escape clauses (adoption of new restrictions or 
intensification of those already existing), it 
nevertheless has equally negative effects from 
the standpoint of improving conditions of inter-
national trade for the developing countries. 
These considerations do not constitute a con-
demnation of escape clauses per se. They may 
be inevitable and necessary in situations where 
fulfilment of a commitment comes up against 
warrantable difficulties or has caused signifi-
cant problems either for the economy as a whole 
or for some important sector, and it seems 
unlikely that the developed countries would be 
willing to assume certain commitments without 
them. However, by definition, they should be 
used only in exceptional and duly substantiated 
cases, since they must not be assumed to consti-
tute an expedient for evading compliance with 
a commitment. Otherwise, the commitment 
would be meaningless. Hence the necessity of 
making the use of each escape clause dependent 
on certain conditions, defining as precisely as 
possible the circumstances in which it may be 
invoked and, above all, establishing procedures 
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and machinery which will ensure its adequate 
interpretation and application. 
A more precise definition of the circumstances 
in which these clauses might be invoked would 
help to avoid any problems resulting from the 
vague or excessively broad formulation of some 
of them. However, this characteristic is due to 
the essentially general nature of the commit-
ments involved. Therefore, the proposed aim 
can only be achieved in most cases by defining 
the commitments more precisely through the 
establishment of specific action programmes for 
their effective implementation. Even if this were 
done, the problem would not be completely 
solved unless, in addition to a sufficiently 
precise indication of the circumstances in which 
escape clauses might be invoked, objective cri-
teria were defined and agreed upon and ade-
quate machinery established for determining 
whether those circumstances really existed in 
each case. This problem would thus be raised 
with respect to escape clauses relating to more 
or less concrete situations, such as the existence 
of market disruption. 
The problem of escape clauses might be 
largely overcome by modifying the existing 
procedures for their application. This is true 
with respect to the vague and general formula-
tion of escape clauses as well as the lack of 
objective criteria for determining whether or 
not they may be legitimately invoked. Modifica-
tion of these procedures is the most urgent 
measure that should be taken and one which 
consequently offers the most important and 
immediate possibilities of achieving results. 
As mentioned earlier, the most questionable 
aspect of the escape clauses is their unilateral 
character, which permits developed countries to 
interpret them and invoke them without any 
outside control, thereby lessening the efficacy 
of the commitments concerned. This procedure 
should be replaced by a multilateral consulta-
tive and supervisory mechanism for verifying 
in each case whether or not there were reasons 
for resorting to the escape clause and, if so, for 
determining the nature, scope and duration of 
the restrictions imposed. As regards the com-
mitment to take measures such as the reduction 
and elimination of import barriers for products 
of interest to the developing countries, the 
machinery suggested would make it possible to 
prove whether the developed countries had 
complied with it to the fullest extent possible 
or whether compelling reasons had prevented 
them from doing so. 
The establishment of a mechanism of this 
type is proposed in the Charter of Algiers and 
is also provided for in article XXXVII of the 
General Agreement. Although in the first stage 
action might be limited to consultations on 
specific cases of recourse by developed countries 
to escape clauses and the consideration of claims 
presented by developing countries regarding 
the former's failure to comply with previously 
accepted commitments or recommendations, at 
a later stage it would be necessary to arrange 
that the decisions of the consultative machinery 
should be binding. In this way, recourse to 
escape clauses would be subject to a procedure 
similar to that followed in the General Agree-
ment, in connexion with, for example, those 
contemplated in articles XI and XII, for which 
a waiver must be obtained in each case. Accord-
ing to this procedure, the competent body 
would decide whether or not a country was 
justified in resorting to an escape clause— 
involving either commission or omission—and, 
if it was, this body would determine the nature, 
scope and duration of the restrictions that could 
be applied or that could be maintained in cases 
of temporary suspension in connexion with 
commitments to reduce or eliminate trade bar-
riers for products of interest to developing 
countries. 
Restrictions applied by virtue of escape 
clauses, particularly those related to problems 
of market disruption, should likewise be tem-
porary, and subject to progressive elimination 
within time-limits previously established through 
the consultative process; this should not pre-
vent the developed country which is applying 
the restriction from granting compensation 
to the developing countries affected by it, par-
ticularly in cases of violation of the standstill 
commitment.^® This compensation might take 
18 Paragraph 31 of the "Action Plan of Viña del 
Mar", which is included in the final report of the fifth 
annual Meetings of the Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council at the Expert and Ministerial Levels 
(Viña del Mar, Chile, June 1967), reads as follows: 
"At the request of the developing country or countries 
of the inter-American System that feel affected by a 
presumed violation of the international standstill com-
mitments, CIAP will serve as a forum for consultation, 
with a view to finding a satisfactory solution for the 
interested parties. This action will not prevent the 
countries concerned from being able to resort to other 
appropriate international bodies to seek suitable com-
pensation. CIAP will study existing international sys-
tems to determine damages that may be caused by such 
violations, and make recommendations to the next 
lA-ECOSOC meeting as to whether they should be 
strengthened, and the need for and feasibility of creat-
ing new arrangements for such purposes." (OEA/Ser.H/ 
XÍI.14, p. 20.) 
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the form, inter alia, of granting concessions on 
other products.^® 
The establishment of procedures such as those 
indicated for controlling the use of escape 
clauses will call for a radical change in the 
traditional position maintained by the developed 
countries. Otherwise, the commitments which 
those same countries have accepted, both in 
GATT and in UNCTAD, would have no real 
value nor would there be any assurance of 
sufficient stability and continuity of the con-
ditions of access to the markets of developed 
countries for the products of developing coun-
tries. 
Until now the problem of the application of 
restrictive measures and that of controlling the 
use of escape clauses have arisen essentially 
in relation to conditions of access to the 
markets of developed countries for primary 
products of developing countries. However, they 
are acquiring increasing importance in relation 
to manufactured and semi-manufactured pro-
ducts and their solution is particularly urgent 
for the establishment of a system of general 
preferences in favour of these products. 
Without new rules there is a serious risk 
that the industrialized countries, under pressure 
of internal interests and claiming situations of 
market disruption, may resort to restrictions in 
order to limit, or even eliminate, the margin of 
preference or the volume of goods imported 
under the preferential régime and that this will 
affect products for which the developing coun-
tries have been able to establish substantial 
export flows. The very fear of this risk would 
have an adverse psychological effect on indus-
trialists and exporters in developing countries 
who would not feel encouraged to take full 
advantage of the opportunities offered by the 
preferential treatment, since they would not feel 
they could really rely on such treatment or on 
The commitment to refrain from establishing or 
increasing customs duties or non-tarifiF restrictions on 
imports of products of special interest to the developing 
countries was accepted by the developed countries not 
only in recormnendation A.II.l of the first session of 
UNCTAD but also in article XXXVII of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and means that tariff 
and non-tariff restrictions for such products have been 
consolidated at the levels prevailing at the time that 
commitment went into effect. This represents a commit-
ment similar to that arising out of the concessions 
granted in negotiations carried out in GATT, and al-
though article XXXVII of the Agreement permits ex-
emption from this commitment in cases where there 
may be "compelling reasons" that impede its fulfilment, 
such non-observance must conform to the provisions of 
article XIX of the Agreement, relating to withdrawal of 
concessions. 
conditions of access to the markets of developed 
countries. 
The success of the system of general pre-
ferences will consequently depend to a large 
extent on not leaving to the unilateral decisions 
of countries granting such preferences the in-
terpretation and application of the relevant 
escape and market-disruption clauses. These 
should rather be subject to procedures for 
multilateral consultation, in which all interested 
parties can participate in examining the situa-
tions that might cause a country to resort to 
those clauses and in evaluating the corrective 
measures to be taken.^ ® 
As indicated in the Charters of Tequendama 
and Algiers, a very important complement to 
the efficacious operation of this consultative 
mechanism would be the establishment of 
objective criteria for determining the existence 
of situations of market disruption. Although 
some developed countries pointed out in the 
UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences 
that they considered it would be difficult to 
establish such criteria, there are precedents 
which would indicate that the problem is not 
insoluble. 
In the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which 
authorized the President of the United States to 
negotiate in the Kennedy Round, measures are 
laid down for facilitating adjustment to the new 
competitive situation facing industries affected 
by an increase in imports resulting from the 
concessions granted. 
A further precedent may be found in resolu-
tion 173 (CM/I/III-E) of the Council of Minis-
ters of LAFTA in which rules are established 
for products that have been the object of special 
concessions to the relatively less developed 
countries, in accordance with article 23 of the 
Montevideo Treaty.^^ This resolution provides 
20 This procedure would be a way of applying effec-
tively the provisions contained in article XXXVII of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in relation 
to the fulfilment of commitments set forth in the same 
article and to the achievement of the aims set forth in 
article XXXVI. It would likewise be a way of carrying 
out the unified action referred to in article XXXVIII. It 
should moreover be pointed out that in the November 
1960 Decision of the Contracting Parties, relating to the 
interpretation of article XIX of the General Agreement, 
it is recommended that the interested parties solve prob-
lems deriving from market disruption through "nego-
tiations" instead of resorting unilaterally to emergency 
action. 
21 This article contains an escape clause according to 
which the Contracting Parties may authorize any one 
of them to impose temporary restrictions on the imports 
of products originating in the Area and included in the 
liberalization programme. 
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that the Contracting Party interested in resorting 
to those restrictions should present a request 
accompanied by information showing that: (a) 
the projected measures would not mean a reduc-
tion in normal consumption; (b) imports from 
the Area would occur in such quantities and 
conditions that they would cause or threaten to 
cause serious injury to specified productive 
activities; and (c) such activities are of signi-
ficant importance to the national economy. 
The experience in GATT arising out of con-
sultations related to article XIX of the General 
Agreement (which refers precisely to the appli-
cation of restrictions on specified products due 
to situations of market disruption) and that of 
the EEC and EFTA in the application of escape 
clauses motivated by similar problems could, 
without doubt, likewise provide useful data for 
determining objective criteria which might be 
used by the consultative body in order to de-
termine the existence of market disruption situa-
tions.^2 
22 The secretariat of ECLA is undertaking a study 
with the same objective, in accordance with resolution 
272 (XII) , approved by the Commission at its twelfth 
session (Caracas, May 1967). 
D. RESULTS OF THE KENNEDY ROUND FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
1. OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES 
The opening of the Kennedy Round in May 
1964 aroused considerable and well-founded 
hopes of securing substantial improvements in 
the foreign trade conditions of the developing 
countries, particularly as regards access for 
their products to the markets of the developed 
countries. At the time of the adoption of the 
GATT Programme of Action at the Ministerial 
Meeting in May 1963, it had already been antici-
pated that there would be an opportunity to 
improve conditions of access in the course 
of the Kennedy Round. 
This attitude was grounded, first, on the 
general objectives that had been established for 
the negotiations, which included not only sizable 
tariff reductions but also (in contrast with 
previous negotiations) the reduction or elimina-
tion of other non-tariff restrictions, and, se-
condly, on the fact that special rules and pro-
cedures had been agreed upon for the participa-
tion of the developing countries in the Kennedy 
Round, so that they might obtain the best pos-
sible results. The developed countries had 
reaffirmed on many occasions their desire to 
make a substantial contribution, through the 
negotiations in question, to the solution of 
the developing countries' problems. 
Among the special provisions and regulations 
established in favour of the developing coun-
tries in the Kennedy Round, particular mention 
should be made of those designed to ensure 
that: 
(a) Products of special interest to the de-
veloping countries should be eliminated from 
the developed countries' lists of exceptions 
to the linear cut; 
(b) These same products should be included 
in the industrialized countries' lists of products 
subject to the selective-offer procedure; 
(c) In the case of these products it might be 
possible for tariff cuts to exceed 50 per cent; 
(d) Tariff concessions for products mainly 
supplied by developing countries, either in-
dividually or jointly, should be applied imme-
diately, instead of being spread over a period of 
five years in accordance with the procedure 
generally applicable (application without phas-
ing) ; 
(e) The developed countries should have no 
opportunity of excluding products of special 
interest to the developing countries from their 
offers, during the final phase of the negotiations, 
by applying the principle of reciprocity among 
themselves; 
( / ) The contribution of the developing coun-
tries should be subject to the principle of non-
reciprocity, this being understood to mean that 
a less-developed contracting party should not 
be expected to make an offer in the course of 
trade negotiations incompatible with its eco-
nomic development needs, its financial situation 
and its foreign trade; 
(g) Tariff and non-tariff barriers to the entry 
of tropical products should be eliminated to 
the maximum extent, while at the same time— 
in the view of certain developing countries 
enjoying preferences in the markets of par-
ticular industrialized countries—compensation 
should be accorded for the loss or reduction 
of those preferences; 
(h) Special conditions of access to world 
markets should be established for exports of 
temperate-climate commodities, primarily by 
means of appropriate international agreements. 
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The GATT Committee on Trade and De-
velopment, at its eighth session (January 1967), 
examined the progress made in the Kennedy 
Round in relation to the interests of the develop-
ing countries, concentrating in particular on: 
(a) Application without phasing, in favour 
of the developing countries, of all the conces-
sions negotiated; 
{b) The position of the countries signatories 
of the Yaoundé Convention with regard to 
special preferences. 
The subject of the application of concessions 
without phasing had always been approached 
from the angle of the products of special in-
terest to developing countries, on the basis of 
the most-favoured-nation clause. The industrial-
ized countries in general had expressed their 
sympathy with this approach, "in principle". 
At the above-mentioned meeting of the Com-
mittee on Trade and Development, it was 
pointed out that application without phasing 
on these lines would benefit only the traditional 
export products of developing countries, and 
would be of little use in relation to a whole 
range of products, particularly manufactures, 
of which the developing countries were not the 
chief suppliers. It was finally suggested that all 
the concessions negotiated in the Kennedy Round 
should be subject to application without phasing, 
regardless of whether a developing country was 
the principal supplier or not. 
It was obvious that the countries benefiting 
by the special preferences which EEC grants 
to the signatories of the Yaoundé Convention 
were unwilling to exchange them for the pros-
pect of a general system of preferences. Their 
representatives insisted that they should be 
allowed compensation for the preferences they 
would lose and a reasonable length of time in 
which to make sure that the compensation 
in question matched or outweighed the ad-
vantages of which they would be deprived if 
they renounced the existing preferential margins. 
This not only affected the negotiations on the 
tariff side, in respect of the products enjoying 
preferences, but also undermined the possibility 
of making all the Kennedy Round concessions 
subject to application without phasing. Nor 
were the countries eligible for such compensa-
tion precisely identified. 
2. EVALUATION OF RESULTS 
From the standpoint of the developing coun-
tries, and in relation to the objectives estab-
lished, the final results of the Kennedy Round 
fell short of expectations. Headway was made 
in the elimination of tariff barriers, for some 
of the products exported by the developing 
countries, but in all other respects little or no 
progress was achieved. In a joint statement 
formulated at the close of the negotiations, the 
developing countries recorded exactly the same 
impression, adding that they were "not in a 
position to share, to the same extent, the satis-
faction of the developed countries at the con-
clusion and the achievements of the Kennedy 
Round".23 
The results of the Kennedy Round can be 
evaluated according to different criteria. One 
way would be merely to determine the pos-
sible effect of the concessions accorded (in this 
case, tariff concessions) on trade flows; and 
another to attempt to draw up a balance sheet, 
by estimating, in accordance with certain hypo-
theses, the respective values of the concessions 
negotiated and of those on which agreement 
could not be reached. The simplest method is 
to show that, as against fairly substantial tariff 
concessions, satisfactory results were not ob-
tained in such fields as the reduction and elimi-
nation of non-tariff barriers,' the abolition of 
internal rates and taxes, the establishment of con-
ditions of free access to markets for tropical 
products, the elimination of discriminatory trade 
regimes, etc., and thence to infer that in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms what was 
not done far outweighed what was. In the future 
a procedure may possibly be devised whereby 
each and all of the negative and positive 
features of the negotiations can be objectively 
evaluated. 
In the meantime, to serve as a basis for dis-
cussion at the second session of UNCTAD, a 
method of evaluation that may be found useful 
is to -weight the tariff reductions fixed for each 
product by the actual value of trade in that pro-
duct during an earlier period, as has been done 
in the studies prepared by the UNCTAD secre-
tariat and by GATT itself. If this method is 
applied, its limitations must be clearly re-
cognized, since it gives only an approximate 
idea of the significance of the tariff cuts nego-
tiated, and may lead to erroneous conclusions 
respecting their value, at least in the case of 
the developing countries. 
Similarly this type of evaluation gives much 
more weight to products in which a considerable 
volume of trade already exists (whence it may 
be deduced that no serious problems are en-
countered regarding access to markets), but no 
See "Joint statement by the developing partici-
pating countries in the Kennedy Round negotiations" 
(GATT/994), Press Release, 30 June 1967. 
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clear picture is afforded of the possible effects 
of the concessions—or lack of them—on pro-
ducts for which the market is at present small 
or non-existent, with very difficult conditions of 
access, and in respect of which the developing 
countries are keenly interested in expanding 
their export trade.^^ 
A quantitative evaluation strictly confined to 
tariff concessions may be adequate for the in-
dustrial countries, in view of the amount of 
products involved in their reciprocal trade, the 
competitiveness of their industries and the fact 
that they control the application of non-tariff 
measures of all kinds, as well as transport 
facilities. In their case, the consolidation or 
reduction of a duty, however modest it may 
seem, represents a trade opportunity. 
Where the developing countries are concerned, 
the true importance of the concessions must be 
measured in terms of the trade they are capable 
of generating. This is the consideration that 
really matters, although its validity as a yard-
stick is not absolute. Thus, (o) there are no 
means of predicting how far it will be possible 
to take real advantage of the improved con-
ditions of access; (b) even if substantial im-
provements are achieved in the field of tariffs, 
they may be offset or rendered inoperative by 
the maintenance of other restrictions—quantita-
tive or disguised—which are acquiring steadily 
increasing importance; (c) a number of other 
24 A typical example is the 50 per cent reduction 
agreed upon in the case of certain duties which are 
applicable to specific mineral products, but which have 
been suspended for some years. This result can easily 
be assessed in quantitative terms as a concession, but in 
actual fact it does not represent a new concession at 
all, since the duty has been suspended so that the sup-
ply requirements of industries in the developed country 
concerned can be satisfactorily met. 
A quantitative evaluation also shows distorted results 
in those cases where apparently considerable tariff con-
cessions are in practice of little or no significance. For 
example, the European Economic Community levies a 
4 per cent import duty on fish meal, a product of par-
ticular interest to some Latin American countries; the 
50 per cent cut implied lowering this duty to 2 per cent, 
but the 2 per cent reduction will be effected in five 
annual instalments of 0.4 per cent, from 1968 to 1972. 
There will certainly be a 50 per cent cut, in line with 
the optimum procedure negotiated, but its effect on 
trade will not be exactly spectacular. Yet according to 
a quantitative evaluation the volume of trade benefited 
would amount to tens of millions of dollars. 
The best plan would be to exclude from any estimate 
those traditional products for which regular access to 
the markets of industrialized countries was already as-
sured (regardless of the incidence of tariff duties), and 
for which concessions are mainly nominal, and to in-
clude those products which were not the object of direct 
negotiation because their share in trade in 1964 was 
so modest, but which have benefited by the application 
of the most favoured-nation clause. 
factors would have to be taken into account. 
These include the extent to which the incidence 
of the tariff or the real protection it affords is 
modified at the different stages of processing 
by virtue of concessions granted in respect of 
the raw material and the finished product; real 
or potential export opportunities; the elasticity 
of supply and demand; competition from third 
countries—including the developed countries 
themselves; competition from synthetic substi-
tutes; and indirect concessions obtained through 
the most-favoured-nation clause. 
The evaluation made by the UNCTAD secre-
tariat^ ® has the merit of attempting to achieve 
the fusion of quantitative and qualitative elements 
without which a mere list of tariff reductions is 
meaningless. It endeavours to show how the con-
cessions negotiated may improve conditions of 
access to the developed countries' markets for 
exports from the developing countries. The 
analysis is focused on those countries or areas 
(the European Economic Community, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States) which 
absorb a major proportion of the exports in 
question. It is rightly pointed out that in the 
case of many agricultural commodities the elimi-
nation of non-tariff barriers (quantitative restric-
tions, internal consumption taxes, variable im-
port duties, production and export subsidies, 
etc.) is a more urgent and significant objective 
than tariff reductions, so far as improving con-
ditions of access is concerned. In respect of the 
manufactures and semi-manufactures group (in-
cluding processed agricultural products), atten-
tion is drawn to the gradual escalation of tariff 
structures in the industrial countries accord-
ing to the degree of processing undergone 
by the product, as well as to the fact that the 
nominal duties on manufactures and semi-
manufactures do not reflect the real degree of 
protection, which is usually quite high. Cases in 
point are such products as leather goods, cotton 
textiles, vegetable oils, petroleum products, pre-
pared and preserved foods, wood veneers and 
plywood, and rubber manufactures, all of which 
are of export interest to developing countries. 
The following are among the main con-
clusions reached in the preliminary evaluation 
prepared by UNCTAD. 
(o) The negotiations implied a significant 
reduction of tariff barriers for exports shipped 
to the four leading markets (EEC, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the United States). On an 
average the tariff cuts exceeded those secured 
23 See "The Kennedv Round: preliminary evaluation 
of results with special reference to developing coun-
tries" (TD/6 and Supplements 1, 2 and 3). 
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in previous tariíF negotiations, since in the case 
of manufactured goods they averaged approxi-
mately 36 per cent. The operation as a whole 
will facilitate the expansion of trade among 
industrialized countries and may indirectly im-
prove demand for products exported by develop-
ing countries. 
(b) The groups of products for which substan-
tial tariff reductions were obtained are character-
ized by advanced techniques and capital inten-
sity. Where chemical products are concerned, the 
increase in trade opportunities may sharpen 
the trend towards the substitution of synthetics 
for primary products. It therefore seems likely 
that unless other trade policy measures are 
adopted in the field to correct such tendencies, 
the Kennedy Round will contribute to a further 
decline in the developing countries' share in 
world trade. 
(c) The tariff reductions obtained for the 
primary products of industrialized countries 
exceeded, on an average, those benefiting the 
primary products of developing countries. 
(d) Generally speaking, products of interest 
to the developing countries were not accorded 
substantial reductions, and in some cases remain 
subject to quantitative restrictions and other 
non-tariff barriers. 
(e) The industrialized countries did not agree 
to take any steps towards modifying the support 
policies applied in favour of their agricultural 
production, or the fiscal measures affecting pro-
ducts from developing countries. 
( / ) The "effective protection" of transforming 
industries, although reduced in some cases, is 
still a major impediment to imports of manu-
factures and semi-manufactures from developing 
countries. 
(g) No change was introduced in existing 
preferential regimes as a result of the nego-
tiations. 
(h) No progress was made with regard to 
the reduction or elimination of non-tariff bar-
riers. 
The GATT secretariat evaluated the results 
of the Kennedy Round with a view to "assisting 
Governments to assess the significance of the 
reductions on individual items in terms of 
the trade involved".^® The analysis covered six 
industrial markets (EEC, Japan, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, the United Kingdom and the United 
States) whose purchases account for 90 per cent 
of the aggregate exports of the developing coun-
tries. A study was made of 367 tariff items. 
4R. 
26 See GATT documents COM.TD/46 and COM.TD/ 
which embrace almost all the products exported 
by the developing countries, excluding cereals, 
meat and dairy products. Some of the con-
clusions reached in connexion with the seven 
commodity sectors analysed are presented below. 
Tropical products. Although real progress was 
made as a result of the negotiations, "there is 
no doubt that the final results were below the 
expectations of at least a number of developing 
countries". This outcome is ascribed to the 
maintenance of preferential margins for a few 
privileged suppliers; to the protection of 
domestic production against competition from 
tropical products; and to policies based on 
fiscal considerations. 
Processed foodstuffs. While recognizing that 
substantial tariff reductions were obtained, the 
GATT secretariat points out that many items in 
this group are basically subject to non-tariff 
restrictions which hinder their access to in-
dustrial markets. 
Non-ferrous metals and products thereof. Of 
the trade in respect of which concessions were 
granted, 63 per cent was already duty-free before 
the Kennedy Round. Tariff reductions were 
made for the remainder, but in many cases the 
application of the duties concerned had already 
been suspended. 
Cotton yarn and fabrics. Tariff cuts, which 
were sizable in some industrial markets, were 
made contingent upon the maintenance of 
the quantitative restrictions established under the 
Long-Term Arrangement Regarding Interna-
tional Trade in Cotton Textiles until 30 Septem-
ber 1 9 7 0 . 
Clothing. Tariff duties on products in this 
category varied from 15 to 25 per cent ad 
valorem. Concessions were obtained for 60 per 
cent of this trade, which now falls within the 
10.1 to 20 per cent range. 
Other textiles. The proportion of zero duty 
rates increased from 13.5 to 58 per cent, mainly 
owing to the concessions granted by Sweden 
and the United States. 
Leather and leather manufactures. In this 
sector the 50 per cent linear cut was applied 
on a large scale. 
3. FACTORS LIMITING THE RESULTS OF THE 
KENNEDY ROUND 
In the report of the GATT Ad Hoc Group on 
Assessment of Kennedy Round Results ,men-
tion is made of the grounds on which the 
developed countries failed to take fuller action 
27 See GATT document COM.TD/49, 2 November 
lQfi7. 
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on particular products or groups of products 
of interest to the developing countries. The 
causes adduced, which to a large extent conflict 
with the regulations and objectives already 
established in favour of the developing coun-
tries prior to the opening of the negotiations, 
may be summed up as follows. 
(а) Fiscal considerations, accounting for the 
maintenance of import duties and internal fiscal 
charges on tropical products of interest to 
developing countries, such as coffee, tea, cocoa 
and bananas; 
(б) Protection, especially for agricultural, 
primary and industrial products, to which the 
duties applied are progressive according to 
the degree of processing; 
(c) Problems deriving from the preferences 
established in favour of a number of developing 
countries; 
(d) Problems relating to the adoption of non-
tariff measures in respect of products for which 
tariff or other trade barriers are not the prin-
cipal factor regulating trade. This point shows 
how seriously limited is the efficacy of negotia-
tions of the traditional type, including the 
Kennedy Round, since they are almost entirely 
confined to the tariff sector, in which the in-
dustrial countries have a strong interest and 
are in a position to agree upon commitments; 
(e) Joint action, which made a great many 
of the benefits accorded to the developing 
countries conditional upon unanimous agree-
ment among the industrialized countries. This 
meant that a number of good intentions on 
the part of one or a few of the latter could 
not bear fruit. For example, it was impossible 
to secure general agreement that the Kennedy 
Round concessions should be applied without 
phasing in favour of the developing countries, 
even in respect of products of particular interest 
to them;28 
(/) Technical problems stemming from the 
fact that the tariff nomenclatures of certain 
developed countries did not differentiate between 
products which are produced in developing 
countries and those emanating from developed 
countries; 
(g) Concessions apt to benefit developed 
countries because of the small share of the 
28 Ten developed countries (Canada, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States) submitted 
lists of concessions for application without phasing, 
some being conditional upon parliamentary approval 
and others on similar action by other developed coun-
tries (see GATT document L/2912). 
developing countries in world trade in certain 
products; 
{h) Problems of reciprocity between de-
veloped countries and of negotiating balance. 
In some instances, an item was excluded from 
offers because the principal suppliers were 
countries not participating in the negotiations. 
This happened in the case of crude petroleum 
and to some extent affected Latin America's 
negotiations; 
( j ) "Sensitive" products: a number of pro-
ducts of particular interest to developing coun-
tries were considered to be "sensitive" items 
by certain developed countries. 
The Kennedy Round demonstrated the need 
for the Latin American countries to co-ordinate 
their action more closely in order to increase its 
efficacy and strengthen their bargaining power, 
as was recommended at the meetings of CECLA. 
For example, small as was the number of Latin 
American countries that participated directly in 
the negotiations, it would have been extremely 
useful for them to have presented a consolidated 
list of offers, to be formalized subject to a 
number of concessions from the industrialized 
countries. This seemed feasible in the case of 
the Latin American countries which had no 
conflicting interests. The examples afforded by 
the European Economic Cormnunity and the 
Nordic countries,^® among those in the in-
dustrialized group, give some idea of how bar-
gaining power is increased when concerted 
action is taken. 
4. RESULTS OF THE KENNEDY ROUND IN RELA-
TION TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN 
GENERAL AND THE LATIN AMERICAN COUN-
TRIES IN PARTICULAR 
The significance of the results of the Kennedy 
Round for trade among the industrialized coun-
tries is beyond question, but the negotiations 
fell far short of fulfilling the aims and meeting 
the expectations of the developing countries in 
general and the Latin American countries in par-
ticular. This is especially true of agricultural 
products—^which are of vital importance to the 
developing countries—since most of the prob-
lems affecting them remained unsolved. Owing 
29 In the initial phase of the Kennedy Round, Den-
mark, Finland, Norway and Sweden negotiated sepa-
rately, but in view of their lack of bargaining power, 
especially vis-a-vis the European Economic Community, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, they 
changed their tactics and negotiated on a joint basis, as 
the Scandinavian Group. The results of the tariff con-
cessions showed that negotiating en bloc multiplied 
their opportunities of trad© expansion. 
to the existence of discriminatory systems of 
preferences and the support they obtained from 
the developed countries associated with such 
systems, complete liberalization of trade in tro-
pical products was not secured. Similarly, 
almost the whole of the sector comprising tem-
perate zone agricultural products—^mainly 
foodstuffs, in particular cereals, meat and dairy 
products—was relegated to a secondary position, 
because the industrial countries failed to reach 
agreement with respect to the negotiation of 
non-tariff concessions. This view is borne out 
by the limited scope of the agreement on cereals, 
in comparison with what was originally pro-
grammed, and the non-ratification of the meat 
agreement between EEC and the Argentine 
Republic. 
In the case of manufactures, and also in that 
of certain primary products, the negotiations 
were conducted mainly among the "major nego-
tiators"—i.e., among the developed countries 
themselves—, so that the liberalization measures 
benefited chiefly those manufactures and semi-
manufactures which constitute a substantial pro-
portion of trade among the countries in question, 
while many products of particular interest to 
the developing countries were left on one 
side. The tariff reductions negotiated related 
mainly to lines of production characterized by 
advanced technology or high degrees of capital-
intensity, i.e., products that the great majority 
of the developing countries are not in a position 
to export. The cuts agreed upon in respect of 
chemical products, which are also exported 
mainly by the developed countries, may speed 
up the displacement of natural by synthetic 
products. In the last analysis, all this is liable 
to accelerate the expansion of the developed 
countries' reciprocal trade, without giving the 
developing countries any real share in the in-
crease achieved, except perhaps in the case of 
those at relatively more advanced stages of eco-
nomic growth. 
Thus, the gains of the developing countries 
were purely marginal, and were contingent upon 
the indirect benefits deriving from the most-
favoured-nation clause.®® Although, on the one 
hand, the concessions granted to one another 
by developed countries are also applicable to 
the developing countries, and in some instances 
may signify a substantial improvement in con-
ditions of access to markets and may enlarge 
30 This was the case of one Latin American coun-
try in connexion with a type of wool it exports to the 
United States market, because a prior agreement had 
not been reached between the United States and Austra-
lia, its leading supplier. 
the whole export potential of certain pro-
ducts, the value of many of the concessions 
accorded by developed countries in response to 
requests submitted by the Latin American coun-
tries, and by the developing countries in general, 
is considerably lessened by the fact that through 
the most-favoured-nation clause they are auto-
matically extended to the other developed coun-
tries. 
From the broader standpoint of the opportuni-
ties they afford for increasing the export 
earnings of the developing countries through 
real improvements in conditions of access for 
their products, the concessions will have to be 
weighed against the persistence of non-tariff 
barriers, the application of differential maritime 
freight rates, and other factors hindering access 
to the industrial countries' markets. 
The Latin American countries that took part 
in the Kennedy Round®^ have evaluated its 
results by quantifying the concessions and 
weighting them by the value of their exports in 
1964. With a few exceptions, they are at one 
in considering that the concessions obtained for 
their traditional export lines and the prospects 
opened up for certain products of potential 
export interest are favourable. 
On the other hand, from the standpoint of 
real opportunities for new trade, the conclusion 
must be that little or no substantial change 
has been achieved. A study of the lists of con-
cessions obtained by Latin American countries 
shows that in many instances they are con-
centrated in a few products currently exported 
to the markets of the industrialized countries, 
so that tariff reductions or bindings may exert 
no decisive influence on the expansion of exports. 
Conversely, in the case of a number of products 
that were not taken into account in the direct 
negotiations because they were exported only 
sporadically or in very small quantities, and 
for which no evaluation can be attempted 
because no direct concessions were granted to 
Latin American countries, the trade potential 
of some developing country may possibly be 
improved through the operation of the most-
favoured-nation clause. 
It can be asserted, in short, that the demands 
of the Latin American countries were not met 
in respect o f : (a) complete liberalization of 
trade in tropical products; (6) a substantial 
reduction of non-tariff barriers for temperate 
zone agricultural products; (c) tariff cuts of 50 
per cent or over for manufactured goods; ( ¿ ) 
31 They were: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican 
Republic, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Peru, Trinidad and To-
bago, and Uruguay. 
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immediate application (i.e., without phasing) of 
all the Kennedy Round concessions in respect of 
both tradition and potential trade; (e) elimi-
nation of special preferences, particularly those 
favouring tropical products. 
The foregoing is confirmed by a comparison 
of tariff duties and non-tariff restrictions on 
imports of products of interest to Latin America 
before and after the Kennedy Round (see 
annex I ) . On the basis of this comparison and 
of data prepared by UNCTAD, a list of the 
most important products of particular interest 
to the Latin American countries is also pre-
sented, with an indication in each case as to 
whether there has been a real improvement in 
conditions of access to the markets of the 
developed countries (see table 2 ) . 
5. FUTURE ACTION 
In the Charter of Tequendama, the Latin 
American countries set forth the measures that 
should be adopted by the developed countries 
in order to improve conditions of access to 
their markets both for primary products and 
for manufactures and semi-manufactures ex-
ported by the developing countries. In the 
Charter of Algiers, the same group of countries 
urged that the developed countries should adopt 
a set of measures directed towards those ends, 
with emphasis on the immediate application in 
favour of all developing countries (i.e., without 
phasing) of the concessions agreed on during 
the Kennedy Round in respect of products of 
export interest to the developing countries; that 
the developed countries should state at the 
second session of UNCTAD that all concessions 
agreed on during the Kennedy Round for pro-
ducts of export interest to developing countries 
would be extended at the time of implementa-
tion to all developing countries, whether or not 
members of GATT, without reciprocity; and 
that, on the basis of the evaluations of the 
Kennedy Round being prepared by the UNCTAD 
and GATT secretariats and those prepared by 
governments themselves, the New Delhi Con-
ference should identify "all outstanding issues 
for further negotiations". In these negotiations 
all developing countries should be allowed to 
participate if they so desired, and it should be 
understood that neither the most-favoured-nation 
clause nor the principle of reciprocity should 
be applicable in the case of developing coun-
tries. 
In this context, the forthcoming session of 
UNCTAD will obviously have to concentrate on 
the negotiation of specific action programmes 
covering the various fields in which no definite 
progress was made during the Kennedy Round. 
However, new tariff negotiations—at any rate 
of the type hitherto conducted—should not be 
immediately embarked upon, not only because 
it would be difficult to secure the full co-
operation of all the developed countries just 
after the close of such long-drawn-out negotia-
tions as the Kennedy Round, but also for other 
reasons connected with the possible scope and 
coverage of the new negotiations. 
In the manufactures sector, the potential 
adoption of a system of general preferences 
leaves only limited room for new tariff conces-
sions. As regards primary commodities, there is 
a consensus of opinion in favour of the com-
modity-by-commodity approach, which would 
make it possible to identify in each individual 
case the nature of the barriers, their significance 
in relation to world trade flows, and the specific 
measures that might be adopted to remove them. 
An essential objective of the New Delhi Con-
ference should therefore be to establish the 
bases or principles and conditions for the nego-
tiation of these specific programmes, to deter-
mine the time-schedule and procedures for their 
implementation, and to set up groups of experts 
to formulate, in accordance with clearly-defined 
terms of reference and within fixed time limits, 
such proposals as they might consider relevant 
for each product or product group in each of the 
fields where action is required. 
In any event, it would at least be necessary 
for a study to be made—first by panels of ex-
perts and then through inter-country consulta-
tions—of the restrictions which are most dif-
ficult to eliminate. In the case of agricultural 
commodities, for example, consideration should 
be given to the question of how far the restric-
tions on temperate zone products are maintained 
by each individual developed country as an 
integral part of its over-all system for the pro-
tection of its agriculture, and to the possibilities 
of eliminating or reducing their incidence on 
products of special interest to the developing 
countries. The same procedure might be followed 
with regard to restrictions affecting industrial 
products or groups of products, in cases where 
their removal presents particular difiiculties. 
Similar action would have to be taken in 
respect of the standstill commitment, the deter-
mination of minimum percentage shares for the 
developing countries in the provision of supplies 
for the developed countries, the abolition of dis-
criminatory preferences, the reduction and elimi-
nation of tariff and non-tariff restrictions and of 
internal taxes, etc. 
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w 00 Table 2 (continued') 
PRODUCTS OF EXPORT INTEREST TO THE LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES AND CONCESSIONS MADE DURING THE KENNEDY ROUND TO 
IMPROVE ACCESS FOR THOSE PRODUCTS TO THE MARKETS OF DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
BTN 
classification 
Main Latin American 
exporters Major markets Summary of action taken 
02.01A 
Bovine meat, fresh, chilled or 
frozen 
03.01 
Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen 
(selected) 
03.03 
Shellfish, fresh, chilled, frozen, 










Coffee (raw and roasted) 
Argentina, Mexico, Nicara-
gua, Uruguay 
United States, EEC, United 
Kingdom 
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago United States 
Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, Pan-
ama, Venezuela, Guyana 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecua-
dor, Honduras, Panama 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 
Mexico 
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala 
United States 
All 
United States, EEC, United 
Kingdom 
United States (on a small 
scale) 
All 
No action taken. No improvement in access to markets. 
The United States abolished duties on two items of little 
importance; duties for tuna and sea herring were already 
zero. Although access to markets improved (except in the 
case of the United Kingdom, which made no concession), 
tariff barriers (high in some cases) still remain. 
In the United States nearly all supplies already entered 
duty free; on the remainder, existing rates were halved. 
Same conclusion as for the previous item. 
No action taken. No improvement in access. The three main 
markets with tariff barriers retain them at relatively high 
levels; the United States applies no duty, and in two 
markets (EEC and the United Kingdom) quota restric-
tions are also applied. 
Limited improvement in access to the United Kingdom. All 
four markets continue to apply tariff barriers, in some 
cases at a relatively high level, which in EEC and Japan 
are combined with other restrictive measures. 
Limited improvement in access to the markets of EEC, 
United Kingdom and United States. Japan and the 
United Kingdom retain quantitative restrictions in addi-
tion to duties. 
All supplies already entered the United States duty free; 
improvement in access to the United Kingdom and 
Japanese markets. However, some relatively high duties 
remain, together with quantitative and other restrictions. 
09.04 
Pepper and pimento Brazil, Jamaica, Mexico 
10.05 




Castor oil seeds 
Mexico 
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru 
15.07 
Fixed vegetable oils, etc.' Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
16.02 
Other prepared or preserved Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
meat Uruguay 
16.03 
Meat extracts and meat juices Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay 
16.04 
Prepared or preserved fish Ecuador, Peru 
>o 
17.01 
Beet and cane sugar (solid) Barbados, Cuba, Guyana, 
Dominican Republic 
United States, EEC, United 
Kingdom 
Limited improvement in access to the United States mar-
ket; greater improvements in access to the United King-
dom and Japanese markets. No improvement in access 
to the EEC market, in which duties remain relatively 
high. 
EEC, United Kingdom Limited improvement in access to the markets of the 
United Kingdom and the United States, the latter being 
a minor importer; no action was taken by the EEC, in 
which maize is subject to a variable levy. 
United States 
EEC, United Kingdom 
No action taken. 
Imports into EEC already entered duty free. No action was 
taken by the United Kingdom. The only action taken was 
by the United States, which does not import this product. 
EEC, United States, Japan Access to the United States and Japan improved to some 
extent. Many nominal duties remained relatively high 
and "effective protection" of groundnut oil increased in 
Japan. Quantitative restrictions were retained in EEC, 
the United States and Japan. 
United Kingdom, United 
States, Japan 
The main improvements in access were to the United States 
and the United Kingdom, although in some cases duties 
were maintained on products of interest to Argentina and 
Brazil. More limited improvements in access to Japan 
and EEC. In some cases relatively high duties and quan-
titative restrictions remain. 
EEC, United Kingdom, United 
States 
Access to these markets was improved by abolition or 
reduction of duties. 
United States Improvement in access to the United States, although no 
action was taken on various types of sardines and tuna. 
All, plus the Soviet Union No improvement whatsoever. All markets retain either a 
combination of tariffs and quantitative restrictions or a 




Mein Latin American 
exporters 
18.01 
Cocoa beans Brazil, Ecuador 
18.03 
Cocoa paste Brazil 
18.04 
Cocoa butter Brazil 
18.05 
Cocoa powder, unsweetened Brazil, Dominican Republic 
18.06 
Chocolate and other fruit Dominican Republic 
preparations containing cocoa 
23.01 
Flour and meals of meat, Argentina, Chile, Peru 
offals, fish, etc. 
23 .04 
Oil-cake and other residues Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 
24.01 
Unmanufactured tobacco Dominican Republic 
Table 2 (continued') 
Major markets Summary oí action taken 
United States, Japan United States imports were already duty free. Improve-
ments in access to the United Kingdom and Japan, which 
abolished existing duties. No improvement in access to 
EEC, in which internal taxes are applied in addition to 
duties. 
United Kingdom, EEC, Japan All-round improvement; "effective protection" reduced in 
EEC and Japan, and abolished in the United States and 
United Kingdom. Internal taxes, in addition to the tariff, 
retained in EEC. 
All All-round improvement; "effective protection" reduced in 
EEC, Japan and the United States, and abolished in the 
United Kingdom. Internal taxes, in addition to the tariff, 
retained in EEC. 
United States 
United States 
Access was improved. The United States halved its duty. 
Access was improved only to the United States market, in 
which "effective protection" of processing was reduced. 
All Access was improved to EEC, which still applies duties; 
imports into Japan and the United States were already 
duty free, but Japan still retains some quantitative re-
strictions. 
EEC, United Kingdom, United 
States 
Some improvement in access to the United Kingdom and 
the United States, which still apply duties. No improve-
ment in the case of Japan, which also retains quantita-
tive restrictions. 
United States Little improvement made. High tariff barriers still main-
tained. 
26.01A and 26.01B 
Iron ore and concentrates and Brazil, Chile, Peru, Venezuela 
roasted iron pyrites 
26.01C 
Copper ore and concentrates Chile, Peru, Nicaragua 
26.01E 
Bauxite and concentrates Dominican Republic, Guyana, 
Jamaica 
26.01G 
Zinc ore and concentrates Mexico, Peru 
26.01H 
Tin ore and concentrates Bolivia, Mexico 
26.01M Tungsten ore and concentrates Bolivia, Brazil 





Petroleum and shale oils, other Venezuela, Trinidad and To-
than crude bago 
32.01 
Vegetable tanning extracts Argentina 
41.01 
Raw hides and skins Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Uruguay 
41.02 
Bovine leather Argentina, Uruguay 
All All imports into the four main markets already entered 
duty free. 
All The United States reduced its temporarily suspended duty 
from 1.7 to 0.8 dollar cents per pound. This duty was 
suspended from 9 February 1966 to 30 June 1968. Im-
ports to the remaining markets already entered duty free. 
All There were no duties in EEC, the United Kingdom and 
Japan. The United States abolished its duties, which had 
already been suspended. 
United Stales, Japan No improvement in access to the United States, the only 
country still applying duties. 
United States, United King- No improvement, since imports were already duty free, 
dom, Japan 
EEC, United States, United Improved access to the United States, which still applied 
Kingdom duties. Quantitative restrictions retained by Japan. 
EEC, United States, United No improvement in market access. Quantitative restrictions 
Kingdom retained in the United States and EEC. 
All Slight improvement in access. Quantitative restrictions re-
tained in EEC and Japan. 
EEC, United Kingdom, United 
States 
Slight improvement. Access to the United Kingdom mar-
ket would be further improved if the American Selling 
Price system were abolished. 
All All remaining tariffs in the United States and United 
Kingdom were abolished, except for imports of certain 
bovine varieties into the United States. The bulk of im-
ports into all main markets already entered duty free; 
EEC and Japan providing entirely duty-free access. 
United Kingdom, EEC, United 
States 
Access to the three markets was improved and the "effec-
tive protection" of processing was reduced. Duties of up 
to 20 per cent remain. 
K> Table 2 (continued) 
BTN 
classijication 
Main Latin American 
exporters Major markets Summary of action taken 
41.04 
Goat and kidskin leather Mexico 
53.01 
Sheep's or lambs' wool (not Argentina, Uruguay 
carded or combed) 
United States 
EEC, United States 
Some improvement in this market. 
Access was improved to the two markets (United States 
and United Kingdom) that still apply duties. 
53.05 
Sheep's or lambs' wool or other Argentina, Peru, Uruguay EEC, Japan, United States 
animal hair (carded or 
combed) 
Only very limited improvement in access to one of the 
three markets that still apply duties (United States). 
55.01 
Raw cotton Brazil, El Salvador, Guate- EEC, Japan, United Kingdom 
mala, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Peru 
Limited improvement in access to the United Kingdom. 
Imports already entered duty free into EEC and Japan. 
The United States is an exporter of this product, al-
though it imports small quantities of extra-long fibre, 
mainly from the United Arab Republic. 
57.04 
Other vegetable textile, fibres, Brazil, Haiti, Mexico 
raw or processed (not spun) 
EEC, Japan, United States Imports into EEC and Japan were already duty free, as 
well as most United States imports. Some improvement in 
access to the United States. 
74.01 
Copper matte, cement, copper, Chile, Peru 
etc. (including refined and 
unrefined copper) 
EEC, United Kingdom, Japan Access was improved to the three markets (United States, 
Japan and United Kingdom) that still apply duties, and 
"effective protection" of processing was reduced, in vary-
ing degrees. 
78.01 
Unwrousrht lead Mexico, Peru EEC, United States, Japan Access was improved only to Japan and the United King-
dom, the latter country importing almost exclusively from 
Australia and Canada. 
Source: UNCTAD, "The Kennedy Round: preliminary evaluation of results with special reference to developing countries" (TD/6, Supp. 3). 
a Including groundnut oil, palm oil, palm kernel oil, coconut oil, cottonseed oil, sesame oil, sunflower seed oil, castor oil, soya bean oil, linseed oil, olive 
oil, etc. 
With regard to the removal of non-tariff bar-
riers, it should be recalled that in a document 
entitled "Programme for Expansion of Interna-
tional Trade. Obstacles to Trade in Industrial 
P r o d u c t s " , t h e Director-General of GATT 
points out that the results of the Kennedy Round 
in respect of barriers of this type against trade 
in industrial products were relatively modest 
in comparison with those achieved in the tariff 
field, and notes that that is an area of great 
concern, which may grow in importance as the 
tariff reductions agreed upon in the Kennedy 
Round are implemented. He also suggests that 
32 L/2893, 7 November 1967. 
an examination of non-tariff barriers should cer-
tainly form part of the activities of the work-
ing groups proposed by GATT for individual 
sectors, and that governments should be invited 
to submit lists of non-tariff restrictions which 
they believe to have an adverse effect on their 
export trade. 
Another possibility to investigate is that of 
negotiating the establishment of a time-schedule 
or series of deadlines for the fulfilment of com-
mitments or recommendations designed to secure 
the gradual elimination of the various tariff and 
non-tariff restrictions applied by the developed 
countries to the developing countries' export 
products. 
I I I . L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E S E C O N D S E S S I O N O F U N C T A D 
A . OBJECTIVES OF THE SECOND SESSION 
Most of the problems affecting the external 
sector of developing countries, and the inter-
national trade and financial policy measures 
for overcoming them, are already sufficiently 
well identified. The 1961 Ministerial Declara-
tion, the 1963 Programme of Action, the new 
part IV of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade and the Final Act of the first session 
of UNCTAD constitute in this respect a fairly 
detailed inventory of what has to be done. 
Sufficient progress has been made in some 
respects to pass from the stage of formulating 
principles, commitments, recommendations and 
general declarations to the stage of implement-
ing them through action programmes which 
would, as far as possible, establish specific 
targets and time-limits. 
Multilateral negotiations between different 
groups of countries will be needed to establish 
such programmes. A fundamental objective of 
the second session of UNCTAD should therefore 
be to establish the basic principles and specific 
aims for such negotiations, and to decide on a 
time schedule and procedures for carrying them 
out. Little would be gained by resuming discus-
sion of general questions of principle, or by 
adopting new recommendations or endorsing 
those already adopted, if that meant further 
postponement of action. The question is, there-
fore, to deterimne not what has to be done but 
how to do it. 
It is not feasible to do this in all the areas 
covered by the agenda for the second session of 
UNCTAD, since in some insufficient progress 
has been made in the preparation of specific 
proposals, even though the nature of the prob-
lems has been identified. The objectives of the 
second session of UNCTAD are more limited 
in those fields, because the action to be under-
taken needs to be studied in greater depth and 
discussed more fully before specific negotiations 
can be undertaken. Consideration should be 
given at the session to the advisability of estab-
lishing groups of experts to carry out such 
studies and prepare reports, within a given time-
limit and in accordance with fairly specific 
terms of reference, containing suggestions re-
garding the type of action needed, for sub-
sequent consideration by government representa-
tives in UNCTAD with a view to negotiating 
specific measures or programmes of action. 
The best course in some cases would be to 
establish consultation machinery rather than ac-
tion programmes—e.g., with regard to proce-
dures for applying escape clauses—, or to draw 
up international agreements laying down mini-
mum requirements in respect of standards of 
hygiene, quality, brands, containers, etc., and 
setting up arbitration tribunals to consider 
claims in respect of non-observance of those 
regulations. 
As regards primary commodities, for exam-
ple, there is no doubt that the work of the second 
session of UNCTAD in connexion with trade 
liberalization should not be confined to general 
recommendations. A more realistic approach 
that might yield immediate results would be to 
demarcate certain aspects of the general ques-
tion of liberalization—e.g., tariff restrictions 
and internal taxes on imports of tropical com-
modities—, and request a group of experts or 
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the UNCTAD secretariat to work out specific 
proposals for the reduction or elimination of 
those restrictions and taxes. It would have to 
be understood that the proposed solutions would 
be negotiated on a certain date. A similar proce-
dure might be adopted in the case of temperate 
zone commodities, for which the problem of 
trade liberalization is linked to that of the 
developed countries' existing protectionist poli-
cies; therefore, the most feasible solution 
seems to be to negotiate commitments guaran-
teeing a minimum participation in the markets 
of developed countries and in future increases 
in consumption. 
There are various precedents which demon-
strate the advantages of following this course. 
For example, with regard to the establishment 
of a preferential system in favour of exports 
of manufactures and semi-manufactures from 
developing countries, although the Group on 
•Preferences of the UNCTAD Committee on 
Manufactures clarified many aspects of the prob-
lem, no specific proposals were put forward 
until a small group of government representa-
tives assumed the task of preparing them. Sup-
plementary financing offers another example. 
At the request of the Secretary-General of 
UNCTAD, the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development prepared a project 
for discussion by the Trade and Development 
Board and eventual negotiation at the second 
session of UNCTAD. 
At the fifth session of the Trade and Develop-
ment Board there was general agreement on the 
objectives of the second session of UNCTAD, 
and the various agenda items were grouped in 
three main categories: (a) items which simply 
provide information for the Conference (trade 
trends and a review of the general economic 
situation of the developing countries, progress 
achieved in implementing the previous recom-
mendations, etc.); (6) items for which specific 
measures could be adopted, since they have al-
ready been sufficiently discussed; (c) subjects 
on which a similar degree of understanding has 
not been reached and for which the type of 
studies and research required to support specific 
proposals for action needs to be defined. This 
division does not imply any criteria with regard 
to priority, but is simply meant as a practical 
means of enabling the Conference to concentrate 
on areas in which concrete results may be ex-
pected. 
As a result of this grouping of topics, the 
President of the Trade and Development Board, 
at its fifth session, was able to stress the desir-
ability of distinguishing the main "centres of 
gravity" or "points of crystallization" of the 
coming Conference. He said that in the primary 
commodities sector there had been general agree-
ment that international action could be success-
ful only by means of a commodity-by-com-
modity approach. This was true not only of the 
negotiation of international commodity agree-
ments or arrangements, but also of the conclu-
sion of other agreements such as those relating 
to trade liberalization, the creation, operation 
and financing of buffer stocks, and programmes 
for the diversification of production and ex-
ports. However, this approach did not imply, in 
principle, that consideration should not also be 
given to the guiding principles of commodity 
trade policy as a whole. 
He said that progress had been made in 
discussing a system of preferences for exports 
of manufactures and semi-manufactures from 
developing countries. Consideration of this sub-
ject should lead to agreement because the de-
veloped countries were prepared to present the 
main outlines of such a scheme of preferences in 
favour of the developing countries. In this re-
gard, he thought it advisable to draw up an 
over-all balance-sheet of the results of the 
Kennedy Round in order to determine the extent 
and effects of the concessions established for 
exports from developing countries, and the 
progress still to be made in respect of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers. 
As regards financing, he said that the Inter-
Governmental Group appointed to examine the 
proposals of the International Bank had made 
considerable headway in its discussions and had 
been authorized to report its findings direct to 
the Conference. It was not unreasonable to hope, 
therefore, that the Group would be able to sub-
mit a draft for negotiation at the coming 
UNCTAD session. 
B . COMMODITY PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 
1. IMPROVEMENT OF CONDITIONS OF ACCESS TO 
MARKETS 
The problems discussed in the present section 
and the suggestions put forward for solving 
them converge upon a single point: the improve-
ment of conditions of access to the markets 
of the developed countries for the developing 
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countries' commodity exports. At its first ses-
sion, UNCTAD unanimously adopted a balanced 
set of recommendations (see the Final Act, an-
nex A . I H ) whose ultimate objective is to en-
sure such an improvement in conditions of ac-
cess. According to the first of these, "no new 
tariff or non-tariff barriers should be created 
(or existing barriers increased) by developed 
countries against imports of primary products 
of particular interest to developing countries" 
(standstill) ; then come measures designed to 
secure fuller liberalization of trade through the 
reduction and elimination of customs charges, 
internal charges and revenue duties, and quanti-
tative restrictions; lastly, attention is drawn to 
the various types of international commodity 
arrangements that can be made and to the impor-
tance of their role as appropriate instruments 
for promoting the expansion of trade and in-
creasing the export earnings of the developing 
countries. Furthermore, the new part IV of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade estab-
lishes similar commitments, particularly in ar-
ticle XXXVII, which stipulates that "the de-
veloped Contracting Parties shall to the fullest 
extent possible—that is, except when compelling 
reasons, which may include legal reasons, make 
it impossible— . . . (a) accord high priority to 
the reduction and elimination of barriers to 
products currently or potentially of particular 
export interest to less-developed Contracting 
Parties, including customs duties and other re-
strictions which differentiate unreasonably be-
tween such products in their primary and in 
their processed forms; (b) refrain from intro-
ducing, or increasing the incidence of, customs 
duties or non-tariff import barriers on products 
currently or potentially of particular export 
interest to less-developed contracting parties; 
and (c) (i) refrain from imposing new fiscal 
measures, and (ii) in any adjustments of fiscal 
policy accord high priority to the reduction and 
ehmination of fiscal measures which would 
hamper, or which hamper, significantly the 
growth of consumption of primary products, 
in raw or processed form, wholly or mainly 
produced in the territories of less-developed 
Contracting Parties, and which are applied 
specifically to those products". 
Article XXXVII also establishes a consulta-
tion procedure (not so far brought into opera-
tion) to be applied whenever it is considered 
that effect is not being given to any of the 
foregoing provisions. Subsequently, article 
XXXVIII adds that "the Contracting Parties 
shall collaborate jointly, within the framework 
of this Agreement and elsewhere, as appropriate, 
to further the objectives set forth", and that 
they shall, in particular, "where appropriate, 
take action, including action through interna-
tional arrangements, to provide improved and 
acceptable conditions of access to world markets 
for primary products of particular interest to 
less-developed Contracting Parties and to devise 
measures designed to stabilize and improve con-
ditions of world markets in these products, 
including measures designed to attain stable, 
equitable and remunerative prices for exports 
of such products". 
Thus, the UNCTAD recommendations and the 
above-mentioned commitments assumed by the 
Contracting Parties of GATT are at one in ac-
cording high priority to problems relating to the 
improvement of conditions of access to markets, 
which is the key objective of commodity policy. 
Nevertheless, no significant progress has been 
made in the implementation of these recom-
mendations and commitments; on the contrary, 
in many cases measures have been adopted 
which manifestly violate both the spirit and the 
letter of the provision concerned, and which 
therefore represent a retrogression in market 
access conditions. Hence it is understandable 
that the Declaration of the Presidents of 
America should again raise the question of im-
proving conditions of access to the markets of 
developed countries, echoing the terms of the 
recommendations and commitments already 
adopted in other discussion centres, such as 
UNCTAD and GATT, and re-emphasizing the 
imperative need to put those recommendations 
and commitments into effect. 
Furthermore, the Charter of Tequendama, like 
that of Algiers, reaffirms the importance attached 
by the developing countries to the solution of 
market access problems. In the Charter of 
Tequendama, the subject of commodity prob-
lems and policies is introduced by a statement 
to the effect that "for the developing countries 
it is essential that, in the discussions and nego-
tiations held at the second UNCTAD, the highest 
priority should be given to improving the con-
ditions of access for the commodities which they 
export to the developed market economy coun-
tries and to the centrally-planned economy coun-
tries". The text goes on to suggest various meas-
ures which the countries members of the Special 
Committee on Latin American Co-ordination 
consider to be of basic importance in that con-
nexion. They cover, inter alia, effective observ-
ance of the standstill committment; the adoption 
of a programme of tariff and non-tariff liberali-
zation and of programmes to discourage uneco-
nomic production, in the developed countries, 
of products which compete with products origi-
nating from the developing countries, through 
the abolition of subsidies for the production and 
export of such competing products, and to 
secure total elimination by the developed coun-
tries of domestic taxes and fiscal surcharges 
applied to products of interest to the developing 
4S, 
countries; and provisions to guarantee the 
developing countries a minimum share in the 
market of the developed countries. 
The terms of the Charter of Tequendama go 
beyond the mere reiteration by the Latin Ameri-
can countries of general recommendations as to 
the various measures that should be adopted by 
the developed countries in order to improve 
conditions of access to their markets for primary 
products (including those in processed and semi-
processed form) from the developing countries. 
Stress is laid on the need for programmes to 
be adopted and consultation procedures estab-
lished at the second session of UNCTAD with 
the aim of ensuring the effective implementation 
of such measures. On the other hand, it will 
obviously be impossible, save in a very few ex-
ceptional cases, for the Conference to embark 
upon negotiations concerning the specific forms 
the measures in question should take. The for-
mulation of concrete programmes of action in 
each field will entail multilateral negotiations, 
which, if they are to be effective, should in prin-
ciple be conducted product by product, or at 
least at the level of groups of products. 
As has already been suggested, the basic ob-
jective of the second session of UNCTAD should 
rather be to reach agreement on the bases and 
scope of such negotiations, on the appropriate 
time and forum for conducting them, and on 
the establishment of groups of experts to draw 
up, in accordance with the terms of reference 
formulated and within fixed time limits, such 
specific proposals as they may deem apposite 
in respect of each product or group of products 
in each of the fields where action is called for. 
These proposals would then serve as a basis for 
the multilateral negotiations referred to above. 
This product-by-product approach, which is 
in line with the consensus of opinion at the 
fifth session of the Trade and Development 
Board,®® has undeniable merits. First, it makes 
it possible to identify the nature of the barriers 
in each case, and to determine their relative 
33 In his final statement at the session, the President 
of the Board, referring to the "centres of gravity" or 
"points of crystallization", said: "In the primary com-
modities sector there has been general agreement that 
international action can be successful only by means of 
a commodity-by-commodity approach . . . The very broad 
support for the commodity-by-commodity approach does 
not, however, appear to imply any opposition in princi-
ple to the idea that matters relating to international 
commodity policy should also be examined from the 
standpoint of general guidelines. This is true, for ex-
ample, of the functions, operation and financing of 
buffer stocks . . . , market stabilization techniques, price 
policies, etc." 
importance in world trade flows and the specific 
measures that might be adopted to remove them, 
thus reducing to its true proportions a task 
which would otherwise appear too complex. 
Secondly, it eliminates the over-all approaches 
and recommendations which, as has been seen, 
remain mere generalizations, and in essence 
make no new contribution to the solution of 
the problems in hand. 
As regards the negotiation of international 
agreements, it was recognized many years ago 
that the product-by-product approach is the 
only method capable of producing satisfactory 
results, in view of the diversity of the charac-
teristics and market problems of the individual 
products concerned. In extending the same pro-
cedure to other aspects of commodity trade, it 
should be borne in mind that although the 
product-by-product method is very useful at the 
stage of identifying problems and discussing 
jossible measures (for example, in the field of 
iberalization of conditions of access), several 
products could be dealt with at once in the 
negotiation process, which would otherwise be-
come unduly complicated and long-drawn-out. 
In the following sections suggestions are put 
forward as to some of the specific forms of 
action that might be considered either in the 
discussion of programmes at the second session 
of UNCTAD, or by the expert groups, or in the 
course of multilateral negotiations on detailed 
methods of ensuring the effective implementation 
of commitments in the main fields where steps 
must be taken to improve conditions of access, 
namely: the standstill commitment; determina-
tion of the developing countries' minimum per-
centage shares in supplies for the developed 
countries; reduction and elimination of tariff 
and non-tariff restrictions and of internal taxes; 
and abolition of discriminatory preferences. 
2 . STANDSTILL 
The various standstill recommendations and 
commitments accepted by the developed coun-
tries are of great importance in relation to the 
volume of exports of the developing countries, 
since their aim is to obviate the risk that 
through the tightening-up of existing restrictions 
or the erection of new barriers the share of the 
developing countries' products in their tradi-
tional markets—normally those of the indus-
trialized countries—^may be reduced. At the 
same time, the fulfilment of this aim is a point 
of departure for the pursuit of another, broader 
objective: that of improving conditions of access 
to the markets in question through the reduction 
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or elimination of the various existing types of 
barriers. 
Nevertheless, many instances could be cited 
in which developed countries have adopted or 
are thinking of adopting®^ policies and measures 
which are at variance with both the letter and 
the spirit of the standstill recommendations and 
commitments. The countries concerned may be 
seeking to afford their domestic production a 
higher degree of protection, or to increase their 
degree of self-sufficiency and collect fiscal reve-
nue, or to defend their balance-of-payments 
position, or again to increase their own share 
in the world market by displacing the non-
subsidized exports of the developing countries. 
Broadly speaking, it is fair to say that, in prac-
tice, recent years have witnessed a setback rather 
than an improvement in the conditions of access 
for primary commodities to the markets of the 
developed countries, particularly in the case of 
certain products, such as sugar, meat and wheat. 
Of greater importance, however, is the fact 
that an analysis of the scope of the standstill 
commitment and of the difficulties of checking, 
in many cases, whether it has or has not been 
complied with, suggests the need for an exact 
definition of its objectives in terms not only of 
measures but also of the desired effects or re-
sults, and for the establishment of implementa-
tion machinery that would ensure the achieve-
ment of the results in question. This need arises 
not only because under the present terms of 
the provisions their objectives are not properly 
defined, but also because the conclusion to be 
drawn from such an analysis is that even if the 
commitment as it stands were effectively ful-
filled, it would not suffice to enable the devel-
oping countries' exports to maintain their foot-
hold in their traditional markets and their share 
in future consumption increments in the markets 
concerned. 
The share of temperate zone agricultural com-
modities and some mineral products is in fact 
being adversely affected and showing signs of 
diminishing—even without the establishment of 
new barriers or increases in the incidence of 
those already existing—not only as a result 
of the restrictions in force, but also owing to 
the competition put up by similar exports from 
34 Cases in point are afforded by several bills sub-
mitted for consideration to the United States Congress, 
under the terms of which quantitative restrictions would 
be established, or the incidence of some already in 
force would be increased, on imports of various prod-
ucts of special interest to developing countries. How-
ever, the President of the United States has declared 
his intention to veto the corresponding law or laws 
should Congress pass the bills in question. 
other developing countries, supported sometimes 
by subsidies for domestic production designed 
to secure a higher rate of self-sufficiency, and 
sometimes by a cut-price policy deliberately ap-
plied with a view to cornering markets. 
In the case of tropical agricultural products, 
the problem assumes a different guise. The ex-
pansion of exports of most tropical products is 
hampered by the existence of internal taxes and 
surcharges—at both the national and local 
levels—in the developed countries, which some-
times push up final consumer prices unduly, and 
thus discourage the growth of total consumption. 
Furthermore, the maintenance of such taxes and 
surcharges largely cancels out the effect of the 
tariff reductions obtained for some of these 
products in the Kennedy Round. In some in-
stances, too, this over-pricing at the level of 
the consumer sways consumption habits in the 
direction of substitute products. 
Again, the agreements whereby certain devel-
oping countries or groups of countries enter 
into association with the European Economic 
Community, and their gradual extension to other 
developing countries in specific areas (a ten-
dency which would gain a good deal of additional 
impetus should the United Kingdom join EEC), 
afford the countries in question preferential con-
ditions of access and violate the spirit of the 
standstill commitment, inasmuch as discrimina-
tion against "third countries", particularly those 
of Latin America, is intensified, with the con-
sequent deterioration in conditions of access to 
the Community's market for the products of 
those countries. 
In addition, the possibilities of effective im-
plementation of the standstill recommendation, 
as formulated at present, are circumscribed by 
the difficulties of applying viable and objective 
criteria in every case to determine what should 
be understood by new barriers (or increases in 
the incidence of those already existing) against 
exports from the developing countries, especially 
in situations such as have arisen and still are 
arising in the European Economic Community. 
The countries members of the Community, in 
forming their Common Market, have to replace 
their national tariffs and regulations in respect 
of imports from third countries, and other pro-
visions relating to the protection of their do-
mestic production—especially agricultural pro-
duction—, by common tariffs and regulations. 
In these circumstances, the problem is to de-
termine whether the effect of these new common 
tariff barriers and regulations is or is not more 
restrictive than that of the internal provisions 
they supersede. This difficulty will come to the 
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fore again should the United Kingdom, or any 
other new member, join the Community. 
There is good reason to believe that in this 
process of formation of the Common Market the 
degree of protection accorded to agriculture 
tends to be fixed in relation to the costs of the 
Community's least efficient producers. If this is 
in fact the case, the common external tariff, and' 
other measures in support of domestic produc-
tion forming part of EEC's common agricultural 
policy, are likely to have a more restrictive 
effect than some of the former national tariffs 
and other measures. This is particularly ap-
parent in the case of products subject to a system 
of variable import duties, since such duties 
absorb any difference that may exist between 
world market quotations and prices on the EEC 
market, which, for several of the products 
traditionally exported by some Latin American 
countries, have been set fairly high. By virtue 
of this measure and others adopted to support 
domestic production, EEC's common agricul-
tural policy not only makes for greater self-
sufficiency on the Community's part, but also 
encourages the creation or expansion of ex-
portable surpluses, whose external sales pros-
pects are guaranteed or enhanced by the pro-
visions of regulation 25 concerning export 
subsidies. 
Clearly, then, for efTective implementation of 
the standstill clause a mere commitment to re-
frain from erecting new barriers or increasing 
the incidence of those already existing is not 
enough. A body of multilaterally-negotiated 
measures is called for, whose expressly-defined 
purpose is to guarantee that there will be no 
deterioration in conditions of access to the de-
veloped countries' markets for products exported 
by the developing countries. In this connexion, 
the Charter of Tequendama points out that one 
of the objectives of the second session of 
UNCTAD should be to secure an undertaking 
on the part of the developed countries to abolish, 
by 31 December 1968 at latest, all tariff and 
non-tariff restrictions adopted subsequently to 
the signing of the Final Act of the first session 
of UNCTAD. This is simply a way of reaffirm-
ing the need for the standstill recommendation 
to be implemented on the basis of the situation 
existing prior to mid-1964, as obviously ought 
to be the case. What is further required is a 
precise declaration that the object of abolishing 
such restrictions is to restore the developing 
countries' former share in the various markets 
of the developed countries. Thus, compliance 
with the standstill recommendation would be 
determined not so much by the clear recognition 
that measures and policies adopted by the devel-
oped countries constituted tariff or non-tariff 
barriers as by the impact of those measures and 
policies on the exports of the developing 
countries. 
3. ASSURANCE OF A MINIMUM SHARE IN THE 
MARKETS OF THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Both the Charter of Tequendama and the 
Charter of Algiers underline the need to guar-
antee the developing countries a minimum share 
in the developed countries' markets, i.e., to en-
sure that the latter allocate to the former a 
fixed percentage of their consumption, in the 
case of products of developing countries which 
compete with the domestic production of the 
developed countries. This could be achieved, 
as the Charter of Tequendama indicates, through 
undertakings on the part of the developed coun-
tries to set ceilings on self-sufficiency, or to 
m_ake certain purchases, both under interna-
tional commodity agreements or arrangements 
and through other means. In any case, a sub-
stantial percentage share of any increase in 
domestic demand for primary commodities in 
the developed countries should be reserved for 
the output of the developing countries. Measures 
of one or other of these types would constitute 
means of guaranteeing that conditions of access 
to markets would not be less favourable than 
those existing at the time of the first session 
of UNCTAD, and would therefore be suitable 
instruments for putting the standstill recom-
mendation into effect. 
These minimum percentage shares in importer 
markets, or the importer countries' maximum 
rates of self-sufficiency, like purchase under-
takings, could be established only through mul-
tilateral negotiations which, as pointed out in 
the Charter of Algiers, would have to follow 
the product-by-product and country-by-country 
procedure; to that end, the bases for such 
negotiations should be discussed and agreed 
upon at the second session of UNCTAD, 
together with the question of a suitable occasion 
and forum for conducting them. 
As already explained, the product-by-product 
and country-by-country approach is necessitated 
by the wide range of situations to be found 
in the world commodity market. This negotia-
tion procedure, which seems, moreover, to be 
the most appropriate method of tackling other 
Community trade problems as well (especially 
that of improving conditions of access for pri-
mary products to the markets of the developed 
countries), has the additional merit of reducing 
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to its true proportions a task which would other-
wise seem too complex. In the case under con-
sideration—the establishment of minimum per-
centage shares in the developed countries' 
markets for products from developing countries, 
or, alternatively, the setting of ceilings on self-
sufficiency in the developed countries—, product-
by-product negotiations will make it easier to 
demarcate the area of the problems that must 
be solved in order to reach the desired goal. 
The question of assuring exports from the 
developing countries a specific share in the de-
veloped countries' markets does not, of course, 
arise in the case of commodities wholly or 
mainly produced by the developing countries, 
and faced by no competition from synthetic 
or substitute products (although the volume 
of exports of such commodities may be, and 
in some cases is, affected by the application 
of customs duties, internal taxes or other re-
strictions, as well as, in the case of specific 
countries, by the preferential treatment granted 
to others). But it represents a very real difficulty 
for products subject to such competition, as well 
as for those produced both by developed and 
by developing countries. 
In respect of commodities produced mainly 
by developing countries but facing competition 
from synthetic products, the problem of guaran-
teeing them a minimum share in the developed 
countries' markets arises in so far as the do-
mestic policies of the developed countries, 
through tax or other incentives, encourage in-
creased consumption of substitutes or alterna-
tives, at the expense of the product exported 
by developing countries. The fact that most sub-
stitutes or alternatives for natural products are 
of industrial origin (synthetic rubber and fibres, 
plastics, etc.) imparts a special character to 
the replacement process, since it would be un-
reasonable te expect the industrialized countries 
to adopt measures which are in any way likely 
to discourage technological research and dis-
coveries.^® On the other hand, there can be no 
35 However, at the first session of UNCTAD it was 
recommended "that countries, particularly developed 
countries, should avoid giving special encouragement to 
the production of new synthetics which may displace 
other natural products and to additional investment in 
the production of synthetic materials competing with 
the natural products exported by the developing coun-
tries, especially when such investment can be employed 
more effectively in other fields"; and that "in excep-
tional cases requiring a departure from this principle, 
consultation should be held with the developing coun-
tries likely to be adversely affected, or with the appro-
priate international bodies, in order to consider forms 
of co-operation, including financial measures, to miti-
gate such adverse effects". (See Final Act, recommen-
dation A.II.7, para. 2.) 
doubt that the tariff treatment applied by many 
developed countries to certain natural products, 
and the marked supply and price fluctuations 
to which these same commodities are subject, 
have been among the factors making for their 
progressive displacement by synthetic products. 
Only lately has the study of these problems 
begun to engage sufficient attention, mainly as 
a result of the recommendations adopted at 
UNCTAD's first session and the establishment 
of its Permanent Group on Synthetics and Sub-
stitutes. 
Unquestionably, however, effective imple-
mentation of recommendation A.II.7—which 
was adopted unanimously at the first session of 
UNCTAD, and which, among other measures, 
proposes precisely that of reducing and elimi-
nating tariff and non-tariff barriers in the case 
of natural and semi-processed products facing 
competition from synthetics—^would represent a 
real incentive to increased consumption of the 
products in question. In the course of the sug-
gested multilateral negotiation to determine the 
means whereby the developed countries could 
grant and guarantee a minimum share in their 
markets to products in this group exported by 
the developing countries, consideration would 
have to be given, in the first place, to the reduc-
tion and ultimate elimination of the said tariff 
and non-tariff barriers, and of production and 
export subsidies for synthetic products, and also 
to other measures which might help to facilitate 
the access of natural products to world markets 
or to improve their competitive position. 
For the group of commodities produced both 
by the developed and by the developing coun-
tries (mainly temperate zone agricultural prod-
ucts, in particular wheat, maize, rice, meat, 
milk products, fresh fruits, sugar, oils and oil-
seeds, and certain mining products, such as 
copper, lead, zinc and iron ore, and petroleum), 
the key problem consists in the highly protec-
tionist policy applied by many developed coun-
tries in favour of their domestic production, 
through tariff and non-tariff restrictions, sub-
sidies and other forms of aid to production, 
as well as through subsidies and other strong 
incentives (e.g., terms of payment) for exports 
of occasional or chronic surpluses or the sale 
of reserves by the developed countries. All these 
different measures not only progressively reduce 
the developing countries' share in supplies for 
the developed countries, but also lead to increas-
ing competition from the latter in other markets. 
Negotiation on a product-by-product basis would 
make it possible to determine the direction of 
trade flows in each case; to select a specific 
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period as the base for estimating the minimum 
share in each of the developed countries' 
markets that should be guaranteed to imports 
from developing countries; and to set up ap-
propriate institutional machinery whereby this 
share could be assured, with the necessary 
safeguards against unforeseen shortfalls in sup-
plies from the developing countries. At the 
same time, the establishment of consultation 
procedures should be negotiated, with a view 
to regulating the disposal of production sur-
pluses or reserves of developed countries (with-
out prejudice to the adoption of other measures 
to discourage or avoid encouraging the creation 
of such surpluses), so that they would not ad-
versely affect the developing countries' exports 
or exert a depressive influence on world prices.®® 
One possible form of guaranteeing some of 
the above-mentioned products a minimum share 
in the markets of developed countries might be 
the "multilateral sale-and-purchase contract". In 
this context, the international wheat agreements 
negotiated since 1949 furnish a very useful pre-
cedent, which could readily be adapted to the 
ends pursued here. These agreements, however, 
have operated on the basis of a multilateral 
commitment assumed by the exporter countries 
to supply (in conformity with a range of ceiling 
prices) a specific percentage of the "commercial 
imports" of each importer country. A multi-
lateral sale-and-purchase contract on these lines 
does not constitute a guarantee of a minimum 
share in the markets of developed countries, 
since total imports might be reduced if domestic 
production increased faster than consumption. 
This minimum share should therefore be estab-
lished as a percentage of total consumption in 
each developed country. 
A slight variant of this type of multilateral 
commitment is constituted by the proposal 
mooted in the draft sugar agreement that has 
been under discussion since 1965. This provides 
for the maintenance of the exporter countries' 
minimum share in the markets of the importer 
countries by means of a provision establishing, 
first, that the net annual imports of each party 
to the agreement shall not be lower than the 
average for the four preceding years, and, sec-
36 The following is one of the decisions adopted by 
the American Chiefs of State at the Punta del Este 
meeting with reference to international trade: "To 
strengthen the system of inter-governmental consulta-
tions and carry them out sufficiently in advance, so as 
to render them effective and ensure that programmes 
for placing and selling surpluses and reserves that 
affect the exports of the developing countries take into 
account the interests of the Latin American countries". 
(See Declaration of the Presidents of America, chap-
ter III, paragraph 4.) 
ondly, that each of the importer countries shall 
adopt measures to ensure that at least 50 per 
cent of its total consumption increment shall be 
satisfied by means of imports. The incorporation 
of the latter factor—increases in imports pro-
portional to those of consumption—really pro-
vides reasonable guarantees of access to the 
importer markets, since, on the one hand, the 
point of departure is the maintenance of the 
current share (determined by the average for 
the four preceding years), and, on the other 
hand, an endeavour is made to ensure that this 
share will remain at least the same at future 
levels of consumption. The adoption of an ar-
rangement of this kind, whose application, like 
that of the other procedure described above, 
could be confined to developed countries' im-
ports from developing countries, would at the 
same time afford a means of "setting ceilings 
on self-sufficiency" in the developed countries, 
and thus modifying the over-protectionist poli-
cies which some of them pursue. 
In the case of a good many of the products 
comprised in the group under consideration 
(wheat and secondary grains, meat, milk prod-
ucts and fisheries products), the share of the 
developed countries in world exports is relatively 
high (between 75 and 80 per cent), and there-
fore the scale of the quantitative commitments 
that some of these countries would have to 
assume with respect to market access for exports 
from the developing countries would not be 
large enough to introduce an undue measure 
of rigidity in trade flows. To a lesser extent, 
the same is true of other products, such as 
tobacco, citrus fruits, vegetable fats and oils, 
etc., in respect of which the developed countries' 
share of world exports generally exceeds 50 per 
cent. 
4. THE REDUCTION AND ELIMINATION OF TARIFF 
AND NON-TARIFF RESTRICTIONS 
As in the case of other measures for facilitat-
ing the access of primary products to the mar-
kets of developed countries, if international ac-
tion is to succeed in reducing or eliminating 
tariff and non-tariff restrictions on commodities 
in those markets, it is necessary to proceed on a 
product-by-product basis, with the object of 
negotiating the establishment of a gradual 
liberalization programme. 
TO that effect, the first step would be to 
weigh the different significance of the protec-
tionist restrictions imposed on products which 
compete with the output of developed countries 
and those of a mainly fiscal character usually 
imposed on products which only developing 
50 
countries export. A programme of action de-
signed to remove the first type of restrictions 
must necessarily have long-term objectives, in 
view of the complexity of the interests associated 
with each country's protectionist policy. In the 
case of tariff restrictions imposed purely for 
fiscal purposes, the action programme may have 
short-term objectives, since in most cases the 
aim would be mainly to cushion the impact of 
a loss of fiscal revenue, which does not generally 
represent very large sums in the national budgets 
concerned. 
A third category of restrictions, usually in 
the form of customs duties, is intended to accord 
preferential treatment to imports from certain 
countries or groups of countries. Such imports 
are completely or partially exempt from the 
duties applicable to goods from other countries. 
These special preferences, which occur mainly 
in the British Commonwealth of Nations and 
the European Economic Community in favour 
of associate countries, are dealt with separately 
in the next section. 
As regards protected products in the developed 
countries' markets (where imports compete with 
home production), the first objective is unques-
tionably to secure strict compliance with the 
standstill commitment, i.e., to avoid intensifying 
protectionist policy and thus afford progressively 
stronger incentives for the expansion of domestic 
production. The adoption of "setting ceilings 
on self-sufficiency", which was discussed in a 
previous section, would be a positive step in this 
direction, even though it does nothing to solve 
the problem of lowering tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. Therefore, without the developing 
countries' renouncing the final objective of 
more trade liberalization for products which 
compete with the developed countries' own pro-
duction, it would seem advisable to discuss some 
short-term action measures, particularly in re-
gard to tariff restrictions. 
To that end it would be best—in the case of 
some of the more important products—to ex-
amine the possibilities of establishing duty-free 
quotas in favour of exports from developing 
countries. Considering the relatively small share 
of these countries in world exports of most of 
the products in question, the creation of duty-
free quotas would not seriously jeopardize the 
stability of the developed countries' domestic 
markets, while on the other hand the appro-
priate safeguard or escape clauses could be 
established, provided recourse to them were de-
pendent upon multilateral consultation ma-
chinery. 
In the same context, it would be worth-while 
exploring the possibilities of arrangements 
similar to that negotiated for beef (but not 
yet put into effect) between EEC and Argentina 
in the last stage of the Kennedy Round. The 
bases of that arrangement were a reduction in 
tariff charges, a reduction in the supplementary 
variable levy during some months of the year 
and, during the remaining months, its complete 
suspension, which would be timed to coincide 
with the period when domestic supply declined. 
This type of arrangement undoubtedly offers 
certain advantages for those products in respect 
of which there are marked seasonal fluctuations 
in market supplies. 
In the case of products for which it is im-
possible to negotiate a duty-free quota or the 
type of arrangement described above, a third 
alternative might be for developed importing 
countries to undertake to transfer unilaterally 
to developing exporter countries a specific per-
centage of the taxes and other charges levied on 
imports from that source. If this unilateral 
transfer were established only for the proportion 
of imports from developing countries, the de-
veloped countries would still retain the amount 
collected on imports from other developed 
countries (which in this group of products 
generally account for the larger proportion of 
world trade). Although this procedure would 
do something to facilitate such an international 
arrangement, since the sums transferred to de-
veloping countries would represent only a frac-
tion of the total collected, it might defeat its 
own ends inasmuch as it would mean dividing 
the developed countries' imports into two cate-
gories, one subject to partial drawback and the 
other not, with every likelihood of the former 
being discouraged in favour of the latter. It 
would be as well, therefore, to examine very 
carefully the repercussions of any international 
arrangement of this kind, in order to foresee its 
possible effect on demand for products from 
developing countries. 
In the group of products in which the de-
veloped countries' protectionist policies play 
no part, i.e., tropical agricultural commodities,^^ 
the majority of those countries have recognized 
the need to grant complete exemption from 
tariff charges on imports, first at the GATT-
sponsored Ministerial Meeting in May 1963 and 
subsequently in the Final Act of the first session 
of UNCTAD. Although some countries have 
complied with these commitments, at least in 
Although these are the commodities mainly af-
fected by the above-mentioned problem of restrictions 
applied by EEC and the United Kingdom (see next sec-
tion) with the purpose of according special preferential 
treatment to imports from certain developing countries. 
part, exemption from tariff charges is not yet 
the general rule. 
Moreover, tariff charges are not the only or 
even always the major obstacle encountered by 
tropical agricultural commodities in the markets 
of some developed countries. They are com-
monly supplemented or replaced by internal 
taxes which often amount to more than the 
actual import tariffs. Consequently, the reduction 
or elimination of customs duties alone would 
not suiSce to achieve a substantial liberalization 
of trade in these items. The internal taxes 
(particularly where they unduly restrict con-
sumption of the products affected) would also 
have to be reduced or eliminated. This measure 
has already been provided for in recommenda-
tion A.II.l of the first session of UNCTAD and 
in the commitments established under article 
XXXVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade. 
Negotiations for a programme of reduction 
and elimination of customs duties and internal 
taxes levied by the developed countries on this 
group of commodities might be based on the 
principle of a gradual process whereby: (a) the 
complete elimination of tariff charges would be 
achieved in five years by a cumulative annual 
reduction of 20 per cent; (6) internal taxes 
would be eliminated in the same way, or the 
developed countries might agree to restore to 
exporter countries a cumulative annual propor-
tion of 20 per cent of the total collected under 
that head, so that by the end of the fifth year 
the drawback would be equal to the total. The 
adoption of this gradual formula might obviate 
the difficulties which the developed countries 
have hitherto encoutered in implementing the 
pertinent recommendations and commitments 
they accepted, since spacing the process out over 
five years would avoid the disruptions that 
might result from complete and immediate elimi-
nation. The drawback formula might be a 
feasible course if the developed countries con-
sider that such taxes should be maintained for 
reasons other than that of obtaining fiscal 
revenue. 
Quantitative restrictions are relatively easy to 
identify, although the preparation of a complete 
list would entail extensive research in which co-
operation would be required not only from 
Governments but also from chambers of com-
merce and exporting and importing organiza-
tions and enterprises, which are in the best posi-
tion to have a direct knowledge of such restric-
tions. The interested parties would have to 
negotiate a programme for the gradual elimina-
tion of such restrictions—particularly, and in a 
shorter period, those infringing GATT provi-
sions and not covered by waivers, and those 
introduced after the adoption of standstill 
recommendations and commitments—or for the 
gradual increase of quotas until the restriction 
is in fact eliminated. 
5. THE ELIMINATION OF SPECIAL PREFERENCES 
FOR PRIMARY PRODUCTS®® 
• The community of interests which is largely 
the basis for concerted action by the developing 
countries to defend their international trade 
interests is jeopardized by the preferential tariff 
treatment given by some developed countries to 
certain developing countries. 
The need to eliminate these discriminatory 
policies was recognized and accepted by all 
countries participating in the first session of 
UNCTAD. Recommendation A.II.l of the Final 
Act established that preferential arrangements 
should be abolished pari passu with the effective 
application of international measures provid-
ing at least equivalent advantages for the 
present beneficiaries. The widespread establish-
ment of conditions of free access for primary 
products to the markets of developed countries, 
which would result from the implementation of 
other provisions of the same recommendation, 
would inevitably mean the elimination of pre-
ferential treatment, while affording the develop-
ing countries at present benefiting from such 
treatment the advantage of free access to the 
markets of other developed countries. 
Despite the importance of this problem, no 
progress has been made since the first session of 
UNCTAD towards implementing the above-
mentioned recommendation, and little has been 
done to evaluate the trade advantages which 
preferential treatment represents for the coun-
tries benefiting therefrom, or to define and 
analyse the possible equivalent advantages that 
might be offered to those countries. 
In the circumstances, adequate background in-
formation was not available for the discussion of 
38 It is generally accepted that the elimination of 
existing preferences will present far fewer difficulties in 
respect of manufactures and semi-manufactures than in 
the case of commodities, and that the establishment of 
a system of general preferences for the former, accorded 
by the developed to the developing countries, would in 
principle provide, through free access to the developed 
countries' markets, advantages equivalent to those en-
joyed by some developing countries which now benefit 
from special preferences in those markets. In any case, 
as set forth in the Charter of Algiers, this should be a 
feature of the general system of preferences, which 
should also contain provisions by virtue of which situa-
tions where that objective had not been achieved could 
be remedied. 
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this subject by the Group of 77 at its meeting 
in Algiers, and the Charter of Algiers merely 
reaffirms unanimous support for the original 
recommendation, and requests that studies be 
carried out, on a country-by-country and a 
commodity-by-commodity basis, on the implica-
tions of the abolition of the special preferences 
in force and on measures appropriate to ensure 
that countries which at present enjoy such 
preferences receive equivalent advantages. The 
Charter also states that, in the case of certain 
commodities, international agreements might 
constitute the appropriate instrument for reduc-
ing and even eliminating special preferences. 
At best, it will be a long time before the 
studies in question can be completed and their 
conclusions considered in order to negotiate 
an over-all programme for the elimination of 
special preferences. Meanwhile, it appears es-
sential that the developed countries should enter 
into a commitment at the second session of 
UNCTAD not to extend existing preferences to 
other developing countries, to take any other 
trade measures that might increase the coverage 
of those preferences,®® or to establish new pre-
ferences. 
The importance of this commitment is all the 
greater inasmuch as, since the first session of 
UNCTAD, EEC has negotiated new arrange-
ments of this kind and is considering others. 
It is thus obviously making the task of eliminat-
ing such preferences more complex, because 
of both their wider geographical coverage and 
the larger number of products involved. Non-
proliferation of these special preferences is 
really implicit in the standstill commitment, 
since wider application would be a means of 
intensifying the discrimination against exports 
from the largest group of developing countries 
(and thereby making the existing barriers even 
more effective). 
This is all without prejudice to any measures 
that may be internationally concerted in favour 
of the less advanced developing countries. The 
Latin American States have always recognized 
the need to grant preferential treatment to the 
relatively less developed countries, but at the 
same time they have unanimously declared that 
"these special privileges should not constitute a 
trade discrimination among developing coun-
tries''.^ 
It is urgently necessary to arrive at specific 
commitments in this connexion for a number 
of reasons. First, it is generally recognized that 
these arrangements involving special preferences 
constitute a reversion to the earlier political 
idea of "spheres of influence". Secondly, if such 
discriminatory arrangements persist, and still 
more so if new ones are concluded, more pres-
sure will be applied to enable the Latin Amer-
ican countries also to obtain discriminatory 
preferences in the United States market. A third 
consideration which must never be lost sight of 
is that the proliferation of special preferences 
not only tends to split up the world market 
but is also liable to create political friction 
among the developing countries.^^ Now that the 
Yaoundé Convention is nearing expiry and the 
developing countries belonging to the British 
Commonwealth are preparing themselves for the 
changes that may take place if the United King-
dom joins the European Economic Community, 
this is an ideal time to adopt decisions which 
will lay down trade policy guidelines for the 
next decade. 
(a) The position of the Caribbean countries in 
the United Kingdom's preferential system 
The preferential treatment accorded to the 
Caribbean countries members of the British 
Commonwealth (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, 
and Trinidad and Tobago) in the United King-
dom market mainly benefits two agricultural 
commodities (sugar and bananas). 
Of the total tonnage covered by the Com-
monwealth Sugar Agreement (a little over 2.5 
million tons), a quota of approximately 900,000 
tons is allocated to the Caribbean countries. The 
preferential treatment which the United Kingdom 
accords to the parties to the Agreement con-
sists, first in the application of a lower import 
tariff than that levied on supplies from third 
countries and, secondly, in the payment of a 
previously negotiated price (higher than the free 
world market price) for most of the supplies 
provided against their quotas. In the case of 
the Caribbean countries, the negotiated price 
is applied to about 730,000 of their aggregate 
quota of 900,000 tons; the remainder has access 
to the United Kingdom market at free prices 
plus preferential tariff duty. 
For example, by raising customs duties on imports 
from third countries, or by reducing or abolishing the 
duty-free banana import quota allocated in EEC to the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which is the Latin 
American banana producers' biggest market in Europe. 
40 See the Charter of Alta Gracia. 
41 The dangers inherent in the system of special pref-
erences are highlighted in the Survey of the Alliance 
for Progress. Foreign Trade Policies. A study prepared 
at the request of the Sub-Committee on American Re-
publics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations^ 
United States Senate (Washington, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 30 October 1967). 
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Canada has no part in this arrangement; it 
imports sugar from the Caribbean countries at 
free market prices up to an aggregate quota of 
275,000 tons, on which it imposes a prefential 
tariff of 29 Canadian dollar cents per 100 
pounds. By virtue of a recent agreement, Canada 
decided to refund to Caribbean exporter coun-
tries members of the United Kingdom prefential 
system the total value of duties collected on sugar 
imports from that source. 
As a result of this preferential treatment, the 
Caribbean nations export their sugar mainly to 
the United Kingdom and Canadian markets, al-
though in recent years exports to the United 
States have risen because of an increase in the 
import quotas allocated to those countries (see 
table 3 ) . 
Banana exports are important only for Ja-
maica, where they represented about 8 per cent 
of the total value of exports in 1964-65. The 
preferential treatment accorded by the United 
Kingdom to imports from British Commonwealth 
countries consists in complete exemption from 
import charges, whereas supplies from other 
countries are subject to ad valorem duties of ap-
proximately 15 per cent. This preferential treat-
ment is supplemented by quantitative import 
restrictions. In 1965, 95 per cent of Jamaica's 
banana exports went to the United Kingdom. 
This brief description of the preferential treat-
ment enjoyed by the Caribbean countries in the 
United Kingdom market in respect of their two 
major agricultural exports shows the magnitude 
of the problems those countries will have to face 
if it is gradually eliminated. Except for Bar-
bados, where sugar accounts for a large propor-
tion of total exports, in the other countries the 
contribution represented by sugar exports is 
much smaller, and has been declining in recent 
years as a result of the increase in exports of 
bauxite and alumina (from Guyana and Ja-
maica) and petroleum and petroleum products 
(from Trinidad and Tobago). Moreover, the 
sugar problem could be suitably dealt with in 
the context of the international sugar agreement 
which is currently being negotiated, by means 
of guarantees covering, for instance, a minimum 
share in the total consumption of developed 
countries and a price level above that of free 
market prices both of which objectives are in-
cluded in the draft agreement under discussion. 
Nevertheless, mainly in the light of their 
past history, there are grounds for considering 
that the economy of the Caribbean countries is 
even more heavily dependent than this brief 
analysis reveals upon the preferences they en-
joy, particularly in the United Kingdom market. 
The sudden withdrawal of those preferences 
might cause serious structural distortions; con-
sequently, any action to eliminate them should 
be adopted graudally and consistently with the 
other requisites established in the relevant re-
commendation of the first session of UNCTAD. 
On the other hand, even the gradual elimination 
of those preferences, as a result either of the 
implementation of the UNCTAD recommenda-
tion or of the United Kingdom's possible acces-
sion to membership in EEC, will undoubtedly 
stimulate and greatly accelerate the process of 
change that has already started in the Caribbean 
countries' trade flows and economic links. It is 
taking the form of a move towards closer rela-
tions with one another and also with the neigh-
bouring Latin American countries, and is lead-
ing to more and more intensive co-operation 
which may well culminate in economic integra-
tion. 
(b) The EEC system of special preferences 
The European Economic Community grants 
special preferences to the Associated African and 
Table 3 
SUGAR EXPORTS FROM THE CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES, BY DESTINATION 




Total exports, average for 1964-66 (thou-
sands of tons) 167 268 423 189 
Percentage shipped to: 
United Kingdom 85.4 49.2 55.0 72.0 
Canada 12.3 36.8 24.3 21.6 
United States 2.2 13.9 20.7 6.4 
Sugar exports as a percentage of each 
country's total exports 79.3 32.2 32.4 6.3 
Source: Official foreign trade statistics. 
Malagasy States under the Yaoundé Convention, 
which came into force in June 1964 for a period 
of five years. The annex to this Convention lists 
the following products which can be imported 
from the associated States free of all duties in 
force in the Community: pineapples, copra, 
green coffee, tea, cocoa, pepper, cloves, vanilla 
and nutmeg. The same exemption is applicable 
to banana imports over and above a duty-free 
quota for the Federal Republic of Germany's 
imports from third countries. Accordingly, all 
EEC imports of these products from countries 
not associated with the Community (except 
bananas, as indicated) are subject to the com-
mon external tariff, which is 9.6 per cent for 
green coffee, 5 per cent for cocoa beans and 20 
per cent for bananas. These three commodities 
represent a high proportion of the exports of 
several Latin American countries, which are 
therefore greatly concerned about the discrimi-
nation against them in the Community. 
The representations which the Latin American 
countries have made to EEC in this connexion, 
mainly through contacts between their missions 
and the Community, and by means of joint 
memoranda, have so far failed to elicit much 
response. The stand taken by EEC is that the 
special preferences accorded to the associated 
African States cannot injure the Latin American 
countries, whose exports to the Community have 
continued to increase in volume a good deal 
faster in recent years than those of the associated 
States, even in the case of the above-mentioned 
commodities of special interest to Latin America. 
However, although total export figures may be 
adduced as evidence that special preferences in 
favour of associated States have not affected 
Latin America's exports, there is no guarantee 
that this situation will continue in the near 
future, especially as the financial and technical 
assistance given to the associated States sub-
stantially increases their export capacity. More-
over, it is essential that the problem be ap-
proached in the light of the principle that there 
should be no trade discrimination among de-
veloping countries. The basic objective by which 
the conduct of all developing countries should 
be guided is the spread of conditions permitting 
free access to the markets of all developed 
countries for commodities exported mainly or 
exclusively by the former group. As was seen 
in the last phase of the Kennedy Round, the 
persistence of special preferences impedes the 
establishment of such general conditions of free 
access. 
(c) Possible procedures and machinery for 
eliminating special preferences 
A first step to facilitate implementation of the 
UNCTAD recommendation on the elimination 
of special preferences for primary commodities 
should be to prevent their increased or continued 
proliferation by the adoption, at the second ses-
sion of UNCTAD, of an undertaking not to ex-
tend existing preferences to other countries or 
take any other trade measures which will in-
crease their coverage, and not to establish any 
new discriminatory preferences. 
Another essential move, which would con-
siderably simplify and facilitate consideration 
of the problems raised both by the existence of 
preferences and by their elimination, would be 
to reduce them to their true scope and propor-
tions, by means of the commodity-by-commodity 
and country-by-country studies requested in the 
Charter of Algiers, on the effect of the abolition 
of the special preferences in force and the steps 
necessary to ensure that countries which at 
present enjoy such preferences receive advan-
tages at least equivalent to the losses resulting 
from their abolition. The product-by-product 
approach will make it possible to analyse the 
characteristics and problems of each commodity 
and the measures that might be adopted to over-
come the difficulties in question. The study would 
no doubt show that the problems are by no 
means as far-reaching or as difficult to solve as 
they seem when stated in general terms. 
Thus, a first broad evaluation indicates that 
the major Latin American exports which are or 
might be affected by the special preferences en-
joyed by other areas or countries in the United 
Kingdom and EEC markets are sugar,^^ coffee, 
42 It has been said that the Latin American countries-
enjoy special preferences in the United States market for 
their sugar exports, and that this relationship with the 
United States places them in the same position as the 
associate countries with the European Economic Commu-
nity. However, this comparison does not stand up: 
(a) United States sugar imports are subject to the 
quota system, which does not exist for EEC imports 
from the associated States; (6) the quotas benefit not 
only Latin American suppliers but other developed and 
developing countries as well; (c) all United States im-
ports, without discrimination, are subject to an import 
tariff, even when the amount of the charge is offset— 
under normal market conditions—by the higher price 
of sugar on the home market; (d) the difference be-
tween United States and free world market prices does 
not constitute a discriminatory trade advantage, since it 
benefits all supplier countries; (e) this price difference 
might disappear (and has done so on occasion) with a 
rise in world market prices, and in fact there are times, 
as in 1963, when the United States price may be lower 
than the free world market price; and ( / ) whereas the 
system of special preferences in favour of the asso-
ciated States is conducive to the substitution of some 
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cocoa and bananas. It must not be overlooked 
that many other commodities which have a 
smaller share in Latin America's total exports 
but are nevertheless important to some coun-
tries—certain vegetable oils, for instance—are 
also liable to be harmed by special preferences. 
There are international agreements in force 
or in process of negotiation or renegotiation for 
sugar, coifee and cocoa. The problems arising 
from the abolition of the special preferences in 
force for them could be at least partially solved 
by means of those agreements, as suggested in 
the Charter of Algiers. In other words, the 
agreements offer practical possibilities for solu-
tions that would be compatible with the wide 
range of interests of all developing countries, the 
basic objective being the elimination of special 
preferences. 
No negotiations are envisaged in the near 
future for the conclusion of an international 
banana agreement. Nor does this appear feasible, 
because of the nature of the product and the 
marketing procedures involved—even though 
bananas are included in the group of com-
modities for which the Charter of Algiers re-
quests that such agreements be concluded as 
soon as possible—, unless the agreements were 
not of the traditional type, but an arrangement 
providing for inter-governmental consultations. 
These consultations might take place within the 
FAO Study Group on Bananas, with a view to 
reconciling the interests of exporter countries at 
the international level. In any case, the point 
of departure should be, as a minimum require-
ment, maintenance of the staius quo (mainly in 
relation to the duty-free quota in the market 
of the Federal Republic of Germany), and an 
equitable distribution of future increases in con-
sumption among all exporter countries, without 
prejudice to the adoption of a procedure for 
gradually eliminating the special preferences en-
joyed by some producer countries in the markets 
of certain developed countries. 
The following are among the measures that 
may be suggested for application to facilitate 
the elimination of the special preferences in 
force (a process which, according to the 
UNCTAD recommendation, should be gradual 
in the case of commodities in respect of which 
immediate abolition of the preferences might 
cause serious structural distortions or other 
grave injury to the economies of countries bene-
fiting therefrom) : 
sources of supply for others, that is not the aim of the 
United States import quota system, which has tended 
rather to reduce the share of all foreign sources in total 
supply. 
(i) A temporary guarantee should be ex-
tended to those countries, where necessary, as 
an interim phase in the process of general 
liberalization, by establishing quotas in the 
markets of developed countries where prefer-
ential treatment exists. Imports exceeding the 
agreed quotas would be subject to most-favoured-
nation treatment until the general liberalization 
process was completed; 
(ii) Countries at present enjoying special 
preferences should be provided with more finan-
cial and technical assistance to improve their 
productivity, and therefore their competitive 
position in international markets, in respect of 
products affected by the elimination of prefer-
ences, or to facilitate the conversion of sucK 
lines of production to others which might yield 
better returns. There should therefore be a 
substantial increase in financial and technical 
assistance provided by agencies such as the Eu-
ropean Investment Fund, the International De-
velopment Association, etc., and in other special 
facilities which could be considered within the 
supplementary financing scheme currently under 
discussion in UNCTAD. Until such time as the 
special preferences are completely eliminated, the 
developed countries according them should con-
tribute the amount of customs duties they receive 
on primary products from other developing 
countries towards this programme of increased 
financial aid; 
(iii) In any case, it would be necessary to 
eliminate the "reverse preferences", i.e., those 
granted by developing to developed countries, 
or at least to allow such preferences to be ex-
tended to other developing countries as well, so 
that the treatment of their products in the 
markets of developing countries currently ac-
cording such preferences would be not less 
favourable than that given to similar products 
from developed countries. Thus a serious ob-
stacle to the expansion of trade between develop-
ing countries would be removed.'^ ® 
The elimination of reverse preferences is 
justified not only because they introduce an 
element of reciprocity in the concessions of de-
veloped countries to some developing States, but 
also, and above all, because in many cases they 
involve considerable cost to the latter, through 
over-pricing, the price often being much higher 
for imports effected under this system of prefer-
ences. Research reveals that in 1961, c.i.f. prices 
paid for imports from France by the Ivory 
43 Some preliminary research shows, for example, that 
the expansion of EEC exports to Cameroon was achieved 
at the expense of imports from other countries, includ-
ing some developing States. 
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Coast, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Senegal 
and Madagascar were 58 and 17 per cent higher 
for food products as a whole and textiles respect-
ively, than those paid for the same products 
imported from other countries.^^ 
6. INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY ARRANGKMENTS 
The fundamental concept governing the rec-
ommendations adopted at the first session of 
UNCTAD in relation to international commodity 
agreements or arrangements is that they can be 
suitable instruments for promoting the expansion 
of world trade in primary commodities, and 
therefore constitute an integral part of interna-
tional trade policy. Consequently, their function 
is viewed in terms of a broader conception of 
the links existing between trade and develop-
ment, with the result that their use is not con-
fined to dealing with emergency situations but 
is determined by their potential contribution, in 
relatively stable conditions, to the growth of 
exports of developing countries. 
Thus, the objectives ascribed by UNCTAD to 
commodity agreements not only went beyond the 
restricted and occasional nature of the function 
originally assigned to them under the Charter 
of Havana, but also gave them greater flexibility 
by considerably broadening their procedures and 
characteristics, with a view to adapting them to 
the specific production and market conditions of 
each individual commodity. In particular, the 
recommendation in annex A.II.l states that the 
scope of agreements should be extended in such 
a way that the techniques for regulating the 
market by establishing floor and ceiling prices, 
export quotas, long-term purchase and sale ar-
rangements, bufl"er stocks and trade liberaliza-
tion measures may be supplemented by measures 
relating to the co-ordination of national produc-
tion and export policies, realistic guarantees to 
developing countries in respect of terms of ac-
cess to markets of developed countries, and 
market promotion and improvement of market-
ing conditions and distribution channels. 
However, this new conception of international 
commodity agreements, despite its unanimous ac-
ceptance at the first session of UNCTAD, has 
not yet succeeded in modifying the attitude of 
certain developed countries, whose co-operation 
is in some cases essential for the success of the 
agreements. Admittedly, an agreement in prin-
ciple on the negotiation of a specific commodity 
arrangement does not necessarily guarantee 
René Detono, "Les importations des pays en voie 
de développement posent des problémes aussi graves que 
ceux de leurs exportations", Développement et Civilisa-
tion, N° 24 (Paris, December 1965). 
agreement on all its operational aspects; but it 
must also be recognized that the conceptual 
advances made at the first session of UNCTAD 
have not in practice had the significance that 
might have been expected, mainly because the 
attitudes of the developed countries do not 
reflect this new conception. The prolonged ne-
gotiations on sugar and cocoa have revealed that 
some of the developed countries have not been 
prepared to consider—in the context of those 
agreements—measures to liberalize trade, guar-
antee better terms of access to their markets and 
ensure the maintenance of a minimum share 
in the future growth of consumption, etc. 
This attitude is at variance with the oft-
repeated postulate that, in the primary com-
modities field, international agreements are the 
most appropriate instruments for solving the 
export problems of developing countries. It 
would seem advisable, therefore, that discussion 
of this subject at the second session of UNCTAD 
should not be limited to a reaffirmation of sup-
port for the recommendations and principles 
already adopted, but an attempt should be made 
to arrive at specific commitments for the negotia-
tion of agreements on a specified number ot 
products, defining their main characteristics and 
the nature of the measures to be adopted to at-
tain their objectives. 
The developing countries declared, in the 
Charter of Algiers, their intention to "consult 
and co-operate among themselves in order to 
defend and improve their terms of trade by ef-
fective co-ordination of their sales policies", and 
expressed their hope that a cocoa agreement 
would be concluded before the end of 1967 and 
a sugar agreement early in 1968. They were like-
wise anxious that commodity arrangements for 
oil-seeds and vegetable oils, bananas, rubber, 
tea, sisal and hard fibres should be concluded 
at the earliest possible date, and that appropriate 
action should be taken in respect of iron ore, 
nickel, tobacco, cotton, wine, citrus fruit, man-
ganese ore, pepper, mica, shellac and tungsten. 
A list of products as heterogeneous as these 
cannot be properly studied in the short time 
available at the second session of UNCTAD, 
but it would be possible to adopt decisions on 
the carrying out of preliminary studies and the 
drafting of the corresponding agreements, to 
establish an order of priority for the prepa-
ratory work and to lay down general guidelines 
for the conduct of the negotiations. Relevant to 
this preliminary analysis is the classification of 
primary commodities into the three main groups 
used by the UNCTAD secretariat: (a) com-
modities entirely or mainly produced in develop-
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ing countries, which are not seriously affected 
by competition from substitutes and/or syn-
thetics; (6) commodities subject to a high 
degree of displacement, particularly by synthetic 
materials; and (c) commodities produced in 
both developed and developing countries. 
It has been recognized that, in general, com-
modities in group (b) are less suited to be the 
subject of international agreements, mainly 
because any measure designed to raise the prices 
of these commodities by regulating supply 
tends, in the last analysis, to encourage the dis-
placement of the natural product by synthetics.*® 
It has been suggested, therefore, that the basic 
way of dealing with the market problems of these 
commodities must be through measures to in-
crease productivity and improve the natural 
product's competitive position, through cam-
paigns to promote consumption and through 
research on new uses. This group includes na-
tural rubber, wool, cotton, and jute and other 
hard fibres; in every case, world consumption 
is either declining or not growing quickly 
enough to absorb world supply. 
In accepting the general conclusion that for 
this group of products international agreements 
would not be the most appropriate instrument for 
defending the interests of the developing ex-
porter countries, it must be understood that this 
conclusion refers to agreements based on regu-
latory mechanisms such as export quotas, mini-
mum selling prices and other restrictive mea-
sures. However, the same UNCTAD recom-
mendation {Final Act, annex A.II.l) indicates 
that commodity agreements can vary consider-
ably in form and nature, so that they can be 
adapted to suit the specific situation of each 
commodity. 
Consideration could be given to negotiating 
agreements that would cover the establishment 
and administration of funds to finance pro-
grammes for improving productivity, research 
on new uses of the natural product, diversifica-
tion of production and campaigns to promote 
consumption. All these are possible ways of al-
leviating the difficulties with which countries 
exporting these commoditites are faced. For the 
commodities in this group organizations already 
exist, in one form or another, which serve as a 
common forum for the discussion of production 
and trade problems and which could well be 
expanded to undertake functions such as those 
mentioned above. These organizations include 
the International Rubber Study Group, the In-
ternational Wool Study Group, the International 
Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC) and the 
FAO Study Group on Jute, Kenaf and Allied 
Fibres. It would probably not be very difficult 
to make each of these institutions the executing 
agency for programmes in the field of technical 
assistance to producer countries, technological 
research for promoting new uses of the com-
modity in question, promotion of consumption 
and discussion of common problems with a view 
to adopting standard marketing policies. The 
International Cotton Advisory Committee, for 
example, has been discussing the possibility of 
preparing a draft international cotton agree-
ment, and has come to the conclusion that the 
type of agreement which restricts production of 
exports would not work in favour of the develop-
ing exporter countries, but would tend, on the 
contrary, to counteract the efforts producers 
should make to meet competition from synthetic 
fibres.*® It was suggested that the most appro-
priate solution would be to establish a Policy 
Sub-Committee within the Standing Committee 
of ICAC, to act as a consultative and co-ordinat-
ing body with regard to the policies adopted by 
member countries. 
For natural rubber, too, some progress has 
been made regarding the type of international 
action that should be adopted to stabilize rubber 
prices and improve its competitive position vis-
a-vis synthetic rubber. At the Conference of 
Natural Rubber Producing Countries held in 
October 1967, it was decided to estabUsh an 
Association of Natural Rubber Producing Coun-
tries, whose main task would be to encourage 
those countries to adopt joint marketing mea-
sures with a view to checking the present down-
ward trend of prices, and measures relating to 
current distribution and transport practices, 
maritime freight rates, dissemination of tech-
niques for improving crops, and promotion of 
the use of natural rubber. As a longer-term ob-
jective, the Conference recommended the nego-
tiation of an international commodity arrange-
ment embracing not only natural rubber and 
synthetic rubber producing countries but con-
sumer countries. The existing institutional body 
(the International Rubber Study Group), to 
which the main natural and synthetic rubber 
45 xhis does not rule out consideration of price levels 
in certain types of international agreements on these 
products. In fact, the maintenance of a reasonable de-
gree of stability could help to strengthen the competitive 
position of the natural product in relation to the 
synthetic. 
International Cotton Advisory Committee, Cotton, 
Monthly Review of the World Situation, July 1966. A 
similar conclusion is put forward in the report pre-
sented by the UNCTAD secretariat, "The international 
organization of commoditv trade—case study on natural 
rubber" (TD/B/C.l /PSC/3) , 16 May 1966. 
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producing countries belong, would undoubtedly 
assist in the consultations on rubber already 
initiated by UNCTAD. 
The biggest group, about which it is im-
possible to generalize because so many different 
situation are presented, is constituted by com-
modities produced in both developed and de-
veloping countries. This very fact—that both 
types of countries produce them—does make it 
possible, however, to define certain types of 
problems that are common to all, the most 
important being the role played by the protec-
tionist policies of importing countries. In most 
cases the developing exporter countries fulfil 
the function of residual suppliers, with the result 
that their share in the markets of the developed 
countries is determined by variations in those 
countries' total output. Equally important is 
the fact that the developed countries are also 
exporters of many commodities within this 
group, and that their exports are generally sub-
sidized, with the result that they are in a favour-
able position to compete against the exports 
of developing countries in the markets of third 
countries. In short, for most of the commodities 
within this group international agreements of a 
restrictive nature do not represent a satisfactory 
solution from the standpoint of the developing 
countries; but this does not rule out the pos-
sibility of negotiating other types of arrange-
ments. 
Consideration should be given, in the first 
place, to multilateral contracts, which have long 
been used in the world wheat trade. Since the 
main problem with such a commodity is to 
secure guaranteed access to the markets of the 
importing countries, the multilateral-contract 
type of agreement determines the amounts which 
importers undertake to buy and exporters to sell 
within a certain price range. The effectiveness 
of this form of agreement in guaranteeing the 
developing countries a certain volume of exports 
is very slight when the purchase-and-sale com-
mitments are established not in relation to con-
sumption but in relation to commercial imports, 
as has been done in the most recent wheat agree-
ments. In this case, the developed countries' 
policies for promoting domestic production tend 
to reduce import requirements, with the result 
that there is no actual guarantee covering the 
volume of imports from the developing coun-
ries, even if there is a guaranteed floor price. 
The establishment of minimum import prices 
can also be negotiated under this type of multila-
teral contract, as in the wheat agreements, but 
in this case it is extremely important to deter-
mine the developing countries' share in world 
imports. If, as in the case of wheat, the establish-
ment of a minimum selling price means an in-
crease in the earnings of the developed exporter 
countries (which are the biggest world exporters 
of wheat), thus making imports dearer for the 
developing countries (which absorb a large pro-
portion of world imports), this will largely 
defeat the purpose of commodity agreements, 
which is not exactly to ensure more remunerative 
prices for the exports of developed countries. 
Of course, in the specific case of wheat, the 
developing countries were compensated to some 
extent by the establishment of a multilateral 
aid fund equivalent to about 4.5 million tons 
per year, in relation to average annual imports 
of 18.3 million tons, in the period 1959/60-
1963/64. 
Besides cereals (particularly wheat) and 
sugar, the commodities in this group include 
meat, dairy products, hides and skins, animal 
and vegetable oils and fats, fruit and tobacco, 
among agricultural products, and copper, iron, 
lead, zinc and petroleum, among mineral pro-
ducts. In the Kennedy Round an agreement 
on meat was reached between Argentina and 
the European Economic Community countries, 
but, when France tried to introduce amendments 
that were unacceptable to Argentina, it was 
shelved. Apart from meat, wheat and sugar (it 
is still considered likely that a sugar agreement 
will be negotiated), the prospects of establishing 
multilateral arrangements for the remaining 
commodities seem very remote, although this 
does not mean that attempts to obtain guaranteed 
access to markets through one of the procedures 
suggested above should be abandoned. 
The problem is somewhat different where 
mineral products are concerned. In most cases 
the extractive industries in developing countries 
represent investments by the developed countries 
and are usually subject to special regimes. The 
contractual nature of some of these régimes sets 
well-defined limits to the capacity oí action oí 
the developing countries, although, as has been 
seen recently, this situation is tending to im-
prove as the countries in question succeed in in-
creasing their participation in the marketing 
of the product and the establishment of export 
prices. The most important point to be stressed 
is that the essential objective of the developing 
countries is to secure a larger share in the re-
turns on these exports. 
In this regard, the experience of the Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
is very interesting. At the Third Meeting of the 
Special Committee on Latin American Co-ordina-
tion at the Expert Level, in July 1966, it was 
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suggested that this' type of organization should 
be established among the developing copper ex-
porting countries, since it was felt that an agree-
ment to which the developed countries were 
parties would not adequately serve the interests 
of the developing exporter countries. At the 
Lusaka Conference (June 1967), the Govern-
ments of Chile, the Congo, Peru and Zambia 
agreed to set up an Inter-Governmental Council 
of Copper Exporting Countries, primarily with 
a view to adopting and co-ordinating measures 
to increase the real income accruing to those 
countries from their copper exports.^^ With this 
organization, the developing copper exporting 
countries are in a position to exercise a stronger 
influence in all matters relating to the production 
and export of copper. A similar arrangement 
could be made in respect of iron ore, lead and 
zinc. In the case of these last two commodities, 
an International Lead and Zinc Study Group 
exists, but although it serves as a forum for the 
discussion of problems affecting those metals, 
it does not fulfil any of the functions of OPEC 
or of the Inter-Governmental Council of Copper 
Exporting Countries. 
The main commodities exported by develop-
ing countries only and, within certain limits, not 
subject to competition from immediate substi-
tutes, are coiFee, cocoa, tea, bananas, spices, 
tropical woods, fish meal and tin. Some of these 
products have characteristics which make it 
feasible to negotiate international agreements of 
a restrictive nature, whose main purpose would 
be to increase the earnings of exporter coun-
tries. The different techniques for regulating 
the market' which might be adopted for this 
purpose have already been tried out under tíie 
existing agreements on coffee and tin, and some 
of them are also being considered in the cur-
rent negotiations on cocoa. 
Although this group is not very large, each 
commodity is of vital importance as the main 
source of export earnings for specific groups 
of developing countries. Export price policy— 
or, in other words, the objectives established in 
respect of achieving and maintaining remunera-
tive prices for exporters—^is, therefore, one of 
the most important aspects of the negotiations 
for a commodity arrangement and the most 
difficult from the standpoint of securing an 
agreement, particularly where effective opera-
tion of the arrangernent requires the co-operation 
of the importing countries. The concept of 
"remunerative prices" may be defined in very 
different terms by importing and exporting 
countries, and even by the different export-
ing countries. Consequently, a simpler solution 
should perhaps be adopted, at least in some 
cases. The need for the price or price range 
established in the agreement to correspond in 
theory to the concept of "remunerative prices" 
or "long-term equilibrium prices" should be 
waived in favour of its being determined by 
market conditions in a specific period. At the 
same time, the administrative council of 
the agreement should be empowered to modify 
prices in accordance with subsequent market 
trends, in so far as its own regulations make 
such modifications possible or necessary. It is 
useful to recall, in this regard, the object lesson 
of the international agreements on coffee and 
tin. The original text of the coffee agreement 
did not establish a floor price; subsequently, 
however, a price range was established at a 
higher level than that prevailing when the agree-
ment was negotiated, partly because it had been 
possible to impose some degree of control over 
supply. In the case of tin, the International Tin 
Council adopted successive changes in the price 
range, as market conditions made it necessary 
to give greater incentives to producers in order 
to close the gap between production and con-
sumption. 
Agreement on a minimum export price may 
be an indispensable requisite when the arrange-
ment includes the operation of a buffer stock. 
It should be pointed out, in this connexion, 
that the difficulties encountered in the negotia-
tion of a cocoa agreement, which until recently 
were related to the establishment of a floor price 
and the nature of the operation of the buffer 
stock, seem to have been overcome at last in 
the exploratory negotiations conducted under the 
auspices of UNCTAD. The countries participat-
ing in those negotiations agreed to establish an 
"indicator price" somewhere between 24.5 and 
28 dollar cents per pound. Within this range, 
the Administrative Council of the agreement will 
take certain measures in relation to export 
quotas, where they are in operation. It was also 
agreed that the floor and ceiling prices should 
be 20 and 29 dollar cents per pound, respec-
tively, and an indication was given of the 
measures to be adopted by the Council when 
those limits were exceeded, including the use 
of the buffer stock. No report on the operation of 
the buffer stock appears in the memorandum 
describing the agreement on the price range 
however, information from another source 
Corporación del Cobre, Informe de Mercado N° 6, 
Santiago, Chile, June 1967. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, "Memorandum of Agreement of 4 October 1967" 
(TD/COCOA.1/11), 25 October 1967. 
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indicates that the Governments of the United 
States and Ghana reached an agreement on this 
question.^® According to this information, the 
buffer stock will be financed by a levy on pro-
ducers of one dollar cent a pound on all sales 
of cocoa beans in world markets. Producers 
will be able to sell to the buffer stock any 
output above their export quotas, but at only 
half the floor price established in the agree-
ment. If at any future time the buffer stock 
were to sell cocoa in the market to stop prices 
from rising above the agreed ceiling, the pro-
ceeds would be used to pay the other half of 
the minimum price to producers from whom it 
had previously bought surpluses. The maximum 
size of the buffer stock has been fixed at 
250,000 tons, the approximate equivalent of 
two years' production surpluses in the recent 
past. 
The agreement reached between the leading 
exporter and the largest world consumer of 
cocoa removes one of the obstacles that had 
arisen in the cocoa negotiations, although it is 
not absolutely certain that this agreement will 
be ratified by all the remaining countries at 
the United Nations Cocoa Conference to be 
held at the end of 1967. Although this agree-
ment represents a modification of the stand 
taken by the developing countries in earlier 
stages of the negotiations, it does not imply 
renunciation of the earlier principle ratified in 
the Charter of Algiers, that international fi-
nancing institutions and developed countries 
should participate in the financing of buffer 
stocks. The action of the buffer stock is confined 
to the purchase of surpluses over the export 
quotas, so that it cannot intervene directly and 
regularly in defence of the floor price. The 
maintenance of this minimum price level de-
pends basically on adjustments in the export 
quotas, although, clearly, as these quotas are 
reduced, the amount producers can sell to the 
buffer stock increases, up to the maximum in-
dicated above. At the same time, producers 
will not feel encouraged to sell to the buffer 
stock, since they will receive only half the 
agreed minimum price. 
Another commodity in this group which is 
of special importance to Latin American coun-
tries is coffee. The International Coffee Agree-
ment is in the process of being re-negotiated. 
The most important problems to be considered 
in these new negotiations are the redistribution 
of export quotas, the establishment of produc-
tion targets (with a view to eliminating chronic 
surpluses) and the creation of a diversification 
49 The Economist, London, 14 October 1967. 
fund. The redistribution of quotas is one of 
the most difficult questions, since many coun-
tries claim that they need to secure increases 
in their quotas, in view of the steady decline in 
world coffee prices. This problem is related 
to the automatic adjustment of quotas in ac-
cordance with fluctuations in the prices of 
certain basic grades of coffee, a system which 
has benefited countries exporting inferior grades 
rather than those exporting more expensive, 
high-quality grades. No information is yet avail-
able on the results of the negotiations under 
way, but authoritative sources agree that if the 
problem of the selective adjustment system and 
redistribution of quotas can be solved satisfac-
torily the Agreement will be renewed for a 
further period. There seems to be a basis of 
agreement on the establishment of the Diversifi-
cation Fund, and this would enable the Fund 
to enter into operation in the near future. 
Having considered coffee and tin. for which 
agreements are in existence, and the possible 
negotiation of an agreement on cocoa, there 
remains one other product—bananas—of great 
significance in the exports of certain Latin 
American countries. Because of their natural 
characteristics and production and marketing 
conditions, bananas are not a commodity that 
can be made the subject of an agreement, like 
coffee or cocoa. On the other hand, the Banana 
Study Group, set up by FAO in June 1965, 
may play an important role in adopting uniform 
quality standards, promoting consumption, im-
proving productivity, etc. The Study Group was 
not in a position to adopt effective measures 
on these questions at its first sessipn in March 
1966, but undoubtedly did so at its second 
session in October 1967. The question which is 
perhaps of greatest interest to the exporter 
countries is the study of problems relating to 
the distribution of bananas in the consumer 
markets, since in most cases there are monopoly 
conditions unfavourable to producers. Further-
more, there is undoubtedly a case of negotiating 
an inter-governmental agreement on bananas to 
establish a co-ordinated policy on export prices, 
transport, and distribution in the consumer 
markets, particularly with a view to ensuring 
a greater share of the final price for the pro-
ducers. 
Despite the different forms that government 
action on international commodity arrangements 
or agreements can take, the actual contribution 
that can be made by such agreements in in-
creasing the export earnings of developing 
countries is relatively limited, in some cases 
by the small number of commodities for which 
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agreements can operate effectively, and in others 
because the policies of the developed countries 
do not yet fully reflect the spirit of co-opera-
tion and assistance which characterized the 
UNCTAD recommendations. 
It should also be recognized that in some 
cases there are substantive differences between 
the developing countries themselves, which 
make it difficult to adopt a common stand on 
specific commodity trade problems. Particularly 
in the case of tropical products, the special 
preferences granted in the markets of the 
European Economic Community and the United 
Kingdom to certain developing countries have 
given rise to conflicts of interest between those 
who enjoy the preferences and those who suffer 
from the discrimination, and this has become 
a serious obstacle to the adoption of a common 
stand vis-a-vis the developed countries. It should 
therefore be repeated that this problem must 
be fully considered during the discussions at 
the second session of UNCTAD, since this would 
help to strengthen the position of the develop-
ing countries as a whole and facilitate the 
negotiations for agreements on a certain number 
of commodities. 
7. OPERATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUFFER STOCKS 
Considerable attention has been given in inter-
national commodity agreements policy to the 
establishment and operation of buffer stocks. 
The establishment of such stocks is determined 
mainly by certain characteristics of the com-
modity (durability, storage facilities and costs, 
international quality standards, etc.) and they 
appear to be particularly suitable for commodi-
ties whose supply or demand is strongly 
affected by sharp short-term fluctuations, or for 
dealing with occasional production surpluses. 
To some extent these conditions restrict the 
establishment of buffer stocks to a small num-
ber of primary commodities. Moreover, as their 
specific function is to eliminate or reduce the 
effect on prices of short-term fluctuations in 
production or demand, their establishment must 
generally be considered within the framework 
of an international agreement on the commod-
ity in question and as part of a stabilization 
mechanism which includes other forms of action, 
such as export controls and the establishment 
of floor prices. 
Once the prerequisites for the establishment 
of a buffer stock have been satisfied, two essen-
tial aspects of its operation remain to be con-
sidered: (a) the form in which it will intervene 
in the market, and (b) the method of financing. 
With regard to the first aspect, it would seem 
essential that the action of the buffer stock 
should cover the forward as well as the spot 
market. Its intervention would thus not be 
limited to the moment when prices drop to 
the minimum level established in the agreement, 
but would cover a specific area within the 
price range, in both selling and buying opera-
tions. Authority to intervene in the market 
should apply to the whole of the commercial 
year in question, whenever market conditions 
demand, and not merely to the end of the 
commercial year. Finally, the obligation to buy 
at the minimum price should include—in so 
far as financial resources allow—all exportable 
surpluses not sold by the developing countries, 
or—where there are export quotas—the part of 
the quota not exported. In this last case, if 
producers still have exportable surpluses, the 
buffer stock could buy these surpluses at prices 
below the minimum level, provided that they 
can be used in non-traditional ways. 
Secondly, the developing countries should 
reaffirm, as an essential principle, the respon-
sibility incumbent on the developed importing 
countries with regard to methods of financing. 
Of the various methods suggested, the most 
disadvantageous from the standpoint of the 
developing countries are those based wholly or 
partly on the establishment of an export tax, 
since that would immediately reduce their 
income. Although this reduction might not 
constitute an actual loss, it would in any case 
deprive them of a certain amount of foreign 
exchange to meet their most pressing import 
needs. It would therefore be better if the tax 
were imposed on imports. In either case the 
problem is that this mode of financing will 
only permit the operating capital of the buffer 
stock to be formed over a fairly long period, 
so that it would not be able to intervene effec-
tively in the market, if circumstances so re-
quired, from its first year of operation. Subscrip-
tion of the initial capital of the buffer stock is 
therefore an essential requisite, and several 
formulas have been suggested. One is that 
developed importing countries should contribute 
this capital by means of a long-term loan at 
low interest rates; and another is that an offi-
cially guaranteed loan should be negotiated 
with the international financing agencies. The 
participation of international financing agencies 
might be considered a logical extension of their 
stabilization credit policy, and in that sense it 
may well lie within the scope of their present 
statutes, as was decided in the case of compen-
satory credit.®® 
50 According to a statement made by the representa-
tive of the International Monetary Fund at the second 
session of the UNCTAD Committee of Commodities, 
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The secretariat of UNCTAD has proposed a 
method of financing buffer stocks that is worthy 
of note. A central fund would be established 
with capital supplied by governments and inter-
national financing agencies, to provide the initial 
capital of buffer stocks created under a specific 
international commodity agreement. The admin-
istering council of the agreement concerned 
would continue to be responsible for the opera-
tion of the buffer stock itself, so that the fund 
would act only as the stock's banking institu-
tion, for which purpose it could even receive 
deposits made by the council.®^ 
The operational details of such a scheme 
would present no major difficulty and perhaps 
in this way some of the objections raised by the 
international financing agencies to participating 
in these activities could be overcome. The 
creation of a fund such as that proposed would 
also have certain advantages; for example, the 
total financial resources needed for the opera-
tion of two or more buffer stocks could be less 
than the sums required for each individual 
stock; moreover, the fund would have easier 
access to commercial credit when needed to 
cover a larger volume of operations. However, 
although the creation of a central fund has 
certain advantages, there are also greater dif-
ficuhies to overcome, particularly on the part 
of the developed countries. It would therefore 
be advisable for the developing countries, while 
supporting the proposal until it can be more 
carefully evaluated, to emphasize the need to 
create special funds for individual buffer stocks 
within the framework of international com-
modity arrangements. 
8. POLICY RELATING TO DIVERSIFICATION OF 
EXPORTS 
In considering world commodity trade prob-
lems, the question of the diversification of ex-
ports cannot be overlooked. Undoubtedly, the 
that institution will carefully consider what contribution 
it can make towards solving the problem of financing 
buffer stocks. 
"Operation and financing of buffer stocks: outline 
of a study for the second session of the Conference" 
(TD/B/C.1/29), 10 January 1967. 
problems inherent in the diversification of pro-
duction lie mainly in the sphere of economic 
development policy, but they are none the less 
closely linked with specific aspects of trade 
policy. Diversification of domestic production 
in developing countries would help to reduce 
the heavy dependence of some countries on one 
or two commodities as their main source of 
export earnings, and might lessen the require-
ments for certain imports, such as foodstuffs 
and raw materials. Obviously, in this context 
the most important aspect is the extent to which 
specific commodity policies might contribute 
to the diversification of production. 
A diversification programme adopted within 
the context of a specific international commodity 
agreement might offer advantages even over the 
short term for products suffering from chronic 
production surpluses. The programme would 
have to be financed by a central fund ad-
ministered by the corresponding council, with 
capital contributions from governments signa-
tories of the agreement, particularly the de-
veloped countries, and even from international 
development financing agencies. The Interna-
tional Coffee Organization is at present con-
sidering the creation of such a fund, and the 
United States has promised to participate. It 
might also be possible for the exporting coun-
tries themselves to undertake to contribute to 
the fund a proportion of the higher export 
earnings they would obtain if prices rose above 
a certain level or if existing basic export quotas 
were increased. While it is true that a pro-
gramme to restrict some crops and encourage 
others cannot have the same urgency or priority 
in all countries, there is no doubt that all 
would benefit from a policy aimed at eliminat-
ing chronic production surpluses. 
The creation of these diversification funds as 
a feature of international commodity arrange-
ments was supported by all the developing 
countries in the Charter of Algiers, "highest 
priority being given to diversification in the 
programmes on inter-regional, regional and sub-
regional levels in the process of trade expansion 
and economic integration among developing 
countries". 
C, TRADE IN MANUFACTURES AND SEMI-MANUFACTURES 
I . PREFERENTIAL ACCESS TO THE MARKETS OF 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES FOR MANUFACTURES 
AND SEMI-MANUFACTURES FROM DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
One of the most urgent and feasible objec-
tives to be attained at the second session of 
UNCTAD is to negotiate and agree on the basic 
principles for the establishment of a general 
system of preferences by the developed coun-
tries in favour of the manufactures and semi-
manufactures of developing countries, and to 
secure a commitment to negotiate the details 
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of the system at a later date, at specific times 
and places, on the basis of those principles. 
The Latin American countries memhers of 
the Special Committee on Latin American Co-
ordination (CECLA) formulated in the Charter 
of Tequendama their common position on the 
minimum aspects which should be covered by 
those basic principles; these essentially coincide 
with those specified in the Charter of Algiers 
as representing the position of the Group of 77. 
The developed countries members of the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment, for their part, agreed at a ministerial 
meeting at the end of November 1967 to submit 
to the New Delhi Conference a proposal con-
taining various basic principles for the estab-
lishment of the preferential system, which rep-
resent the concerted position worked out in 
the OECD discussions. 
The Charters of Tequendama and Algiers 
incorporate—with some modifications—many of 
the proposals submitted by the ECLA secre-
tariat for consideration by the members of 
CECLA. Summarizing the essential aspects 
of these proposals, the basic principles for 
preferential access to the markets of developed 
countries for the manufactures and semi-manu-
factures of developing countries are as follows: 
(i) The system should include general non-
discriminatory and non-reciprocal preferences 
granted by all developed countries to all de-
veloping countries; 
(ii) Preferential treatment should take the 
form of free access for manufactures and semi-
manufactures from the developing countries, 
through: the elimination of all import duties; 
the elimination of non-tariíF restrictions, without 
prejudice to the establishment of quotas for 
products regarded as "critical" or "sensitive"; 
(iii) Preferences should cover all manufac-
tures and semi-manufactures from the develop-
ing countries, without restrictions on volume 
or value. Products regarded as "critical" or 
"sensitive" by various developed countries may 
be excepted; the negative lists or lists of ex-
ceptions should be considered in consultation 
with the developing countries®^ to ensure that 
they are kept to a minimum and that no product 
is completely excluded, e.g., by establishing 
(tariff) duty-free quotas to which preferential 
treatment would be applied, or by granting a 
53 The procedure could be similar to that followed 
with the lists of exceptions in the Kennedy Round. In 
addition to the initial consideration, the lists should be 
revised periodically, with a view to achieving their 
gradual elimination or an equally gradual increase in 
the tariff quotas. 
partial reduction in customs duties for develop-
ing countries; 
(iv) An escape clause would also be in-
cluded, by virtue of which quantitative or tariff 
limitations similar to those described in the 
previous sub-paragraph could be imposed in 
duly established cases of market disruption 
in important industries in the developed coun-
tries caused by preferential imports. Applica-
tion of this escape clause should be subject to 
multilateral consultations, objective criteria and 
other procedures which, as was pointed out in 
chapter H, should in general govern the use 
of escape clauses by the developed countries 
and, in particular, the application of restric-
tions on the ground of market disruption 
problems. The developed countries should like-
wise agree to take the appropriate domestic 
measures to make the necessary adjustments in 
those industries which are unable to compete 
with similar industries in developing countries; 
(v) The economically relatively less developed 
countries should not be subject to the limita-
tions imposed for one or other of the reasons 
indicated above, unless imports from those 
countries have been an important factor in the 
market disruption;®® 
(vi) The preferential system should be of 
sufficient duration to ensure that its objectives 
are fully achieved and that all developing 
countries benefit from the preferences.®'' In any 
event, it should be revised at the end of an 
initial minimum period with a view to extending 
its duration, particularly in the case of the 
economically relatively less developed coun-
tries. The withdrawal of preferential treatment 
should be gradual; 
(vii) Without prejudice to the measures in-
dicated above in favour of the economically 
relatively less developed countries (exemption 
from the quantitative restrictions imposed on 
"critical" products or from the application of 
escape clauses in cases of market disruption, 
and greater duration of the preferential treat-
ment), once the system is under way other 
measures will be determined where necessary 
to ensure that they are able to take full ad-
vantage of the preferences;®® 
The Charter of Algiers states, however, that "escape 
clause actions limiting or excluding particular exports 
should not apply to the less competitive products from 
less advanced countries". 
The Charter of Algiers states that the preferential 
system should last for an initial period of at least twenty 
years. 
55 Other special measures which are indicated below 
could be taken in favour of the relatively less developed 
countries, particularly in the field of technical and finan-
cial assistance, with a view to promoting the establish-
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(viii) The special preferences already granted 
in markets of certain developed areas or coun-
tries to manufactures and semi-manufactures 
from certain developing countries should be 
absorbed in the system of general preferences;®® 
(ix) The developed countries with centrally 
planned economies should grant advantages 
whose effects are at least equivalent to the 
preferences granted by the developed market 
economy countries (for example, their import 
programmes should include increasing quanti-
ties of manufactures and semi-manufactures 
from developing countries, including tolerance 
margins for prices and delivery dates) 
(x) Permanent machinery should be estab-
lished, within a sufficiently universal framework, 
to supervise and evaluate the preferential sys-
tem, to undertake consultations (e.g., for the 
periodic revision of the lists of exceptions, 
the application of the escape clause, and the 
consideration of new measures that might be 
adopted in favour of the relatively less de-
veloped countries or to correct situations un-
favourable to certains countries), to identify 
the different problems presented by the appli-
cation of the system and to propose ways of 
overcoming them. Without prejudice to this 
work to be undertaken on a permanent basis, 
provision should be made for more comprehen-
sive periodic revisions of the system at reason-
able intervals (every three or four years), with 
a view to modifying the system and adopting 
new measures that experience has shown to be 
either necessary or advisable.®® 
ment or expansion in those countries of export-oriented 
industries. In fact, during the first stage, these would be 
the most important measures, since in those countries 
the first problem to be overcome in order that they may 
take full advantage of the opportunities provided by 
the preferential system is to ensure that they have 
industries in a position to export. 
58 The Charter of Algiers states that "the new system 
of general preferences should ensure at least equivalent 
advantages to developing countries enjoying preferences 
in certain developed countries to enable them to suspend 
their existing preferences on manufactures and semi-
manufactures. From the beginning, provisions should be 
incorporated in the system of general preferences, for 
the developed countries to redress any adverse situation 
which may arise for these developing countries as a 
consequence of the institution of the general system of 
preferences." 
For other possible measures that could be taken by 
the centrally planned economies in favour of the de-
veloping countries, see section H below. 
58 It should be taken into account that the establish-
ment of the system of general preferences will be break-
ing new ground, and that it will not be possible to 
identify and solve beforehand all the problems and spe-
cial situations which might arise during its operation; 
on the other hand, it is extremely likely that some of 
the problems and difficulties anticipated will prove to be 
less serious than expected or will not materialize at all. 
The proposal to be submitted by OECD to 
the second session of UNCTAD also contains 
a number of principles which essentially coin-
cide in many aspects with those suggested here 
and those contained in the Charters of Tequen-
dama and Algiers. Of the aspects on which the 
greatest differences of opinion exist—and on 
which the negotiations at the New Delhi Con-
ference will therefore have to concentrate in 
order to reach agreement on the basic features 
of the proposed preferential system—, three 
should be mentioned: the products to be 
covered by the system of preferences; the pre-
paration of the lists of exceptions and the 
procedures to be employed; and the method 
of application of the escape clauses. 
With regard to the first point, OECD would 
propose that the preferential treatment (which 
would take the form of tariff preferences only) 
should be applied in principle to all manufac-
tures and semi-manufactures, these being under-
stood to mean the products included in chapters 
25 to 99 of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature 
(BTN), and that the inclusion of other prod-
ucts should be determined separately in each 
case. It is of vital interest to the developing 
countries that the preferential treatment should 
be extended to many products in earlier chap-
ters of the BTN, especially prepared foodstuffs 
and other processed and semi-processed primary 
commodities, since these are produced by in-
dustries which have better and more immediate 
prospects of exporting to developed countries. 
At the very least, an attempt should be made 
to secure a partial reduction of customs duties 
on these products in order to remove the pro-
tectionist element, leaving that part of the 
duties which compensates the domestic industry 
for the greater cost of the raw materials or 
other inputs (this is an extremely important 
element in the case of prepared foodstuffs, given 
the high degree of protection generally afforded 
to their agricultural products by the developed 
countries). In other words, this would eliminate 
the protection given to the domestic industry, 
which would then be on an equal footing with 
similar industries in the developing countries. 
In certain specific cases, a duty-free quota 
could be established for the developing coun-
tries. 
With regard to the lists of exceptions (which, 
according to the OECD report, should be as 
short as possible), it has already been pointed 
out that they should not be established on a 
unilateral basis by each developed country, but 
should be submitted for consultation and nego-
tiation with the developing countries, in order 
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to avoid including products of particular interest 
only to some of these countries; and that if it 
is not possible to remove the latter products 
from the lists, an attempt should be made to 
secure either a partial reduction of duties or 
duty-free quotas. In addition, these lists, and 
the lists of products generally excluded from the 
preferential system, should be revised periodi-
cally, with a view to reducing or eliminating 
them or to securing a gradual increase in the 
amount of tariff reduction or in the size of 
the tariff quota. 
It has also been pointed out that the escape 
clause should not be freely interpreted and 
unilaterally applied by the developed countries. 
A multilateral consultation procedure should be 
adopted (for instance, as part of the proposed 
machinery for supervising the operation of the 
preferential system), for the purposes of ascer-
taining, as far as possible on the basis of 
objective criteria, whether such clauses can 
justifiably be invoked in any given case, and, 
if so, the nature and scope of the restrictions 
to be applied. Otherwise, the system of pre-
ferences is liable to lose much of its efficacy. 
Besides negotiating and agreeing upon the 
bases for the system of preferences and an 
appropriate occasion for conducting the relevant 
negotiations, the New Delhi Conference should 
adopt a decision to bring the system into force 
by 1 January 1969 at the latest, even if only 
provisionally, i.e., even though the negotiations 
may not have been completed. 
If the expected agreement is reached at the 
second session of UNCTAD on several of 
the basic features of the system and priority is 
given to the inunediate negotiation of others, 
there would seem to be no insuperable obstacles 
to the entry into operation on 1 January 1969, 
or even earlier, of the arrangements already 
agreed upon, while the negotiation of other 
points still open to question can be continued 
later. For example, it is agreed in principle that 
the system of preferences should cover at 
least the products comprised in chapters X X V 
et seq. of the Brussels Trade Nomenclature, and 
that for most of them the preferential treatment 
would consist in duty-free access to markets, 
with the exclusion of products on the lists of 
exceptions. 
To bring the system of preferences into 
operation, it would not be essential for agree-
ment to have been reached on other questions, 
such as, for example, the definitive form and 
content of these lists of exceptions and of the 
lists of other products either not covered at all 
or only partly covered by the preferential 
system; procedures for the application of escape 
clauses; equivalent benefits for countries cur-
rently enjoying special preferences; the dura-
tion of the system; and formulas for the gra-
dual exclusion from the preferential system of 
developing countries that have attained a satis-
factory competitive position. 
The solution of some of these and other 
problems will be greatly facilitated, and in 
some cases will only be made possible by the 
experience acquired in the actual course of 
operation of the system of preferences. More-
over, the longer its entry into force is deferred, 
the less its efficacy will be, owing to the gradual 
application of the concessions granted by the 
developed countries in the Kennedy Round. 
2. PROGRAMME FOR THE LIBERALIZATION AND 
EXPANSION OF TRADE IN MANUFACTURES 
AND SEMI-MANUFACTURES OF INTEREST TO 
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
An undertaking on the part of the developed 
countries to grant general preferential treat-
ment to the developing countries' manufactured 
and semi-manufactured products would be the 
most efficient contribution that the second ses-
sion of UNCTAD could make to the improve-
ment of conditions of access to the developed 
countries' markets for the products in question. 
But there are several other aspects of trade 
relations between developing and developed 
countries which are of essential interest at the 
same level, and which may not be covered by 
a system of preferential treatment of the type 
analysed in the preceding section. They relate 
mainly to matters complementary to the pre-
ferential system, such as the elimination of 
non-tariff restrictions of every kind, and the 
effective application of other commitments, 
resolutions and recommendations previously 
adopted at various meetings and conferences. 
In this connexion, the developing countries 
have drawn attention, at the most recent ses-
sions of the Trade and Development Board, to 
the slowness of the progress in this field.®® At 
GATT meetings, too, it has been pointed out 
that a number of residual import restrictions 
are still being applied to manufactures and 
semi-manufactures classified as of special export 
interest to the developing countries; in many 
®® The Committee on Manufactures alluded to the 
non-removal of barriers against exports of manufactures 
and semi-manufactures of interest to the developing 
countries, and recommended that sectoral studies should 
be undertaken first on wood and forest products, and 
later on fisheries products and iron ores. 
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instances, these restrictions are incompatible 
with the General Agreement itself.®" 
All this suggests the necessity of combining 
preferential treatment for the developing coun-
tries' manufactures and semi-manufactures in 
the developed countries' markets with the adop-
tion of specific programmes of action and other 
measures directed towards various objectives 
whose attainment will strengthen the export 
prospects of the products concerned under 
existing market conditions. 
Of basic importance in such a plan of action 
is fulfilment of the undertaking to refrain from 
increasing the incidence of restrictions on pro-
ducts currently or potentially of special export 
interest to the developing countries. This stand-
still commitment in its turn is directly linked 
to the application of restrictions on grounds of 
market disruption. It would be of little use to 
improve conditions of access to the developed 
countries' markets for the developing countries' 
manufactures and semi-manufactures, if, in the 
event of the generation of fairly large-scale 
export flows of some of these products, the im-
porter countries began to invoke escape clauses 
to justify the application of restrictions (par-
ticularly on the grounds that market disruption 
was occurring or might occur), without first 
seeking to modify their own structure of pro-
duction on lines that would permit of solutions 
compatible at least with the maintenance of 
the said trade flows. 
In addition to the system of preferences, 
therefore, a liberalization programme would 
have to be adopted in favour of the manufac-
tures and semi-manufactures of developing coun-
tries, whose essential provisions should relate 
to the following objectives, inter alia: 
(a) The establishment of a specific pro-
gramme for the reduction and gradual elimina-
tion of quantitative and other non-tariff restric-
tions applied by the developed countries to 
products currently or potentially of special 
export interest to the developing countries. 
Such a programme is a sine qua non for the 
effective implementation of the specific pro-
visions of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, part IV, article XXXVII. Should 
the general reduction or elimination of such 
restrictions, in particular those described as 
"residual", be impossible, they could at least 
be reduced or eliminated in favour of imports 
from the developing countries; 
{b) The developed countries should also 
undertake to adopt, in the event of their being 
faced with market disruption problems, internal 
measures to promote adjustments of their in-
dustrial structure, especially the conversion of 
any industries that are unfitted to cope with 
immediate or potential competition from their 
counterparts in the developing countries. This 
would be an essential prerequisite for a new and 
more dynamic international division of labour 
which would promote the expansion or estab-
lishment of industries producing mainly for 
export in the developing countries. The appli-
cation of this principle would imply the need 
for the developed countries to adopt aid pro-
grammes in support of internal industries or 
activities adversely affected by competition from 
imports of developing countries' products, so 
as to facilitate their conversion to other activi-
ties or sectors in which their efficiency or 
productivity might be greater;®^ 
(c) In cases where tariff and non-tariff restric-
tions are based on apprehensions as to competi-
tion from products exported by other developed 
countries, an endeavour should be made to 
accord individual treatment to products from 
developing countries through the opening of 
tariff sub-items. In this connexion, a very 
valuable contribution is represented by the 
Customs Co-operation Council's offer to col-
laborate in studying the technical possibilities 
of identifying those products of export interest 
to the developing countries whose characteristics 
may differ from those produced in developed 
countries; and in respect of which tariff reduc-
tions could be negotiated;®^ 
{d) The developed countries should seek to 
reduce their margins of effective tariff protec-
tion for primary products at various stages of 
processing not included in the system of pre-
ferences for manufactures and semi-manufac-
tures, so as to allow or encourage their pro-
cessing in the developing countries. It often 
happens that a higher degree of effective pro-
tection is also related to the number of stages 
of processing, particularly in the case of food 
products or final consumer goods 
See, for example, the reports of the Committee on 
Trade and Development, the Group on Residual Restric-
tions, and the GATT Negotiations Committee for the 
Kennedy Round. 
See the provisions of the United States 1962 Trade 
Expansion Act set forth in chapter 11, section A, above. 
62 For example, on the basis of studies carried out on 
textile products made on hand looms, the Customs Co-
operation Council formulated recommendations which 
served as a basis for the Nordic countries' decision, 
announced at the second session of the UNCTAD Com-
mittee on Manufactures, to grant tariff reductions on 
products of this type. 
«3 See the study prepared for UNCTAD by Bela Ba-
lassa under the title "The structure of protection in the 
67 
(e) The liberalization process for manufac-
tures and semi-manufactures of special interest 
to the developing countries should also cover 
the "invisible" restrictions implicit in health 
provisions, regulations relating to mixing, 
standards, techniques, packing, brands, quality, 
etc., which are also acquiring increasing im-
portance, in both relative and absolute terms, 
as effective instruments for the restriction of 
imports. An inventory of such restrictions must 
be made, and their nature, scope and effects 
defined, in order to determine how far they are 
justified and to promote their elimination or 
modification in the light of objective criteria, 
particularly in cases where their application is 
left to administrative discretion, and therefore 
creates situations of uncertainty for exporters in 
developing countries, who do not know until a 
shipment reaches its destination whether it will 
or will not be considered acceptable. It would 
also be advisable to request a group of experts 
to prepare a code of regulations with which 
the content and application of health provisions 
and other regulations normally accepted as 
legitimate should be brought into line, in order 
to prevent their serving as cover for improper 
import restrictions. Consultation machinery or, 
better still, a court of arbitration should be 
established to deal with complaints of non-
compliance with the regulations in question;®* 
( / ) In the study of maritime transport prob-
lems, an exhaustive examination should be 
made of the availability of shipping space and 
the incidence of freight charges, since, as these 
often depend on the scale and direction of trade 
flows, they usually represent a proportionally 
heavier burden for developing countries' exports 
to developed or other developing countries; 
(g) Lastly, in connexion with the developed 
countries' current or future commitments to 
liberalize their imports of manufactures or 
semi-manufactures from the developing coun-
tries, the problem of the escape clauses once 
again arises. As they are applied at present, 
they restrict the scope of the commitments to 
a greater or lesser extent, and often render 
them inoperative. 
industrial countries and its effects on the exports of pro-
cessed goods from developing nations" (TD/B/C.2/36, 
May 1967), which includes a table showing nominal 
and effective tariffs on specific products, according to 
their degree of processing, in the major industrial 
countries. 
See, for example, the provisions of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, article X. 
3. SOME PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE SUPPLY 
AND PROMOTION OF EXPORTS OF LATIN AMERI-
CAN MANUFACTURES AND SEMI-MANUFACTURES 
In considering the problems related to supply 
and exports of manufactures, a distinction 
should be drawn between countries which al-
ready have a sufficiently broad industrial base 
and those whose industrial or manufacturing 
base is at a very incipient stage. In the latter, 
trade in manufactures can only increase if the 
productive base is expanded and, in particular, 
if potential export industries are established. 
The problem is very different in countries 
which already possess a fairly broad industrial 
base and whose exports of manufactures should 
be far more dynamic than they have been so 
far. This is attributable to several well-known 
factors, particularly the slanting of their in-
dustrial development almost exclusively towards 
the domestic market, and the high tariffs by 
which such development has always been pro-
tected. The result is a large number of industries 
which are relatively inefficient because of the 
small domestic markets, the absence of the in-
centive of competition, the fact that they are 
compelled to use inputs produced locally at a 
high cost—which puts them at a disadvantage 
on world markets—and the lack of a suitable 
economic policy in most countries. Entrepre-
neurs, for their part, have generally shown no 
interest in launching out to the external market. 
This absence, in some cases, of an export 
mentality on the part of entrepreneurs and of 
a systematic government policy for promoting 
exports is evident from the fact that most in-
dustrial plants rarely work at over 70 per cent 
of their installed capacity. In other words, there 
is usually a considerable margin of idle ca-
pacity and, therefore, an export potential which 
cannot be made use of, although if it could 
production costs would drop considerably. It is 
only in exceptional cases, generally associated 
with periods of severe economic recession and 
therefore of limited domestic demand, that entre-
preneurs have been interested in seeking export 
markets. While they have usually obtained fairly 
satisfactory results, their interest has flagged 
with the recovery of domestic demand. 
It should, however, be recognized that in the 
last few years a number of Latin American 
entrepreneurs have shown themselves increas-
ingly concerned with the export trade and have 
been making greater efforts to sell their products 
in foreign markets, while the governments have 
been adopting a variety of measures to pro-
mote these exports. These measures, however, 
have been of relatively limited scope and have 
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not been welded into a coherent and systematic 
programme. The same reservations apply to 
the technical assistance which the countries have 
been receiving with regard to both the estab-
lishment and the expansion of export industries 
and to the actual promotion of exports of 
processed and semi-processed products. 
Studies carried out by the secretariat of 
ECLA, in collaboration with that of UNCTAD, 
on the background data and prospects for ex-
ports of manufactures from some Latin American 
countries at a fairly advanced stage of industrial 
development®® (see estimates, table 4, p. 70) show 
how far such exports might be increased over 
the short and medium term merely by making 
full use of the various industries' existing pro-
duction capacity, provided that the above-
mentioned obstacles are satisfactorily overcome 
and that other requirements such as adequate 
supplies of raw materials, better operating con-
ditions for industry and some institutional im-
provements are fulfilled. Although these esti-
mates only represent orders of magnitude, they 
indicate the extent to which the growth of 
Latin America's exports of manufactures is ob-
structed by factors attributable to supply con-
ditions, and the considerable growth potential 
which could be turned to account by energetic 
and systematic action. However, this in no way 
lessens the obstacles to growth resulting from 
existing or potential restrictions which prevent 
these products from entering the markets of 
developed countries. 
In order to make better use of this growth 
potential and overcome the existing limitations, 
the Governments of the developing States agreed 
65 See "Short- and medium-term prospects for export 
of manufactures from selected developing countries" 
(Chile, TD/B/C.2/33; Argentina, TD/B/C.2/34; Bra-
zU, TD/B/C.2/35; Venezuela, TD/B/C.2/40; and Co-
lombia, TD/B/C.2/45) . These studies were presented 
jointly by the secretariats of UNCTAD and ECLA to 
the Committee on Manufactures of UNCTAD at the 
session held in July 1967. 
to suggest to UNCTAD and the United Nations 
Organization for Industrial Development that 
further steps should be taken to develop and 
promote their exports of manufactures. 
As a result of various moves on the part of 
the United Nations, it was decided to establish 
the United Nations Export Promotion Pio-
gramme to take care of the provision and co-
ordination of technical assistance to developing 
countries in this field, through an international 
trade centre set up jointly by UNCTAD and 
GATT. The system will operate in close co-
operation with the regional commissions. It 
will provide specialized technical assistance to 
the developing countries requesting it, and it 
can draw on the resources of other specialized 
agencies. 
Accordingly, in order to supplement more 
suitable industrial development policies and 
other internal measures it will be necessary to 
adopt other measures in the sphere of interna-
tional co-operation aimed mainly at: 
(o) Greater and more effective international 
technical and financial assistance in improving 
the domestic productivity and international com-
petitive position of industries in developing 
countries, with emphasis on the identification, 
programming and development of export in-
dustries ; 
(b) Technical assistance for the promotion 
of exports at the national level (including man-
power training at different levels, quality and 
packing control, etc.), and in the form of ex-
ternal market research on products for which 
developing countries may have existing or po-
tential export prospects. It would be particularly 
useful if UNCTAD could collaborate with 
UNIDO, GATT and the regional economic com-
missions in both this respect and that referred 
to in paragraph (a ) ; 
(c) Expansion of markets for developing 
countries' industries through regional co-opera-
tion, integration and complementarity. 
D. THE FINANCING OF TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 
1. EXTERNAL SECTOR FINANCIAL TRENDS IN THE 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
In 1964-66 the annual growth rate of total 
exports from the region (excluding Cuba) was 
higher than in previous years and, partly as a 
result of this, Latin America was able to over-
come the serious stagnation of total imports from 
1961 to 1963 (see table 5) . The factors determin-
ing the improvement in exports in 1964-66 were 
mainly temporary, and external demand declined 
steadily towards the end of 1966 and more 
TA  
sharply in 1967—as reflected in the drop in 
external prices of many export items. 
Consequently, there has been renewed pressure 
on the balance of payments of most countries 
of the region, with a widening of the persistent 
gap between export earnings and the growing 
foreign exchange needs for external payments. 
The larger amounts involved in servicing foreign 
investment and loans during the past few years, 
the limitations on a larger net inflow of foreign 
capital—both because of its higher cost and die 
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Table 7 
TOTAL EXPORTS AND EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES, SHORT- AND MEDIUM-TERM 
PROJECTIONS FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1960, 1963 AND 1965 
{Millions of dollars) 
Exports 
¡960 1963 1965 
Estimated potential 
export capacity 
Short term: Medium term: 
1-2 years 4-5 years 
Argemina 
Total exports 1,079 
Exports of manufactures 116 
BrazU 
Total exports 1,269 
Exports of manufactures 37 
Chile 
Total exports 490 
Exports of manufactures 37 
Colombia 
Total exports 465 
Exports of manufactures 7 
Venezuela 
Total exports 2,384 
Exports of manufactures® 3 
Total for the five countries 
Total exports 5,687 






































Source: "Short and medium-term prospects for export of manufactures from selected developing countries" 
(Chile, TD/B/C.2/33; Argentina, TD/B/C.2/34; Brazil, TD/B/C.2/35; Venezuela, TD/B/C.2/40; Colombia, TD/ 
B/C.2/45) . 
a Alternative I, with restricted domestic demand, 
b Alternative II, with normal domestic demand. 
<= Provisional figures. 
<1 This total was obtained by assuming that the value of Argentina's exports of manufactures in 1965 was the 
same as in 1963 and 1964. 
shortness of the repayment periods—and the 
relatively low levels of international reserves in 
many countries, all mean that imports are more 
likely to feel the effects of the insufficient growth 
of external purchasing power. There is no real 
change, therefore, in the diagnosis of the situa-
tion that has been facing the Latin American 
countries for many years.®® 
®® See, inter alia. The economic development of Latin 
America in the post-war period (United Nations publi-
cation, Sales No.: 64.II.G.6), and "Latin America and 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment" (E/CN.12/693), which is included in Proceedings 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, vol. VII, and was published in Spanish under the 
title of El Comercio internacional y el desarrollo de 
América Latina (México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
1964). 
In the Charter of Tequendama and the Charter 
of Algiers a number of common positions have 
been adopted on the need to reach agreement at 
the second session of UNCTAD on a series of 
international financial measures aimed at sub-
stantially raising the developed countries' con-
tribution to the balanced growth of developing 
States. These measures include the following: 
developed countries should supply at least 1 per 
cent of their gross national product for net 
financial flows to the developing countries; the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment should be transformed into a develop-
ment bank for supplying credit exclusively to 
developing countries; the resources of the Inter-
national Development Association should be 
augmented and all other international credit 
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Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA:a BALANCE OF PAYMENTS POSITION ON CURRENT ACCOUNT, 1951-66 






Net external factor payments 
Goods 




















Source: ECLA, on the basis of IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbook. 
" Excluding Cuba. 
Including net movements of non-monetary gold. 
Including private transfer payments (grants). 
<1 Provisional figures. 
current 
account 
7,068.7 854.6 7,923.3 —6,048.5 -1,589.9 -7,638.4 —828.1 -86 .7 —914.8 -629.9 
7,930.2 1,303.1 9,233.3 —7,013.6 —2,159.4 —9,173.0 -1,035.9 —186.6 -1,222.5 -1,162.2 
8,596.3 1,528.2 10,124.5 —7,381.7 -2,264.0 -9,650.7 —1,067.5 —337.3 —1,408.8 —931.0 
9,983.3 1,886.3 12,102.9 —8,291.7 -2,735.7 —11,027.4 -1,327.9 —479.4 -1,807.3 -731.8 
8,145.1 1,495.9 9,641.0 -7,316.2 —2,219.7 —9,535.9 —1,014.3 —329.8 -1,344.1 —1,239.0 
8,602.4 1,493.5 10,095.9 —7,565.5 -2,288.6 —9,854.1 -1,103.1 —348.4 —1,451.5 —1,209.7 
9,041.3 1,595.3 10,636.6 -7,263.3 -2,298.8 -9,562.1 -1,085.0 —333.6 —1,418.5 —344.1 
9,737.9 1,724.3 11,462.2 -7,841.3 -2,650.7 —10,492.0 —1,231.9 -414.6 -1,646.5 —676.3 
10,182.7 1,894.2 12,076.9 -8,086.0 -2,649.6 -10,735.6 —1,290.4 -491.7 -1,782.1 -440.8 
10,729.4 2,040.3 12,796.7 —8,947.7 —2,906.9 -11,854.6 -1,461.4 -532.0 —1,993.4 -1,078.3 
16.1 23.4 19.5 12.3 20.6 14.3 24.4 42.1 28.7 —21.4 
Table 6 
1951-55 325.3 50.0 47.7 97.7 29.2 66.2 518.4 131.2 61.7 —81.5 629.9 
1956-60 827.2 201.1 95.3 296.4 103.7 59.9 1,287.2 151.3 44.7 -321 .1 1,162.1 
1961-63 275,5 246.5 605.5 8.52.1 129.9 -303 .7 953.8 90.2 76.4 —189.4 930.9 
1964-66 484.4 66.2 739.7 805.9 137.0 5.3 1,432.5 —80.8 —335.1 - 284 .9 731.1 
1961 371.6 329.0 486.7 815.7 130.3 -298 .7 1,018.9 109.3 206.2 —95.4 1,239.0 
1962 211.4 306.1 520.1 826.2 129.1 - 245 .9 930.8 266.1 427.5 414.7 1,209.7 
1963 233.5 104.5 809.8 914.3 130.2 -366 .4 911.6 —104.7 —404.6 —58.0 344.1 
1964 395.7 197.3 760.3 957.6 137.5 221.9 1,712.7 52.9 —266.7 —822.6 676.3 
1965 529.5 —18.9 533.2 514.3 172.9 —147.2 1,069.5 -102 .1 —620.9 94.3 440.8 
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Source-. ECLA, on the basis of IMF, Balance of Payments Yearbook. 
" Excluding Cuba. 
Including reinvestment. 
Provisional figures. 
operations should be on terms currently applied 
by IDA; a multilateral interest equalization fund 
should be created; short- and medium-term 
debts should be consolidated into long-term 
obligations in order to alleviate the excessive 
burden on the balance of payments in developing 
countries; a supplementary financing scheme 
should be adopted on the basis of a consensus 
to be reached after considering the proposal 
prepared by the International Bank; conditions 
governing drawings on the International Mone-
tary Fund under the compensatory financing 
scheme should be made more flexible; and, lastly, 
the needs of developing countries should be 
duly considered in establishing conditions for 
access to the additional international liquidity 
recently approved by IMF. 
Although these suggestions do not cover all 
the financial questions affecting the position of 
developing countries, they constitute a minimum 
programme for the decisions which will have to 
be negotiated at the second session of UNCTAD 
and subsequently. 
Consideration of financial aspects of the ex-
ternal sector of the Latin American economies as 
a whole can only be on the basis of generaliza-
tions which are not always valid for a particular 
country. Nevertheless, the conclusions reached 
illustrate the nature of the problems affecting 
these countries. 
The growing volume of net external factor 
payments has already been mentioned. The next 
point to examine is the recent evolution of net 
transfers of foreign resources to Latin America, 
for which purpose the net movements of capital 
are shown in table 6. If the amount of those 
payments (as shown in table 5) is compared 
with the net autonomous or non-compensatory 
capital movements included in table 6, it will be 
seen that in the two periods 1961-63 and 1964-66 
there was a net outflow of funds from the region. 
Since imports cannot be contained beyond cer-
tain limits without affecting the domestic econ-
omy it is understandable that Latin America's 
total international reserves should have been 
subjected to strong pressures, which in 1962 
brought them to their lowest level in the past 
fifteen years. The modest recovery between 1963 
and 1965 was halted in 1966 when they once 
again declined (see table 7) . 
This, together with the rigidity and size of 
the external debt servicing, will undoubtedly 
severely restrict Latin America's chances of 
speeding up its rate of development, unless there 
is a considerable change in the next few years in 
external financing terms for the developing coun-
tries, or a radical reorientation of international 
trade policy. 
A number of technical studies have recently 
revealed a serious widening of the gap between 
foreign exchange needs and availabilities in the 
developing countries in general and in the Latin 
American countries in particular.®^ 
This research leads to the conclusion that 
even a slight improvement in the rate of eco-
nomic growth will call for a substantial increase 
in net transfers of funds to the developing coun-
tries, and an expansion and diversification of ex-
ports which wi 11 be very hard to achieve, given 
the prevailing conditions in international trade 
and present international economic policy. Fi-
nancial problems also arise that will demand im-
mediate attention. Service payments on external 
investment and loans tend to increase much 
faster than exports, and will lead to an even 
greater reduction of the capacity to import than 
in the last few years. This will frustrate the ef-
forts made in some of the Latin American coun-
tries to generate the necessary expansion of 
their export trade, which have had powerful re-
percussions, owing to the nature of the measures 
that have been adopted in some instances to 
encourage exports and restrict imports, and thus 
enable the countries concerned to meet their 
service commitments (amortization and interest 
payments on external loans and profits and divi-
dends on foreign investment). 
In a recent IBRD study,®® attention is drawn 
to the magnitude of the disbursements which the 
Latin American countries will have to make in 
the next few years under the head of amortiza-
tion and interest payments on the public debt 
and the ofllcially-guaranteed private debt. When 
other short-term debts—^the non-guaranteed pri-
vate debt and the dividends and profits payable 
—are also taken into account, the resulting total 
shows the urgency of correcting the situation 
without delay. Otherwise, the Latin American 
countries will be unable to obtain the capital 
goods, raw materials and intermediate products 
which they require in ever-growing quantities 
in order to further their economic development. 
Not only will the endeavour to improve the rate 
of economic growth have been in vain, but in 
many Latin American countries it will be dif-
cult even to maintain the existing levels of eco-
nomic activity. 
See F. Gerard Adams, "Alternative projections of 
the foreign exchange 'gap': a reconciliation" (ID/B/ 
C.3/30), prepared at the request of the UNCTAD 
secretariat. 
68 IBRD, External medium- and long-term public debt. 
Past and projected amounts: outstanding transactions 
and payments 1956-75 (October 1966). It should be 
noted that the Bank does not assume responsibility for 












1950 . . . . 2,757 6,475 37,400 
1953 . . . . 2,853 6,960 39,590 
1957 . . . . 3,434 6,325 44,130 
1960 . . . . 2,746 6,700 47,560 
1961 . . . . 2,640 5,860 45,120 
1962 . . . . 2,135 6,070 45,815 
1963 . . . . 2,610 6,540 47,335 
1964 . . . . 2,735 6,505 48,750 
1965 . . . . 3,165 7,305 4S,835 
1966 2,975 7,970 48,665 
Table 7 
,  ,  
,  
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, 
Supplement to 1963/64, 1966/67. 
® Excluding Cuba and including Jamaica, 
b According to IMF classification. 
In the transactions between Latin American 
countries and international financing agencies, 
although operations with the Inter-American 
Development Bank have increased and the re-
gion's share in the total loans authorized by 
IBRD has remained virtually the same (though 
with a higher percentage of utilization), its 
relative position has deteriorated somewhat in 
transactions with the International Finance Cor-
poration, and markedly so in transactions with 
IDA, which grants very easy terms. Moreover, 
although IMt transactions are not development 
credit operations but are intended to cover 
balance-of-payments deficits, in the past three 
years Latin America has recorded a net outflow 
of funds vis-á-vis IMF, in contrast with the 
position of other developing countries in their 
firansactions with the Fund. 
In conclusion, unless and until there is a 
radical change in the pattern of the flow of funds 
into the developing countries—as regards both 
the amount of assistance provided and the terms 
on which it is offered—the Latin American 
countries will find it more and more diflicult 
to finance their economic development, and the 
endeavours made in recent years to expand their 
capacity to export will be crushed under the 
growing burden of their external payments 
situation. 
The UNCTAD secretariat has carried out a 
study (TD/B/C.3/36) on the developing coun-
tries' new capital requirements if net inflows 
are to be maintained at their present level. The 
basic assumption is that the terms on which 
assistance is given will take one of the following 
three alternative forms: 
1. Terms generally similar to those current 
in 1966; 
2. IDA-like terms (50-year maturity, 10-year 
grace period, no interest, and a service rate 
of 0.75 to 1 per cent); 
3. Terms similar to those generally applied 
by IBRD in the case of development credits 
(25-year maturity, 5-year grace period and in-
terest rate of 6 per cent per annum). 
On the basis of these three alternatives, pro-
jections were formulated of the gross loans re-
quired, the debt outstanding, and the percentage 
of gross loans that will be absorbed by debt 
service, if net credit inflows are to increase at 
an annual rate of 5 per cent (see table 8) . 
At the first session of UNCTAD, a project 
was presented (E/CONF.46/C.3/2) for the es-
tablishment of an interest equalization fund, 
financed by the developed countries or by 
IBRD, as a means of obtaining resources from 
the traditional capital markets for IDA, which 
would lend them to the developing countries on 
its usual terms. 
Table 8 
ANNUAL GROSS LOANS, DEBT OUTSTANDING 
AND PERCENTAGE OF GROSS LOANS THAT 
WILL BE ABSORBED BY DEBT SERVICE 











































Source: UNCTAD, "Problems of debt servicing: The 
outlook for debt service" (TD/B/C.3/36), tables 2 
and 
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The developed countries claim that legal and 
technical diíEculties would be created for their 
governments by the fact that the interest equali-
zation fund would involve them in long-term 
commitments for an indefinite period. If these 
operational difficulties could be overcome and 
the proposal put into effect, this system might 
do much to augment the flow of capital into 
developing countries or consolidate the external 
debt in countries with a critical balance-of-pay-
ments situation. 
In part two, section C, of the Charter of 
Algiers and in the Charter of Tequendama, the 
developing countries endorsed the proposal to 
create a multilateral interest equalization fund 
to cover the interest margin between loans ob-
tained on international capital markets and the 
resources channelled to developing countries. 
Similarly, consideration should be given to 
the idea of the industrialized countries establish-
ing national interest equalization funds for the 
same purpose. This would make it considerably 
easier to establish a multilateral interest equali-
zation fund at a later date. 
2. INTERNATION'AL FINANCING POLICY AND FLOWS 
In different forums and on different occasions, 
the highest authorities of international financing 
agencies have referred with marked pessimism 
to the evolution of the financial flows from in-
dustrialized countries to developing areas, which. 
far from attaining the objectives established for 
the Development Decade, displays—two-thirds 
of the way through the period—the following 
characteristics: virtual stagnation of the total 
amount of aid; a decrease in assistance as a 
proportion of the income of the developed coun-
tries ; a reduction in the proportion of assistance 
extended in the form of donations and "soft" 
credits; an increase in the proportion of "tied" 
credits; higher interest rates; shorter average 
maturity periods. 
Table 9 shows disbursements made over the 
period 1961-66 by the countries members of the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
If interest payments (which rose from 223 
million dollars in 1961 to 494 million in 1966) 
are deducted from total official disbursements, 
the net flow of financial resources would be 
virtually the same throughout the period, except 
in 1964, when there was a decline. 
On the other hand, private disbursements fol-
lowed a very erratic course. As defined by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, the figures include new invest-
ment and loans net of disinvestment, repatria-
tion of principal and amortization of capital in 
Composed of representatives of Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and the Commission of the European Economic 
Community. 
Table 9 
NET OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE, BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DISBURSEMENTS 
BY D A C MEMBER COUNTRIES, 1961-66 
(Millions of dollars) 
mi 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Official disbursements 
Grants and grant-like operations 
Long-term loans, net 



















Operations with multilateral agencies, net.. 















Total private disbursements 

























Sources: 1961-62: OECD, The Flow of Financial Resources to Less-developed Countries, 1961-1965, p. 201 
table A . l ; 1963-66: OECD, Development Assistance Efforts and Policies, 1967 Review, pp. 184-185,' table 2. 
a Development Assistance Committee, see footnote 69. 
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credits and loans. In other words, they exclude 
payments of profits, dividends and interest, 
which are substantial and could appreciably re-
duce the net amounts available to developing 
countries. Nor are export credits computed since 
they are excluded in the definition of net finan-
cial resources given in annex A.IV.2, paragraph 
4, of the Final Act of the first session of 
UNCTAD.^» 
As regards the objective of transferring 1 per 
cent of national income to the developing coun-
tries, which, in accordance with recommendation 
A.IV.2, each economically advanced country 
should endeavour to attain, table 10 is self-
explanatory. 
The table gives the percentage estimated by 
DAC to represent official and private flows and 
the reconciliation prepared by DAC in order 
to make its figures compatible with those worked 
out by various United Nations agencies.''^ 
Column E shows the percentage figures cal-
culated by the United Nations, which indicate 
that the DAC reconciled figures are over-esti-
mated by 20 per cent. They also reveal that the 
targets envisaged are far from being attained, 
TO See UNCTAD, Final Act, vol. I, p. 44, footnote 54. 
There are certain differences between the methods 
of calculation applied by DAC and by other sources 
(see International flow of long-term capital and official 
donations, 1961-1965, with special reference to table 2, 
footnote b, p. 7, and the 1967 Review, op. oil., annex I, 
"Reconciliation of DAC and UN/UNCTAD data on the 
flow of resources to less-developed countries and multi-
lateral agencies"). 
and point to the marked deterioration in recent 
years, which has prompted the emphasis, in 
both the Charter of Tequendama and the Char-
ter of Algiers, on the developing countries 
aspirations for the attainment of the goal of 
1 per cent of the gross national product, estab-
lishing a minimum proportion, to be progres-
sively raised, for official aid flows, net of 
amortization and interest payments.^^ 
From the over-all figures published by DAC, 
it may be inferred that Latin America's share 
in total flows of donations, public and private 
credits, and transactions with multilateral agen-
cies, which was approximately 15 per cent from 
1961 to 1963, declined somewhat in the next 
two years, but regained its former level in 1966. 
No complete statistics are available for ac-
curate quantification of the flow of resources 
from the centrally-planned economies to the 
developing countries. The bilateral commit-
ments of the economies in question, to judge 
from the data to hand, fluctuated widely, falling 
A resolution on the subject adopted by the Execu-
tive Council of the General Treaty on Central American 
Economic Integration at its second session (Teguci-
galpa, September 1967) reads as follows: "The indus-
trialized countries with both market and centrally-
planned economies should undertake to credit direct to 
IDA the difference between 1 per cent of their gross 
product and the amount of financial assistance actually 
provided each year, whenever the latter is lower than the 
former. IBRD will establish, jointly with UNCTAD, the 
machinery for measuring international financial flows in 
order to determine those magnitudes" (SIECA/CE-
XXIX D.T.32). 
Table 10 
DISBURSEMENTS BY DAC MEMBER COUNTRIES TO DEVELOPING AREAS AS 
A PERCENTAGE OF THEIR GROSS PRODUCT 
Year 
According to DAC^ methodology 








A B c D É 
1961 0.78 0.42 1.20 1.06 0.84 
1962 0.72 0.30 1.02 0.90 0.72 
1963 0.27 0.96 0.85 0.66 
1964 0.61 0.34 0.95 0.82 0.65 
1965 0.60 0.39 1.00 0.88 
1966 0.31 0.88 ... ... 
Sources: Columns A-D: for 1961, OECD, The Flow of Financial Resources to Less-
developed Countries, 1961-1965, p. 208, table A.3; for 1962-66, OECD, Development As-
sistance Efforts and Policies, 1967 Review, pp. 104-105, table VII.l; column E: Inter-
national Flow of Long-term Capital and Official Donations, 1961-1965 (United Nations 
publication. Sales No.: 66.II.D.3). 
® Development Assistance Committee, see footnote 69. 
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from 1,000 million dollars in 1961 to one-
third of that sum in each of the years 1962 and 
1963, rising again to 1,246 million in 1964 
and dropping to a little over half that amount 
in 1965. 
From a qualitative standpoint, Latin America 
is at a still greater disadvantage vis-a-vis the 
other developing countries, since most of the 
United States's sales on grant-like terms are 
made to Asian countries, and France's grants 
and grant-like operations largely benefit its 
former colonies in Africa; whereas a very high 
proportion of the export credit operations with 
developed market-economy countries falls to 
the share of the Latin American countries which 
aggravates the situation still further. 
The financial terms granted by DAC coun-
tries, which had deteriorated notably in 1965, 
improved in the course of 1966 with the reduc-
tion in the weighted average interest rates, and 
barely perceptibly as regards maturity periods, 
which were kept much shorter than in 1964 (see 
table 11). 
Table H 
DACa MEMBER COUNTRIES: AVERAGE FINAN-
CIAL TERMS OF OFFICIAL BILATERAL LOAN 
COMMITMENTS, 1962-66 
increase costs by from 20 to 40 per cent, and 
in extreme instances may even result in price 
differentials ranging as high as 100 per cent 
Weighted average Weighted average 
Year maturity periods intcTost rate 
( years) ( percentages) 
1962 24.5 3.5 
1963 25.1 3.3 
1964 28.4 3.1 
1965 22.3 3.6 
1966 23.5 3.1 
Source: OECD, Development Assistance Efforts and 
Policies, 1967 Review, p. 76, table V.3. 
» Development Assistance Committee, see footnote 69. 
The export credits (tied aid) granted by the 
market economies have increased in recent years 
on such a scale that they now account for two-
thirds of the developing countries' total service 
payments. There are serious objections to this 
type of financing. In the first place, the credits 
are extended on a short- or medium-term basis, 
and their servicing aggravates balance-of-
payments problems; secondly, costs are very 
heavy, owing to the interest rates, insurance and 
other commissions charged; and, thirdly, the 
tying of the use of these credits to specific 
sources of supply means that higher prices are 
paid for the goods purchased. For example, 
it has been estimated that "the tying of aid may 
or more".'^ ® 
It is pointed out in a recent United Nations 
study'^ ^ that "since the late nineteen-fifties, a 
gradually increasing number of export credits 
have been insured and granted on terms and 
for purposes which have tended to blur the 
distinction between trade and aid. As a result 
of this trend, the annual gross flow of new 
guaranteed export credits exceeding five years, 
as reported to the Berne Union, rose rapidly 
from the equivalent of 78 million dollars in 
1960 to 709 million in 1963. The resulting com-
plex situation has led to growing concern regard-
ing both the increasing external debt burden 
of the developing countries and the possibility 
of trade distortion. 
. . Even the extended export credit matu-
rities (averaging eight years, though in some 
cases much longer) still fall far short of 
those of genuine development credits, and are 
not usually based on a realistic evaluation 
of the importing country's ability to pay. 
In fact, these maturities often fail to accord 
with the equipment's appropriate amortiza-
tion (pay-back) period in the developing 
country or indeed with the project's chances 
to 'yield an economic return at all'. Conse-
quently, the lengthening of export credit 
maturities beyond the five-year limit has not, 
in most cases, signficantly eased the develop-
ing countries' over-all external debt burden. 
Furthermore, in those instances where the 
burden has been eased, the alleviation has in-
duced a number of these countries to accept 
a rapid increase in their total export-credit-
financed imports. 
"For many developing countries, the in-
debtedness problem has reached a point where 
there is a serious question as to whether they 
will be able to continue servicing their exist-
ing debts and whether they will be able to 
secure—or reasonably to accept—additional 
external financing through the export credit 
route for the acquisition of equipment needed 
for new projects." 
The proportion of oflScial bilateral loans from 
the DAC countries represented by export credits 
actually used, calculated as a weighted average 
UNCTAD, "The terms, quality and effectiveness of 
financial flows and problems of debt servicing" (TD/ 
B/C.3/35), p. 16. 
United Nations, "Export credits and development 
financing. Part one: Current practices and problems" 
(E/4274), p. 7. 
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for the six-year period 1961-66, was 45.4 per 
cent (see table 12). The DAC 1967 Review 
emphasizes the failure to implement the rec-
ommendation on financial terms approved by 
the Committee in 1965, in which the DAC mem-
ber countries, recognizing that aid tying "can 
bring about cumbersome limitations on the 
freedom of the recipient to choose freely the 
most suitable sources of supply on the inter-
national market", agreed to endeavour jointly 
and individually to reduce progressively the 
scope of aid tying with a view ultimately to 
removing procurement restrictions to the maxi-
mum extent possible. 
3. COMPENSATORY FINANCING 
On the basis of a report by the secretariat 
of the International Monetary Fund,^ ® prepared 
at the request of the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Commodity Trade, the 
Executive Board of IMF decided, at a meeting 
on 27 February 1963, to introduce a special 
system for dealing with balance-of-payments 
deficits of member countries arising out of 
short-term fluctuations in export earnings. 
This system consisted in creating additional 
resources to facilitate drawings on the Fund, 
particularly by primary exporting countries, 
but only to compensate for temporary short-
falls in export earnings attributable to causes 
IMF, Compensatory Financing of Export Fluctua-
tions (Washington, February 1963). 
beyond their control. Thus, a drop in prices 
would not be covered by the system if it was 
offset by an increase in volume. Nor did the 
system take account of a deterioration in the 
terms of trade or a reduction in the purchasing 
power of exports abroad. 
At the first session of UNCTAD the Gov-
ernments members of IMF were requested to 
study a number of measures to expand the sys-
tem and give it greater flexibility.'® The Fund 
modified the system in September 1966,'^ in-
troducing amendments which could be of great 
importance in the event of a short-term deterio-
ration in certain primary commodity prices. 
However, some of the suggestions made by the 
developing countries were rejected and these 
could be discussed at the second session of 
UNCTAD with a view to their eventual adoption 
by the Fund in the light of the experience ac-
quired in operating the system. 
(i) Compensatory credits have not been 
placed "entirely outside the structure of the 
gold and successive credit tranches", so that 
drawings of such credits "would not directly 
or indirectly prejudice a member's ability to 
make an ordinary drawing".'^® 
(ii) Although compensatory drawing rights 
have been increased to 50 per cent of the quota. 
76 UNCTAD, Final Act. annex A.IV.17. 
IMF, Compensatory Financing of Export Fluctua-
tions: Second Report (Washington, September 1966). 
78 UNCTAD, Final Act, annex A.IV.17. 
Table 12 
DACa COUNTRIES: NET INCREASE IN PUBLIC DEBT AND PUBLICLY GUARAN-
TEED EXPORT CREDITS EXTENDED TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1961-66 
















1961 1,243 277 376 653 52.5 
1962 1,322 202 397 599 45.3 
1963 1,672 250 283 533 31.9 
1954 1,604 349 528 877 54.7 
1965 1,981 282 455 737 37.2 
1966 2,158 466 666 1,132 52.5 
TOTAL 1961-66 9,980 1,826 2,705 4,531 45.4 
Source: ECLA, on the basis of OECD, Development Assistance Efforts and Policies 
1967 Review, p. 72, table V.l. 
a Development Assistance Committee, see footnote 69. 
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they cannot be used all at one time, save in ex-
ceptional circumstances. 
(iii) Instead of the rights being applied auto-
matically once the shortfall has been established, 
the Fund will first determine whether the mem-
ber country has attempted to find appropriate 
solutions for its balance-of-payments difficul-
ties. 
(iv) The Fund has not complied with the 
request that, in its determination of the short-
fall in export receipts, it should give greater 
weight to the actual experience of the three 
preceding years, but has maintained its crite-
rion of taking a moving average for a five-year 
period centred on the shortfall year, which is 
weighted with a coefficient higher than that 
assigned to the two preceding years. In this 
way, the derived export trend value is lower 
and, consequently, the amount of the shortfall 
to be compensated for is also diminished. This 
is in line with the Fund's view that "it is not 
the object of the compensatory facility to aim 
at the largest possible amount of drawings".^® 
(v) No action has been taken on the request 
that ways should be explored of securing pos-
sible refinancing of compensatory financing 
obligations in the event of a persistent short-
fall in export receipts beyond the control of 
the country affected, although in this regard 
it must be remembered that the repurchase of 
currency in respect of ordinary drawings makes 
it possible for new drawings to be made, and 
that the Fund's Articles of Agreement specify 
that it should deal only with temporary balance-
of-payments difficulties and not with long-term 
deficits. 
4. SUPPLEMENTARY FINANCING 
With the modifications introduced in Sep-
tember 1966, the IMF's system of compensatory 
credits represents a significant step forward in 
the field of financing, which could be further 
improved by measures which experience proves 
to be the most appropriate for liberalizing its 
terms. It should be pointed out, however, that 
short-term plans for financing fluctuations in 
export earnings have no effect on long-term 
trends and only serve as a temporary palliative. 
The fundamental problem is to overcome dif-
ficulties in the financing of economic develop-
ment plans. Many proposals, projects and studies 
have been considered by international organiza-
tions over the last few years, but it was solely 
nn tVip basis nf recommendation A.IV.18 of the 
first session of UNCTAD that the International 
Bank prepared, in December 1965, the proposal®® 
which is still under consideration by the 
UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financ-
ing related to Trade and by the Inter-Govern-
mental Group on Supplementary Financing. 
The Bank's proposal was adopted as a basis 
for the discussion of supplementary financing 
in the above Committee and in the Inter-Gov-
ernmental Group specifically created for that 
purpose. At the fifth session of the Trade and 
Development Board, it was agreed that the 
Group should submit its findings and recom-
mendations directly to the second session of 
UNCTAD, with alternative proposals so that 
countries could express their views on the type 
of scheme that should be established. Mention 
should be made, however, of some of the ob-
servations made on the Bank's original pro-
posal. 
With regard to the principles involved, the 
developing countries were concerned lest the 
faculties of the administering agency might be 
such that its decision would prejudice the 
sovereignty of governments in respect of certain 
economic policy decisions involving technical 
aspects, and that differences of opinion on these 
subjects might give rise to friction or affect a 
country's prospects of receiving aid. From the 
technical standpoint, it was pointed out that 
the amounts estimated by IBRD for the experi-
mental period might prove to be insufficient, 
in which case the problem would arise of how to 
determine the bases for a pro rata distribution 
of the resources available. 
Another view expressed was that the financ-
ing of a drop in export earnings might not be 
sufficient to make up for a rise in import 
prices, and this would involve a conceptual 
modification of the scheme in order to finance 
net income on current account. In this regard, 
a representative of the Bank pointed out the 
technical difficulties of calculating movements 
in import prices, but said that the adminis-
tering agency, if it had the necessary technical 
means, could calculate export shortfalls in real 
rather than in nominal terms. 
Criticism was also levelled at the requirement 
that overages should be used to offset future 
export shortfalls within the plan period, and it 
was suggested that they might be used to deal 
with other pressing needs in the countries con-
cerned, such as amortization of the short-term 
See Compensatory Financing of Export Fluctua-
tions: A Second Report, op. cit. 
80 International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, Supplementary Financial Measures: A Study Re-
quested by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (Washington. December 1965). 
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external debt, reconstitution of the reserves, ac-
celeration of investment programmes or execu-
tion of investment projects that had been defer-
red. In this last case, the beneficiary country 
might retain a percentage of the overage and 
transfer the remainder to IBRD. 
Another important consideration related to 
the terms of assistance, which, according to the 
UNCTAD recommendation, should be similar to 
those granted by the International Development 
Association. Under the IBRD scheme, the terms 
envisaged are similar to those of the basic 
development financing provided for each in-
dividual plan, and this might subsequently 
create balance-of-payments difficulties for the 
beneficiary country. 
5. COMPENSATION FOR DETERIORATION IN THE 
TERMS OF TRADE 
Both the IMF compensatory financing system 
and the IBRD's supplementary financing scheme 
are designed solely to cover shortfalls in export 
earnings, regardless of the possible effects of a 
rise in import prices on the purchasing power 
of exports. Both agencies have acknowledged 
the validity of the arguments in favour of com-
pensatory financing of a deterioration in the 
terms of trade, but allege the impracticability of 
calculating such compensation. The Fund study 
recognizes that "there are undoubtedly good 
economic reasons for compensating not the 
money value but the real value, or importing 
power, of exports. An estimate of the latter 
could be arrived at by deflating exports by an 
import price index based on the shortfall 
year."®^ It adds, however, that there are a num-
ber of objections to this procedure, since most 
primary producing countries have no import 
price index, and where such indexes exist, 
many are unrepresentative or unreliable. Gen-
erally speaking, they are usually not available 
until several months after the export data come 
to hand, which would delay compensatory draw-
ings. The export and import price indexes of 
the industrialized countries would not be useful 
for the purpose in question. 
The study outlining the IBRD scheme declares: 
"Ideally, export shortfalls probably should be 
calculated in real terms, i.e., after taking ac-
count of unexpected movements in import prices, 
because this would indicate the unexpected 
change in the ability to purchase a given volume 
of imports resulting from an unexpected decline 
in export proceeds. In this way, the scheme 
81 Compensatory Financing of Export Fluctuations: 
A Second Report, op. cit. 
could take cognizance of some aspects of the 
terms-of-trade problem, which has created so 
much concern in the post-war period."®^ But 
IBRD, too, goes on to argue that there are 
statistical obstacles to an evaluation of the 
changes in import prices within a reasonable 
margin of error, and that in any event during the 
period 1959-63 the weighted index number of 
the unit value of imports for the developing 
countries as a whole showed no very marked 
change. 
In other words, the only objection is that at 
present there are no statistical means of estab-
lishing import price indexes, since delays in 
compensatory drawings as a result of possible 
time-lags in the provision of statistical data, to 
which the Fund alludes, could be temporarily 
obviated by means of adjustable drawings. 
Whatever the conclusions that may be reached 
as regards the treatment of the terms of trade 
in the compensatory and supplementary financ-
ing mechanisms, it is important to recall that 
the developing countries—in particular those 
of Latin America, in the Charter of Alta Gracia 
—have urged the need to establish some mecha-
nism whereby they can obtain equitable and 
non-reimbursable compensation for the losses 
they suifer as a result of deteriorations in the 
terms of trade. 
6. REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY 
SYSTEM 
While it is true that no factual background 
data exist on the basis of which a direct rela-
tion can be established between the sum total 
of international monetary reserves and the vol-
ume of world trade, there can be no doubt, if the 
long view is taken, that the slowness of the 
growth of international liquidity in comparison 
with the expansion of world trade is causing 
a number of balance-of-payments distortions. 
Hence the increasing need to solve the problems 
linked to international liquidity and to the im-
pact of radical changes in the level of reserves 
on each individual country's internal monetary 
policy. These problems often take the form of 
pressures on the level of employment, on the 
stability of prices or exchange rates and on 
economic growth. 
From the standpoint of the developing coun-
tries, the difficulty is more acute, in view of 
the relatively low level of their international 
reserves, the fluctuations in their export earn-
ings, and their growing need to increase their 
capacity to import in order to meet the require-
Supplementary Financial Measures, op. cit., p. 64. 
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ments of steady and well-ordered economic de-
velopment. 
It is almost universally agreed that the level 
of international monetary liquidity should be 
raised, and that deliberate action should be 
taken to this end. In other words, it will not do 
to go on, as hitherto, augmenting the reserves 
of central banks by steadily-diminishing amounts 
of gold, or maintaining the balance-of-payments 
deficits of countries with reserve currencies (the 
United States, and, in a progressively lesser 
degree, the United Kingdom), or adding to the 
number of reserve currency countries. 
Some proposals, such as the revaluation of 
gold (or others, like the establishment of a sys-
tem of fluctuating exchange rates, which in prac-
tice may also imply a currency devaluation) 
were officially rejected at the outset of the dis-
cussions of the Group of Ten.®® On the grounds 
that they were not technically covered by the 
concept of "reserves", the same attitude was 
adopted towards certain short-term swap opera-
tions—of which in practice only a very limited 
number of countries can avail themselves—or 
the extension of facilities of the medium-term 
stand-by type granted by the International Mone-
tary Fund, although in the latter case, if the 
credits did not have to be refunded within a 
given period, they could be regarded as com-
parable to reserves. 
The existing system for increasing reserves 
contains an element of uncertainty deriving 
from the risk of a sudden large-scale conversion 
of reserve currencies into gold, which would 
cause a sharp contraction in the volume of 
means of payment, with consequent repercus-
sions on world trade. Acceptance of the prin-
ciple that the world supply of long-term reserves 
should be subject to planned control may eli-
minate this uncertainty. 
After prolonged discussion of possible solu-
tions, the Group of Ten prepared an outline 
plan for the reform of the international mone-
tary system, which was unanimously adopted at 
the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors 
of the International Monetary Fund (Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, 1967). This plan provides for 
the establishment of what are termed "special 
drawing rights". 
The system devised does not fully solve 
balance-of-payments problems,®^ but by helping 
to create an atmosphere of confidence in which 
all countries would co-operate multilaterally in 
the solution of international liquidity problems, 
it might induce some countries—especially those 
whose reserve position is strong and whose 
balance of payments regularly shows a sur-
plus—to apply less rigidly restrictive trade 
policies. Table 13 lists the sums that would be 
allocated to each of the Latin American coun-
tries per annual amount of 1,000 million dollars 
of special drawing rights established. 
Although the possible annual amounts of 
special drawing rights have not been ofScially 
specified, the consensus of opinion places them 
somewhere between 1,000 and 2,000 million dol-
lars yearly during an initial period of five 
years (after which the plan would be revised). 
Thus, the additions to the external payments 
capacity of countries in the Latin American 
area, whose total imports in 1966 amounted 
to 11,000 million dollars and whose gold and 
foreign exchange reserves at the end of that 
year totalled about 2,900 million dollars, would 
really be insignificant; but the procedure might 
help to create the right international condi-
tions for more important moves towards a 
monetary system designed to serve the expansion 
of world trade, which would more adequately 
take into account the interests of the develop-
ing countries. 
In this connexion, at the second session of 
UNCTAD bases for negotiations might be pro-
posed which would satisfy the developing coun-
tries' aspirations as regards the problems left 
outstanding by the plan adopted at Rio de 
Janeiro, 
In the first place it is agreed in all authorita-
tive circles that the amount of special drawing 
rights to be established in the first basic period 
would not create any danger of an inflationary 
expansion of international means of payment. 
Additional sums might therefore be considered, 
in conformity with the development trends of 
world trade. 
Secondly, a modification of the proposed out-
line might also be sought, whereby IMF, in-
stead of making the establishment of special 
83 Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and the United States of America. 
Other participants in the proceedings of the Group were 
Switzerland, and representatives of the International 
Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements 
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. 
When the pound sterling was devalued on 18 No-
vember 1967, a consortium of central banks in Western 
Europe and the United States granted a loan of 
1,400 million dollars to IMF for the purposes of a 
stand-by arrangement with the United Kingdom. This 
sum should be compared with the 116 million dollars 
which would be allocated to the United Kingdom per 
annual amount of 1,000 million dollars of special draw-
ing rights established. 
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Table 13 
ALLOCATIONS TO COUNTRIES IN THE LATIN 
AMERICAN AREA, IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THEIR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 
QUOTAS AS AT 30 APRIL 1967, PER 1,000 
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Source: Calculated by ECLA on the basis of the 
quotas for the various countries, published by IMF. 
drawing rights proportional to the quotas of 
member countries, would allocate to the de-
veloping countries an aggregate sum exceeding 
their total share in the capital of the Fund, 
which would be distributed among them on a 
pro rata basis, in accordance with their sub-
scriptions. 
Thirdly, a great deal of stress had been laid, 
especially by France, on the fact that a pre-
requisite for puttina; the plan into operation 
is the elimination of the balance-of-payments 
deficits of the United Kingdom and the United 
States. This implies that restrictions will have 
to be established on the trade or financial flows 
of these two countries. Agreement would have to 
be reached on some system to prevent these 
restrictions from affecting the developing coun-
tries, or on effective measures whereby coun-
tries with regular surpluses would compensate 
the decrease in the external income of develop-
ing countries resulting from the restrictions. In 
this connexion, the objectives propounded by 
the United Kingdom authorities on the occasion 
of the recent devaluation of the pound sterling 
were to improve the United Kingdom's competi-
tive position, restrict imports and rechannel 
investment to the United Kingdom, all of which 
may to some extent affect the developing 
countries. 
Fourthly, the developing countries have urged 
the need to link the creation of new reserve 
assets to the financing of their development. 
The countries forming the Group of Ten pointed 
out that two such different conceptual elements 
as the creation of liquidity and the effective 
transfer of real resources should not be com-
bined within the scope of a single measure. 
To that end, long-term commitments might be 
negotiated, whereby the industrialized countries 
would undertake to increase their contributions 
to multilateral financial assistance agencies, ir-
respective of the counterparts allocated to them 
in the establishment of special drawing rights. 
Lastly, in view of the interest recently shown 
by various industrialized countries and group-
ings of such countries in the formation and 
consolidation of integration movements on the 
part of developing countries, it might be agreed 
that the special drawing rights allocated to the 
developing countries should be used to build 
up regional funds, in whose administration 
IMF would take part, and which could be 
applied, for example, to the formation of 
common reserves for intraregional compensation 
of trade balances, or the purchase of long-term 
securities issued by regional development insti-
tutions. 
E . . S H I P P I N C 
At the second session of the Trade and Devel-
opment Board's Committee on Shipping (Feb-
ruary-March 1967), while no suggestion was 
made that any of the items relating to shipping 
proposed at the fourth session of the Board 
should be deleted from the provisional agenda 
for the second session of UNCTAD, it was ad-
vocated that attention should be focused on 
those questions which lent themselves to the 
adoption of effective measures. To this end, the 
UNCTAD secretariat was requested to state which 
of the studies it had been asked to carry out in 
Íi9. 
that field had reached a sufficiently advanced 
stage to serve as a basis for a discussion in 
depth at the New Delhi Conference, emphasis 
being laid on the desirability that the Confer-
ence should concern itself only with final reports. 
According to the report to the Committee 
(TD/B/C.4/22) and other information pre-
sented by the ÜNCTAD secretariat, the studies 
available for the second session will be those 
on national merchant marines, the use of con-
tainers and other new shipping techniques, and 
consultation machinery. A number of mono-
graphs will also be available, on other topics 
such as maritime transport in the foreign trade 
of India and of West Africa, and shipping costs 
and the trade of developing countries in Asia. 
Some important and detailed studies on the 
level and structure of freight rates, conference 
practices, the adequacy of shipping services and 
port improvements will not be completed, and 
only provisional or progress reports will be 
available on those subjects. 
Accordingly, the Committee's discussion of the 
provisional agenda for the second session of 
UNCTAD centred on two topics: (a) the ship-
ping industry in developing countries, including 
expansion of those countries' merchant marines, 
and (b) international legislation on shipping. 
The first is the most important of the shipping 
questions to be considered at the second session 
of UNCTAD. 
The lack of basic studies on most of the other 
topics will make it difficult to discuss them in 
depth at the Conference, especially in the case 
of those relating to the level and structure of 
freight rates, conference practices and the ade-
quacy of shipping services, which are of vital 
importance for the developing countries. Never-
theless, to judge from available information 
on the content and objectives of the studies 
under way—summarized below under the head 
of each provisional agenda item and supple-
mented by various comments and suggestions 
for action—and from the considerations, pro-
posals and reommendations formulated in the 
Charters of Tequendama and Algiers, significant 
progress is likely to be made at the second 
session of UNCTAD both in the conceptual field 
and in the satisfaction of specific aspirations on 
the part of the developing countries.®® 
85 See also ECLA, "Latin America and international 
trade policy" (E/CN.12/773), chapter III, section 4, in 
particular pp. 165-178, which reviews Latin American 
shipping and foreign trade; the share of Latin American 
fleets in the region's foreign trade; the evolution of 
Latin America's merchant marines; the incidence of 
1. REVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND LONG-
TERM TRENDS IN SHIPPING AND INTERNATIONAL 
LEGISLATION THEREON 
The recommendations on shipping in the Final 
Act of the first session of UNCTAD related 
mainly to the establishment of consultation ma-
chinery and to the adoption of institutional 
arrangements and procedures for dealing with 
these questions in UNCTAD. The recommenda-
tion on institutional arrangements, methods and 
machinery led the Trade and Development 
Board, at its first session, to set up a Com-
mittee on Shipping. The establishment of ma-
chinery for consultation between conferences 
and shippers is the subject of item 13 {d) of 
the provisional agenda for the second session 
of UNCTAD. 
As regards the review of recent developments 
and long-term trends in the field of shipping, 
it is expected that at the New Delhi Confer-
ence an UNCTAD report will be available 
similar to that presented at the second session 
of the Committee on Shipping (TD/B/C.4 /25) . 
On that occasion the Committee also approved 
the outline of an annual review submitted by 
the secretariat, and requested the secretariat to 
prepare future reviews along the lines indicated. 
The inclusion of international legislation on 
shipping in the above agenda item will afford 
an opportunity for general discussion of this 
question at the second session of UNCTAD, and 
for a further recommendation on the need for 
the Committee on Shipping to carry out a study 
of the problems relating to international ship-
ping legislation. The importance of such a study 
was unanimously stressed by the developing 
countries at the second session of the Com-
mittee, as well as at the fifth session of the 
Trade and Development Board. Both the Charter 
of Tequendama and the Charter of Algiers en-
dorse the request that at the second session of 
UNCTAD a decision should be adopted to 
include this study in the work programme of 
the Committee on Shipping, and that the devel-
oped countries should co-operate in its prepa-
ration (as in that of other studies on the pro-
gramme) by furnishing the UNCTAD secretariat 
with any background data and information they 
may have at their disposal. 
The study would not deal with all aspects 
of public and private shipping law, but only 
with matters bearing on trade and development 
and on commercial relations between ship-
freight, and trends in maritime freight rates in relation 
to prices of raw material and manufactured products; 
and policies for modernizing maritime transport in Latin 
America. 
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owners and shippers. In this connexion, it 
should be borne in mind that, for historical rea-
sons and others mentioned when the topic was 
discussed by the Committee on Shipping and 
at the fifth session of the Board, existing legis-
lation often fails to reflect the interests and 
aspirations of the developing countries. 
2 . LEVEL AND STRUCTURE OF FREIGHT RATES, 
CONFERENCE PRACTICES AND ADEQUACY OF 
SHIPPING SERVICES 
(a) Freight rates 
Of the country, commodity and route studies 
which will form an integral part of the work 
programme approved by the Committee on 
Shipping, together with aggregative studies, the 
most important are the route studies, on which 
an agreement was reached, not without con-
siderable difficulty, at the special session of the 
Committee held in July 1966. 
According to the above-mentioned report by 
the UNCTAD secretariat (TD/B /C .4 /22 ) , the 
first step towards carrying out these studies is 
to identify liner routes which are sufiiciently sim-
ple for the purposes of practical analysis. The 
first stage of the work, therefore, will consist 
in studying several routes in order to find one 
or two which combine the requisites for such 
an analysis. This implies extensive preliminary 
research. 
The main object of the studies is to throw 
more light on the rate-making process. In view 
of the innumerable factors that come into play, 
a simplified system of "ideal" or theoretical 
freight rates would be drawn up for the route 
or routes under consideration, for comparison 
with the real rates. This would provide a basis 
for analysing the special factors which deter-
mine the major differences between the two, 
and making a more objective study of the highly 
controversial question of "discrimination" in 
freight rates, as well as of the effects of possible 
and appropriate changes in the structure of these 
rates, particularly from the standpoint of the 
developing countries. 
The UNCTAD secretariat is to submit a pro-
gress report on its studies of maritime freight 
rates to the second session of UNCTAD. 
Although it is impossible, at this stage, to em-
bark upon very fu 1 comments, it is worth noting 
that the Charters of Tequendama and Algiers 
expressed the grave concern of the Latin Ameri-
can and other developing countries at the fact 
that conference freight rates are not only con-
tinuing to rise but are still discriminatory and 
restrictive vis-a-vis the developing countries, and 
recommended that immediate steps should be 
taken at the second session of UNCTAD to 
provide a basis for future action on freight 
rates. They urged the UNCTAD secretariat to 
conclude its projected route-by-route studies on 
freight rates as soon as possible. The Charter 
of Tequendama also recommended that in fixing 
freight rates consideration should be given to 
the need for placing the products of the devel-
oping countries on international markets under 
competitive conditions. 
In this connexion it is also worth recalling 
the resolutions adopted by the Special Com-
mittee on Latin American Co-ordination at its 
meeting at the expert level in July 1966, which 
stressed the need to establish incentive freight 
rates to facilitate exports of manufactures pro-
duced by developing countries with their own 
raw materials. 
More recently, some of the developing coun-
tries have suggested that the losses which the 
adoption of such incentive rates might entail 
for shipping lines could be covered by the de-
veloped maritime countries themselves, possibly 
through contributions to an international fund 
managed by UNCTAD. Although for the time 
being such a procedure does not seem very 
feasible, it should be stressed that incentive rates 
ought not necessarily to constitute a source of 
loss for shipping lines. In the case of new ex-
ports, the corresponding freight charges could 
be fixed at levels covering only the marginal 
or additional costs implicit in the transport 
concerned. As there is often surplus hold ca-
pacity in liner vessels, the costs in question 
would barely exceed those of loading and un-
loading the goods carried. The development of 
new export lines might therefore rather prove 
to be a source of profit for the regular shipping 
companies, especially if the marginal or addi-
tional costs were supplemented by a small extra 
sum, as the contribution of the trade in question 
to the other operating costs of liner ships. 
Another fairly widespread practice on routes 
from developing to developed countries is that 
of charging general cargo rates for semi-manu-
factures and manufactures. These general cargo 
rates cover a wide variety of products, and their 
level is relatively high. This practice may be 
partly imputable to historical factors, but it 
none the less constitutes a formidable obstacle 
to the promotion of new export lines by the 
developing countries. As such exports did not 
exist in the past, or were insignificant or spo-
radic, the conference tariffs are often not adapted 
to the needs and characteristics of the new 
products currently or potentially exported by 
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developing countries. Although several confer-
ences, especially those formed by shipping com-
panies in the developing countries, have taken 
steps to remedy this situation in recent years, 
UNCTAD should urge shipping conferences, and 
shipping companies in developing countries, to 
take steps to adapt their freight rates with a 
view to encouraging exports of an increasingly 
diversified range of manufactures and semi-
manufactures from the developing countries. 
The tables in annex II contain data on the 
level of conference freight rates at the end of 
1966 for certain important exports from Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay, and on 
the effect of freight rates on the f.o.b. value of 
those products. The ratio of freight costs to 
f.o.b. value ranges from 3 to 75 per cent. 
(b) Conference practices 
As an indispensable supplement to the studies 
on freight rates and in conformity with the work 
programme of the Committee on Shipping, the 
UNCTAD secretariat is planning to carry out 
several special studies on various conference 
practices which are the cause of complaint on 
the part of the developing countries. In this 
case, too, only a progress report by the secre-
tariat will be available for the second session of 
UNCTAD. 
There are some conference practices whose 
elimination should not entail lengthy study, 
and on which a decision could be adopted at 
New Delhi. These include the "closed" nature 
of many conferences, the inadequate representa-
tion of conferences in a number of major ports 
in the developing countries, and little or no 
information on freight rates and other transport 
conditions. 
It is of particular importance for the devel-
oping countries that conferences should cease 
to be of a "closed" nature, because of the 
effects of this practice on the expansion of the 
developing countries' merchant marines, and 
because its elimination might enable them to 
obtain favourable freight rates as an incentive 
to their trade. At the second session of the Com-
mittee on Shipping, the representative of Co-
lombia mentioned that the Flota Mercante Gran-
colombiana had found difficulty in securing 
admission to the Japan Latin American East-
bound Freight Conference on satisfactory and 
normal terms, and that the same thing had 
happened before in the case of other shipping 
conferences. 
The inadequate and ineffectual representation 
of conferences at many major ports in devel-
oping countries constitutes a serious obstacle to 
the efficient operation of the machinery for con-
sultation between conferences and shipowners 
on the one hand, and users or shippers on the 
other, as the experience of some of the Latin 
American countries has shown. The need to 
refer all matters or decisions, even those of 
minor importance, to the head office of the con-
ference hampers the proceedings of the con-
sultation agencies. 
As regards the failure to publish freight rates, 
although the relevant data are communicated 
to interested parties where rates for specific 
types of merchandise are concerned, many con-
ferences continue to insist that information on 
freight rates as a whole is of a confidential or 
at least private nature. This has been an awk-
ward stumbling-block for recent studies on prob-
lems relating to the level and structure of freight 
rates. Hence it would seem reasonable to raise 
this problem at the second session of UNCTAD, 
with a view to the adoption of a recommenda-
tion on the need for publication of shipping 
conferences' tariffs and for their registration by 
the competent national authorities in countries 
to which the conferences run shipping services.®® 
The same may be said of the necessity for con-
ferences to give reasonable advance notice of 
their intentions or decisions with respect to 
increases in their freight rates, the levy of sur-
charges, etc., so as to improve the bargaining 
position of suppliers and users of shipping 
services in the developing countries. 
The resolutions adopted by CECLA at its 
meeting at the expert level (July 1966) may be 
recalled in this connexion. They reaffirmed the 
principle of "participation of shipping lines of 
developing countries in shipping conferences, on 
equitable terms". Stress was also laid on the 
progress achieved by LAFTA with the signing 
of the Water Transport Agreement, which pro-
vides for the constitution of shipping confer-
ences to serve intra-regional trade, their super-
vision by the appropriate government agencies 
and the publication and unification of their 
freight rates, together with the establishment of 
machinery for consultation between conferences 
and shippers' councils. 
With regard to certain conference practices, 
the Charter of Tequendama once again stressed 
the need for UNCTAD to recommend recogni-
se it should be pointed out, in this regard, that under 
current legislation in the United States, liner confer-
ences operating services from and to United States ports 
must register their freight rates and other conditions of 
carriage with the United States Federal Maritime Com-
mission. 
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tion of the right of shipowners in developing 
countries to take part in freight conferences 
on an equal footing with shipowners of the 
developed countries, and the right of the devel-
oping countries to be fully informed of the 
structure and fixing of freight rates and other 
conditions of carriage applied to products in-
volved in their trade. 
(c) Technical advances in shipping, including 
container ships 
This item is not explicitly included on the pro-
visional agenda for the second session of 
UNCTAD, but reference should be made to the 
topic on account of its importance for the devel-
opment of shipping lines, and its close con-
nexion with conference and freight problems. 
The UNCTAD secretariat has prepared a pre-
liminary study on the subject.®'^  
Although no precise information is available 
for the moment, a more detailed study on these 
and other new techniques may possibly be pre-
sented at the second session of UNCTAD, ac-
cording to a statement made by the UNCTAD 
secretariat to the Committee on Shipping. Fur-
thermore, at a United Nations seminar on these 
problems (London, May 1967), the ECLA sec-
retariat presented a provisional analysis of the 
questions raised by the introduction and applica-
tion of such new techniques in the region's 
maritime transport. 
These matters are unlikely to be discussed in 
depth at the forthcoming session of UNCTAD, 
but they are clearly of vital importance to the 
developing countries on account of their reper-
cussions on the organization and structure of 
shipping conferences, cost levels, the structure 
of freight rates, and port operation and organi-
zation techniques.®® 
The introduction and efficient utilization of 
these new techniques calls for the adoption of 
various regulatory and administrative measures, 
which have a pressing claim on the attention 
of governments and responsible authorities. In 
Latin America, the Governments of Argentina 
and Brazil have already taken action to facilitate 
and encourage the use of container ships in 
maritime transport. 
It therefore seems desirable for these ques-
tions to be the subject of an UNCTAD recom-
mendation to the effect that the Committee on 
Shipping, in co-operation with the regional 
"Basic economics of containemation and unitiza-
tion in ocean shipping" (TD/B/C.4/34). 
88 See "Latin America and international trade policy", 
op. cit.. p. 180. 
economic commissions, should undertake a study 
on regulatory measures, which will necessarily 
have to be largely uniform throughout the vari-
ous regions of the world. The co-operation of 
shippers' councils and consultation agencies 
would be very useful for these purposes. 
3. THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY IN DEVELOPING COUN-
TRIES INCLUDING EXPANSION OF THESE COUN-
TRIES' MERCHANT MARINES 
As mentioned above, it was stated at the most 
recent session of the Committee on Shipping 
that this would be the focal point of the dis-
cussion on shipping problems at the second 
session of UNCTAD, largely because by that 
time the UNCTAD secretariat would have pre-
pared the first basic study on the subject. This 
study will analyse the role of merchant marines 
in economic development and the pertinent eco-
nomic investment criteria, both from the stand-
point of enterprises and their commercial via-
laility and from that of the economy as a whole, 
taking into account the over-all economic im-
plications of merchant marines and the com-
parative economic merits of investment in mer-
chant shipping and in other sectors of the 
national economy. It will include a comparison 
of various possibilities for investment in the 
shipping industry: in liner shipping or bulk-
carrier tramp steamers, in new or second-hand 
ships, or in purchased or chartered vessels. It 
will also devote attention to the general problem 
of financing the development of merchant 
marmes. 89 
Presumably, during the proceedings of the 
second session of UNCTAD, the traditionally-
maritime developed countries will reaffirm their 
objections to certain practices whereby the de-
veloping countries endeavour to protect and 
develop their incipient merchant marines, on 
the grounds that they are of a discriminatory 
character. In this connexion, it is apposite to 
recall the principles incorporated in the Decla-
ration on Policy with respect to Maritime, River, 
and Lake Transport approved at the meeting 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Con-
tracting Parties to the Montevideo Treaty (No-
vember 1965), and also earlier resolutions 
adopted by the Special Committee on Latin 
American Co-ordination (CECLA). 
89 According to the latest information from the 
UNCTAD secretariat, an important study will be made 
analysing problems relating to the establishment or 
expansion of mechant marines in developing countries, 
and a shorter document wiU be prepared summarizing 
that study and the conclusions reached. 
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The declaration in question, after establishing 
the objective of encouraging the maintenance 
and promoting the development of the merchant 
marines of the LAFTA countries, emphasizes 
the need for member countries' own shipping 
to be guaranteed a prior right to carry a sub-
stantial proportion of intra-regional trade car-
goes, and for the countries of the Area to 
possess sufficient hold capacity to meet the 
transport requirements of a substantial propor-
tion of their world trade. The LAFTA countries 
will take concerted action to defend their com-
mon transport policy, protect the development 
of their merchant marines and ensure their own 
freighters a satisfactory share in their world 
trade.»" 
At its July 1966 meeting, CECLA reaffirmed 
the inalienable right of countries to reserve a 
substantial proportion of their foreign trade 
cargo for transport under their own flags. Al-
though the developing countries have repeatedly 
endorsed these principles at the first session of 
UNCTAD and in the UNCTAD Committee on 
Shipping, mention should be made of the reaf-
firmation of these aspirations in the Charters 
of Tequendama and Algiers. In similar or 
identical terms, they reaffirm the inalienable 
right of the developing countries to establish 
and to expand their merchant marines in rela-
tion to the freight position and prospects gen-
erated by their foreign trade. In addition, the 
measures adopted by the developing countries 
to achieve those objectives, including the reser-
vation of a large and equitable share of the 
cargo transported to and from those countries, 
should not be regarded as discriminatory nor 
should they lead to the adoption by the devel-
oped countries of retaliatory or other measures 
which might have the effect of nullifying the 
measures taken by the developing countries. 
Moreover, the second session of UNCTAD 
should adopt measures to ensure that the devel-
oped countries and international credit agencies 
extend financial and technical assistance for the 
establishment and expansion of merchant ma-
rines in developing countries, and lay down 
criteria to ensure that such financing is granted 
to genuinely national enterprises. 
In the ECLA study quoted above,®^ reference 
was made to the adverse reactions produced 
in certain world shipping circles by the signing 
of the LAFTA countries' Water Transport Agree-
ment, inasmuch as it constitutes the first 
9® See also "Latin America and international trade 
policy", op. cit., pp. 175-177. 
pp. 176-177. 
regional-scale reservation of cargo through an 
inter-governmental agreement. 
At its fifth annual session (Viña del Mar, 
Chile, June 1967), the Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council (lA-ECOSOC) adopted a 
resolution concerning the Declaration on Policy 
with respect to Maritime, River and Lake Trans-
port and to the Water Transport Agreement. 
In the preamble to this resolution, it is pointed 
out that the provisions of the Water Transport 
Agreement establish principles which diflfer 
from those traditionally governing maritime 
transport but are consistent with the needs and 
the real social and economic situation of Latin 
America, relating to such questions as a system 
of freight conferences under government super-
vision; establishment of freight rates on the 
basis of certain predetermined principles, and 
the need for them to be submitted to the Con-
tracting Parties for approval; and representa-
tion of users' interests through the creation of 
shippers' councils. In the operative part, it is 
recommended that support should be given to 
the Latin American countries' maritime trans-
port programmes as an effective contribution 
to their economic development, and that en-
deavours should be made to ensure that as far 
as possible all the developed countries co-operate 
in such programmes. 
The resolution was unanimously adopted by 
the Latin American countries. The delegation of 
the United States expressed sympathy with the 
Latin American countries' aims, but objected 
that some of the provisions of the Water Trans-
port Agreement would not efficiently promote 
economic development. It disapproved, in par-
ticular, of the provisions relating to the reserva-
tion of cargo and mandatory membership of 
freight conferences for shipowners; such prin-
ciples could only have the effect of pushing up 
freight rates, which would hamper rather than 
promote intraregional trade and would limit 
the scope of the Latin American common market. 
Commenting on the doubts expressed by the 
United States delegation, the Chilean delegation 
said that the Water Transport Agreement estab-
lished fair and healthy competition, while pre-
venting the sort that serves to create chaos in 
maritime transport and makes it possible, in 
the long run, for the strongest competitor to 
monopolize freight traffic by displacing his 
weaker rivals. Some of the provisions of the 
Agreement would make for the carriage of a 
larger share of cargo under Latin American 
flags, and would therefore lead to an improve-
ment in balance-of-payments positions, thus 
speeding up the integration process which was 
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to culminate in the common market. The same 
delegation drew attention to the magnitude of 
the subsidies granted by developed countries, 
including the United States, to their merchant 
marines, and to the measures adopted by the 
United States Government to reserve specific 
types of cargo for its own merchant fleet. 
4. MACHINERY FOR CONSULTATION ON SHIPPING 
PROBLEMS 
The Committee on Shipping, at its second 
session, discussed a comprehensive secretariat 
study and adopted a resolution laying down 
guidelines for future action. In this resolution, 
it called on the regional economic commissions 
to continue their efforts, in co-operation with 
the UNCTAD secretariat, to establish shippers' 
councils and national and regional consultation 
machinery along the lines laid down in the 
resolution.®^ It also stresses the importance of 
United Nations technical assistance programmes 
for the attainment of the objectives indicated. 
The UNCTAD secretariat study will be widely 
distributed and available for discussion at New 
Delhi. As the Trade and Development Board, 
at its fifth session (August-September 1967), 
expressed the view that this agenda item was 
ready for consideration, relevant measures could 
be adopted at the forthcoming session of 
UNCTAD. 
Latin America's experience in this field has 
demonstrated that for the establishment and 
efficient operation of shippers' councils it is very 
important that close contact should be main-
tained between such councils and the ECLA 
secretariat. There has been a continual exchange 
of information with the councils, which has 
provided measures of guidance for their ac-
See "Consultation in Shipping. Establishment of 
national and regional shippers' bodies; consultation and 
negotiation between shippers and shipowners" (TD/B / 
C.4/20/Add.2), for information on ECLA's activities in 
this field. 
tivities. However, as far as is known, the Latin 
American Governments have not made use of 
technical assistance programmes for the organi-
zation of consultation machinery, as envisaged 
in the Committee on Shipping's resolution. 
In these circumstances, it seems desirable to 
suggest that the second session of UNCTAD 
should adopt a resolution endorsing that of the 
Committee on Shipping, and inviting the Com-
mittee to draw up a specific action programme, 
in co-operation with the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme, to establish national and 
regional consultation machinery, priority being 
given to the establishment and improvement of 
national systems. 
5. PORT IMPROVEMENT 
The UNCTAD secretariat has stated that no 
significant study on port development can be 
prepared prior to the New Delhi meeting. Pre-
sumably, therefore, discussion of these problems 
in depth will not be possible. 
The resolutions adopted by the Special Com-
mittee on Latin American Co-ordination 
(CECLA) at its July 1966 session should be 
recalled in this connexion. In these resolutions, 
CECLA recognizes the need to step up efforts 
to improve port conditions at all levels, but 
considers that national resources are inadequate 
for this task, whose the fulfilment of which will 
largely depend on technical and financial assist-
ance. In almost identical terms, the Charters of 
Tequendama and Algiers reaffirm the position 
taken at the first session of UNCTAD and in 
the Committee on Shipping on improvements 
in port operations. They stress that the New 
Delhi meeting should adopt practical measures 
to ensure that the savings obtained from the 
improvement of port facilities are of immediate 
benefit to the developing countries through 
reduction of the freight rates applicable to 
ports where such improvements are made. 
F. TRADE EXPANSION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Trade between developing countries has been 
growing at a very slow pace—more slowly than 
their trade with industrialized countries, accord-
ing to recent UNCTAD and GATT studies.®® 
93 "Examination of measures for the expansion of 
commodity trade among developing countries", report by 
the secretariat of UNCTAD (TD/B/C.1/27) and 
"Trade among developing countries", report by the sec-
retariat of GATT (Com.TD/D/W.3). For further details, 
see Trade expansion and economic co-operation among 
developing countries (United Nations publication, Sales 
Moreover, it is under-diversified, since 80 per 
cent consists of primary products (petroleum, 
40 per cent; foodstuffs, 25 per cent; raw ma-
terials, 15 per cent). Trade in manufactures has 
increased proportionately more than commodity 
trade, but the absolute figures involved are still 
very modest, and it is confined to a few light-
No.: 67.II.D.2), and Trade expansion and economic in-
tegration among developing countries (United Nations 
publication, Sales No.: 67.II.D.20). 
88 
industry products. In the Latin American in-
tegration areas, however, reciprocal trade has 
been expanding rapidly. In the countries of the 
Latin American Free Trade Association, imports 
and exports rose from 660 million dollars in 
1961 to 1,460 million in 1966 (i.e., by 122 per 
cent); in the Central American Common Market, 
they increased from 36.8 million dollars to 176.3 
million over the same period (i.e., by 379 per 
cent). 
The sluggishness of the developing countries' 
reciprocal trade can be largely ascribed to the 
persistence of certain unfavourable structural 
factors. The economic, financial and trade links 
between developing States and industrialized 
countries continue in force, and with them the 
traditional trade flows. The resulting orientation 
of the transport and communications systems 
and trade channels in specific directions substan-
tially raises freight costs and hampers com-
munications between developing countries. Their 
production patterns are often such that supply 
is ill-adjusted to market requirements, and their 
industrial development policy is frequently im-
plemented in watertight compartments with no 
attempt at co-ordination. Inadequate scales of 
production raise the costs and thus undermine 
the competitive capacity of the lines of produc-
tion concerned, which are maintained by means 
of strong tariff protection that prevents access 
of similar products from other developing 
countries. 
Other factors militating against the expansion 
of trade between developing countries include 
the precarious financial position of many devel-
oping countries, which limits their capacity to 
compete with industrialized countries in extend-
ing credit facilities to buyers; deficient admin-
istrative organization in the fields of trade, 
finance and insurance, which leads to trouble-
some formalities; and unequal competitive con-
ditions vis-a-vis industrialized countries, which 
subsidize production and exports or operate on 
the basis of concessions. 
The preferential tariffs granted by some de-
veloping countries for products from certain 
developed nations (reverse preferences) seriously 
limit the prospects for expansion of trade be-
tween developing countries. 
Latin America's share in total trade between 
developing countries (excluding its intra-regional 
trade) is insignificant and is confined to a 
few traditional commodities. Petroleum and pe-
troleum products, raw cotton and meat account 
for 60 per cent of its exports, and these plus 
coffee, sugar and some tropical fruits, for over 
80 per cent. Its trade is also characterized by 
a high degree of concentration as regards buyers, 
since Yugoslavia, Egypt, Hong Kong, Israel, 
China (Taiwan), India and South Korea absorb 
60 per cent of Latin America's exports to devel-
oping countries. In those markets there is keen 
competition between some items, such as meat, 
wheat, cotton, petroleum products, and other 
similar products from the industrialized coun-
tries. This shows that there is a wide margin 
for substitution if negotiations for securing that 
the developing countries accord one another 
preferential terms not applicable to industrial-
ized countries are successful. 
Both GATT and UNCTAD have made con-
siderable headway in analysing and formulating 
measures which might contribute to the expan-
sion of this trade and to the economic integra-
tion of developing countries, and little remains 
to be done except to provide the appropriate 
instruments for their implementation. 
GATT attaches major importance to the nego-
tiation of tariff and non-tariff concessions be-
tween developing countries, while not neglecting 
to explore other ways of expanding their recip-
rocal trade. The negotiations have been in the 
hands of an unofficial group of twenty develop-
ing countries, fourteen of which presented pro-
visional schedules as a basis for the negotiations. 
Only ten of these countries, including five Latin 
American States (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru 
and Uruguay) have expressed a wish to con-
tinue this exploratory work. Some working 
hypotheses and basic rules have been suggested 
for these negotiations and it is proposed that a 
negotiations committee should be set up, con-
sisting of representatives of the interested Latin 
American countries, whose first task would be 
to discuss these rules. 
UNCTAD, in studies carried out by a com-
mittee of experts and the secretariat,®® adopts 
a much broader and more complex approach, 
the objective being to achieve substantial changes 
in supply conditions by means of changes in 
the structure of production and demand, as well 
as in the channelling of developing countries' 
trade flows. With that end in view, it corisiders 
and proposes measures not only for the elimina-
tion or reduction of trade barriers among those 
countries, but also in relation to investment and 
financing, payments problems and export credits. 
Stress is also laid on the importance of identi-
The other five countries are India, Pakistan, Yugo-
slavia, Israel and the United Arab Republic. 
95 See Trade expansion and economic co-operation 
among developing countries, op. cit., and Trade expan-
sion and economic integration among developing coun-
tries, op. cit. 
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íying possibilities, problems and procedures 
relating to the economic integration of devel-
oping countries. Other suggested measures to 
promote the expansion of trade and economic 
co-operation between developing countries relate 
to international support for achieving balanced 
development (with particular regard to the po-
sition of the less developed countries), to the 
investment policy of developing countries (with 
emphasis on multinational investment), to ways 
of facilitating the financing of trade flows, and 
to the provision of technical assistance.®® 
Both the Charter of Tequendama and the 
Charter of Algiers take up many of these sug-
gestions, although special importance is attached 
to a number of measures which deserve priority 
or offer more definite possibilities for the ex-
pansion of trade between developing countries 
and their economic integration. Thus, the Charter 
of Tequendama stresses the desirability of 
strengthening and speeding up processes of re-
gional and sub-regional economic integration 
as the most appropriate method of expanding 
intra-area trade and of promoting the harmo-
nious development of the countries participating 
in those processes, and sets forth basic principles 
for the elimination of barriers impeding such 
expansion. In the Charter of Algiers specific 
studies are requested with a view to the estab-
lishment of country groupings or national and 
regional export promotion centres, and the 
establishment and improvement of multilateral 
payments systems between developing countries. 
It also advocates the adoption of a number of 
principles and convergent measures as a basis 
®® See "Trade expansion, economic co-operation and 
integration among developing countriesf' (TD/B/137/ 
Add. l ) , which summarizes the suggestions contained in 
the publications referred to in the previous footnote. 
for international action by developed and devel-
oping countries to attain the proposed objec-
tives. The developing countries are also urged 
to inform UNCTAD, at its second session, of 
the efforts they are making or planning to make 
in order to increase their trade and strengthen 
their economic co-operation, particularly in the 
field of inter-regional, regional and sub-regional 
co-operation. In this respect, and more specifi-
cally in relation to regional economic integra-
tion, the Declaration of the Presidents of 
America contains provisions which form the 
basis for a programme of objectives established 
by the Latin American countries themselves 
as a step towards the establishment of a regional 
common market. 
The following are some possible additional 
measures: the harmonization of development 
plans, or at least of investment projects, with 
a view to co-ordinating industrial and agricul-
tural production and infrastructural improve-
ments in the developing countries; specialization 
of regional and sub-regional development banks; 
and the conclusion of agreements to facilitate 
purchases between developing countries with 
funds made available under programmes of aid 
from developed countries. 
As proposed in the Charter of Algiers, it 
would be desirable to set up a special working 
group at the second session of UNCTAD to 
study the most important or pressing practical 
questions and problems, and the above-mentioned 
measures, without prejudice to the simultaneous 
establishment of a permanent committee whose 
task would be to study all matters relating to 
the expansion of trade between developing coun-
tries and their economic integration and whose 
most urgent activities are described by the 
Group of 77 in the Charter of Algiers. 
G. SPECIAL MEASURES IN FAVOUR OF THE RELATIVELY LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
The international community has accepted 
the principle that measures to improve external 
sector conditions in the developing countries 
should include special treatment for the rela-
tively less developed countries. An attempt 
should be made to counteract as far as possible 
the handicaps of under-development which pre-
vent these countries from taking advantage of 
opportunities that might present themselves, and 
to make an effective contribution towards bridg-
ing the gap between their levels of income and 
those of other countries. 
This principle has also been accepted and 
effectively applied in the Latin American Free 
Trade Association. It appears as one of the 
principles of Latin American economic integra-
tion in the Declaration of the Presidents of 
America (14 April 1967), which states, in this 
regard, that "the different levels of development 
and economic and market conditions of the 
various Latin American countries must be borne 
in mind, in order that the integration process 
may promote their harmonious and balanced 
growth. In this respect, the countries of rela-
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lively less economic development, and, to the 
extent required, those of insufficient market, 
will have preferential treatment in matters of 
trade and of technical and financial co-opera-
tion". To this end, the Declaration recommends 
action to facilitate free access of products from 
the relatively less developed countries to the 
market of the other LAFTA countries, and the 
installation and financing in those countries of 
industries intended for the enlarged market, 
and to secure preferential conditions in the sub-
regional agreements in which they have an 
interest. 
There are, notwithstanding, practical difficul-
ties in applying the principle of granting special 
treatment to the relatively less developed 
countries. 
In the first place, it is difficult to formulate 
objective criteria for identifying which are the 
relatively less developed countries. The prob-
lems involved are similar to those encountered 
in establishing the difference between developed 
and developing countries, and are perhaps even 
more difficult. These difficulties are further in-
creased by the differences between the various 
developing areas. Experience so far has shown 
that the use of various economic indexes and 
theoretical principles to define different degrees 
of economic development has not yielded suffi-
ciently convincing and satisfactory results, and 
that equally or even more acceptable results 
could be obtained by using empiric methods. 
Thus, the second session of UNCTAD should 
discuss the possibility that the countries within 
each region should themselves determine which 
of their group should be considered relatively 
less developed. So far as Latin America is con-
cerned, there is already general agreement on 
which countries should be so described. 
Difficulties are also encountered in specify-
ing the nature, scope and operational procedures 
of the special measures to provide more favour-
able treatment for the relatively less developed 
countries. 
In the Charter of Algiers, the developing 
countries recognized that it would be premature 
to define the appropriate combination of special 
measures, but stated that they could derive from 
joint action in the following spheres: (a) com-
modity policy, including measures of financial 
and technical assistance for diversification pro-
grammes; (6) preferences in trade in manufac-
tures and semi-manufactures; (c) development 
finance; (d) regional economic integration; 
(e) invisibles; and ( / ) trade promotion. 
In view of the complexity of the questions 
involved in these six spheres of action, the 
Algiers Meeting decided to establish a working 
group composed of representatives from fifteen 
countries (five in each regional group), which 
should meet between 1 December 1967 and 
15 January 1968 to make specific proposals for 
action in each of those spheres. 
The Charter of Algiers sets forth a number 
of criteria on several topics. With regard to 
commodity policy, it recommends that special 
consideration should be given at the second 
session of UNCTAD to the needs of the less 
developed countries in relaxing tariff and non-
tariff barriers affecting access to the markets 
both in tropical and temperate zone products. 
It also recommends temporary refunds, at least 
in part, of revenue charges and duties on com-
modities of particular interest to the least de-
veloped countries. 
With regard to trade in manufactures and 
semi-manufactures, it recommends the applica-
tion of measures to ensure that, in establishing 
a general system of preferences, the developed 
countries should give special treatment to the 
relatively less developed countries. More specifi-
cally, the preferential system must be conceived 
in such a way as to make possible for the least 
advanced among developing countries to share 
in its benefits. Any time limits of the system 
should be flexible so that countries at present 
in the primary stages of development will even-
tually be able to reap its advantages. Escape 
clause actions limiting or excluding particular 
exports should not apply to the less competitive 
sroducts from less advanced countries. It is 
ikewise recommended that specific commitments 
should be undertaken to provide technical and 
financial assistance for the establishment in 
those countries of export-oriented industries, 
with a view to markets both in the developed 
world and in other developing countries. 
The experience acquired in the operation of 
such a system of preferences should make it 
possible to identify other appropriate and fea-
sible measures which could be adopted in favour 
of the relatively less developed countries, in 
addition to those already mentioned, to enable 
them to take full advantage of the opportunities 
provided by that system. To these measures 
could be added others, such as that contained 
in the Declaration of the Presidents of America 
and repeated in the Charter of Tequendama, 
recommending that, under-regional or sub-
regional economic integration agreements, due 
consideration should be given to the special 
situation of the relatively less developed coun-
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tries by granting them commercial, financial and 
other advantages.®'^  
It is essential, on the other hand, that in 
considering and proposing specific provisions 
in each of the different spheres in favour of 
the relatively less developed countries, care 
should be taken to ensure that the nature and 
97 Article 32 of the Montevideo Treaty provides for 
special measures in favour of the economically relatively 
less developed countries in the LAFTA Area, and in 
particular, the granting of advantages not extended to 
the other Contracting Parties, Moreover, consideration 
is being given in LAFTA to a proposal that non-recipro-
cal tariff preferences might be granted to economically 
relatively less developed countries in Latin America, as 
scope of these provisions should not unduly 
or unnecessarily affect the interests of the 
remaining developing countries. 
requested by those countries on many occasions. In this 
connexion, the LAFTA Council of Ministers, in its reso-
lution 196 adopted at the Asunción meeting (August 
1967), requested that "after the necessary supplemen-
tary studies had been made, the Standing Executive 
Committee should submit to the Council of Ministers at 
its third meeting proposals regarding the Association's 
policy on non-reciprocal tariff preferences Vfhich the 
LAFTA countries might grant to Central America or 
Panama, and vfhich "would be extended only to economi-
cally relatively less developed countries", and that 
"when it considered it appropriate, the Council should 
submit the matter to the LAFTA-CACM Co-ordinating 
Committee." 
H . EXPANSION OF TRADE WITH THE CENTRALLY PLANNED ECONOMIES 
Total Latin American exports to the centrally 
planned economies expanded considerably in the 
period 1960-1966. The total value of these ex-
ports in 1966 was 211 per cent higher than 
in 1960, which reflects a more rapid rate of 
growth of exports to socialist markets than in 
other developing areas (see table 14). However, 
this rate of growth is lower and the absolute 
figures are considerably smaller if the export 
figures for Cuba are excluded from the total. 
Excluding Cuba, total Latin American exports 
to the socialist countries rose from 149 million 
dollars in 1960 to 400 million in 1966 (168 per 
cent). Even so, this still represents a higher 
rate of growth than in other developing areas. 
These high growth rates are partly the result 
of the relatively low level of the absolute export 
figures for the base year. The proportion of 
total exports represented by exports to the so-
cialist countries has undoubtedly increased, but 
it still remains relatively low. Once again men-
tion should be made of the effect of the inclu-
sion of the export figures for Cuba. If Cuba 
is included, the proportion of Latin American 
exports to the socialist countries rose from 3.6 
per cent in 1960 to 8.3 per cent in 1966; in 
contrast, if Cuba is excluded, the corresponding 
increase was from 1.9 to 3.7 per cent. 
In analysing the recent development of Latin 
American exports to the socialist countries, it 
is preferable to consider Cuba separately from 
the rest of the region. As is indicated in table 15, 
in 1960 Cuban exports to the socialist coun-
tries almost equalled in value the exports of 
all the remaining Latin American countries to 
the same area. However, there was a radical 
change in this situation after 1961, since while 
Cuba's exports in that year tended to be mainly 
channelled towards the socialist markets (its 
exports to other areas declining), those of the 
Table 14 
EXPORTS FROM THE DEVELOPING AREAS TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, 1960-66 
(Millions of dollars) 
Latin 










1960 305 100 375 100 470 100 70 100 1,215 100 
1961 580 190 325 87 485 103 80 114 1,475 121 
1962 615 202 300 80 540 115 110 157 1,560 128 
1963 550 180 410 109 585 124 130 186 1,675 138 
1964 710 233 420 112 660 140 150 214 1,940 160 
1965 935 307 570 152 740 157 135 193 2,380 196 
1966 950 311 560 149 790 168 150 214 2,450 202 
Source: GATT. "Network of total international trade". In: International Trade 1966 (1967). 
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other Latin American countries remained at 
their 1960 levels and the increases recorded in 
the succeeding years were relatively lower than 
the increases in Cuban exports. Consequently, 
the total value of Cuban exports to socialist 
markets has been much higher since 1961 than 
that of the exports from the rest of Latin 
America. While the higher growth rate of Cuban 
exports to the socialist countries is mainly the 
result of a diversion of trade, the increase in 
exports from the remaining Latin American 
countries represents to a large extent a creation 
of trade. 
There are other aspects which should be em-
phasized in the recent development of export 
trade between the two areas under consideration. 
Between 1960 and 1963 the growth of Latin 
American exports (excluding Cuba's) was rela-
tively small in absolute terms, but significant 
increases were recorded in 1964 and 1965. The 
upward trend was halted in 1966, when there 
was an increase of only 5 million dollars in 
relation to 1965. The growth of Latin American 
exports (excluding Cuba's) to the socialist area 
was, therefore, mainly confined to 1964 and 
1965, and the factors which helped to determine 
that growth should therefore be examined in 
more detail. 
It should be pointed out, in the first place, 
that the number of Latin American countries 
exporting to socialist markets is very small; 
in point of fact about 80 per cent of Latin 
Table 15 
EXPORTS FROM COUNTRIES IN THE LATIN AMERICAN AREA TO 
THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, 1960-66 
(Millions of dollars) 
I960 mi 1962 1963 196Í 1965 1966 
Argentina 6L1 56.5 78.7 55.1 152.7 196.2 227.1 
Bolivia — — — — — — — 
Brazil 71.3 75.2 73.2 92.4 88.3 89.0 105.2 
Colombia 2.2 2.0 LI 3.6 7.4 9.9 15.9 
Chile 0.6 1.2 1.2 2.2 2.3 7.3 5.5 
Ecuador — 0.1 0.1 0.7 — — — 
Mexico 1.0 0.2 6.0 3.6 17.5 61.2 8.5 
Paraguay — — — — — — 
Peru 0.1 0.2 2.0 7.9 11.8 15.3 21.3 
Uruguay 13.1 14.3 24.1 11.1 13.0 10.1 16.4 
Venezuela — — 0.1 0.1 3.0 0.1 
LAFTA countries 149.4 149.7 186.4 176.7 293.1 392.0 400.0 
Costa Rica __ 0.2 0.6 
El Salvador .— 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6 3.7 0.3 
Guatemala — — — 
Honduras — — . — — — .—. 
Nicaragua — — — — — — 





























Source: ECLA, on the basis of official foreign trade statistics. 
Note: No reason could be established for the slight discrepancies between the country data and the over-all 
data in the previous table. 
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American exports (excluding Cuba's) in 1964-66 
were from only two countries—Argentina and 
Brazil—, the rest being mainly from Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. Secondly, the in-
crease in exports in 1964-66 in relation to 
1960-63 was mainly confined to Argentina and 
on occasion (in 1965) to Mexico. Table 15 
shows that it is not possible to generalize on 
the development of exports from individual 
countries, since while in some cases there were 
jeriods of relative stagnation (in Argentina 
jetween 1960 and 1963, and in Brazil between 
1960 and 1965), in others there were sharp 
fluctuations (mainly in Mexico and Uruguay) 
or growth was sustained but of little significance 
in absolute terms, as in Colombia and Peru. 
Moreover, there is a high degree of concen-
tration with regard to the destination of these 
exports, as well as to their origin. In 1964-66 
the bulk of Latin American exports (excluding 
Cuba's) went to the Soviet Union, Eastern Ger-
many, Czechoslovakia, Poland and mainland 
China. The growth of exports in Argentina 
mainly took the form of increased sales to the 
Soviet Union and mainland China. In the case 
of Brazil, on the other hand, the share of the 
Soviet Union declined in 1965-66 in relation 
to 1963-64, while sales to Eastern Germany, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary increased. Gen-
erally speaking, the exports of every Latin 
American country fluctuated greatly throughout 
this period with regard to their destination, 
which is undoubtedly attributable to the rela-
tively short period of the trade agreements 
under which these exports were made. 
The trade of certain Latin American countries 
with the socialist area is mainly based on short-
and medium-term bilateral agreements which 
usually include indicator lists of products and 
have a bilateral payments mechanism, with 
limited-swing credits whose balances can nor-
mally be spent only in the debtor country. 
Convertible-currency transactions have generally 
been limited to exports to mainland China, some 
of the agreements with Czechoslovakia and the 
purchase of cereals from Argentina by the 
Soviet Union. In any event, it would seem that 
the predominance of strict bilateralism in trade 
between the Latin American and socialist coun-
tries is the main factor limiting expansion of 
this trade. Other restrictive factors include the 
preference of Latin American importers for 
products and well-known brands from the 
rnarket-economy industrialized countries, defi-
ciencies in sales promotion and a lack of com-
munication between exporters on both sides, 
and a certain amount of insecurity regarding 
the future supply of spare parts and the ser-
vicing of equipment purchased from the socialist 
countries. 
Some of these limitations and deficiencies are 
tending to disappear, particularly with a new 
type of trade agreement such as that signed 
between the Soviet Union and Brazil in August 
1966. Under this agreement, the Soviet Union 
guarantees to supply Soviet machinery and 
equipment of various kinds for a period of three 
years and to a value of 100 million dollars, with 
credit over a period of eight years and at an 
annual interest of 4 per cent. In January 1967 
a similar agreement was signed between Chile 
and the Soviet Union to a value of 15 million 
dollars (with the direct participation of the 
private sector to the amount of some 2 million 
dollars). An imporant feature of these agree-
ments is that the loans can be partly repaid 
in the form of exports of manufactures from 
the Latin American countries (25 per cent in 
the case of Brazil and 30 per cent in the case 
of Chile). 
Although these agreements are still based on 
trade and financial bilateralism, they off^ er 
greater flexibility, with the use of convertible 
currency in reciprocal accounts and a clause 
enabling trade balances to be transferred to 
third countries, subject to the agreement of the 
contracting parties. Another aspect that should 
be mentioned is the procedure applied in regard 
to the most-favoured-nation clause in the trade 
agreement between the Soviet Union and Chile, 
which stipulates that the advantages, exemptions 
and privileges established under that clause shall 
not include those granted by either of the con-
tracting parties to bordering countries, those 
deriving from possible customs unions, or those 
granted by Chile to any other Latin American 
country because of its participation in free-
trade areas or other regional economic pacts. 
It is not yet possible to evaluate the potential 
contribution of this new type of trade agree-
ment to the establishment of stable and perma-
nent trade flows between the two areas, or to 
judge whether these agreements will be ex-
tended to a greater number of countries. In any 
event it should be pointed out that one of the 
objectives agreed upon at the first session of 
UNCTAD—^the establishment of long-term trade 
agreements—has not been attained, although it 
is impossible to say at this point who is responsi-
ble for the difiSculties or obstacles in the way of 
their negotiation. 
The Latin American countries are undoubtedly 
interested in promoting greater trade with the 
socialist countries and have, for that purpose. 
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reaffirmed in the Charter of Tequendama some 
of the principles and bases for increasing such 
trade. The measures suggested by the Latin 
American countries in the Charter are meant to 
be the equivalent of the free access and preferen-
tial treatment which the developing countries 
are requesting from the developed countries, 
measures which if properly implemented would 
make it possible to take advantage of the great 
potential for mutual trade between countries 
of the two areas. To this end, the Latin Amer-
ican countries feel that it is necessary that: 
(а) The socialist countries should include in 
their purchasing plans increasing volumes of 
products from developing countries and assign 
to these countries an ever-growing share of the 
increase in their imports of manufactures and 
semi-manufactures; 
(б) The socialist countries should take the 
necessary steps to reduce the margins between 
the import prices and domestic selling prices 
of products from developing countries, and thus 
promote consumption of those products; 
(c) Under those bilateral agreements with 
developing countries in which provision is made 
for reciprocal payments accounts, greater flexi-
bility should be given to the use of the develop-
ing countries' credit balances both within and 
outside the socialist area, and machinery should 
be established for a gradual increase in the 
proportion of bilateral trade which is paid for 
in convertible currency; 
{d) Preferential access should be given to 
products from developing countries, including 
the establishment, in the socialist countries' pur-
chasing policy, of margins of tolerance with 
regard to prices and delivery terms. 
(Annex 1 appears overleaf) 
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Beef, fresh or frozen ib. 
Shellfish and other crustaceans; and 
molluscs — 
Lobsters — 
Shrimps 22 .5% 
Clams 2 0 % 
Oysters, in airtight containers lb. 4 . 5 ; 6 . 0 Í 
Other 0 
Bananas, fresh 0 
Coconuts, etc., fresh or dried 
Coconuts n. 0.125(! 
Brazil nuts lb . 1.125(f 
Cashew nuts lb . 0.7Í 
Oranges lb. 
Other citrus fruit 




Tea ; . 0 
Pepper — 
Unground 0 
Ground lb. 3(i 
( 60 lb. bushel 21«t 
Wheat \ lb. 100;52«i 
Maize 56 lb. bushel 25Í 
Rice — 
In the husk or husked lb. 1.25;1.5<f 
Polished lb . 2.5Í 
Broken lb . 0.3ÍÍ 
Groundnuts lb . 4.25(i 
Castor oil seeds lb . 0.25ÍÍ 
Vegetable oils — ^ 
Olive oil lb- S .Oi ' 
Coconut oil l b . O.S(f 
Palm oil lb . 3Í 
Soya bean oil 4 5 % 
Castor oil lb . 1.5ÍÍ 
Oils for industrial use (except castor 
oil) — 
Other prepared meats — 
Beef in airtight containers 1 5 % 
Beef, salted or smoked { 
Pnrk Í lb". 3é 
i 1 0 : 2 0 % 
Other l b . 3 ; 10Í 
Meat extracts and meat juices lb . 3.75^ 
In containers of more than 20 kg. . , — 
In containers of less than 20 kg. . . . — 
Of beef — 
Of other meats — 
{ 10 . l f Í2 ,3% 
Cocoa beans 0 
Cocoa paste l b . 0.6250 
Cocoa butter 6 .25% 
Cocoa powder, unsweetened lb. 0.75^ 
Chocolate and other food preparations 
containing cocoa 
Chocolate, unsweetened lb . 0.625(^ 
Chocolate, sweetened lb. O .80 ;1O% 
Cocoa powder, sweetened — 
Other 5 : 1 0 % 
Prepared or preserved fruit — 
Apples l b . 1.07Í 
Pears 2 0 % 
Pineapples lb . 0.75(í 
Prepared bananas 1 5 % 
Grapefruit — 
Peaches ove 7 ; 2 0 % 
Preserves, not containing spirit . . . . — 
Other — 
Coffee extracts or essences — 
Soluble coffee 0 
Other lb. 3<f 
Flours and meals, of meat, offals, fisli, 
etc., unfit for human consumption . . . 0 
Oil-cake and other residues — 
Of linseed lb. 0.25(* 
Of soya — 
Other lb . 0.3<i 
Unmanufactured tobacco — 
(3«i) 
1 1 % 


























7 . 5 % 
7 % 
1 0 % 
lb. 
(3(f) 









0.4(f: 5 % 















0 : E S 
ex 0 : ex ES 
BO 












2 0 % 
20% 





9 : 1 4 % 
ex 0; 8 % 
5:8% (0)1 
f 20-22% 
I •25: 26% 
•2% 
9 : 2 4 % 
2 5 % 





23 ; 2 5 % (0)<> 
17-25% 
2 4 % 




GDOM AND JAPAN: TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF RESTRICTIONS ON 
EREST TO LATIN AMERICA 
EEC United Kingdom Japan 
Non-tariff restrictions. etc. Tariff duties I^on-tariff 
restrictions, 
etc. 
Tariff duties Non-tariff 
restrictions, 
etc. EEC Fed. Rep. 
of Germany 
France Pre-KR Post-KR Pre-KR Post-KR 
: P S : E S ST — 
f lb. 2/3 d 
( 3 /4 d : 20% 
(2 /3 d) ) 
3/4 d; 20% J PS 25% (25%) GO 
-
eotPS — 0-30% (0-30%) 5; 15% 
5; 15% 
5; ^ 5 % 
5 ; 7.5% 
GO 
— — — - — — — — — 
- -
QR cwt 79 6d (78 6d) GO (-DA) 
10; 15% 
70% 
(10; 1 5 % ) 
(70%) 
-
C ; P S 
-

















(20 : 4 0 % ) CO 
E S : P S 
cwt (3s6d) ' 
cwt 5s 
(356d) " 































5 : 1 0 % 
— 
P S : E S ST 0 ; 10% (0 ; 10%) 20% (20%) ST; PS 
P S : E S 
P S : E S ST 
ST 
ST 
0 ; 10% 0 : 5 : 1 0 % 
— 
0: 10% (0)<1 
15% (O)-! 
(0 ; 10%) 
(15%) ST; PS 
e x Q R ; ST 
ST 






















Kg. 28 Y 
10% 












ST; exGQ or BQ 
*20% 15% 












:e july ) G Q ; S T 
Í8VL J 
exGO or BO 
QR; ST 
























,, rf4 7s4HJ 
iiSsi'Ad 



















£4 J a i ' / í í ' l 
£4 8s4;4d J 
GQ;PS I 
ex GO (-DA) 
ave ) 





























( 5 % ) 
0 
(355%) 








































Filler tobacco, Turkish type* 
Other 
Iron ore and concentrates 
Roasted iron pyrites 
Copper ore 
Bauxite and concentrates 
Zinc ore and concentrates 
Tin ore 
Tungsten ore 
Petroleum oils, crude 
Less than 25° (A.P.I.) Over 25° (A.P.I.) 







Raw hides and skins 
Bovine hides 
Other 
Bovine cattle leather 
Sheep and Iamb skin leather 
Vegetable-tanned 
Dyed or tinted 
Other 
Goat and kid skin leather 
Other kinds of leather 
Plywood and veneered panels 
Plywood 
Other 
Wool, not carded or combed 
Coarse 
Fine 




Cotton, not carded or combed 
Bleached 
Unbleached 
Having a staple length under . . 
Having a staple length between I W 
and 1 11/16" 
Having a staple length 1 11/16" or 
more 
Other woven fabrics of cotton 





Other, not carded or combed 
Other, carded or combed 
Sacks and bags, woven 
Not bleached or coloured 
Bleached or coloured 
Of jute, unused 
Of jute, used 
















































0 : 5 % 
0; 2 
O 
5 : 9 % 
6% 























e x O i l 
10-14% 




E S : G O 










EEC United Kingdom Japan 
Non-tariff restrictions, etc Tariff duties Non-tariff 
restrictions, 
etc. 
Tariff duties Non-tariff 
restrictions, 
etc. EEC Fed. Rep. 
of Germany 






— — - 0 : 1 0 % 0 - 0 0 -
— — - 0 0 - 0 0 -
— — — 0 0 — 0 0 — 
— — — 0 0 - 0 0 -
— — — 0 0 - 0 0 -
— — — 0 0 — 0 0 GO 
— — OR: ST 0 : Nil 0 :NiI 
— 
kilolitre 530 Y 
(640 Y) 
(530 Y ) ' — 
OR: ST ex GO 
— — — Nil (Nil) — — — — 
- : 10% 
0 : 1 0 % 
5 % 
0 : 4 % z 
15-22.5% 
( kilolitre ) 




0 ; 7.5% 
-
— 
- - 0 : 1 0 0 - 0 0 
- - - 10-20% 8-16% - 15-20% (15-20%) GO 
— — 
-







- — - 10-15% 8-12% - 1 5 : 2 0 % 7 . 5 : 2 0 % ex GO 
- — - 10-15% 8 % - 15-25% 7.5-12.5% — 







— 20% 15% 
-
- PS PS 10 5 % PS 0 0 


















- lb. 9d .+17 .5% 
i r . 5 % 




































etc. Pre-KR Post-KR 
— — ( 10-19% ) 
í ( 8 : I 5 % ) M 
8-10% 
7301 Pig iron — — 4-15 % « 0 ; 4 % 
Spiegeleisen: — — — 
containing chromium, molybdenum. 
ave 15% (15%) tungsten, etc — — 
not containing chromium, etc. . . . 
Other, containing chromium, molyb-
ave 1 % ( 1 % ) — — 
denum, tungsten, etc ton 56.25^ 2U — — 
Other, not containing chromium, etc. ave 0.4% 0 — 
7401 ave 4.4-25.4%^ 2.2.12.7% - 0 0 
7801 Unwrought lead ave 9 .8% (9 .8%) — 0 ; 4 . 5 % ( 0 ; 4 . 5 % ) 
Umted Stales 









ave 0.4  









Sources: GATT, "Preliminary survey of the results of the Kennedy 
Round Negotiations for products of interest to developing countries" 
(COM.TD/46 and Add.l , 2, 5 and 6, July 1967) ; UNCTAD, "The 
Kennedy Round: Preliminary evaluation of results with special 
reference to developing countries" (TD/6/Supp.3, September 1967) ; 
Respective national tariff schedules; GATT, "Notifications of import 
restrictions applied inconsistently with the provisions of GATT 
and not covered by waivers" (L/2740 and Add.1-14, 1967), " In . 
formation on import restrictions applied by developed countries on 
the products of export interest to developing countries" (COM/ 
TD/W/60 , July 1967) . Data for United States taken from GATT 
document L/2568, Add.6 (March 1966) ; and for France, from 
GATT documents COM.TD/W/19 (March 1966), L/2817 (July 1967) 
and "Information on state trading, subsidies and taxes in in. 
dustrialized countries" (COM.TD/W/34, November 1966). 
Symbols: ( ) Brackets signify that the tariffs were not subject 
to negotiations; K R : Kennedy Round; VL : Variable levies; QC: 
Quality control; SD: Special duty; PS: Production subsidy; ES: 
Export subsidy; ST: State trading; IT : Internal taxes; Q: Quota; 
GQ: Global quota; BQ: Bilateral quota; P : Permit; PP: Permit 
required for imports, but which is in general fairly easily obtainable; 
IP: Import prohibited; (-SA) : applicable only outside the sterling 
area; (DA) : applicable to the dollar area; QR: Quantitative re-
striction; * ; Major item; dollar cent; d . : penny; s . : shilling; 
Y : yen; cwt: hundredweight (112 lbs.) ; ave: ad valorem equivalent. 
General note: This list refers only to certain products of special 
inn 
/ (continued) 
EEC United Kingdom Japan 
Non-tariff restrictions, etc. Tariff duties Non.tariff 
restrictions, 
etc. 
Tariff duties Non-tariff 
resections, 
etc. EEC Fed. Rep. 
oí Germany 
France Fre-KR Post-KR Pre-KR Post-KR 
_ _ 17.5-33 1 / 3 % (17.5-33 1 / 3 % ) _ 15-20% 7.5-10% 
— OR 0; 10% 0 : 8 % 10% 5 % — 
10% 8 % 
— — — 
— — ex P 0 ; 107o 0 ; 5 % _ 0; 10% 0-10% — 
— — — ave 0-10% 0 ; 5 % — 10-20% 5-12% — 
interest for Latin American exports, selected on the basis of the 
following documents: UNCTAD, "Report on items of export interest 
to the developing countries" (TD/B/C.2/20, March 1967) ; GATT, 
"Products notified as being of export interest to less-developed 
countries" (COM.TD/23, June 1966) ; "Memorandum of the Latin 
American Missions to the EEC" (February 1966) . 
»Applied to imports from April to November. 
*> Including the weight of the container. 
c Reserving the right to revert to the previous rate in the event 
of market disruption. 
^ Duties currently applied. 
® Plus an additional duty. 
' Average of duties applied by the countries of the European 
Coal and Steel Community. 
ff Applied on the net zinc content. 
^ Applied to all countries except the European countries, countries 
associated with EEC, Cyprus, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Jamaica, 
and Trinidad and Tobago. 
* Applied in accordance with the long-term agreement on cotton 
textiles. 
1 Consolidation of a reduction applied on a temporary basis 
under the Yaounde Convention, 
^ Application of the duty had been provisionally suspended. 
Í Duties will be reduced when the American Selling Price customs 
evaluation method is abolished. 
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Annex ¡I 
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, PERU AND URUGUAY: LINER FREIGHT RATES 
IN EXPORT TRADE AT THE END OF 1956 
1. Freight rates in Argentina's export trade im'th the United Kingdom and Northern 





p , Freight," 







Canary seed 14,921 75.4B 18.72 24.8 
Hulled rice 19,447 87.76 20.80 23.7 
Fish meal 2,165 94.42 27.56 29.2 
Fish oil 1,161 129.09 44.20 34.2 
Dried vegetables 10,927 155.71 23.92 15.4 
Quebracho extract 27,807 165.51 19.76 11.9 
Fats and greases 4,182 174.88 42.12 24.1 
Preserves, fruit and vegetables 4,398 207.45 43.16 20.8 
Edible oils 74,062 266.92 44.20 16.6 
Salted hides 37,834 280.93 43.68 15.6 
Wine, in crates 27 319.27 80.08 25.1 
Dried fruit 1,045 320.21 31.72 9.9 
6,775 536.74 46.28 8.6 
Greasy wool 42,900 748.10 44.20 5.9 
Frozen or chilled beef 190,094 619.92 93.60<i 15.1 
186,531 117.24 82.73<i 70.6 
Preserved meat 12,240 872.60 31.72 3.6 
Calculating and accounting machines . . 219 6,387.78 208.00 3.3 





F.o.b. , mcluding 
surcharges 







Maize 6,311 54.25 70.55 130.0 
Roundwood 4,943 94.21 29.50 31.3 
Brazilian pinewood, sawn 14,367 80.15 21.19 26.4 
Tanning extracts 1,853 127.43 26.25 20.6 
Fruit juices 2,249 351.22 78.90 22.5 
Cocoa 68,243 280.86 39.50 14.1 
97 482.98 38.50 8.0 
Dried bananas 87 511.30 73.00 14.3 
Coffee beans 376,569 874.92 45.83 5.2 
Greasy wool 732 1,104.26 68.64 6.2 
Jute and sisal fibres, in bales 23,712 157.59 40.00 25.4 
Preserved meat 9,909 737.60 31.50 4.3 
Cotton, woollen and linen fabrics 3,832 1,066.34 101.00 9.5 
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Annex II (continued) 
3. Freight rates in Brazil's export trade with the United Kingdom and Northern Europe 





„ , Freight,* 







Maize 58,049 50.21 28.60 57.0 
Roundwood 18,884 194.15 42.50 21.9 
Brazilian pinewood, sawn 197,009 90.04 28.53 31.7 
Tanning extracts 4,793 133.13 23.50 17.7 
Fruit juices 3,733 311.59 69.00 22.1 
Cocoa 5,820 334.29 41.50 12.4 
Raw cotton 117,226 491.37 52.00 10.6 
Dried bananas 28 464.61 35.60 7.7 
Coffee beans 286,772 893.89 43.30 4.8 
Greasy wool 9,920 926.63 55.40 6.0 
Jute and sisal fibres, in bales 63,497 171.04 33.00 19.3 
Hulled rice 25,024 114.30 27.60 24.1 
Preserved meat 4,155 767.50 29.40 3.8 
Cotton, woollen and linen fabrics 245 944.18 82.00 8.7 

















Nitrate, in bags 6,780 32.09 24.25 75.5 
Wood, in the rough 150 89.70 33.22 37.0 
Newsprint 82 107.92 31.36 29.1 
Fish meal 4,782 125.16 34.92 27.9 
Garlic 281 200.50 55.93 27.9 
Dried vegetables 600 209.62 39.65 18.9 
Wine, in crates 409 246.10 46.35 18.8 
Olives 168 416.08 45.76 11.0 
Electrolytic copper 12,178 799.69 44.60 5.6 
1,370 995.98 71.38 7.2 
Copper wire 6,261 919.37 45.42 4.9 
5. Freight rates in Chile's export trade with the United Kingdom and Northern Europe 






va¿e " ' ' I 
surcharges 







3,687 952.25 57.68 6.1 
14,161 117.75 82.40 70.0 
Sodium nitrate, in bags 15,137 32.13 10.50 32.7 
Fish oil 7,942 172.61 23.07 13.4 
Prunes 1,619 200.24 31.00 15.5 
Dried vegetables 13,809 186.62 23.07 12.4 
Sawn pinewood 25,481 47.89 30.90 64.5 
Wood, in the rough 2,253 71.78 30.28 42.2 
Electrolytic and refined copper 158,591 787.46 20.08 2.5 
Wine, in crates 40 329.45 80.34 24.4 
Copper wire 17,289 753.90 38.21 5.1 
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Cotton 7,526 781.24 46.00 5.9 
Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen 2,983 150.99 95.00 62.9 
Coffee beans 27,541 842.67 39.00 4.6 
Refined lead 24,472 302.47 16.73 5.5 
Refined sugar 276,519 116.17 27.00 23.2 
Electrolytic copper 34,007 695.53 18.21 2.6 
Preserved fish and shellfish 4,142 392.55 45.00 11.5 
Fish meal 213,003 103.13 23.00 22.3 
Woollen carpets 12 2,724.10 220.00 8.1 
Dried vegetables 1,374 206.63 30.00 14.5 
Veneer panels, sawn 3,866 143.62 36.00 25.1 
7. Freight rates in Uruguay's exports trade with Atlantic ports in the 














(dollars per ton) f.o.b. value 
Canary seed 50 74.99 40.19 53.6 
Rice 502 127.00 37.35 29.4 
Greasy wool 16,835 1,225.42 67.35 5.5 
Frozen beef 50 599.98 155.07 25.8 
Casein 696 679.56 43.57 6.4 
Preserved meat 7,162 488.97 36.92 7.6 
Meat extract 71 12,147,65 47.54 0.4 
Fruit juice 110 739.85 72.44 9.8 
Wool tops, combed ., , , 735 2,074.00 111.49 5.4 
Fabrics 4,294.94 134.69 3.1 
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8. Freight rates in Uruguay's export trade with the United Kingdom and Northern Europe 














(dollars per ton) f.o.b. value 
Rice 107.30 20.00 18.6 
Barley 1,194 50.38 15.00 29.8 
Greasy wool 24,472 1,185.48 48.50 4.1 
Frozen beef 22,557 542.97 95.00 17.5 
Preserved meat 611.45 38.00 6.2 
Meat extract 264 13,076.98 66.00 0.5 
Wool tops, combed 5,459 2,085.10 52.00 2.5 
Salted cowhide 106.25 33.00 31.1 
Salted beef tripe 656.64 47.50 7.2 
Meat meal 61.02 35.50 58.2 
Sources: Rates published by the shipping conferences and Foreign Trade Yearbooks 
of the countries included. 
" Includes Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
•> Tonnage includes total exports to the countries in question. 
" Freight from Buenos Aires to Antwerp. 
^ Freight in refrigerated chambers. 
"Freight from Santos to New York. 
'Freight from Santos to Antwerp. 
® Freight from Valparaiso to San Francisco. 
Freight from Valparaiso to Antwerp. 
' Freight from Callao to New York. 
Í Freight from Montevideo to New York, 
k Freight from Montevideo to Antwerp. 
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CHARTER OF TEQÜENDAMA 
PREAMBLE 
The first United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) identified and 
defined the problems presented by international 
economic relations, and especially by the condi-
tions in which the foreign trade of the develop-
ing countries is carried on and in which their 
economic and social development is proceeding. 
The Final Act of the Conference brought 
together a series of principles and recommenda-
tions on measures and programmes of action 
which, if carried out, would have made it pos-
sible to solve many of the problems confronted 
at that time and to lay the foundations for a 
better world trade order and more effective 
international economic co-operation. 
The developing countries, taking into account 
the work done by the organs of the Conference, 
wish to reach at the second session of UNCTAD, 
among other basic objectives, practical agree-
ments with the developed countries on specific 
questions. 
The countries members of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Latin American Co-ordination 
(CECLA) reaffirm this position and stress the 
urgent need that, at the second UNCTAD, institu-
tional machinery should be established and ef-
fective measures adopted so that, with the co-
operation of the developed countries, the goals 
proclaimed by the United Nations for the De-
velopment Decade may be fully attained. 
The developing countries of other regions, in 
order to analyse their special problems and 
consider their common attitude on general 
questions, have been holding meetings that will 
undoubtedly do much to clarify the general and 
specific topics to be discussed at Algiers and at 
the second UNCTAD, and to devise solutions 
for problems common to the developing coun-
tries. 
In these circumstances, the countries members 
of CECLA deem it appropriate to make known 
to the participants in the Algiers meeting the 
position of Latin America and its specific 
views on some of the substantive questions on 
the agenda for the second UNCTAD, in order to 
continue a constructive exchange conducive to 
harmonious expression of the aspirations and 
interests of the developing countries. 
The Latin American countries members of 
CECLA unanimously agree on the following: 
L COMMODITY PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 
1. For the developing countries it is essen-
tial that, in the discussions and negotiations 
held at the second UNCTAD, the highest priority 
should be given to improving the conditions of 
access for the commodities which they export 
to the developed market economy countries and 
to the centrally planned economy countries. In 
this connexion the countries members of CECLA 
consider it of fundamental importance: 
(a) That the principle of the status quo ac-
cepted at the first Conference should be effec-
tively observed, and that an undertaking should 
be obtained from the developed countries to 
eliminate, by 31 December 1968 at the latest, 
all tariff and non-tariff restrictions adopted since 
the signing of the Final Act of the first Con-
ference. To that end the secretariat of UNCTAD 
should prepare in co-operation with the com-
petent international agencies, before 30 June 
1968, a list of such retrogressions for submission 
to the participating Governments; 
(6) That a programme of tariff and non-
tariff liberalization should be adopted for pri-
mary commodities of export interest to the de-
veloping countries, and that all restrictions and 
charges applied by the developed countries to 
such commodities originating exclusively from 
the developing countries should be removed im-
mediately. Immediate removal of restrictions 
and charges should also be granted by the 
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developed countries for other primary com-
modities which are not in direct competition 
with their own domestic products; 
(c) That a programme of measures should be 
adopted to discourage uneconomic production, 
in the developed countries, of products which 
compete with products originating from the 
developing countries, and to abolish subsidies 
on the production and export of such competing 
products; 
(d) That a programme should be drawn up 
for the total elimination by the developed coun-
tries of domestic taxes and fiscal surcharges ap-
plied to products of interest to the developing 
countries; 
(e) That the developing countries should be 
guaranteed a minimum share in the markets of 
the developed countries through the setting of 
ceilings on self-sufficiency, through undertakings 
given under agreements or international com-
modity arrangements to make certain pur-
chases, and through other means. In any case, 
a substantial share of any increase in domestic 
demand for primary commodities in the de-
veloped countries should be reserved for the 
output of the developing countries; 
( / ) That encouragement should be given to 
the holding of complementary negotiations to 
improve on the results obtained by the develop-
ing countries in the Kennedy Round and to 
ensure that such results as have been or may be 
obtained are extended to all developing coun-
tries; 
That consultative machinery should be 
established to ensure that the production sur-
pluses or reserves of the developed countries 
are disposed of in an orderly manner so as not 
to interfere with the developing countries' ex-
ports and not to depress international prices; 
(h) That, under a multilateral institutional 
arrangement, objective criteria should be 
adopted for identifying situations in which re-
strictions are applied by virtue of safeguard 
clauses, and the unilateral application of restric-
tions should be avoided; 
(i) That, independently of the right to require 
the immediate cancellation of measures which 
violate the rules adopted as proposed in the 
foregoing paragraphs, appropriate machinery 
should be established to make good any loss or 
damage caused to the developing countries by 
such measures. 
2. That an essential aspect of international 
policy on commodity trade is the protection of 
price levels which, in conjunction with suitable 
conditions of access, will secure higher foreign 
earnings for the developing countries; 
That agreements and other international ar-
rangements concerning commodities represent, 
in many cases, the appropriate means of pro-
viding the developing countries with safeguards 
in the matter of access and prices, and of re-
conciling the interests of exporting and con-
suming countries; 
That such agreements and other arrangements 
should be negotiated commodity by commodity, 
with due regard for the characteristics peculiar 
to each commodity. This should not deter 
UNCTAD from continuing its studies on the 
general principles of commodity agreements; 
3. That, on the basis of the agreements 
reached at the first UNCTAD concerning the 
establishment of general conditions of free ac-
cess for primary commodities, the developing 
countries should press for the implementation 
of the agreements reached on that occasion con-
cerning the elimination of discriminatory pre-
ferences against developing countries; 
4. That the creation, where feasible, of buf-
fer stocks of primary commodities should help 
to reduce the short-term instability of markets 
without affecting long-term trends and without 
releasing the developed countries from other 
obligations which they have assumed or may 
assume concerning, inter alia, access, prices or 
regulation of production. To assist in financing 
such stocks, particularly at the initial stage, the 
international financial agencies should be urged 
to participate and the developed countries to 
adopt a more constructive attitude. It is not 
advisable to promote buffer stocks of com-
modities of which there is structural world 
over-production; 
5. That diversification of the production and 
exports of primary commodities by the develop-
ing countries will be more effective if adequate 
financial resources are obtained for the imple-
mentation of programmes adopted under inter-
national commodity agreements or national de-
velopment plans. To that end, immediate further 
action is recommended with a view to the 
establishment of specific funds for particular 
products. Diversification programmes for prod-
ucts originating in developed and developing 
countries should secure for the developing coun-
tries a larger share of world trade in the 
product concerned, and hence production control 
should be applied in the first instance, and with 
greater intensity, in the developed countries. 
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I I . EXPANSION AND DIVERSIFICATION OF EXPORT OF MANUFACTURES AND 
SEMI-MANUFACTURES OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
With a view to promoting exports of manu-
factures and semi-manufactures as a dynamic 
factor in financing development and stimulating 
technological progress in the developing coun-
tries, the countries members of CECLA con-
sider that first priority should be given to the 
following points: 
1. ESTABLISHMENT OF A SYSTEM OF PREFER-
ENCES FOR PRODUCTS EXPORTED BY DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES 
At the second UNCTAD, basic principles 
should be negotiated for a general system of 
tariff and non-tariff preferences, together with a 
commitment to work out in specified forums, 
and within specified time-limits, the specific 
details of the system. The basic principles of the 
preferences should embody at least the follow-
ing features: 
(o) They should be general, non-discrimi-
natory and -without reciprocity, and should be 
granted by the developed countries to all de-
veloping countries; 
(fe) They should take the form of free access 
for manufactures and semi-manufactures orig-
inating from developing countries to the markets 
of developed countries, with the complete and 
immediate abolition of tariffs and all non-
tariff restrictions; 
(c) They should cover all manufactures and 
semi-manufactures produced in developing 
countries, without restrictions on volume or 
value; 
(d) The developed countries could, however, 
establish tariff quotas for preferential imports 
of articles which were recognized as "critical" or 
"sensitive". The relevant lists negotiated for 
each developing country would be subject to 
periodic revision with a view to their gradual 
elimination; 
(e) The system should include provision for 
the machinery needed to make it work éíEcieníly 
and, in case it should prove necessary to apply 
safeguard clauses, provisions should be laid 
down specifying the circumstances and condi-
tions under which countries granting preferences 
would be able to apply such clauses temporarily, 
and the compensation they would grant in such 
event to developing countries affected by the 
loss or reduction of the preference in question; 
( / ) In the event of the application of safe-
guard clauses, the only imports restricted would 
be those of the countries responsible for the 
situation giving rise to the application of those 
clauses; 
(g) The preferences should be of sufi&cient 
duration to ensure that, in time, all the develop-
ing countries take full advantage of them; 
(h) Arrangements should be made to grant 
technical and financial assistance wherever 
needed in order to ensure that all the develop-
ing countries take full advantage of the pre-
ferences; 
(i) Without prejudice to such of the arrange-
ments described above as may favour the less 
developed among the developing countries; to 
arrangements made in their favour in order to 
promote trade between developing countries; or 
to such arrangements as have been or may be 
agreed upon in regional or sub-regional systems 
of developing countries; once the general system 
of preferences is in operation, efforts will be 
continued to arrive at other arrangements of 
which the developing countries will be able to 
take the fullest possible advantage; 
( j ) The discriminatory preferences granted by 
developed countries to developing countries for 
manufactures and semi-manufactures will be 
absorbed in the general preferential system; 
(A;) Suitable machinery should be established 
to supervise the operation of the system of pre-
ferences and, in particular, to determine the 
lists of "critical" or "sensitive" products; 
( / ) The developed countries wth centrally 
planned economies should grant advantages 
whose effects are at least equivalent to the 
preferences requested from the developed 
market-economy countries. 
2. ACCESS FOR MANUFACTURES PRODUCED BY 
DEVELOPING COUINTRIES TO THE MARKET OP 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
At the second UNCTAD, the developing 
countries should press for compliance by the 
developed countries with the agreements reached 
at the first UNCTAD on liberalization for manu-
factures and semi-manufactures of export in-
terest to the developing countries, particularly as 
regards the principle of the status quo. 
In addition the developing countries should 
strive for the establishment of objective criteria 
for the application of restrictions to trade in 
products from developing countries under safe-
guard clauses relating to "market disruption" 
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and other "special circumstances" applied by 
developed countries, so that such situations may 
be defined, provisions may be laid down specify-
ing what measures restrictive of trade can 
legitimately be applied when such a situation 
is found to exist, and compensation may be 
fixed which corresponds to the loss or damage 
suffered by the developing countries. Multi-
lateral consultative and supervisory machinery 
should be set up for that purpose. 
Such compensation might be of a commercial 
nature or might take the form of additional 
financial resources for the sectors of produc-
tion affected by the application of restrictions. 
The developed countries should not promote 
the development in their territories of industries 
of particular interest to the developing coun-
tries. In those cases where developed countries 
have invoked safeguard clauses on grounds of 
market disruption, they should make the ap-
propriate domestic structural adjustments. 
The developed countries should forthwith 
apply to the manufactures and semi-manufac-
tures exported by all developing countries such 
exclusive commercial benefits as they grant out-
side systems of integration, to other developed 
countries and all the tariff reductions agreed 
upon in GATT's Kennedy Round negotiations, 
and should extend them to all developing coun-
tries whether or not members of GATT. 
3 . EXPORT PROMOTION 
Developed countries and international agencies 
should channel more, and more effective, techni-
cal and financial assistance in order to improve 
the productivity of the developing countries' 
industries and their competitiveness in inter-
national markets. 
International co-operation should also be 
secured with a view to the dissemination of trade 
information, particularly with regard to the 
opportunities offered by the developed coun-
tries' markets. To that end, the developing coun-
tries should support the establishment of the 
joint UNCTAD-GATT trade promotion centre 
and obtain the financial and technical support 
of the developed countries for its operation. 
4 . TECHNOLOGY 
The developed countries should encourage the 
transfer of knowledge and technology to develop-
ing countries by permitting the use of industrial 
patents on the best possible terms which will 
enable products manufactured in developing 
countries to compete effectively in world mar-
kets. 
They should also promote the elimination of 
restrictive practices, relating to market distribu-
tion and price-fixing, which are imposed by en-
terprises in developed countries in granting 
licences for the use of patents and trade-marks 
in developing countries. 
I I I . MONETARY AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS RELATED TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
CECLA, having considered various aspects of 
development financing, again expresses its con-
cern at the grave problems created by the in-
sufficiency of the external financial resources 
available for development, the unsatisfactory 
terms of aid, and the growing external indebted-
ness of developing countries in general and the 
countries of Latin America in particular. In 
this connexion, it trusts that special attention 
will be given to the Agreed Statement which was 
adopted at the Second Session of the UNCTAD 
Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related 
to Trade by both developed and developing 
countries and which contained an analysis of the 
main problems of development financing (TD/ 
B/119). 
Furthermore, in connexion with the problems 
of external debt servicing, it stresses the urgent 
need for the capital exporting countries, in 
co-operation with the developing countries and 
the specialized international organizations, to 
consider the adoption of suitable methods for 
long-term consolidation of the short- and 
medium-term external debts of developing 
countries. 
For the purpose of the Algiers meeting and 
UNCTAD II, CECLA submits the following 
recommendations: 
1. INCREASE IN AID FLOWS 
(a) It is recommended that the "Group of 
77" should stress at UNCTAD II the urgent need 
to implement the recommendation in annex 
A.IV.2 of the Final Act of the first Conference 
that an effort be made to supply to the develop-
ing countries financial resources of a minimum 
net amount approaching as nearly as possible 
to 1 per cent of their national income, and that it 
should also stress the need to increase sub-
stantially the proportion of public funds supplied 
under this target. To this end, the UNCTAD 
secretariat should be requested to provide fi-
gures of international financial flows taking place 
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in accordance with the provisions of the recom-
mendation in the above-mentioned annex. 
(b) It is recommended that the Secretary-
General of UNCTAD be requested to seek in-
formation from the developed countries on the 
causes of their failure to carry out the under-
taking which they made on this point at the 
first Conference. 
(c) It is recommended that the statutes of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment should be revised so as to transform 
that organization into a world development bank 
which would provide credits exclusively to de-
veloping countries. It is, however, recognized 
that considerable time would be required to com-
plete all the formalities involved in such a re-
vision. For this reason, it is essential that, dur-
ing this transition period, suitable changes be 
made in IBRD's credit policy to ensure that its 
resources are as soon as possible used ex-
clusively for the provision of aid to developing 
countries. 
(d) It is recommended that developed coun-
tries which received loans from IBRD and which 
at present have outstanding debit balances 
should pay off those balances before maturity so 
that the funds repaid will become available for 
the granting of new credits to developing coun-
tries, the provision of additional resources for 
IDA and for other financial operations on "soft" 
terms. 
2 . SO-CALLED "SOFT" CREDITS 
It is recommended that developed countries 
members of IBRD should, as a matter of urgency, 
provide additional and adequate resources for 
the International Development Association 
( IDA) . 
3. INTEREST EQUALIZATION FUND 
It is recommended that support should be 
given to the early establishment of the multila-
teral interest equalization fund referred to in 
recommendation A.IV.l l of the Final Act of 
the first Conference which would make it pos-
sible to mobilize resources on the international 
capital markets at current rates of interest and 
to use them for granting of credits to develop-
ing countries at low interest and for terms 
longer than is normal. The difference between 
the cost of these resources and the rates of 
interest would be covered out of the above-
mentioned fund. 
4 . SUPPLIERS' CREDITS 
It is recommended that an inter-governmental 
group, with equitable representation of the coun-
tries in which suppliers' credits originate and 
of the borrowing countries, should be set up 
within UNCTAD with the object of eliminating 
abuses and restrictive practices in this field 
and of providing the developing countries with 
an opportunity to work out multilaterally their 
proposals concerning the practices to be fol-
lowed by suppliers and recipients in the future. 
The international financial organizations would 
be invited to co-operate in the work of this inter-
governmental group, which would take into 
consideration the information prepared on the 
subject by the international organizations and 
by the UNCTAD secretariat. The UNCTAD 
secretariat is urged to continue studying all 
aspects of suppliers' credits and other com-
mercial credits, in order to assist the efficient 
functioning of the proposed group, which would 
make use for its purposes of the various studies 
available. 
5 . SUPPLEMENTARY FINANCING SCHEME 
(a) It is recommended that the Latin Amer-
ican countres members of the Inter-govern-
mental Group on Supplementary Financing 
should, at the Group's third session, support the 
preparation of a preliminary draft statute for 
an agency to administer supplementary financ-
ing, for consideration at UNCTAD II. 
{b) It is recommended that, in order to avoid 
interference by the said agency in the economic 
policy decisions of developing countries, the 
conditions for participation by those countries 
in the supplementary financing scheme should 
be limited to the following: 
(i) The developing country and the agency 
would jointly prepare export projections for a 
specific period to be agreed upon; the country 
would indicate the main lines of the economic 
policy it proposed to follow during the period in 
question; during that period there would be no 
consultations for the purpose of checking the 
implementation of the general policy indicated; 
(ii) The decision regarding the granting of 
aid would depend solely on analysis of the causes 
of the drop in earnings and not on the manner 
of implementation of the economic policies in-
dicated, such analysis to include the determina-
tion, by consultation, of whether the drop in 
income is due to circumstances beyond the con-
trol of the country concerned. 
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6 . COMPENSATORY FINANCING SCHEME 
It is recommended: 
(a) That the need should be stressed for 
drawings on the International Monetary Fund 
under the compensatory financing scheme to be 
automatic also between 25 and 50 per cent of 
the countries' quotas in the Fund. 
(b) That it be provided that such drawings 
are not subject to any conditions. 
(c) That the formula for calculating the 
sums compensatable be modified, the exports 
during the three years immediately preceding the 
compensation being taken as the basis. 
7 . REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY SYSTEM 
In view of the fact that this matter is under 
consideration at the annual meeting of the Board 
of Governors of IMF in Rio de Janeiro, it is 
considered undesirable to make any technical 
recommendations concerning it at present. At 
the Algiers meeting, at UNCTAD II and in other 
international gatherings, the Latin American 
countries will have an opportunity to adopt posi-
tions which they feel are consistent with their 
interests, both in respect of changes in the inter-
national monetary system, and of related matters, 
particularly trade, development financing and 
regional financial integration. In this connexion, 
the Latin American delegations intend, at in-
ternational gatherings at which these matters 
are considered, to co-ordinate their activities 
among themselves and with the delegations of 
other developing countries. 
8 . CO-ORDINATED ACTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS 
It is recommended that the Latin American 
countries direct their activities at the Algiers 
meeting and at UNCTAD II in such a way as 
to harmonize their views with those of other 
developing countries concerning the policies 
followed by the international financial organiza-
tions with respect to such matters as facilities 
of access to these organizations' resources, vot-
ing power and improvement of the machinery for 
balance of payments adjustments. For this pur-
pose, the Latin American countries will be 
guided by the positions taken on the relevant 
questions at the annual meetings of IMF and 
IBRD. 
I V . CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE SHIPPING PROBLEMS OF THE 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
1. INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 
(а) During the debate on international legis-
lation on shipping at UNCTAD II it should be 
emphasized that the agreements on maritime 
trade practices and customs were entered into 
at a time when the interests of the developing 
countries were insignificant; 
(б) The inclusion of an item entitled "In-
ternational legislation on shipping" in the work 
programme of the Committee on Shipping should 
be requested. The Committee should have such 
advice as it may deem necessary and it should 
be recommended to bear in mind in its studies 
such factors as the compilation, comparison and 
uniformity of the relevant legislation. 
2 . RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING FREIGHT RATES 
(a) The countries members of UNCTAD 
should be urged to co-operate with the secretariat 
in drawing up as soon as possible a programme 
of studies on maritime freight. 
(b) It should be recommended that in fixing 
freight rates consideration should be given to 
the need for placing the products of the develop-
ing countries on international markets under 
competitive conditions. 
(c) The Latin American countries should ex-
press their grave concern at the fact that con-
ference freight rates are not only continuing 
to rise but are still discriminatory and restrictive 
vis-a-vis the developing countries. 
{d) The widespread practice of fixing special 
freight rates for the transport of non-traditional 
products of the developing countries should be 
condemned. 
(e) The application of incentive freight rates 
designed to promote the export from the develop-
ing countries of manufactures which they have 
produced with their own raw materials should 
be recommended. Such rates might be fixed at 
levels which would merely cover the marginal 
and supplementary costs involved in the trans-
port of these goods. 
if) The UNCTAD secretariat should be urged 
to conclude its studies on the fixing of routes as 
soon as possible. 
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3 . SHIPPING CONFERENCE PRACTICES 
(a) Specific action should be taken at 
UNCTAD II with a view to abolishing those 
shipping conference practices which are detri-
mental to the developing countries, such as: 
(i) The "closed" nature of many conferences; 
(ii) The fact that the conferences are not 
effectively represented in a number of major 
ports of the developing countries; 
(iii) The fact that shipping rates and other 
conditions of carriage are not published at all 
or are given insufficient publicity. 
(6) In this connexion, UNCTAD II should 
be recommended to adopt the following prin-
ciples : 
(i) Recognition of the fact that the develop-
ing countries are fully entitled to take part in 
any freight conference which affects their 
maritime traffic; 
(ii) Recognition of the right of shipowners 
in developing countries to take part in freight 
conferences on an equal footing with ship-
owners of the developed countries; 
(iii) A freight conference concerned with the 
export traffic of a developing country should be 
represented in that country; 
(iv) The right of the developing countries to 
be fully informed of the structure and fixing 
of freight rates and other shipping conditions 
of carriage applied to the products involved in 
their trade and also to be advised sufficiently 
in advance of any change in such rates and 
conditions. 
4 . TECHNICAL ADVANCES IN SHIPPING 
(ffl) It should be recommended that the study 
to be submitted by the secretariat to UNCTAD 
II should take into account the implications of 
the technical advances in shipping in respect 
of the organization and structure of shipping 
conferences, cost levels, rate structure, and tech-
niques of port operation and organization. 
(b) UNCTAD II should be recommended to 
make preparations forthwith for a study of the 
various regulatory and administrative measures 
arising from the adoption of these new tech-
niques. 
5. EXPANSION OF THE MERCHANT MARINES OF 
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(o) Reiteration of the inalienable right of the 
developing countries to determine the size of 
their domestic merchant marines in relation 
to the freight position and prospects generated 
by their foreign trade should be reaffirmed. 
(6) The developing countries should endeav-
our to make the maximum use of their ship-
ping industries in order to meet the requirements 
arising from policies of expansion of their mer-
chant marines. 
(c) The domestic legislation enacted by the 
developing countries with a view to achieving 
the objectives set forth in the two preceding 
sub-paragraphs should not be regarded as dis-
criminatory nor should it lead to the adoption 
by the developed countries of retaliatory or 
other measures which might have the effect of 
rendering ineffective the measures taken by 
the developing countries. 
(d) UNCTAD II should be recommended to 
adopt measures designed to provide for such 
bilateral or multilateral financing as may be 
required to expand the merchant marines of 
the developing countries. Criteria should be laid 
down to ensure that such financing is granted to 
genuine national enterprises. 
(e) It should be recommended that the study 
to be submitted by the secretariat to UNCTAD 
II take into account the implications of the 
technical advances in shipping for the expansion 
of the merchant marines of the developing 
countries. 
6. CONSULTATION MACHINERY 
UNCTAD should be recommended to endorse 
the resolution of the Committee on Shipping so 
as to enable it to consider at its next session a 
programme of specific action in collaboration 
with UNDP and the regional economic commis-
sions, designed to give effect to the proposals 
in the said resolution on the establishment of 
national and regional consultation machinery 
in various parts of the world in accordance with 
the provisions adopted. 
7. PORT IMPROVEMENT 
(a) Practical measures should be adopted at 
UNCTAD II with a view to ensuring that the 
savings obtained from the improvement of port 
facilities are immediately benefiting the de-
veloping countries through reduction of freight 
rates. 
(b) It should be recommended that the 
studies on this subject which are being made 
by the UNCTAD secretariat should include an 
examination of possible schemes of financing 
and technical assistance for programmes relat-
ing to port infrastructure and operation in the 
developing countries, taking into account the im-
plications of technical advances in shipping. 
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V . TRADE EXPANSION AND ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
An increase in trade among developing coun-
tries and schemes for their integration and eco-
nomic co-operation cannot be regarded as a 
substitute for improved trade relations between 
developed and developing countries, but they 
can be considered as an effective complement to 
the means of promoting the economic and social 
development of the developing countries. 
With a view to promoting the expansion of 
trade among developing countries at the re-
gional and world level, the Latin American coun-
tries members of CECLA have agreed on the 
following points: 
1. It is desirable to strengthen and speed up 
processes of regional and sub-regional economic 
integration as the most appropriate method of 
expanding intra-area trade and of promoting 
the harmonious development of the countries 
participating in those processes, 
2. Under regional or sub-regional economic 
integration agreements, the developing countries 
will proceed with the systematic elimination of 
charges and other non-tariff restrictions on 
mutual trade and will give due consideration to 
the special situation of the economically less 
developed among the developing countries by 
granting them commercial, financial and other 
advantages. 
3. Developing countries in different regions 
may negotiate the granting to one another of 
special advantages which are not to be extended 
to developed countries. The latter countries 
should support, in the competent forums, the 
granting of such authorizations or waivers as 
may be necessary for the purpose. 
4. The developing countries should seek to 
improve the infrastructure of transport and com-
munications with other developing countries or 
areas, as well as payments systems and machinery 
and their working practices, so as to encourage 
mutual trade. They should also exchange com-
mercial experience and information. 
5. The developed countries and the com-
petent international agencies should give their 
full support to requests addressed to them, 
through the organs of integration, for technical 
and financial assistance in launching and accel-
erating the processes of regional or sub-regional 
economic integration and in adjusting to struc-
tural changes, particularly in industry and the 
employment of labour. 
6. Those developed countries which grant tied 
loans to developing countries should agree to 
the use of the resources so provided to make 
purchases in other developing countries, es-
pecially countries in the same region. 
7. The developed countries should give up 
receiving from developing countries trade pre-
ferences which discriminate against other de-
veloping countries, or should at least agree to 
the unilateral extension of such preferences to 
all the developing countries. 
8. The developed countries and the interna-
tional and regional financial agencies should pro-
mote the establishment or modernization, in the 
developing countries, of industries geared to the 
export of manufactures and semi-manufactures 
to the world or regional market under com-
petitive conditions with regard to quality and 
price. As part of the processes of regional in-
tegration, they should promote the installation, 
in the economically less developed among the 
developing countries, of industries geared to the 
expanded market. 
V I . EXPANSION OF TRADE WITH THE CENTRALLY-PLANNED-ECONOMY COUNTRIES 
1. The developing countries should urge the 
developed countries with centrally planned econ-
omies to give full effect to the agreements 
reached and offers made at the first UNCTAD 
to set targets for the expansion of their import 
trade in products originating from developing 
countries. 
2. In connexion with the measures requested 
from the developed countries by the developing 
countries in the matter of free access and prefer-
ential treatment, the developed countries with 
centrally planned economies should; 
(a) Include in their purchasing plans in-
creasing volumes of products originating from 
developing countries; and assign to developing 
countries an ever-growing share of the increase 
in their imports of manufactures and semi-
manufactures. 
(b) Take the necessary steps to reduce the 
margins between the import prices and the do-
mestic selling prices of products originating from 
the developing countries, and thus promote the 
consumption of those products. 
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(c) Under those bilateral agreements with 
developing countries in which provision is made 
for payments accounts, agree to greater flexibility 
in the use of the developing countries' credit 
balances both within and outside the socialist 
area. Machinery should be established for a 
gradual increase in the proportion of bilateral 
trade which is paid for in convertible currency. 
( ¿ ) Grant preferential access conditions for 
products originating from developing countries. 
These conditions should include the establish-
ment, in their international purchasing policies, 
of margins of tolerance in favour of the develop-
ing countries with regard to prices and delivery 
terms. In the event that the announced changes 
in the economic structure of the socialist coun-
tries should assign to tariffs a more important 
part in their foreign trade policy, preferential 
tariff measures should be adopted in favour of 
products originating from developing countries. 
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CHARTER OF ALGIERS' 
Adopted by the Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 
on 24 October 1967 
PART ONE 
The representatives of developing countries, 
assembled in Algiers in October 1967 at the 
Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77, united 
by common aspirations and the identity of their 
economic interests, and determined to pursue 
their joint efforts towards economic and social 
development, peace and prosperity. 
Having reviewed the work of the international 
community for economic progress since the 
adoption of the Joint Declaration of the 77 De-
veloping Countries at the conclusion of UNCTAD 
I in 1964, 
Have decided to chart a common course of 
action as conceived in the African Declaration 
of Algiers, the Bangkok Declaration of Asian 
countries and the Charter of Tequendama of 
Latin American countries. 
Deem it their duty to call the attention of the 
international community to the following facts: 
I 
The lot of more than a billion people of the 
developing world continues to deteriorate as a 
result of the trends in international economic re-
lations; 
The rate of economic growth of the develop-
ing world has slowed down and the disparity 
between it and the affluent world is widening; 
While the developed countries are adding an-
nually approximately 60 dollars to the per capita 
income of their people, the average increase of 
per capita income in the developing world 
amounts to less than 2 dollars per annum; 
The share of the developing countries in total 
world exports declined from 27 per cent in 1953 
to only 19.3 per cent in 1966. In the first half 
of the 1960's total world exports grew at an 
average annual rate of 7.8 per cent and exports 
1 This document, original English, was circulated at 
the second session of UNCTAD at the request of the 
delegation of Algeria. 
of developing countries, excluding oil exports, 
grew at an average rate of 4 per cent only. While 
the value of exports of manufactures from in-
dustrial countries increased between 1953-54 and 
1965-66 by 65 billion dollars and from socialist 
countries by 10 billion dollars, the increase 
from developing countries amounted to only 3 
billion dollars; 
The purchasing power of exports from de-
veloping countries has been steadily declining. 
In the mid-1960's the developing countries have 
been able to buy, for a given volume of their 
traditional exports, one-tenth less imports than 
at the beginning of this period. The loss in 
purchasing power amounted annually to approx-
imately 2.5 billion dollars, which represents 
nearly half of the flow of external public finan-
cial resources to developing countries; 
This has aggravated the problem of the in-
creasing indebtedness of developing countries. 
The external public debt alone has increased 
from 10 billion dollars in 1955 to 40 billion in 
1966. While the debt service payments averaged 
half a billion dollars annually in the mid-1950's 
these have already increased to 4 billion dollars 
and may offset the entire transfer of resources 
before the end of this decade if present trends 
continue; they already equal the entire amount 
of grants and grant-like contributions; 
Although modern technology offers develop-
ing countries great possibilities to accelerate 
their economic development, its benefits are 
largely by-passing them due to its capital and 
skill intensive nature, and is drawing away 
from them such limited skills as are developed; 
The virtual stagnation in the production of 
foodstuffs in developing countries, in contrast 
with the rapid increase in population, has ag-
gravated the chronic conditions of under-
nourishment and malnutrition and, combined 
with the distortion of production and trading 
patterns by artificial means, threatens to give 
rise to a grave crisis. 
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II 
The concern over these economic and social 
trends and the joint efforts of the developing 
countries to correct them have progressively led 
the international community to embark on a 
series of initiatives culminating in the Final Act 
adopted in 1964 by UNCTAD I; however, the 
promise held out by the Final Act has not been 
realized. In fact, in spite of the provisions of 
the Final Act of UNCTAD I: 
No new commodity agreement on primary 
products of interest to developing countries has 
been concluded; 
The standstill has not been observed by the 
developed countries and they have increased the 
degree of protection in many of those agricul-
tural products in which developing countries 
are more efficient producers; 
While the average prices for primary pro-
ducts exported from developing countries have 
decreased by 7 per cent since 1958, those for 
primary products exported from developed coun-
tries increased by 10 per cent in the same 
period; 
Heavy fiscal charges continue to be levied on 
products of export interest to developing coun-
tries ; 
The proliferation and promotion of synthetic 
substitutes in developed countries has resulted 
in shrinking markets and falling prices for com-
peting natural products produced by developing 
countries; 
Insufficient progress has been made by de-
veloped countries in dismantling import tariffs 
on tropical products without prejudice to the 
interests of certain developing countries; 
Little or no progress has been achieved in 
the relaxation of quota restrictions that are 
applied particularly to industrial products im-
ported from developing countries; nor did the 
situation improve for some temperate zone pro-
ducts whose access to the developed countries is 
governed by restrictive measures and policies 
applied by the developed countries; 
The implicit discrimination in tariff policies 
towards developing countries has been further 
intensified as a result of the process of economic 
integration among some developed countries and 
also as a consequence of the Kennedy Round 
of negotiations; 
No progress has been made by developed 
socialist countries on the recommended transfer-
ability of credit balances held with them by 
developing countries; 
The wide disparity between domestic selling 
prices of goods imported by socialist countries 
from developing countries and the import prices 
of such goods creates unfavourable conditions 
for increases in consumption and import of 
such goods from developing countries; 
In spite of the unanimously agreed target of 
1 per cent of national income of financial re-
sources to be provided to developing countries, 
actual disbursements have levelled off in ab-
solute terms and declined as a proportion of 
gross national product of developed countries. 
While in 1961 the flow of development financing 
to the developing countries amounted to 0.87 per 
cent of gross national product of developed 
countries, it came down to 0.62 per cent in 
1966; 
With a few notable exceptions, the terms 
and conditions of development finance are be-
coming more and more onerous; the proportion 
of grants is declining; interest rates are in-
creasing; repayment periods are shortening and 
development loans are becoming increasingly 
tied; 
Discriminatory practices and arrangements in 
the field of shipping and increasing freight rates 
have aggravated further the balance-of-payments 
position and hindered the effort to promote the 
exports of developing countries. 
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The international community has an obliga-
tion to rectify these unfavourable trends and to 
create conditions under which all nations can 
enjoy economic and social well-being, and have 
the means to develop their respective resources 
to enable their peoples to lead a life free from 
want and fear. 
In a world of increasing interdependence 
peace, progress and freedom are common and 
indivisible. Consequently the development of 
developing countries will benefit the developed 
countries as well. 
Developing countries reiterate that the prim-
ary responsibility for their development rests 
on them. 
Developing countries are determined to con-
tribute to one another's development. 
However, a fuller mobilization and more ef-
fective utilization of domestic resources of de-
veloping countries is possible only with con-
comitant and effective international action. 
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Traditional approaches, isolated measures and 
limited concessions are not enough. The gravity 
of the problem calls for the urgent adoption of 
a global strategy for development requiring 
convergent measures on the part of both de-
veloped and developing countries. 
The establishment of UNCTAD and the dia-
logue which has taken place within it constitute 
a step towards a new and dynamic trade and 
development policy. What is needed now is to 
move from the stage of deliberation to the plane 
of practical action. 
Developing countries expect that UNCTAD II 
will concentrate on a common endeavour for 
accelerated economic and social development. 
The agreement which has recently emerged on 
the basic issues to be negotiated reflects the gen-
eral feeling in this respect. 
To this end the representatives of developing 
countries at the Ministerial Meeting of the Group 
of 77 have considered carefully the present state 
of affairs and suggest the following programme 
of action as the most urgent and immediate step 
to be taken by UNCTAD II. 
PART TWO —PROGRAMME OF ACTION 
A . COMMODITY PROBLEMS AND POLICIES 
1. COMMODITY POUCY 
(a) Commodity arrangements 
(i) Commodity problems should, where ap-
propriate, be dealt with by international com-
modity arrangements negotiated on a commodity-
by-commodity basis; 
(ii) Producing developing countries should 
consult and co-operate among themselves in or-
der to defend and improve their terms of trade 
by effective co-ordination of their sales policies; 
(iii) A Cocoa Agreement should be concluded 
before the end of 1967 and an Agreement on 
Sugar early in 1968; 
(iv) Commodity arrangements for oil seeds 
and vegetable oils, bananas, rubber, tea, sisal 
and hard fibres should be concluded at the ear-
liest possible date; 
(v) Appropriate action should be taken on 
an urgent basis in respect of iron ore, nickel, 
tobacco, cotton, wine, citrus fruit, manganese 
ore, pepper, mica, shellac and tungsten. 
(b) Buffer stocks 
Buffer stock techniques as a short-term mea-
sure for market stabilization should, where ap-
propriate, be one of the methods adopted for 
international commodity arrangements, and in-
ternational financing institutions and developed 
countries should participate in their pre-financ-
ing, while, with regard to their regular income, 
producing and consuming countries should 
devise a formula ensuring an equitable distribu-
tion of costs. 
(c) Diversification programmes 
Developed countries and the appropriate in-
ternational financial institutions should make 
available additional financial and technical assis-
tance to developing countries, including specific 
funds, in order to facilitate the carrying out of 
diversification programmes, highest priority 
being given to diversification in the programmes 
on inter-regional, regional and sub-regional levels 
in the process of trade expansion and economic 
integration among developing countries. These 
specific funds for diversification should be one 
of the features of commodity agreements. 
(d) Pricing policy 
The main objectives of pricing policy should 
be: (i) elimination of excessive price fluctua-
tions; (ii) the highest possible earnings from 
the exports of primary products; (iii) main-
tenance and increase of the purchasing power 
of the products exported by developing coun-
tries in relation to their imports; and (iv) that 
developed countries undertake to assist in achiev-
ing more stable and higher prices for unpro-
cessed and processed commodities from develop-
ing countries by applying adequate domestic 
taxation policies. 
2 . TRADE UBERALIZATION 
(a) Standstill 
No new tariff and non-tariff restrictions should 
be introduced by developed countries and those 
introduced since UNCTAD I should be elimin-
ated by 31 December 1968. 
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(b) Removal of barriers 
(i) All restrictions and charges applied by 
developed countries to primary commodities in-
cluding semi-processed primary products origi-
nating exclusively from developing countries 
should be removed; 
(ii) A programme of specific commitments 
should be elaborated with a view to eliminating 
tariff and non-tariff barriers, including duties 
and revenue charges, on all products; 
(iii) Pending the elimination of internal 
duties and revenue charges a system of partial 
refund should be introduced to lead progressively 
on an annual basis to full refund; 
(iv) The tariff reductions offered during the 
Kennedy Round of negotiations on primary 
products of export interest to developing coun-
tries should be implemented without phasing 
and without reciprocity in favour of all develop-
(c) Preferences 
The representatives of the developing coun-
tries at the Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 
77, (i) bearing in mind the desire expressed by 
all members of the Group of 77 to apply recom-
mendation A.II.l, Section II, paragraphs 3 and 
6 concerning the elimination of preferences, 
adopted unanimously at UNCTAD I, and noting 
that the abolition of preferences requires that 
the developed countries grant equivalent ad-
vantages to the countries which at present enjoy 
such preferences; (ii) noting that the developed 
countries have not so far taken effective mea-
sures for the implementation of this recom-
mendation; (iii) considering that, in the case 
of certain commodities, the special preferences 
in force could be reduced or even abolished 
through international agreements: 
Decided to request the Secretary-General of 
UNCTAD and the regional groups to undertake 
studies, commodity-by-commodity and country-
by-country on the effect of the abolition of the 
special preferences in force and the steps neces-
sary to ensure that countries which at present 
enjoy such preferences receive advantages at 
least equivalent to the losses resulting from 
abolition. 
(d) Minimum share of markets 
(i) Where products of developing countries 
compete with the domestic production of de-
veloped countries, the latter should allocate a 
defined percentage of their consumption of such 
products to developing countries; in any case, 
a substantial share of any increase in domestic 
demand for primary commodities in the de-
veloped countries should be reserved for the 
output of the developing countries. This alloca-
tion should be arrived at on a country-by-country 
and commodity-by-commodity basis, through 
multilateral negotiation; developed countries 
should agree to establish maximum ratios of do-
mestic production so as to guarantee to develop-
ing countries adequate conditions of access for 
their exports; 
(ii) The developed countries should adopt 
measures to discourage uneconomic production 
of commodities which compete with those origin-
ating from developing countries and should 
abolish subsidies on such competing products. 
(e) Surpluses and reserve stock disposal 
The existing machinery for consultation on 
surplus disposal should be widened and rein-
forced and suitable machinery should be es-
tablished, where such arrangements do not exist, 
in order to ensure that disposal of production 
surpluses or strategic reserves does not result 
in the depression of international prices, and 
does not adversely affect the exports of develop-
ing countries or the intraregional trade and 
agricultural development of developing countries 
and the position of developing countries receiv-
ing those surpluses as assistance. 
( f ) Use of escape clauses 
Objective criteria should be adopted under 
a multilateral institutional arrangement for iden-
tifying situations on which restrictions are ap-
plied by virtue of safeguard clauses and the 
unilateral application of restrictions should be 
avoided. 
3. SYNTHETICS AND SUBSTITUTES 
(i) Special measures- in the field of finance, 
technical assistance and marketing, including 
financing of research, abolition of subsidies and 
granting of preferences should be taken to im-
prove the competitive position of natural pro-
ducts of developing countries that are affected 
by the competition of synthetics and substitutes 
originating from developed countries; 
(ii) The provision of Special Principle Nine 
of the Final Act of UNCTAD I on dumping 
should be implemented with special reference 
to the marketing of synthetic products. 
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B. EXPANSION OF EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES AND SEMI-MANUFACTURES 
1. PRINCIPLES FOR A GENERAL SYSTEM OF 
PREFERENCES 
The following principles should be adopted 
in order to implement a general system of pre-
ferences. They should be accepted simultaneously 
as complementary and indivisible measures. 
(c) At UNCTAD II there should be negotia-
tions which should lead to the conclusion of 
an agreement on a general system of tariff 
preferences on a non-discriminatory and non-
reciprocal basis. The agreement should provide 
for unrestricted and duty-free access to the 
markets of all the developed countries for all 
manufactures and semi-manufactures from all 
developing countries; 
(b) Without prejudice to the general provi-
sions contained in paragraph (a) above, the 
escape clause actions as envisaged below may 
be taken; in particular special treatment may be 
granted by developed countries to the less de-
veloped among the developing countries; 
(c) The manufactures and semi-manufactures 
covered by the preferential system should in-
clude all processed and semi-processed primary 
products of all developing countries; 
(d) All developed countries should grant 
such preferences to all developing countries; 
(e) The form of the escape clause action, the 
objective criteria which should govern the ap-
plication of escape clause action by developed 
countries and the procedures that should be 
followed in such cases must be agreed upon 
internationally. Such action must however be 
temporary in nature and be subject to interna-
tional consultation, approval and review; 
( / ) The preferential system must be conceived 
in such a way as to make it possible for the least 
advanced among the deve oping countries to 
share in its benefits. Accordingly any time 
limits of the system should be flexible so that 
countries at present in very incipient stages of 
developing will also be able to reap its advan-
tages. Escape clause actions limiting or excluding 
particular exports should not apply to the less 
competitive products from less advanced coun-
tries. Specific commitments should be taken for 
technical and financial assistance in the establish-
ment of export oriented industries in least ad-
vanced countries, with a view to markets both 
in the developed world and in other developing 
countries; 
(g) The new system of general preferences 
should ensure at least equivalent advantages to 
developing countries enjoying preferences in 
certain developed countries to enable them to 
suspend their existing preferences on manufac-
tures and semi-manufactures. From the begin-
ing, provisions should be incorporated in the 
system of general preferences, for the developed 
countries to redress any adverse situation which 
may arise for these developing countries as a 
consequence of the institution of the general 
system of preferences; 
(A) In order to achieve the objective of the 
general preferential system the arrangement 
should last long enough to enable all developing 
countries to benefit from it. Initially the arrange-
ment should last for twenty years and should 
be reviewed towards the end of this initial 
period. In any event the preferential treatment 
should not thereafter be abruptly terminated; 
(i) In order that the general system of prefer-
ences makes adequate contribution to the bal-
ance of payments of the developing countries, 
the developed countries should not reduce their 
aid to them or nullify or impair the benefits of 
preferences through other measures; 
(/•) Suitable machinery within UNCTAD 
should be established to supervise and ensure 
the effective implementation of a general system 
of preferences in accordance with the foregoing 
paragraphs. 
2. LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE IN MANUFACTURES 
AND SEMI-MANUFACTURES 
(а) The developed countries should imple-
ment immediately, without phasing, in favour 
of all developing countries, concessions agreed 
on during the Kennedy Round of trade nego-
tiations, on products of export interest to the 
latter countries; 
(б) The developed countries should state at 
UNCTAD II that all concessions agreed on dur-
ing the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations on 
products of export interest to developing coun-
tries would be extended at the time of implemen-
tation to all developing countries whether or not 
members of the GATT, without reciprocity; 
(c) At UNCTAD II both developed and de-
veloping countries should on the basis of the 
evaluation of the Kennedy Round being pre-
pared by the UNCTAD and GATT secretariats 
and those prepared by governments themselves 
identify all outstanding issues for further nego-
tiations. The principles of the most-favoured-
nation treatment and reciprocity should in no 
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way be introduced in these negotiations. In 
these negotiations all developing countries should 
be allowed to participate if they so desire; 
( ¿ ) The developed countries should imple-
ment the agreements reached at UNCTAD I on 
liberalization for manufactures and semi-manu-
factures of export interest to the developing 
countries, particularly as regards the principle 
of the standstill; 
(e) The developed countries should establish 
at UNCTAD II a concrete programme for the 
removal of quantitative restrictions at an early 
date, particularly those which are applied by 
them inconsistently with their international obli-
gations, and also give an undertaking not to 
renew existing restrictions or impose new quan-
titative restrictions, nor adopt any other meas-
ures having equivalent effects on products of 
export interest to developing countries; 
( / ) Developed countries should supply all 
relevant information to the UNCTAD secretariat 
in respect of non-tariff barriers other than quan-
titative restrictions applied in the markets of 
the developed countries for examination at 
UNCTAD 11; 
(g) Objective criteria should be established 
for the application of restrictions to trade in 
products from developing countries under escape 
clauses relating to "market disruption" and 
other "special circumstances" applied by de-
veloped coimtries, so that such situations may 
be defined, provisions may be laid down speci-
fying what measures restrictive of trade can 
legitimately be applied when such a situation 
is found to exist, and compensation may be fixed 
which corresponds to the loss or damage suffered 
by the developing countries. Multilateral con-
sultative and supervisory machinery should be 
set up for that purpose. The developed countries 
should undertake measures for anticipatory 
structural readjustments and other measures for 
bringing about such changes in their production 
patterns as to eliminate the possibility of resort-
ing to restrictive trade policies or escape clause 
actions on ground of market disruption in rela-
tion to products of export interest to developing 
countries in order to establish a new interna-
tional division of labour that would be more 
equitable. The developed countries should not 
promote the development in their territories of 
industries of particular interest to the developing 
countries. In those cases where developed coun-
tries have invoked escape clauses on grounds 
of market disruption, they should make the 
appropriate domestic structural adjustments; 
{h) The developed countries should take ap-
propriate action to carry out readjustments in 
the tariff nomenclatures of their countries so 
as to facilitate the granting of duty-free entry 
on products exported by and large by devel-
oping countries; 
(i) The machinery which would be estab-
lished to supervise the effective implementation 
of a general system of preferences should also 
supervise the programme for the elimination of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers, and the application 
of escape clauses, in particular any such barriers 
which prejudice or nullify the scheme of general 
preferences. 
3 . TRADE WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 
The socialist countries should grant conces-
sions to the developing countries whose advan-
tages are at least equivalent to the effects of 
preferences which would be granted by the de-
veloped countries with market economies. 
The socialist countries should: 
(a) Adopt and implement measures designed 
to increase the rate of growth of the imports 
of manufactures and semi-manufactures from 
developing countries, and to diversify such im-
ports in consonance with the latter's trade and 
development requirements; 
{b) Undertake to contribute to the main-
tenance of remunerative and stable prices for 
the exports of developing countries by the in-
clusion of suitable provisions in their trade 
agreements with these countries; 
(c) In drawing up their national and regional 
development plans take due account of the pro-
duction and export potential in developing 
countries; 
{d) Abolish customs duties and other trade 
restrictions on goods imported from and origi-
nating in developing countries; 
(e) Eliminate the margin between the import 
price and the domestic selling price of the goods 
imported from developing countries; 
( / ) Refrain from re-exporting the goods pur-
chased from developing countries, unless it is 
with the consent of the developing countries 
concerned; 
ig) Encourage conclusion of industrial branch 
agreements for the supply of plant and equip-
ment on credit to the developing countries, ac-
cepting repayment of such credits in particular 
with the goods manufactured by such plant in 
the developing countries concerned; 
(h) Multilateralize, to the extent possible, 
among the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, 
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payments arrangements with developing coun-
tries to facilitate increase of imports from the 
latter; 
(i) Grant preferential access conditions for 
products originating from developing countries. 
These conditions should include the establish-
ment, in their international purchasing policies, 
of margins of tolerance in favour of the devel-
oping countries with regard to prices and de-
livery terms; 
( / ) Within the framework of UNCTAD to set 
up permanent consultative machinery through 
which socialist countries and developing coun-
tries may promote mutual trade and economic 
co-operation, and solve the problems and ob-
stacles which may arise. 
4 . TRADE PROMOTION 
(а) Diversification of production of manu-
factures and semi-manufactures of developing 
countries should be carried out within the frame-
work of a new and more equitable international 
division of labour between developing and de-
veloped countries; 
(б) Developed countries should abstain from 
harming the interests of developing countries 
by fostering production of commodities pro-
duced principally by developing countries, and, 
in that regard, they should encourage the 
establishment in the developing countries of 
export industries processing primary com-
modities produced by the latter; 
(c) Developed countries and international 
agencies should channel more, and more effec-
tive, technical and financial assistance in order 
to improve the productivity of the developing 
countries' industries and their competitiveness 
in international markets; 
(d) International co-operation should also be 
secured with a view to the dissemination of 
trade information, particularly with regard to 
the opportunities offered by the developed coun-
tries' markets. To that end, the developing coun-
tries should support the establishment of the 
joint UNCTAD-GATT trade promotion centre 
and obtain the financial and technical support 
of the developed countries for its operation. 
Also a close and continuing co-operation be-
tween UNIDO and UNCTAD should be pro-
moted, on the general understanding that, as 
stated in General Assembly resolution 2152 
(XXI ) , "the former shall be competent to deal 
with the general and technical problems of in-
dustrialization, including the establishment and 
expansion of industries in developing countries, 
and the latter with the foreign trade aspects 
of industrialization, including the expansion and 
diversification of exports of manufactures and 
semi-manufactures by developing countries". 
Furthermore, developing countries should take 
into consideration the possibility of the estab-
lishment of a single export promotion centre 
within the United Nations family under the aus-
pices of UNCTAD. 
C . DEVELOPMENT FINANCING 
1. FLOW OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE CAPITAL 
(« ) Each developed country should comply 
with the target of a minimum 1 per cent of its 
gross national product for net financial flows, 
in terms of actual disbursements, by the end 
of the Development Decade. A separate mini-
mum target, within this goal, and progressively 
increasing, should be established for the o£B,cial 
component of aid flows, net of amortization and 
interest payments; 
(6) Any gaps remaining in the 1 per cent 
transfer each year should be made good by addi-
tional government transfers; 
(c) Resources of the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA) should be immediately 
replenished and augmented; 
(d) Developed countries and financial insti-
tutions should extend and intensify their support 
to regional development banks; 
(e) The International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD) should be made 
a Development Bank for developing countries 
exclusively. Total repayment of current loans 
by developed countries in advance of maturity 
should be secured. Such released funds should 
be used to augment resources of IBRD and IDA 
to finance development of developing countries; 
( / ) There should be no discrimination by 
international lending institutions against the 
public sector, in particular in industry; 
(g) Special consideration should be given to 
developing countries which have not so far 
received adequate international aid; 
(A) Private investments should be of per-
manent benefit to the host developing country. 
Subject to nationally-defined priorities and 
within the framework of national development 
Dlans, private investments may he encouraged 
jy incentives and guarantees; 
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(i) No developed countries should decrease 
the existing level of their aid to developing 
countries, especially those forms of aid granted 
through negotiations. 
2 . TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF DEVELOPMENT 
FINANCE 
(0) By 1968, the norms of lending laid down 
by General Assembly resolution 2170 (XXI) 
and the Development Assistance Committee of 
OECD should be reached; 
(6) Beyond a date to be internationally 
agreed, all development lending should be on 
terms currently applied by IDA. In regard to 
earlier loans or loans on other than IDA terms, 
the interest should be subsidized by govern-
ments of developed countries; 
(c) Pending the general adoption of IDA 
terms, there should be a considerable lowering 
of interest rates and a considerable increase in 
maturities and grace periods; 
{d) A multilateral interest equalization fund 
should be created to cover the interest margin 
between loans obtained on international capital 
markets and concessional development loans; 
(e) Development finance should be rapidly 
and progressively untied, with a view to reach-
ing the goal of total untying by a specific date; 
excess costs incurred through tying should be 
subsidized by creditor countries; procurement 
in developing countries should be freely per-
missible, especially within the same region; 
( / ) External finance should be made avail-
able both for programmes and for projects and 
should include local costs where necessary; 
(g) Development finance commitments should 
be on a continuing basis to cover plan pro-
grammes over a period of years; 
(h) Appropriate steps should be taken to 
improve the administration of development 
finance; 
(1) An intergovernmental group with equit-
able representation of developed and developing 
countries should be established to deal with 
all aspects of commercial credits, including 
suppliers' credits. 
3. PROBLEMS OF EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS 
Suitable measures should be adopted for 
alleviating the debt-servicing burdens of de-
veloping countries by consolidation of their 
external debts into long-term obligations on 
low rates of interest. In case of imminent dif-
ficulties, speedy arrangements should be made 
for refinancing and re-scheduling of loans on 
"soft" terms and conditions. 
4 . MOBILIZATION OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES 
Developing countries recognize that they 
should, to the fullest extent possible consistent 
with smooth economic growth and social sta-
bility, continue to mobilize their domestic re-
sources for financing their development process. 
They recall, however, that the utilization of 
these resources cannot be fully effective without 
the necessary external assistance. 
5. SUPPLEMENTARY FINANCING 
UNCTAD II should negotiate an agreement 
for early implementation of a scheme of sup-
plementary financing on the basis of a con-
sensus to be reached after considering the report 
of the Intergovernmental Group on Supplemen-
tary Financing on the World Bank study. 
In no case should the scheme involve internal 
policy commitments which prejudice the sover-
eignty of any member country as defined by that 
country, the means for achieving this objective 
to be further discussed at the forthcoming 
meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on 
Supplementary Financing and negotiated at 
UNCTAD II. These discussions and negotiations 
should take account, inter alia, of the positions 
expressed in the regional declarations of the 
developing countries. 
6 . COMPENSATORY FINANCING FACILITY 
The developing countries ask that: 
(a) Drawings on the International Monetary 
Fund under the Compensatory Financing Fa-
cility should be immediately available up to 
50 per cent of the countries' quotas in the 
Fund, and that such drawings are not subject 
to any conditions; 
{b) The formula for calculating shortfalls 
be modified, taking as the basis the exports of 
each of the countries concerned either during 
three normal years or more, preceding the 
payment of compensation; 
(c) Due consideration should be given to 
refinancing debts incurred by developing coun-
tries during periods of persistent shortfalls in 
their export earnings, including a revision of 
current repurchase time limits. 
7. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ISSUES 
(a) Developing countries should participate 
from the outset in all discussions on interna-
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tional monetary reform and in the operation 
of the new arrangements for Special Drawing 
Rights in the International Monetary Fund; 
(b) A link between development finance and 
additional liquidity should be forged as urged 
by the developing countries; 
(c) The developing countries are intimately 
concerned with the policies of international 
financial organizations relating to use of their 
resources, voting power and the improvement 
of machinery for balance-of-payments adjust-
ments. 
D . INVISIBLES, INCLUDING SHIPPING 
Developing countries reaffirm the competence 
of UNCTAD in shipping matters. 
1. INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING LEGISLATION 
(a) Developing countries ask that UNCTAD 
II should include "international shipping legis-
lation" in the work programme of the Commit-
tee on Shipping which should use such technical 
and export advice as may be necessary; 
(b) In accordance with the obligations under-
taken by the international community, all de-
veloped countries should give full co-operation 
to the UNCTAD secretariat by providing com-
plete information for studies being carried out 
by it in the field of shipping including freight 
rates, conference practices, adequacy of ship-
ping services, etc.; 
(c) These studies should take into account 
the implications of technical advances in ship-
ping in respect of the organization and struc-
ture of conferences, cost levels, rate structure 
and techniques of port organization and opera-
tions as well as the implications of technical 
advances for the expansion of merchant marines 
of developing countries. 
2. FREIGHT RATES AND CONFERENCE PRACTICES 
(а) Immediate steps are needed at UNCTAD 
II to provide a basis for future action on 
freight rates which are not only continuing to 
rise but are still discriminatory and restrictive 
vis-a-vis the developing countries; 
(б) Developed countries should press freight 
conferences and shipowners to abolish the wide-
spread practice of fixing special high freight 
rates for the transport of non-traditional pro-
ducts of the developing countries and to lower 
freight rates applied to traditional exports of 
the developing countries; 
(c) Developing countries ask UNCTAD II 
to adopt the following principles: 
(i) The right of developing countries to 
take part in any freight conference aifecting 
their maritime traffic on an equal footing 
with the shipowners of developed countries; 
(ii) Freight conferences to have represen-
tation in developing countries; 
(iii) Publication of information, including 
advance publication of any proposed changes 
on freight rates and other cargo arrange-
ments by freight conferences affecting the 
foreign trade of developing countries; 
(d) Developing countries should intensify 
their co-operation amongst themselves, inter alia 
on a regional basis, to secure maximum benefits 
and better bargaining positions in the field of 
shipping, in particular regarding freight rates. 
3. EXPANSION OF MERCHANT MARINES 
(a) Developing countries affirm their un-
questionable right to establish and to expand 
their merchant marines in the context of rising 
freight rates and the prospects of their foreign 
trade; 
(b) Developed countries and international 
agencies should extend financial and technical 
assistance to developing countries for the estab-
lishment and expansion of national and regional 
merchant marines and related facilities. Such 
assistance should include the training of per-
sonnel in the economic, managerial, technical 
and other aspects of shipping. Financing arrange-
ments should be in favour of national enter-
prises; 
(c) All countries should recognize the right 
of developing countries to assist their merchant 
marines, including the right to reserve a fair 
share of the cargo transported to and from 
those countries; 
(d) The regulations enacted by developing 
countries with a view to achieving the objectives 
aforementioned should not be considered justifi-
cation for the adoption of retaliatory or other 
measures by the developed countries and their 
shipping conferences which may have the effect 
of rendering ineffective the measures taken by 
the developing countries; 
(e) Developing countries should be enabled 
to make the maximum use of their shipbuilding 
industries and expand them. 
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4. CONSULTATION MACHINERY 
(a) Specific action should be taken by 
UNCTAD in collaboration with UNDP and the 
regional economic commissions to give efifect 
to the resolution of the Committee on Shipping 
on the establishment of national and regional 
consultation machinery in various parts of the 
world in accordance with the provision adopted; 
(b) Financial and technical assistance should 
be given to developing countries for the estab-
lishment of such machinery where necessary. 
5. PORT IMPROVEMENTS 
(o) Practical measures should be devised at 
UNCTAD II for financing and giving technical 
assistance to developing countries for port 
development and allied works and programmes 
relating to port operation, taking into account 
technical advances in shipping; 
(6) Measures should be devised at UNCTAD 
II for ensuring that savings achieved by the 
improvement of port facilities in shipping 
operations are utilized to the advantage of 
developing countries through reduction of 
freight rates in respect of the port achieving 
such improvement. 
6 . INSURANCE AND RE-INSUEANCE 
(a) Developed countries should reduce the 
cost of re-insurance to developing countries; 
(b) A substantial part of the technical 
reserves of the insurance and re-insurance com-
panies should be retained in the countries where 
premium incomes arise for re-investment in 
those countries; 
(c) Developing countries should be tech-
nically and financially assisted in building up 
their own insurance and re-insurance facilities. 
7. TOURISM 
(a) Developed countries and financing insti-
tutions should extend credits on easy terms to 
developing countries for promoting tourism; 
(b) Developed countries and international 
credit institutions should make investments in 
infrastructure in tourism in developing coun-
tries; 
(c) Passenger fares to developing countries 
should be concessional and attractive and other 
facilities should be provided in order to en-
courage tourist tra£5c. 
E. GENERAL TRADE POLICY ISSUES 
1. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
RELATIONS AND TRADE POLICIES CONDUCIVE 
TO DEVELOPMENT 
(a) UNCTAD II should review the imple-
mentation of the principles governing interna-
tional trade relations and trade policies con-
ducive to development; 
(b) In compliance with recommendations 
A.I.I and A.I.3 of the Final Act of UNCTAD 
I which leave open the completion of these 
principles, UNCTAD II may elaborate new 
principles. However, principles already adopted 
would not be subject to re-examination. 
2 . TRADE RELATIONS AMONG COUNTRIES HAVING 
DIFFERENT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
(a) The expansion of trade between developed 
socialist countries of Eastern Europe and de-
veloped market economy countries should not 
unfavourably affect the trading possibilities of 
developing countries but on the contrary should 
lead to a rising trade between them and the 
latter. In pursuance of this objective the socialist 
countries should provide in their economic 
development plans and trade policies measures 
for accelerated increase of their imports of 
primary commodities and manufactures and 
semi-manufactures originating from developing 
countries; 
(b) Socialist countries should also reaffirm 
the assurances given by them in UNCTAD I 
that they will refrain from re-exporting the 
goods purchased from the developing countries 
unless it is with the consent of the developing 
countries concerned; 
(c) Socialist countries should adopt the 
necessary measures to reduce the gap between 
import and sales prices of products originating 
from developing countries in order to promote 
the consumption of these commodities; the 
establishment in the import policies and trade 
programmes of the socialist countries of margins 
of tolerance with regard to prices, delivery 
dates and other conditions relating to exports 
from developing countries would greatly con-
tribute to the increase of trade between these 
countries and the socialist countries; 
( ¿ ) Credit extended by socialist countries 
for financing public and private projects in 
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developing countries should be adapted to the 
particular conditions of the countries con-
cerned; and where possible provisions should 
be made for repayment by the export of the 
products of those or other projects; 
(e) In case of contracts, concluded between 
the enterprises in the developing countries 
and the relevant agencies in the socialist coun-
tries, due attention should be given to the 
periods covered by those contracts in order 
to enable the enterprises to plan and execute 
with greater efficiency their investment, pro-
duction and delivery programmes. 
3. IMPACT OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC GROUPINGS 
(а) Regional economic groupings of de-
veloped countries should avoid discriminating 
against the exports of developing countries of 
manufactures, semi-manufactures and of pri-
mary products, particularly temperate and 
tropical agricultural commodities; 
(б) The expansion of these groupings should 
not increase the incidence of any discrimination; 
(c) Regional economic groupings of de-
veloped countries should take measures with a 
view to ensuring freer access of the exports of 
developing countries. 
4. INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR 
A new and dynamic international division of 
labour should be applied whereby developed 
countries avoid taking protective measures af-
fecting agricultural exports of developing coun-
tries in fields in which they are more efficient 
and duplicating investments already made or 
about to be made by developing countries in 
industry. Conditions should be created for in-
dustrialization in developing countries to make 
the fullest use of their available resources. The 
diversification of production of developing 
countries should also be carried out within a 
framework of a division of labour that would 
enable the greatest flow of trade on the one 
hand among developing countries and on the 
other hand between these countries and others. 
5. THE WORLD FOOD PROBLEM 
It was agreed that, in the light of the fact 
that the item had only recently been introduced. 
consultations would be pursued within the 
Group of 77 with a view to adopting a common 
position on the world food problem for 
U N C T A D I I . 
6 . SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE LAND-LOCKED 
COUNTRIES 
A group of experts should be established in 
order to carry out a comprehensive examination 
of the special problems involved in the pro-
motion of trade and economic development 
of the land-locked developing countries, with 
special reference to the high costs involved in 
the execution of their development programmes 
and trade expansion programmes. In the light 
of this examination adequate financial and 
technical assistance should be extended by in-
ternational financial institutions to minimize 
the cost of the factors involved. The interna-
tional financing agencies should also give 
priority to such technical and financial as-
sistance programmes as the land-locked de-
veloping countries may propose in connexion 
with the special problems of their trade and 
development and, in particular, with the de-
velopment and improvement of their transport 
infrastructure. 
7. TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING 
KNOW-HOW AND PATENTS 
(а) The developed countries should encourage 
the transfer of knowledge and technology to 
developing countries by permitting the use of 
industrial patents on the best possible terms 
which will enable products manufactured in 
developing countries to compete effectively in 
world markets; 
(б) They should also promote the elimina-
tion of restrictive practices, relating to market 
distribution and price-fixing, which are imposed 
by enterprises in developed countries in grant-
ing licenses for the use of patents and trade-
marks in developing countries; 
(c) The developed countries should provide 
guidance to their industrial entrepreneurs re-
garding investment opportunities in the export 
industries of the developing countries and 
familiarize them with legal, political, economic 
and other relevant information on the situation 
in the developing countries. 
125 
F. TRADE EXPANSION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(a) The developing countries reaf&rm that 
trade expansion and economic co-operation 
among themselves is an important element of 
a global strategy for development, and they 
are therefore determined to make their own 
contribution toward the fulfilment of the objec-
tives of UNCTAD II by stepping up their 
efforts in this respect. Such action can in no 
way be regarded as a substitute for larger and 
more remunerative exports to developed coun-
tries or for a greater contribution by the 
latter countries. However, trade expansion and 
economic integration among developing coun-
tries raises special problems and difficulties as 
compared with similar processes among de-
veloped countries. Action with regard to trade 
barriers will therefore not be enough, but must 
be combined with suitable measures in other 
fields, in particular investment matters and 
payments. In this connexion, the availability of 
appropriate external financing and technical 
assistance would be an important contribution 
for enabling developing countries to achieve 
more rapid progress in trade expansion and 
integration efforts. This international support 
should however be granted in a manner that 
would fully respect the determination of de-
veloping countries to follow their own methods 
of approach when expanding trade and ad-
vancing towards integration among themselves; 
(b) The developing countries will inform 
UNCTAD II of the efforts they are making or 
planning to make, in order to increase their 
trade and strengthen their economic co-opera-
tion, particularly in the field of inter-regional, 
regional and sub-regional co-operation; 
(c) Since the joint efforts of the developing 
countries cannot be fully successful without 
financial and technical aid from the developed 
countries, the latter should at the same time 
make a formal declaration of support for the 
developing countries' efforts at co-operation and 
integration, specifying the nature and the 
volume of financial assistance they are prepared 
to render to those efforts; 
At UNCTAD II a special working group 
should be set up to study the practical problem 
related to: 
(i) Trade expansion, economic co-opera-
tion and integration among the developing 
countries, including consideration of the 
special problems of the least developed coun-
tries; 
(ii) The establishment or improvement of 
multilateral payments systems between de-
veloping countries; 
(iii) The practical measures for the im-
plementation of an international policy which 
would support these joint efforts with par-
ticular reference to financial and technical 
assistance. 
Regional or sub-regional groups of develop-
ing countries should be invited to participate 
in the working group. 
(e) UNCTAD II should establish a per-
manent Committee whose task would be to study 
all questions relating to trade expansion and 
economic integration among developing coun-
tries, with particular reference to ways and 
means of enabling the developing countries 
participating in such groupings to derive equi-
table benefits therefrom. This Committee should, 
in particular, undertake the following activities: 
(i) The study, centralization and dissemi-
nation of information and data on the ex-
perience acquired by developing countries 
in dealing with specific problems of sub-
regional, regional or inter-regional co-opera-
tion and integration, and the organization of 
symposia on such problems for national and 
regional officials; 
(ii) Studies relating to the possibility of 
establishing export and import groupings by 
commodity, or by groups of commodities, 
among developing countries; 
(iii) Studies for the improvement of the 
infrastructure of transport and communica-
tions among developing countries; 
(iv) Studies of the possibility of establishing 
national and regional information and trade 
promotion centres in developing countries; 
( / ) Consideration should be given to the 
establishment under the auspices of UNCTAD, 
and of other specialized agencies, of a special 
centre to train experts, particularly from de-
veloping countries, in the field of economic 
co-operation and integration among developing 
countries; 
(g) The international information and trade 
promotion centre which is being established 
under the sponsorship of UNCTAD and GATT 
should give due importance to the question of 
promoting exports among developing countries. 
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G. SPECIAL MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN FAVOUR OF THE LEAST DEVELOPED AMONG 
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Owing to the varying stages of economic 
development existing among the developing coun-
tries and to the varying factors responsible for 
their development, the trade and financial policy 
measures required to accelerate the pace of 
economic development would differ from one 
developing country to another. It is therefore 
essential to devise a global strategy of con-
vergent measures in order to enable the least 
developed among the developing countries to 
derive equitable benefits so that all the de-
veloping countries would gain comparable 
results from international economic co-opera-
tion of member countries of UNCTAD, par-
ticularly that with the developed countries. 
The individual measures recommended by 
UNCTAD I and those that would be recom-
mended by UNCTAD II should be viewed as 
components of an integrated policy of co-
operation for achieving the over-all objectives 
of trade and expansion and accelerated de-
velopment. All these measures are inter-related. 
While the appropriate mix of the convergent 
measures required for the least developed 
countries cannot be determined at this stage, 
these measures may be devised from the spheres 
of : 
(a) Commodity policy, including measures 
of financial and technical assistance for diver-
sification programmes; 
(b) Preferences in trade of manufactures and 
semi-manuf actores; 
(c) Development finance; 
(á) Regional economic integration; 
(e) Invisibles; 
( / ) Trade promotion. 
With regard to commodity policy the fol-
lowing actions should be recommended to be 
taken by UNCTAD II: 
(1) Special consideration of the need of the 
least developed countries in relaxing tariff and 
non-tariff barriers affecting access to the markets 
both in tropical and temperate products; 
(2) Temporary refunds, at least in part, of 
revenue charges and duties on commodities 
of particular interest to least developed coun-
tries. 
With reference to manufactures and semi-
manufactures, the recommendation on the gen-
eral scheme of preferences contained in this 
document under section B (Expansion of exports 
of manufactures and semi-manufactures), should 
be taken into consideration and adopted. This 
should take place independently of the prin-
ciple in virtue of which substantial advantages 
may be granted to the least developed among 
the developing countries under systems of re-
gional or sub-regional integration; while the 
atter, where appropriate, attain perfection in 
the matter of customs duties. 
For the purpose of designing special measures 
for the least developed countries it does not 
seem to be desirable or convenient to attempt 
an abstract general definition of such countries 
nor, at this stage, an a priori strict listing of 
such countries applicable to specific measures 
considered. Hence this could be better under-
taken, in due course, in a form agreed upon 
by the developing countries. 
In order to give effect to the provisions of 
section G, the Ministerial Meeting decides to 
establish a working group. The function of 
the working group shall be to make a special 
study of the arrangements to be made on the 
matters referred to in the third paragraph of 
this section. 
Composition of the working group: it is 
agreed that each regional group shall be re-
presented on this group by five members. 
The working group shall meet at Geneva on 
or about 1 December 1967. It shall submit its 
report to the countries members of the Group 
of 77 not later than 15 January 1968. 
PART THREE 
A . FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF THE GROUP OF 7 7 
The representatives of developing countries 
of the Group of 77 are firmly decided to main-
tain and further strengthen the unity and 
solidarity of the group of developing countries. 
They agree to maintain continuous consultations 
and contacts in order to further that objec-
tive. 
The Group of 77 should meet at the ministerial 
level as often as this may be deemed neces-
sary, and in any case always prior to the 
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convening of sessions of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, in 
order to harmonize the positions of developing 
countries and to formulate joint programmes of 
action in all matters related to trade and 
development. It can also meet at any other 
level, as required by the needs of developing 
countries. 
In all matters relating to the preparation for 
Ministerial Meetings of developing countries, 
and, during the intervals between these Minis-
terial Meetings, and for the formulation of joint 
positions on issues within the purview of 
UNCTAD, the competent authority of the Group 
of 77 is the Group of 31 developing countries. 
This Group of 31 is composed of the developing 
countries, members of the Trade and Develop-
ment Board, and should normally meet con-
currently with the Trade and Development 
Board. For all matters related to their specific 
fields of activities the developing countries 
members of the Committee of the Board are 
fully competent. 
The Co-ordinating Committee of the Group of 
77 as established in Geneva in October 1966, 
should be continued until the New Delhi Con-
ference with the following terms of reference: 
(o) To assist in making appropriate arrange-
ments for visits of goodwill missions; 
(¿>) To transmit to Member Governments of 
the Group of 77 the reports of the goodwill 
missions received from the President of the 
Ministerial Meeting; 
(c) To undertake any other work that may 
be entrusted to it by the Group of 77 in Geneva. 
Informal co-ordinating groups of the 77 
should be established in all headquarters of the 
various United Nations specialized agencies. 
B . GOODWILL MISSIONS 
The representatives of developing countries 
participating in the Ministerial Meeting of the 
Group of 77 have decided to send high-level 
goodwill missions to countries belonging to 
other groupings of member countries of 
UNCTAD. These missions, entrusted with the 
task of informing and persuading, shall acquaint 
the respective governments of the countries to 
be visited of the conclusions of the Meeting 
so as to contribute to the creation of the best 
possible conditions for negotiations on the 
programme of action of UNCTAD II. 
There will be six high-level goodwill mis-
sions to visit capitals of developed and socialist 
countries, composed of a least one, and if pos-
sible, two special envoys accredited by Heads 
of States from each of the three regional groups 
within the Group of 77. Each mission will be 
headed by one of its members so as to ensure 
that each regional group provides two mission 
leaders. 
Necessary steps will be taken immediately to 
contact the respective Governments to fix suitable 
dates for the visits of the missions in such a 
way as to ensure the completion of all visits 
before the end of November of 1967. 
Each mission will submit its report to the 
President of the Ministerial Meeting who, in his 
turn, in co-operation with the Co-ordinating 
Committee, will forward these reports to all 
the developing countries members of the Group 
of 77 as soon as possible. 
The President of the Ministerial Meeting of 
the Group of 77 was requested to present the 
Charter of Algiers to the General Assembly 
of the United Nations and to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations. The President 
of the Ministerial Meeting, in his turn, invited 
the Rapporteur General of the Ministerial 
Meeting and the Chairman of the four main 
Committees of the Meeting to accompany him 
on this mission. He also invited the Vice-
President of the Ministerial Meeting to accom-
pany him if their duties permit them to do so. 
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RECENT ECLA ACTIVITIES 
I 
Meeting on the problems of regional integration of the economically relatively less 
developed comitries 
(Guatemala City, 23-28 October 1967) 
In compliance with resolution 254 (XI ) , 
adopted at its eleventh session, ECLA convened 
a meeting of government representatives of the 
relatively less developed countries to evaluate 
the findings of its preliminary study entitled 
"The economically relatively less developed 
countries and Latin American integration" (E / 
CN. 12/774 and Add.1-2). 
The meeting was attended by representatives 
of Bolivia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Trini-
dad and Tobago, Uruguay, and British Hon-
duras (Belize) in its capacity as an associate 
member of the Commission. The following in-
ternational and regional organizations also sent 
representatives: the Permanent Secretariat of 
the General Treaty on Central American Eco-
nomic Integration, the Latin American Free-
Trade Association, the Organization of Ameri-
can States, the Inter-American Committee on 
the Alliance for Progress, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the Institute for Latin Ameri-
can Integration, the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization of the United Nations, the Latin 
American Institute for Economic and Social 
Planning, the International Labour Organisa-
tion, the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural 
Sciences of the Organization of American States, 
the Organization of Central American States, 
the Central American Bank for Economic In-
tegration, the Central American Research Insti-
tute for Industry, the Central American Institute 
of Public Administration and the Central 
American Monetary Council. 
This was the first time that the economically 
relatively less developed Latin American coun-
tries had met to exchange views and discuss 
various problems relating to their participation 
in the Latin American economic integration 
movement. 
As a result of its proceedings, the Meeting 
adopted several decisions relating to bases for 
co-ordinating action by the relatively less de-
veloped countries, trade policy, sectoral agree-
ments, establishment and development of an 
air transport and shipping network, economic 
co-operation between the countries of the Carib-
bean Basin, external financing, technical assist-
ance, establishment of a regional centre for 
the development of small-scale industry, and 
foreign trade. 
With regard to the first of these topics, the 
Meeting recommended to the Governments of 
the countries concerned that they should strive 
to reconcile their national interests with a 
view to increasing their participation in the 
Latin American integration process and strength-
ening their bargaining position on all matters 
relating to international trade and external 
financing. To that end they should establish 
permanent machinery for consultation among 
their countries. They should also encourage 
co-ordination of activities and exchange of in-
formation among national and regional financial 
institutions and among research centres and 
agencies representing the private sector. To 
ensure that national development plans took 
full advantage of the opportunities afforded by 
regional co-operation, it was recommended that 
the Governments should sponsor a technical 
meeting of heads of planning offices and direc-
tors of national integration agencies. 
In the same context, the Meeting decided to 
request the technical units of integration agen-
cies to assist in the attainment of the objectives 
indicated and to co-operate with those eco-
nomically relatively less developed countries 
which decided to form free trade zones or 
economic integration areas. 
In relation to trade policy, the Meeting reaf-
firmed the fundamental concept that products 
of the economically relatively less developed 
countries should have access to the Latin Ameri-
can market on a preferential and priority basis. 
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and that the opening of their own markets to 
the other countries should be carried out grad-
ually and over a longer period. The following 
principles defining the position of the less 
developed countries on trade policy questions 
were also adopted: that while the Latin Ameri-
can common market was in process of formation, 
the relatively less developed countries might 
grant one another trade advantages which did 
not extend to the other Latin American coun-
tries; that they should conclude with one 
another or with more developed countries in-
dustrial integration and complementarity agree-
ments, or sub-regional agreements for accelerat-
ing economic integration, and that the conces-
sions made by virtue of those agreements should 
not be applicable to the relatively more de-
veloped countries; that preferential régimes 
should be established for the relatively less 
developed countries in the process of harmoniza-
tion of external tariffs and in the treatment 
of imports of capital goods and essential in-
puts; and that, in accordance with the foregoing 
principles, the countries at more advanced stages 
of development should recognize that their 
relations with the less developed countries 
should be based on weighted reciprocity which 
took into account the structure and economic 
potential of the latter. 
The Meeting further decided to request the 
ECLA secretariat, in co-operation and co-ordina-
tion with regional and international agencies, 
to carry out studies and suggest ways and 
means of securing compliance with the prin-
ciples set forth above. The studies should deal, 
inter alia, with the following questions: the 
liberalization of trade with preferential treat-
ment for the relatively less developed countries; 
the granting of trade advantages to the rela-
tively less developed countries which should 
not extend to the other Latin American coun-
tries; and tariff equalization, with a view to 
facilitating its acceptance by the relatively less 
developed countries. They should include the 
preparation and up-dating of a table of tariff, 
exchange and other restrictions on trade between 
the Latin American countries; the preparation 
of a report on bilateral and multilateral agree-
ments to which the economically relatively less 
developed countries of the region were parties; 
the evaluation of the probable effects of the 
opening of markets for the less developed 
countries of the region; and a survey of the 
supply of capital goods and industrial inputs 
essential to Latin America. 
The Meeting stressed the need for the rela-
tively less developed countries to participate 
in the formulation of regional policy governing 
sectoral agreements, and in the actual prepara-
tion of the relevant studies. The participants 
likewise expressed their concern that all the 
relatively less developed countries should par-
ticipate in the formulation, elaboration and 
conclusion of sectoral agreements within the 
region, so that their views could be duly con-
sidered, as well as their prospects of participat-
ing in activities deriving from the establishment 
of the Latin American common market. In 
addition, the Meeting reached the following two 
decisions: to request the ECLA secretariat, in 
co-operation with FAO and other specialized 
agencies, to continue to examine the possibilities 
of concluding sectoral agreements in respect of 
agriculture and to work out alternative ways 
in which the various relatively less developed 
countries might participate; and to urge the 
United Nations Development Programme and 
other international agencies to press forward 
in their research on specific natural resources 
found in the relatively less developed countries, 
so that their exploitation might be undertaken 
for the purposes of regional projects. 
In connexion with economic co-operation 
between the countries of the Caribbean basin, 
the Meeting decided to request the ECLA secre-
tariat, in consultation and co-operation with the 
Central American Common Market and the other 
Governments concerned, to undertake a study 
of the possibilities of establishing increasingly 
close co-operation between the countries of the 
Caribbean Basin; and to convene, in due course 
and after consultation with the governments 
concerned, a meeting to consider the study in 
question and reach decisions on the findings 
and proposals it contained. Another decision 
adopted was to request the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank, the secretariat of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
and the United Nations Development Programme 
to provide technical and financial assistance for 
the project. 
With reference to external financing, the 
Meeting recommended to the international and 
regional financing agencies that in defining their 
financial assistance policies and programmes 
they should devote special attention to the 
economically relatively less developed countries 
of Latin America and should grant them pref-
erential treatment. Additional resources should 
be allocated to those countries to meet the new 
financial needs arising from any integration 
programmes in which they participated, without 
prejudice to such resources as might be assigned 
to them for purposes of implementing their 
national development plans. In the allocation 
of those resources, priority should be given to 
investment projects related to integration, par-
ticularly in the following fields: infrastructure; 
the establishment of new industries and the 
modernization of those already existing; the 
expansion of agricultural production and yields; 
and the promotion of exports. Steps should be 
taken to make procedures for the granting of 
credits more flexible, and to reduce requirements 
that slowed up the formalities. As part of the 
preferential treatment, longer repayment and 
grace periods and lower rates of interest should 
be granted to the economically relatively less 
developed countries of Latin America; larger 
proportions should be allocated for the financ-
ing of local costs; specific funds should be as-
signed to national and sub-regional institutions 
to be administered as investment trusts; guar-
antee certificates or vouchers for securities issued 
by governments or their development agencies 
should be authorized, in order to facilitate their 
sale on international capital markets; and tech-
nical personnel from the less developed coun-
tries should be given an opportunity to join the 
staff of such institutions. The Pre-Investment 
Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank 
and the Integration Fund administered by the 
Central American Bank for Economic Integra-
tion, among others, should be strengthened to 
enable them to finance feasibility studies for in-
dustrial, agricultural and infrastructure projects 
in the economically relatively less developed 
countries. 
In the same connexion, the Meeting suggested 
that the governments of the economically rela-
tively less developed countries should consider 
the possibility of establishing a "compensation 
fund" to offset possible reductions in fiscal re-
venue, and that, for that purpose, the Co-ordinat-
ing Commission of the Latin American Free-
Trade Association and the Central American 
Common Market should be asked to prepare, 
with the participation of countries belonging 
to neither of those integration systems, a first 
draft for the project in question. 
With respect to technical assistance, the Meet-
ing recommended to international and regional 
technical assistance agencies that in formulating 
and establishing their programmes they should 
grant priority to the relatively less developed 
countries, and that they should give special 
attention to the needs of those countries in the 
following respects: the identification of activi-
ties of special interest to the relatively less de-
veloped countries with a view to supplying the 
regional market; the establishment or improve-
ment of export promotion procedures and 
mechanism; the modernization of enterprises 
or activities which might be affected by integra-
tion, and the improvement of their efficiency; 
advisory assistance to entrepreneurs and training 
of skilled labour; the training of a group of 
top-level professionals to act as leaders in nego-
tiations with other countries, and the establish-
ment of the necessary training centres. It was 
also decided to recommend to international agen-
cies that they should establish and step up pro-
grammes for direct technical assistance, research, 
and training of public officials, in order to 
improve and modernize the public administra-
tion in the relatively less developed countries 
and increase its efficiency, and that they should 
consider the possibility of inter-institutional co-
operation for that purpose. Emphasis was laid 
on the urgent need to formulate, with the co-
operation of international agencies, particularly 
the United Nations Development Programme, 
intensive programmes for evaluating water, 
forest, mining, fisheries, agricultural, and tour-
ism resources in the relatively less developed 
countries, in order to promote the establishment 
of new industries and diversify the sources of 
employment. For the purposes indicated, the 
Meeting advocated an increase in the resources 
allocated by the Pre-Investment Fund of the 
Inter-American Development Bank and by the 
United Nations Development Programme (Spe-
cial Fund) for financing studies which were of 
special interest to the economically relatively 
less developed countries and which would 
further the regional integration process. 
With regard to the establishment of a regional 
centre for the development of small-scale indus-
try, the Meeting decided to request ECLA and 
the United Nations Industrial Development Or-
ganization to prepare a project and present it 
to the United Nations Development Programme, 
and to enlist the co-operation of international 
and regional agencies, and of the industrialized 
countries concerned, in the prompt execution 
of the project in question. It was recommended 
that the centre should have its headquarters in 
Quito and should work in close co-operation 
with the Central American Research Institute 
for Industry, so that the latter agency might 
broaden its field of activity and serve the Central 
American and Caribbean countries and other 
countries wishing to be associated with the Insti-
tute. 
In the field of foreign trade, the Meeting de-
cided to recommend to the economically rela-
tively less developed countries of Latin America 
that they should join with the other countries 
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of the region in concerted action to remove 
the obstacles restricting the possibilities of sell-
ing the Latin American countries' traditional 
exports on world markets. It urged them to as-
sociate themselves with the other countries of the 
region in efforts to ensure that the export quotas 
established in international commodity agree-
ments were raised to a level that would facilitate 
the more rapid economic and social development 
of Latin America. 
II 
Working group on national accounts 
(Santiago, Chile, 30 October to 10 November 1967) 
This second meeting of the Working Group 
was sponsored jointly by ECLA and the Statis-
tical 0£Ece of the United Nations. Participants 
from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecua-
dor, Guatemala, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago 
and Venezuela attended the meeting. Representa-
tives of the Latin American Institute for Econo-
mic and Social Planning (ILPES) and the 
Development Centre of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) also participated and the Inter-Ameri-
can Statistical Institute ( lASI), the Universidad 
de Chile and the Universidad de Concepción 
sent observers. 
The Group met to consider recent progress 
in the revision and extension of the United 
Nations System of National Accounts (SNA), 
and subsequently presented its conclusions to 
the United Nations Expert Group which met in 
Paris in November 1967 and to the fifteenth 
session of the Statistical Commission, held in 
New York in February 1968. 
Three main topics were discussed: the revised 
system of national accounts and its adaptation 
to Latin America, sources of data and techniques 
for compiling national accounts in Latin 
America, and other business. 
Under the first heading, the Working Group 
discussed the purposes, uses and structure of 
the proposed new system, including input-output 
tables. The new system includes three types of 
accounts: the number I accounts are the con-
solidated accounts for the nation; the number II 
accounts refer to production, consumption ex-
penditure and capital formation; and the num-
ber III accounts take care of financial transac-
tions, and include income and outlay and capital 
finance accounts. The new system contains, in 
addition, two other types of tables, namely, sup-
porting and supplementary tables. The support-
ing tables provide more detailed breakdown of 
the categories included in the accounts; the 
supplementary tables are meant to accommodate 
information which nannnt be derived from the 
main accounts but which is still considered im-
portant enough for some purposes to be in-
cluded in the system. The adaptation of the sys-
tem to developing countries includes a number 
of accounts and tables which cannot be derived 
from the matrix, such as illustrative accounts 
for areas, for key segments and for the public 
sector, and tables for the supply and use of com-
modities where transactions are valued at market 
prices rather than at basic values as in the main 
system. 
The Group considered that the layout of the 
new system was adequate for the presentation 
of data and for socio-economic analysis, since it 
provided a more complete basis than the exist-
ing one. 
Other topics discussed included questions 
related to definitions and classifications, stan-
dard accounts and tables, priorities and estimates 
at constant prices. The discussions on definitions 
and classifications centred on the concept of 
production limits, treatment of the real estate 
industry, income distribution, problems relating 
to the analysis of the labour force and to in-
formation on capital and depreciation, capital 
formation, production and capital formation ac-
counts by institutional sectors, administrative 
and similar expenditure, classification of econo-
mic activities, classification by institutional sec-
tors, indirect import taxes, classification of di-
rect taxes and current transfers by households, 
balance of payments, treatment of bank services, 
used goods, and capital finance accounts. The 
discussions on standards accounts and tables 
centred on the accounts and tables proposed for 
the adaptation of the full system to the develop-
ing countries. The principal change introduced 
in the priorities presented in document E / 
CN.3/356, "Proposals for the revision of the 
SNA, 1952" consists in the assignment of a 
higher priority to the tables at constant prices, 
in view of their importance for the Latin Amer-
ican countries in particular and for economic 
analysis in general. As regards estimates at 
constant prices, the Group agreed that the in-
clusion of a chapter on constant prices in the 
revised SNA constituted an advance. It felt, 
however, that very little progress had been made 
during the last few years in developing prin-
ciples of deflation which go beyond the items 
on the production account. This meeting of the 
Group, like the 1965 meeting was very much 
concerned with the problems and possibilities of 
deflating income flows, in particular the direct 
deflation of the foreign balance. It was recog-
nized that, except in so far as the deflation of 
compensation of employees and the foreign 
balance are concerned, little practical experience 
is available in the field of deflating income flows. 
In view of the importance of the subject for 
countries with inflationary problems, however, 
the Group felt that the matter required intensive 
and thorough study. In this connexion, the 
Working Group strongly recommended that the 
United Nations continue work on the problems 
of estimating national accounts at constant 
prices, and that an effort should be made to 
solve the problems of deflating income flows for 
different purposes, explicitly defining the con-
cepts involved in each case. 
With regard to sources of data and techniques 
for compiling national accounts in Latin 
America, the practical difliculties encountered in 
preparing estimates were discussed in detail, 
with emphasis on those relating to agriculture 
and services. Views were exchanged on the 
methods used to fill the gaps in basic statistics 
in respect of construction and improvements 
undertaken by agricultural producers on their 
own account, and with regard to estimates of 
inventories of agricultural and livestock prod-
ucts held by both producers and middlemen. 
The discussion also touched upon the procedures 
adopted to define prices at the producer level, 
for which basic data are non-existent in most 
countries of the region. Detailed descriptions 
were also given of the methods applied in pre-
paring service estimates, at both current and 
constant prices, special attention being devoted 
to the problems deriving from the use of oc-
cupied-population figures as basic data for such 
estimates. The Group discussed the possibility 
of adopting methods based on the analysis of 
tax data and other administrative records, and 
the results obtained by means of ad hoc sur-
veys on some specific services were also de-
scribed. 
Lastly, the ECLA secretariat was requested 
to institute a system for the regular exchange of 
information and views among national accounts 
experts in Latin America. 
in 
Meeting of g o v e m m e n l experts o f the developing countries members of the Commission 
(Santiago, Chile, 11-15 December 1967) 
This meeting was called by ECLA in com-
pliance with its resolution 264 (XII) on Latin 
America and the second session of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 
Under the terms of this resolution the ECLA 
secretariat was requested to revise and update 
its report on Latin America and international 
trade policy (E/CN.12/773), which was a pro-
visional version of the study prepared for the 
second UNCTAD session. Once this had been 
done, the secretariat was further requested to 
convene a meeting of government experts to 
review the document before submission to the 
second UNCTAD session. 
The meeting was attended by experts accred-
ited by the Governments of Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. 
The debate centred on the recent evolution 
and the trends of Latin America's foreign trade, 
the broad lines of international trade policy— 
the trade policies of the major centres in rela-
tion to Latin America, the fulfilment by the 
developed countries of trade commitments en-
tered into with the developing countries and 
Latin America in particular, problems deriving 
from the application of certain escape clauses 
and possible solutions, the results of the Ken-
nedy Round from the standpoint of Latin 
America, possible formulas and machinery for 
future action—and Latin America's position at 
the second UNCTAD session. On the last point, 
a discussion took place on the aims of the 
second UNCTAD session, commodity trade 
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problems and policies, the expansion and diversi-
fication of exports of manufactures and semi-
manufactures from the developing countries, 
trade and development financing, shipping, the 
expansion of trade, and economic integration, 
among the developing countries, special meas-
ures in favour of the relatively less developed 
countries, and the growth of trade with the 
centrally planned economies. 
The secretariat took note of the comments 
made at the meeting, and included them when-
ever possible in the revised version of the docu-
ment entitled "Latin America and the second 
session of UNCTAD" (E/CN.12/803). 
IV 
Regional inter-agency meeting on community development 
(Santiago, Chile, 23-25 January 1968) 
This meeting was held under the auspices of 
ECLA and in compliance with a recommendation 
of the United Nations Administrative Commit-
tee on Co-ordination. It was attended by officials 
from the following agencies: the Andean Indian 
Programme, the Inter-American Development 
Bank, the Venezuelan Centre for Training and 
Applied Research in Community Development 
(Centro Venezolano de Entrenamiento e Inves-
tigación Aplicada en Desarrollo de la Comu-
nidad) , the United Nations Children's Fund, the 
Chilean Institute for Training and Research 
in Agrarian Reform (Instituto Chileno de Capa-
citación e Investigación de la Reforma Agraria), 
the Organization of American States, the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, the World Food Programme, the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization, the International Labour Organisa-
tion, the World Health Organization and the 
Pan American Sanitary Bureau, and the Latin 
American Institute for Economic and Social 
Planning. 
The following were the three major items on 
the agenda: policy issues in community develop-
ment and co-ordinated action of international 
organizations; integral regional development 
as a basis for local and community programmes; 
and professional training for regional and local 
development in Latin America. 
The object of the meeting was to promote a 
free exchange of ideas, but not to formulate 
recommendations which would represent commit-
ments for agencies or participants. 
Attention was drawn to the international 
agencies' interest in elucidating and defining 
community development concepts, techniques 
and objectives. The discussion showed that the 
experts present were more concerned with the 
problems of introducing appropriate techniques 
for the planning, co-ordination and administra-
tion of development programmes at the local 
level, viewed as a broad category, than in the 
question of clarifying the meaning and future 
role of community development. It did not ap-
pear that Latin America was approaching a 
unified doctrine in this policy area; but the 
continuing search for functional mechanisms to 
stimulate the development of communities, areas 
and internal regions was producing a body of 
theories and techniques with common elements 
in the different sectors, whose application 
coincided with the widening use of the term 
"community development". The very fact that 
governments were increasingly disposed to sup-
port such a policy highlighted the fundamental 
obstacles to its implementation. In addition to the 
difficulties of formulating administrative mecha-
nisms for the co-ordination of health, educa-
tional, agricultural and land reform agencies, 
public works, social services, etc., action at the 
local level involved another serious problem: 
how local government institutions could be sys-
tematically drawn into the processes of decision-
making and programme implementation. 
In the context of regional as against local 
development, it was pointed out that a nation 
was the sum of its regional and local areas, 
whose special features determined the pos-
sibilities of absorbing investment and obtaining 
differential responses to development problems. 
Integral regional development was a means of 
linking national and local planning. In so far 
as the technical agencies concentrated their at-
tention on planning and plan implementation by 
areas or regions, problems of inter-sectoral co-
ordination could be more effectively solved 
through comprehensive programmes at the re-
gional and local levels than by centralized 
mechanisms at the national level. 
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With regard to international professional 
training, the view was expressed that training 
programmes should be primarily directed to-
wards the break-down, localization and imple-
mentation of development policies and pro-
grammes. Regional and local planning theory 
and practice should focus on methods capable 
of capturing local aspirations and feeding them 
back into the plans. Training should foster a 
new attitude among technical personnel and 
officials at both the high and the intermediate 
level which would enable them to use national 
policies and programmes as frames of reference 
for their work, and to incorporate organized 
popular participation in all aspects of the plan 
implementation process. Planning was a joint 
responsibility which required the collaboration 
of the operational and administrative agencies 
with the planners. In order to achieve such inte-
gration, the training programme should include 
comprehensive knowledge of the development 
process and the dynamics of social and institu-
tional change understood as a total-process; a 
broad command of planning techniques; and 
an ability to utilize the techniques of public 
administration. 
Report of the Seminar on Administrative Aspects o f Plan Implementation 
(Santiago, Chile, 19-27 February 1968) 
This Seminar was organized by the United 
Nations through the Economic Commission for 
Latin America, the Latin American Institute 
for Economic and Social Planning, and the 
Public Administration Division and Office of 
Technical Co-operation at Headquarters. It was 
attended by participants from Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Domini-
can Republic, Ecuador, Guayana, Haiti, Hon-
duras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay 
and Venezuela. Also present were observers from 
technical institutions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Cuba, Peru and Venezuela, and from the fol-
lowing international organizations: the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, the World Health Organi-
zation, the United Nations Children's Fund, the 
United Nations Development Programme, the 
Organization of American States, the Ford 
Foundation and the Latin American Faculty of 
Social Sciences. 
The purpose of the meeting was to examine 
the question of assigning authority and respon-
sibility for development planning and the rela-
tions between planning agencies at all levels 
and the centres whose policy decisions influence 
planning; to formulate recommendations for 
greater participation of decision-making centres 
in the planning process; to analyse administra-
tive planning systems in Latin America and seek 
ways of enhancing administrative capacity to 
implement development plans and programmes; 
to examine the administrative organization and 
procedures for short-term activities within the 
framework of medium- and long-term plans; to 
indicate whether there are annual operational 
plans for the whole economy and whether pro-
gramme budgeting is being used for the public 
sector, and to provide the necessary guidelines 
for making annual operational plans and pro-
gramme budgeting effective instruments of plan 
implementation; to discuss the administrative 
requirements for the formulation and execution 
of annual operational plans and programme 
budgeting; to suggest administrative schemes 
for supervising and evaluating the progress of 
plans and for adapting them in order to ensure 
their efficient implementation; and to determine 
whether the established organization and pro-
cedures permit continuing supervision of plan 
implementation at the global, sectoral, regional 
and local levels. 
The discussions centred on four main items: 
plan formulation and implementation machin-
ery; administrative planning as an integral 
part of the planning process; conversion of the 
plan into operational programmes; and control, 
evaluation and adaptation of operational plans, 
programmes and projects. 
With regard to the first item, the Seminar 
discussed general planning machinery and its 
relationship with decision-making centres in 
respect of general development policy, short-
term economic and social policy, public in-
vestment and the private sector; and sectoral 
planning machinery and how it is linked with 
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decision-making centres (with emphasis on agri-
culture and industry): agencies for sectoral 
policy formulation and implementation at the 
central government level; centres for nation-
wide decision-making concerned with develop-
ment, credit, prices, government purchasing, 
technical assistance and other measures which 
influence the development of particular sectors; 
autonomous or decentralized bodies and special-
ized public (or semi-public) enterprises in a 
^articular sector; and the role of regional and 
ocal agencies and the private sector in the for-
mulation and implementation of sectoral plans. 
The discussion of the second item centred on 
the organization, methods and content of admin-
istrative planning at all levels; and methods 
of evaluating and improving administrative ca-
pacity to formulate, discuss, approve, execute, 
supervise and evaluate global, sectoral and re-
gional development plans, and also programmes 
and projects. 
The main points discussed under the third 
item were: administrative questions involved in 
converting the long-term plan into annual opera-
tional plans and, medium-term investment plans, 
including ways of integrating the planning and 
budgeting processes; and projects as components 
of plans and as units for plan implementation. 
Lastly, with regard to the fourth item the 
Seminar discussed administrative systems estab-
lished to control the execution of plans, pro-
grammes and projects at the global, sectoral, 
regional and local levels; and organizational 
systems and procedures for collecting informa-
tion for the periodic evaluation of plan imple-
mentation, analysing the gaps between targets 
and results, and suggesting specific measures 
for adjusting projects, programmes and plans. 
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TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF ECLA 
The Economic Commission for Latin America 
was established on 25 February 1948 by virtue 
of a resolution of the United Nations Economic 
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trend of thought which was attuned to the real 
economic circumstances in Latin America. Up 
to then with only a few exceptions—these cir-
cumstances had been ignored or under-estimated 
in the economic policy adopted to solve eco-
nomic development problems. Latin America 
had no clear conception of economic develop-
ment, if indeed it could be said to have taken 
this concept into account in framing economic 
policy at that time. 
There is no need to analyse this trend of 
thought here. SuiEce it to say it has spread 
rhout the region and that ECLA is now 
the end of a fruitful stage and is re-
y facing the beginning of another stage 
ing a strategy for tackling the major 
ms of under-development. This in fact 
s formulating the broad lines of an eco-
policy to achieve that purpose, 
member Governments of the Commission 
lized this at the last session of the Com-
of the Whole when they unanimously 
!d the following declaration: 
DECLARATION 
EMORATING THE TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY 
THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN 
ERICA 
the occasion of the twentieth anniversary 
e establishment of the United Nations 
mic Commission for Latin America, the 
entatives of the member Governments, 
agnizing that the activities of the Com-
n have represented an important con-
ion to Latin America's economic and social 
ipment process, 
ing, in particular, its work in connexion 
the systematic analysis of the economic 
on, promotion of integration and plan-
machinery, and concerted action to secure 
ational economic co-operation, 
isidering that the secretariat of the Com-
in, with the collaboration of the Latin 
Scan Institute for Economic and Social 
ling, has expended intensive effort in train-
ing technical personnel in the fields of economic 
development and planning, evaluating eco-
nomic, technical and statistical data, and dis-
seminating relevant publications, 
Declare: 
1. The intention of their Governments to 
continue, through the Economic Commission 
for Latin America, their efforts to speed up 
the economic and social development of the integration process and to buttress international 
region, with a view to increasing the material co-operation; and 
and spiritual well-being of the Latin American 2. Their appreciation of the valuable tech-
peoples, forging closer economic links between nical contribution made by the secretariat of 
the Latin American countries and between them the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the other nations of the world, and thus to the development of the Latin Ameri-
helping to strengthen the regional economic can countries. 
INVESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY IN LATIN AMERICA 
1. GENERAL REMARKS 
Capital requirements in the petroleum sector 
are extremely high and in any development 
programme estimation of the amount of invest-
ment required, the time schedule for the in-
vestment in the successive stages and the 
methods of financing are all of primary im-
portance. 
There is a strong element of chance in both 
the exploration and actual production of pe-
troleum, particularly in the former stage. They 
are subject to mining risks, which are absent 
from the refining, transport and marketing 
stages. 
Consequently, it would be useful to isolate 
the investment requirements of each separate 
stage. It is clearly very difiicult to do this, in 
view of the nature of the figures for the dif-
ferent Latin American countries. Only in very 
few cases are there long, differentiated and 
accurate series available. In addition, the variety 
and complexity of physical and monetary con-
ditions in the different countries also make it 
more difficult to arrive at valid conclusions. 
The first step is to eliminate the application 
of average world coefficients, which in addition 
rarely single out the exploration stage proper. 
Even leaving aside such special areas as the 
United Slates and the Middle East, the remain-
ing figures—whose geographical coverage is 
very small—would be of very doubtful value. 
Information on Latin America as a whole is 
similarly unrepresentative, since for a variety 
of factors, the dominance of Venezuela obscures 
that of the other countries, taken individually 
and as a whole. 
However, for the purposes of illustration some 
figures can be cited to indicate orders of mag-
nitude. 
Authoritative sources^ estimate that, with 
large variations from one geographical region 
to another, between 1965 and 1980 average 
world investment per ton of daily production 
capacity is likely to be about 90 dollars, which 
represents a decline in relation to past invest-
ment. Of this total, about 40 dollars would go 
on exploration and production, with between 
15 and 20 dollars for each of the three subse-
quent stages. 
By 1965 world investment was about 120 dol-
lars per ton of daily capacity, excluding the 
United States, where it was about 325 dollars® 
(see table 1) . 
Table 1 
STRUCTURE OF INVESTMENT IN PETROLEUM 
(Percentages) 









Production 71 37 61 31 
Refining 10 17 14 14 
Transport 6 25 8 26 
Marketing . . . . 8 16 11 11 
Petrochemicals 
and other acti-
vities 5 5 6 5 
The stage which has required most invest-
ment in the past—^at least in Latin America— 
is production, including exploratory and de-
velopment activities. The most chancy element 
is undoubtedly the exploration of potential 
oil-producing zones. Success depends on factors 
that cannot be correlated without data that are 
only available from the petroleum companies, 
although there is a relatively large amount of 
information on both stages, expressed in terms 
of crew-months, hectares explored, kind of ter-
rain, wells drilled, etc. 
Unfortunately, the data on reserves, which 
are based on different criteria, introduce im-
perfections into the calculation of unit invest-
ment for proving reserves. It can be stated, 
however, that they vary greatly from one 
country to another in Latin America. There is 
reason to believe that unit investment would 
'>• Petroleum Press Service, vol. XXXII, No. 3 (March 
1965), p. 82. 
2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment, 0Ü Today (1964), pp. 76 e£ seq. 
not be more than 10 dollar cents a barrel in 
Venezuela, but about 20 dollar cents in Mexico 
and as much as 60 dollar cents in Brazil. 
The investment required to develop an oilfield 
and keep it in production is likely to be much 
the same as the investment that was needed 
for similar proved structures. Consequently, 
here is another source of information whose 
usefulness should not be ignored. 
The limitations referred to above do not apply 
to the remaining stages. Fairly precise informa-
tion is available on the cost of recently con-
structed refineries or refineries under construc-
tion or up for tender in almost all the Latin 
American countries, and on their technical 
characteristics; there is, in addition, a con-
siderable amount of international information, 
which can be adjusted to apply to individual 
cases. The same is true with regard to means 
of transport, particularly pipelines of specific 
diameters and lengths, with indications of the 
kind of terrain, characteristics of the fluid, etc. 
It is also a simple matter to calculate the invest-
ment required for internal distribution. 
Investment costs could also be calculated on 
the basis of the main physical data and the 
unit costs of the component elements. Once 
again, this is quite a simple and precise pro-
cedure for refining, transport, storage and mar-
keting, but less so for the actual production 
stage. 
For production the determining element is 
the drilling and installation of the well. Where, 
as is often the case with known deposits or 
deposits whose behaviour is predictable, an 
estimate can be made of the number of wells 
and the average depth needed to ensure a certain 
volume of production, it is possible to estimate 
the investment required for drilling. The cost 
of additional equipment over and above the 
basic investment can then be derived quite 
easily from it. 
In Latin America, these data are available 
for certain countries and certain periods, and 
could be improved. A correlation with terrain 
difficulties, geological formations, depths and 
current techniques would help to establish more 
closely the likely cost per metre drilled. 
As a guide, the average cost of drilling in 
the United States ranges from 100 dollars a 
metre for offshore drilling (continental shelf 
up to a depth of 3,000 metres) to an average 
of 40 dollars a metre for inland petroleum wells 
and 50 dollars a metre for natural gas.® 
For different depths, the figures are: 
From 500 to 1,200 metres—30 dollars a metre 
1,200 to 2,200 metres—35 dollars a metre 
2,200 to 3,000 metres-^5 dollars a metre 
It is well known that exploration wells cost 
much more. Depending on the circumstances, 
they may cost as much as 1 million dollars or 
more. 
Good data are available for Venezuela in this 
regard (see table 2) for the five-year period 
1960-65.^ For previous years the figures fluc-
tuate greatly, being generally lower for develop-
ment wells and equal or higher for exploration 
wells.® 
Table 2 




From 1,000 to 2,500 metres 60 70 
Over, 2,500 metres 150 100 
The costs vary greatly from one oilfield to 
another, being several times higher in Mara-
caibo (the main producing region) than in 
Barcelona. 
2. LATIN AMERICA'S SHARE IN WORLD 
INVESTMENT 
Tables 3 and 4 show the distribution of 
cumulative petroleum investment in the main 
producing and consuming areas of the world.® 
It can be seen that, even though its share in 
the world total is declining, the United States 
still absorbs about 50 per cent of existing capital 
in the petroleum industry of the western world. 
^Oil and Gas Journal (Tulsa, Oklahoma, 15 Novem-
ber 1965), p. 127. 
* Venezuelan Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, 
Petróleo y otros datos estadísticos (October 1967). 
6 Higher costs are recorded for 1959 and 1960 in all 
cases. 
6 This study is concerned with investment and the use 
of capital for the expansion, modernization and renova-
tion of property, plants and equipment used by the in-
dustry in its different activities (production, transport, 
refining and marketing). New investment is the amount 
spent annually to cover these needs. Gross investment is 
the cumulative result of new investment. The figure for 
net investment or net fixed assets is obtained by deduct-
ing from gross investment the sum of the items measur-
ing capital depreciation. These inelude the annual en-
tries relating to the depreciation and amortization of 
property, plants and equipment and the depletion of 
proved reserves. 
Table 3 
WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF NET PETROLEUM INVESTMENT IN FIXED ASSETS, 
1946-65 
(Percentages of total) 
1946 I9S5 1961 1965 
United States 70.0 62.0 49.6 48.3 
Canada 1.4 5.0 6.2 6.2 
Latin America 10.3 8.2 11.2 9.1 
Venezuela 4.9 4.4 5.1 3.1 
Other countries of the western 
hemisphere 5.4 3.8 6.1 6.0 
Western Europe 5.1 7.2 11.2 13.3 
Africa 1.0 0.9 3.5 3.9 
Middle East 4.3 4.8 4.2 3.5 
Far East 2.5 3.5 4.3 5.5 
International investment in tankers 5.4 8.4 9.8 10.2 
TOTAL (millions of dollars) 12,150 33,725 61,250 78,200 
SOURCES; Chase Manhattan Bank, Investment Patterns in the World Petroleum Industry 
(December 1956); Capital Investments of the fforld Petroleum Industry, November 1962 
and various other issues. 
It is also apparent that Latin America's share 
in cumulative net investment was smaller in 
1965 than in 1961, and even smaller than 
in 1946. This is partly because of the relatively 
minor importance of Latin America as a pe-
troleum producing region, and because invest-
ment in recent years has been channelled mainly 
towards the new producing areas in the Middle 
East and North Africa and towards the large 
consumer centres in Western Europe. 
Latin America 's share in the world total, 
excluding the United States, dropped f rom 34.2 
per cent in 1946 to 18.6 per cent in 1965. This 
decline was largely due to Venezuela, the main 
Latin American producer, whose share in 1965 
was smaller than ever before. The share of the 
Table 4 
WORLD DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS PETROLEUM INVESTMENT IN FIXED ASSETS, 
1946-65 
(Percentages of total) 
1946 1955 1961 1965 
United States 71.9 63.8 54.5 51.9 
Canada 1.7 4.0 5.0 5.1 
Latin America 9.8 9.3 11.2 10.2 
Venezuela 4.7 5.4 5.5 4.5 
Other countries of the western 
hemisphere 5.1 3.9 5.7 5.7 
Western Europe 4.6 6.4 9.7 11.6 
Africa 0.7 0.7 2.6 3.2 
Middle East 3.7 4.3 4.0 3.7 
Far East 2.2 3.1 4.0 5.0 
International investment in tankers 5.4 8.4 9.0 9.3 
TOTAL (millions of dollars) 24,600 63,300 111,750 144,375 
SOURCES : Chase Manhattan Bank, Investment Patterns in the World Petroleum Industry 
(December 1956); Capital Investments of the IP'orld Petroleum Industry, November 1962 
and various other issues. 
rest of the Latin American countries as a whole 
rose from 5.4 to 6.1 per cent during the same 
period. 
Venezuela's share in world net petroleum 
investment, excluding the United States, drop-
ped from 16.4 per cent in 1946 to 6.7 per cent 
in 1965. 
3. DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT BY SECTORS 
Tables 5 and 6 show the functional distribu-
tion of petroleum investment in Latin America, 
which is different from that of Venezuela alone 
(see tables 7 and 8 ) . 
The petroleum sector in the rest of Latin 
America has not suffered from the process of 
disinvestment that has affected the sector in 
Venezuela. However, production activities— 
which bear the greatest weight in the total—do 
not receive the high percentages they do in 
Venezuela and a downward trend can be seen 
in the relative share of capital applied to pro. 
duction, despite the fact that gross and net 
cumulative investment in production absorbed 
more than 50 per cent of the total in 1964. 
On the other hand, and once again in contrast 
with Venezuela, in the rest of Latin America 
there has been a steady increase in capital 
applied to marketing and refining activities, as 
a result of the growth of domestic consumption 
of petroleum products and of the boom in the 
refining industry. 
4. INVESTMENT IN PRODUCTION 
Table 9 shows new investment in exploration 
(including exploratory drilling) and production, 
by countries, in the period 1946-66. 
Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: NEW INVESTMENT IN PROPERTY, INSTALLATIONS AND 
EQUIPMENT OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, 1946-66 
Year 
Production Transport Refining Marketing Other activities Total (millions of 
Percentage distribution dollars) 
1946 .. 77.3 3.0 12.1 6.1 1.5 330 
1947 .. 66.7 5.2 20.8 7.3 — 480 
1948 . . 64.5 8.1 21.8 4.8 0.8 620 
1949 .. 66.4 2.5 24.6 4.9 1.6 610 
1950 . . 62.7 3.4 23.7 8.5 1.7 295 
1951 .. 67.7 5.7 16.4 8.9 1.3 384 
1952 .. 71.0 6.0 13.0 9.0 1.0 500 
1953 .. 74.0 3.0 16.0 5.0 2.0 500 
1954 . . 67.3 3.7 21.5 6.6 0.9 535 
1955 . . 62.2 5.2 21.5 8.9 2.2 675 
1956 . . 71.3 4.1 17.6 6.6 0.4 1,220» 
1957 . . 72.5 6.3 15.0 5.6 0.6 1,600» 
1958 .. 64.0 12.4 12.0 8.8 2.8 1,250 
1959 . . 61.1 15.8 12.5 8.7 1.9 1,325 
1960 . . 59.2 13.7 14.6 10.4 2.1 1,200 
1961 .. 58.6 4.5 16.4 17.3 3.2 1,100 
1962 . . 65.4 6.7 12.3 12.3 3.3 895 
1963 . . 62.5 3.7 16.9 10.6 6.3 800 
1964 .. 54.8 3.2 27.8 12.8 1.9 775 
1965 . . 65.0 3.9 17.5 11.0 2.6 770 
1966 . . 48.0 6.4 33.1 9.2 3.3 920 
SoDRCES: Chase Manhattan Bank, Investment Patterns in the World Petroleum Industry 
(December 1955); Capital Investments of the World Petroleum Industry, November 1962 
and various other issues. 
11ncluding rented concessions. 
Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: STRUCTURE OF CUMULATIVE INVESTMENT IN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, 1946-65 
Gross cumulative investment Net cumulative investment 
1946 1955 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1946 1955 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Millions of dollars 
Production 1,770 3,540 7,950 8,195 8,405 8,655 8,860 890 1,425 3,725 3,650 3,685 3,700 3,625 
Transport 105 320 1,015 1,040 1,080 1,105 1,185 60 190 585 575 565 565 600 
Refining 370 1,380 2,425 2,580 2,760 2,880 2,890 205 740 1,340 1,460 1,560 1,370 1,565 
Marketing 140 615 1,480 1,535 1,600 1,655 1,710 85 390 940 965 995 1,015 985 
Other activities 15 35 255 275 280 265 275 10 30 210 225 220 195 195 
TOTAL 2,400 5,890 13,125 13,625 14,125 14,580 14,920 1,250 2,775 6,800 6,875 7,025 6,845 6,970 
Percentage distribution 
Production 73.8 60.1 60.6 60.2 59.5 59.0 59.5 71.2 51.3 54.8 53.1 52.5 54.0 52.0 
Transport 4.4 5.4 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.6 7.8 4.8 6.8 8.6 8.4 8.0 8.3 8.6 
Refining 15.4 23.4 18.5 18.9 19.5 20.2 19.4 16.4 26.7 19.7 21.2 22.2 20.0 22.4 
Marketing 5.8 10.5 11.3 11.3 11.3 11.4 11.5 6.8 14.1 13.8 14.0 14.2 14.8 14.2 
Other activities 0.6 0.6 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.8 0.8 1.1 3.1 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.8 
SOURCES: Chase Manhattan Bank, Investment Patterns in the if arid Petroleum Industry (December 1956); Capital Investments oj the World Petro-
leum Industry, 1962, 1963, 1964 and 1965 issues. 
Table 7 
VENEZUELA: NET PETROLEUM INVESTMENT IN FIXED ASSETS, 1955-65 
(Percentages of total) 
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
85.1 67.2 66.1 64.3 70.4 75.5 82.6 76.4 79.1 77.0 87.0 78.9 
4.3 10.4 15.0 21.5 12.5 13.0 4.6 11.2 10.2 6.5 4.0 10.3 
7.0 20.1 14.7 9.7 9.7 5.1 5.8 5.3 3.9 10.0 3.5 6.0 
Marketing 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.6 2.9 2.7 3.1 1.9 3.6 1.4 2.1 
Other activities 2.3 L I 3.2 3.6 5.8 . 3.5 4.3 4.0 4.9 2.9 3.2 2.7 
TOTAL ( m i l l i o n s 
of bolívares) 928 1,160 1,827 1,788 1,262 730 651 474 511 753 825 633 




VENEZUELA: NET PETROLEUM INVESTMENT IN FIXED ASSETS, BY ACTIVITIES, 1955-65 
(Millions of bolívares) 
I9S5 1956 1957 1958 19 9 ¡960 1961 1962 1963 1964'' J96S« 1966 
Production^ 69.4 72.5 74.2 72.2 72.6 72.6 72.6 72.5 71.5 71.5 72.9 71.6 
Transport 8.3 7.5 8.0 10.3 10.3 10.6 10.6 11.0 12.3 13.0 12.5 13.2 
Refining 16.4 14.9 13.1 12.6 11.6 11.3 11.0 10.7 10.0 9.9 8.9 8.8 
Marketing 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.7 
Other activities 4.6 3.9 3.6 3.9 4.5 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.7 4.2 4.2 4.7 
TOTAL 5,649 7,023 9,002 9,652 10,375 9,771 9,140 8,505 8,086 7,778 7,553 7,039 
Net investment as a percentage 
of gross investment 51.7 53.9 56.9 56.1 55.1 51.5 47.7 44.2 41.8 39.1 37.2 34.5 
SOURCE: Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, "Apéndice Estadístico", 
offprint from Memoria correspondiente al ejercicio anual 1966 (March 1966 
and October 1967). 
" Including payments for concessions. 
•> Figures subject to revision. 
Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: NET INVESTMENT IN EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION, 1956-66 
(Millions of dollars) 
Country or region 1956 1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
Argentina 
Exploration ., . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,. • 
Production ., 
TOTAL 
... ... ... 
225 225 180 m 
... ... ... 
Bolivia 
TOTAL 10 6 7 7 
Brazil 
Exploration . . 17 31 41 36 33 35 41 48 44 46 42 
Production . . 9 16 12 8 12 15 15 14 16 19 24 
TOTAL 26 47 53 44 45 50 56 62 60 65 66 
Chile 
TOTAL , . , 5 20 25 18 12 11 ... 
Colombia 
Exploration . . 15 16 12 20 . . . « . . . . . . . . 
Production . . 9 12 11 20 , . < . . • . . . . . . . . • • • • 
TOTAL 24 28 23 40 30 25 20 20 40 . . . .. • 
Ecuador 
TOTAL 15 4 1 1 
Mexico 
Exploration . . 11 23 29 42 41 51 48 54 , m , ... « • 0 
Production . . 6 13 17 24 59 49 33 31 . . . . . • • • • 
TOTAL 17 36 46 66 100 100 81 85 • . . • • . . • e 
Peru 
TOTAL • • • 30 20 18 15 
Trinidad 
TOTAL ... 30 31 35 30 ... ... ... 
Venezuela 
Exploration . . 117 59 30 36 30 43 
Production . . • . * . . . 211 142 134 96 119 108 
TOTAL 365 530 500 328 201 164 132 149 151 180 130 
Latin America 
TOTAL 565 811 820 785 691 645 554 506 425 500 440 
Latin America, excluding 
Venezuela 
TOTAL 200 281 320 457 490 481 422 358 274 315 310 
SouncES: Chase Manhattan Bank, Capital Investments of the World Petroleum Industry, various issues; 
Brazilian Ministry of Planning, Petróleo (Rio de Janeiro); Venezuelan Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Petró-
leo y otros datos estadísticos (Caracas); Pemex en cifras (Mexico); Nacional Financiera, S.A., La economía 
mexicana en cifras, 1966; ECLA/BTAO/FAO, "El petróleo en Colombid' (July 1961). 
Unfortunately, these data are incomplete and, 
although it was possible to obtain fairly long 
series for countries with the highest levels of 
investment, except for Argentina, in all cases 
corrections and modifications had to be in-
troduced in order to make the figures com-
parable. Where the necessary data were avail-
able, an evaluation was made of the breakdown 
of investment between exploration and develop-
ment activities. In addition, for some years 
information was not available for all the coun-
tries, in which case the totals were taken from 
the Chase Manhattan Bank publications and 
modified to take into account the larger invest-
ments estimated for Brazil. 
To judge by the data thus obtained, the 
region's share in world new investment in ex-
ploration and production, excluding the United 
States and the socialist countries, dropped from 
40 per cent in 1958 and 1959 to 36 per cent, 
in 1960 and 28 per cent in 1963, and to ani 
estimated 19.5 per cent in 1965. 
This decline is mainly due to the downturn^ 
investment in Venezuela, since the shares m 
corresponding to the rest of Latin America as 
a whole rose from 11 per cent in 1956 to 26 
per cent in 1961, dropping once again to 20 per 
cent in 1962 and 1963. The estimated share of 
these countries in 1965 was 23 per centJ 
Gross investment in Latin America per unit 
of production (corresponding to the cost of 
maintaining and expanding the production of 
crude) declined, with small fluctuations, from 
3.5 dollars per cubic metre in 1956 to 2 dollars 
in 1963, if Venezuela—which has an average 
investment of 3.4 dollars—is included. Exclud-
ing Venezuela, average gross investment between 
1956 and 1963 was 7.4 dollars per cubic metre, 
with a sizable drop in the last five years (see 
table 10). 
The Latin American countries with an average 
annual investment of over 50 million dollars— 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela— 
account for more than 80 per cent of total 
investment in the whole of Latin America. 
If to these countries are added Colombia and 
Trinidad and Tobago, which maintain a steady 
level of annual investment, although under 50 
million dollars, their share of the total would 
be more than 90 per cent. 
Three countries—^Argentina, Brazil and Me-
xico—account for about 75 per cent of total 
investment in the region, excluding Venezuela, 
in the years for which complete data are avail-
able. If Colombia and Trinidad and Tobago are 
added to these countries, the percentage rises 
to almost 90 per cent. 
The share of capital expenditure on explora-
tion (including exploratory drilling) in total 
investment in exploration and production is 
about 30 per cent for the group of countries for 
which the relevant data are available. The level 
is lower in Argentina, where it is about 15 per 
cent,® and it is estimated to be between 40 and 
50 per cent for Mexico. 
Venezuela's share in the last few years has 
been between 20 and 25 per cent. In this 
country, capital expenditure on exploration and 
drilling has traditionally accounted for the bulk 
of investment in the production sector, although 
there is a tendency for it to weaken and for 
there to be a great increase in investment in 
secondary recovery. The share of the latter type 
of investment in total investment in production 
rose from 9 per cent in 1960 to 15 per cent in 
1965, as a result of the acquisition of plants 
and equipment for on-the-site injection of gas, 
water and steam and for thermal combustion, 
which allow for a greater and more economical 
recovery of known petroleum resources. This 
type of investment has the same effect as invest-
ment in exploration and drilling, in that it in-
creases the size of the proved reserves of crude. 
Of the three methods of increasing these reserves 
—discoveries, expansions and revisions—the lat-
Calculated on the basis of data from the Oil and 
Gas Journal, 6 March 1967, p. 66. 
8 This estimate takes into account the investment pro-
jections formulated by the National Development Coun-
cil for the period 1965-80, which were based on an analy-
sis of historical data. 
Table 10 
INVESTMENT IN PRODUCTION PER CUBIC METRE OF OUTPUT, 1956-66 
(Dollars) 








1956 3.5 12.2 1.0 2.9 5.4 
1957 4.0 12.2 0.7 3.6 7.2 
1958 4.2 10.8 1.7 3.6 7.4 • 
1959 . , . , 3.7 10.6 1.2 2.6 9.7 
1960 3.1 10.1 0.9 1.5 9.2 
1961 2.9 9.6 0.9 1.0 8.5 
1962 . , , . 2.2 10.7 0.8 0.7 6.8 
1963 2.0 9.7 0.5 0.8 5.5 
1964 . , 1.8 10.8 0.5 0.9 7.5 
1965 1.8 9.8 0.9 0.9 7.3 
1966 1.6 9.4 0.6 0.7 6.1 
SOURCE: ECLA, on the basis of data from the Chase Manhattan Bank. 
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ter has been the most important in Venezuela 
in the last five years, accounting for 70 per 
cent of the increase, and secondary-recovery 
techniques have played a key role (see table 11). 
Table 11 
VENEZUELA: NEW PETROLEUM RESERVES, 1955, 
1958 AND 1960-65 
Year 
Total added in 
the year 
(millions of barrels) 
Total added under 




1955 , , 2,280 36.0 
1958 2,140 2.0 
1960 1,440 18.0 
1961 540 13.0 
1962 1,090 73.0 
1963 1,390 73.5 
1964 1,420 76.0 
1965 1,320 74.0 
1966 850 85.0 
SOURCE: Venezuelan Ministry of Mines and Hydro-
carbons, Petróleo y otros datos estadísticos, 1966 
(October 1967). 
In Brazil, exploration represents on the aver-
age 70 per cent of the value of investment in 
production. Until recently, almost all the Bra-
zilian production of crude came from the Recon-
cavo Baiano basin,® but most of the investment 
in exploration in the last decade went on sedi-
mentary basins that were not productive on a 
commercial scale (see table 8) . On the average, 
this investment represented more than 75 per 
cent of the national total in 1956-60 and 45 
per cent in 1961-63. It can be estimated that 
exploration in the Amazonian region alone— 
where there is still no production on a com-
mercial scale—accounted for an average of 
about 30 per cent of total investment in explora-
tion in the period 1956-60, a proportion which 
dropped to 8 per cent in 1961-63. 
5. INVESTMENT IN REFINING 
In the years for which complete statistics are 
available, over 60 per cent of total investment 
was concentrated in four countries: Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela (see table 12). 
Between 1956 and 1959 the proportion must 
have been even higher, since Brazil and Vene-
zuela alone absorbed about 50 per cent of total 
investment in refineries. During the four-year 
period 1960-63, almost all the Latin American 
countries began to invest in refining. In contrast, 
Venezuela's annual investment declined so 
sharply in absolute terms between 1956-60 and 
1961-65 that the average figure dropped by 
almost four-fifths. The share of Venezuela in 
the regional total was thus reduced from about 
35 per cent in the first three of the ten years 
considered to an annual average of 7 per cent 
over the rest of the period. This suggests that 
the refining sector is expanding appreciably 
throughout Latin America, except in Venezuela 
(see table 13). 
The trend shown in Venezuela was reversed 
in Brazil, whose share in the Latin American 
total had reached about 7 per cent by 1956-65. 
That of Mexico seems to have been some 15 
per cent in 1960-65, to judge from the data 
available. 
Except in Venezuela, the expansion of refin-
ing capacity in Latin America is geared to the 
satisfaction of internal demand for petroleum 
products. In 1939, domestic refining capacity 
supplied 20 per cent of the market, in 1951, 
40 per cent and by 1965, more than 60 per 
cent. If an import-export balance is drawn up, 
this implies that in net terms the region's own 
refineries met 30 per cent of consumer require-
ments in Latin America as a whole (excluding 
Venezuela) in 1939, and nearly 100 per cent 
in 1965. 
At the beginning of 1965, Central America 
and the Caribbean countries (excluding Cuba, 
Aruba and Curagao, Panama, Puerto Rico, and 
Trinidad and Tobago ) " had an aggregate re-
fining capacity of about 45,000 barrels daily, 
with an average of 9,000 per plant. Eleven coun-
tries in the area—excluding those mentioned 
above—have built refineries during the period 
1965-68, with an average plant capacity of ap-
proximately 11,000 barrels daily, and have thus 
raised total daily capacity to 136,000 barrels. 
Only two of the six new refineries have a ca-
pacity of less than 10,000 barrels daily.^^ Setting 
aside Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, as well 
as Mexico, the aggregate refining capacity of 
the South American countries in 1965 was 
approximately 273,000 barrels daily, distributed 
among twenty plants. Between 1965 and 1968, it 
9 Petroleum reserves in the rest of the country on 31 
December 1965 represented 15 per cent of the total re-
serves; production in the rest of the county in the same 
year only accounted for 0.5 per cent of total production. 
Cuba is excluded because of lack of data, and the 
other countries because their capacity reflects their posi-
tion as subsidiaries of the major producer and consumer 
centres. 
11 World Petroleum, 15 March 1965. 
11 
Table 12 
LATIN AMERICA: GROSS INVESTMENT IN REFINING, 1956-66 
(Millions of dollars) 
1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 
10 35 10 5 . . . . . . . . . 
17 35 54 66 47 44 41 38 32 23 
30 20 20 40 
87 56 40 12 10 8 6 17 10 5 
Chile 10 10 4 13 19 . . . . . . 
Colombia 5 3 6 5 
Ecuador 2 2 — — 
El Salvador — 2 5 8 
Guatemala — — — 3 ... 
Honduras — — 15 — . . . . . . 
Jamaica — — — 1 . . • 
— 3 2 2 
Panama 14 20 — 2 
Peru 2 11 1 2 . . . 
Trinidad and Tobago 15 5 10 18 
Uruguay 5 10 — 5 
TOTAL, Latin America 230 245 160 170 171 177 125 151 220 135 305 
SOURCES: Chase Manhattan Bank publications, except in the case of Brazil, where for the State enter-
prise—PETROBRAS—the figures given by the Ministry of Planning in Petróleo (Diagnóstico Preliminar), July 
1966, were adjusted, and for the private companies estimates were prepared on the basis of data presented in 
Conjuntura Económica, Rio de Janeiro (various issues) The figures for Venezuela were taken from the Venezuelan 
Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Petróleo y otros datos estadísticos, 1966, the following being the rates 
adopted for the purposes of conversion to dollars: 1957-63, 3.09 bolívares to the doUars; other years, 4.40 bolívares 
to the dollar. 
has increased to about 375,000 barrels daily, 
and the number of plants has risen to twenty-
four.i2 
6. INVESTMENT IN TRANSPORT AND MARKETING 
(a) Transport 
The estimated totals for 1956-65 are lower 
than the real figures, as reliable data were ob-
tainable only for investment in pipelines. The 
existing supply of rail and road transport equip-
ment, important as it is for some areas and 
products, had to be left out of the calculation, 
owing to the difficulties of preparing reasonably 
accurate statistics for transport of that kind 
(see table 14). 
For shipping, separate data are available only 
with respect to Brazil and Venezuela. In other 
cases, investment was estimated on the basis of 
the figures for increases in tanker fleets pub-
lished by ECLA.13 Between 1963 and 1965, gross 
12 Ibid. 
Economic Survey of Latin America, 1966 (United 
Nations publications, Sales No.: E.8.II.G.1), Part Three. 
tanker tonnage decreased by 15 per cent in 
Argentina (which accounts for 31 per cent of 
the total for Latin America), remained virtually 
stationary in Brazil (whose share of the totals 
is 29 per cent), increased by over 30 per cent in 
Mexico (to 14 per cent of the total) and under-
went no change in Venezuela (standing at 13 
per cent of the total). The total for the rest of 
the countries was 10 per cent higher in 1965 
than in 1963. 
As from 1959, Venezuela's share in total 
investment in pipelines in Latin America de-
clined sharply, and in 1960-65 the total figures 
failed to reach the high absolute levels recorded 
between 1956 and 1960. 
Annual investment in transport fluctuated 
widely, especially in 1956-60, a period charac-
terized by heavy investment in Venezuela as a 
result of the boom in refining. In 1961-65, on 
the other hand, investment was stabilized at 
about 5 million dollars per annum, and the 
percentage of crude that was refined remained 
fairly constant. Thus, refining, whose share in 
cumulative net investment in the Venezuelan 
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Table 13 
LATIN AMERICA: REFINING CAPACITY 
(Thousands of bands daily) 
Year Argen-tina Bolivia Brazil Chile 
Colont' 




Uruguay Vene-zuela Mexico 
Other 
countries Total Curasao 
Puerto 
Kico 
1 9 4 0 . . 94 .2 0.7 6 .5 0 .5 14.5 4 .2 2 .4 22 .0 79 .3 5.0 54 .4 99.8 — 383.5 505 .0 — 
1 9 4 7 . . 98 .7 1 . 2 5 .9 0 . 4 16.7 5 .3 3.8 30.0 96 .3 6 .3 105 .6 175 .0 — 545 .2 617 .0 — 
1 9 4 8 . . 102.0 1.8 9 .3 0 .4 23.2 6.1 4.7 32.8 96.3 9.0 105.6 183.0 — 574 .2 6 1 7 . 0 — 
1 9 4 9 . . 152.3 7.2 12.0 0 .4 23.7 7.3 4.7 35.0 104.3 15.7 133.5 160.4 — 656.5 617 .0 — 
1 9 5 0 . . 151 .7 7 .2 6 .5 0 .4 23 .8 7.3 4 .4 35.1 100.0 25 .2 258 .5 160.4 — 780.5 624 .3 — 
1 9 5 5 . . 189.1 12.3 105.8 20 .0 39.5 7.7 6 .0 47.5 115.0 28 .0 520 .8 408 .5 1,500.2 640 .0 
1 9 5 6 . . 195 .9 11.7 111.3 39.7 39.7 8.7 5.6 46.2 137.0 28 .0 668.8 440.0 — 1,712.9 650 .0 — 
1 9 5 7 . . 197.3 11.7 113.8 2 0 . 0 70.7 84 .2 5.6 49 .2 141.0 28.0 672 .5 444 .0 — 1,838.0 650 .0 72 .3 
1 9 5 8 . . 221 .5 12.3 152.8 24 .0 73.4 88 .4 5 .8 49.2 158.5 28 .0 883 .0 447 .0 — 2,143.9 650 .0 77.5 
1 9 5 9 . . 238 .4 12.2 156.3 24 .0 51.2 86 .9 7.4 49 .2 182.0 28 .0 945.5 357 .0 — 2,138.1 680 .0 83 .7 
I 9 6 0 . . 237 .5 11.2 208 .1 48 .0 78.2 86 .9 13.2 48.6 295 .0 28 .0 1 ,003.5 393 .0 — 2,451.2 680 .0 95 .2 
1 9 6 1 . . 368 .5 11.2 298 .8 44 .0 80 .8 86 .9 16 .2 48 .6 301 .0 48 .0 1 ,037.3 375 .0 — 2,696.3 6 8 0 . 0 102 .0 
1 9 6 2 . . 378 .7 11.5 298 .9 44 .0 84.1 86 .9 15.5 54 .9 305 .0 48 .0 1,072.6 387 .0 78.7 2 ,865.8 680 .0 110.0 
1 9 6 3 . . 372 .7 11.5 298 .9 47 .6 94.3 86 .9 15.5 56.3 310.0 51 .0 1 ,127.4 419 .0 104.7 2 ,995.8 670 .0 118.0 
1 9 6 4 . . 393 .4 11.5 334.6 54 .0 93 .3 85 .6 15.5 56 .4 345 .0 51 .0 1,182.1 461 .0 1 0 1 1 3,188.5 670 .0 155.0 
1 9 6 5 . . 423 .5 12.2 364 .9 83 .6 99.9 85 .6 19.2 63 .2 385 .0 35.0 1,199.9 4 2 1 . 0 104.1 3 ,298.1 7 4 0 . 0 150 .0 
1 9 6 6 . . 436 .0 15.0 370 .0 91 .0 129.0 87 .0 12.0 66.0 390 .0 40.0 1,212.0 436 .0 199.0 3 ,481.0 795 .0 155.0 
SOURCES: The Oil and Gas Journal-, for the year 1966 and for Venezuela, the Venezuelan Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Petróleo y otros datos 
estadísticos, 1966. 
Table 16 
LATIN AMERICA: NEW INVESTMENT IN TRANSPORT OF CRUDE PETROLEUM AND 
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, 1956-65 
(Millions of dollars) 
1957 1962 1963 1964 1965 
A. Oil pipelines 
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Brazil 3 10 19 20 46 12 7 16 10 7 
5 5 15 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Others 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 15 
TOTAL, tankers 8 15 39 25 56 17 11 20 14 22 
TOTAL, Latin America 
( A - f B ) 53 no 174 230 203 79 73 56 39 47 
SOURCES: Estimates based on data furnished by the Chase Manhattan Bank and PETROBRAS (Brazil). 
7 . INVESTMENT IN USE OF NATURAL GAS petroleum industry came next to that of pro-
duction in 1956-61, lost ground to transport 
in 1962-65. 
In the rest of Latin America, transport con-
tinued to absorb a much smaller proportion of 
investment than refining, although this assess-
ment may embody a wide margin of error, since 
lack of data precludes consideration of certain 
transport media whose relative importance is 
substantial in some cases. 
(b) Marketing 
In Venezuela, the share of marketing in in-
vestment was tiny in 1956-65 in relation to 
that of the other categories or activity in the 
petroleum sector (see table 15, which covers 
all petroleum products). 
The explanation lies in the disparity between 
domestic consumption of petroleum products on 
the one hand, and production and refining 
on the other. 
In the other Latin American countries, the 
proportion of total investment in the petroleum 
industry represented by annual investment in 
marketing ranged from 10 to 20 per cent. The 
reason for the downward trend in 1961-65 is to 
be found in the disproportionate increase in 
investment in refining and transport. 
Consumption of natural gas in Latin America 
was five times greater in 1965 than in 1956 
(see table 16). The biggest increase took place 
between 1961 and 1965, when consumption 
soared from 6,750 million cubic metres to 
Table 15 
LATIN AMERICA: NEW INVESTMENT IN 
MARKETING, 1956-65 
Year 
Millions of dollars Percentage of total invest-ment in petroleum 
Venezuela Other countries 
Venezuela Other countries 
1956 , , . , 10 70 1.2 16.5 
1957 , , 10 80 0.9 15.2 
1958 15 95 2.0 18.1 
1959 15 100 3.2 11.8 
1960 15 110 5.2 12.0 
1961 15 175 7.5 19.4 
1962 10 100 5.2 14.0 
1963 10 75 5.0 11.1 
1964 20 75 9.5 11.8 
1965 10 75 4.8 11.4 
SOURCE: Chase Manhattan Bank, Capital Investments 
of the World Petroleum Industry. 
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Table 16 
LATIN AMERICA: CONSUMPTION OF NATURAL GAS OUTSIDE THE 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, 1956-65 
(Millions o¡ cubic metres) 
Year Argentina Brazil Colombia Mexico Venezuela 
Latin 
America 
1956 305 — 1,378 932 2,615 
1957 388 — 1,414 1,120 2,922 
1958 , . — — 1,679 1,260 3.337 
1959 . 421 — 1,965 1,515 3,901 
1960 805 66 — 2,436 1,686 4,993 
1961 1,714 54 — 3,203 1,781 6,752 
1962 2,238 30 121 3,909 2,043 8,341 
1963 . 34 204 4,648 2 249 9,600 
1964 , 2,761 33 320 5,364 2,557 11,035 
1965 . , ,. 3,317 35 . . . 6,178 2,703 12 233 
SOÜRCE: ECLA, on the basis of official statistics. 
12,230 million. Mexico accounted for one-half 
of this total. Next came Argentina, where con-
sumption amounted to 3,300 million cubic 
metres, and Venezuela, with 2,700 million. Con-
sumption in the other countries as a whole, 
excluding that of the petroleum industry, did 
not represent even as much as 5 per cent of 
total consumption in the region. 
Production of gas (generally in association 
with crude petroleum) is far in excess of con-
sumption ; it is therefore estimated that consump-
tion may increase considerably in the near 
future, if gas is used as raw material for the 
petrochemical industry or exported in liquid 
form (as might be done in Venezuela) 
Separate figures for investment in natural gas 
cannot be given, as it is not usually itemized in 
investment breakdowns. For Argentina, however, 
it was possible to obtain these data (see table 
17) 
Hitherto, almost all the natural gas used in 
Latin America has been associated gas, and 
consequently little or no investment has been re-
quired at the production stage. In Mexico, 
Brazil and Argentina a few free gas deposits 
are being worked. Apart from the figures on 
Argentina given in table 17, it is assumed that 
in Brazil investment has been insignificant, since 
the volume of consumption is small, and that 
in Mexico, on the other hand, it has been 
substantial, although in neither case are sta-
tistical data available. 
It is in the transport of natural gas that initial 
investment requirements are heaviest. For the 
"See The Oil and Gas Journal, 20 November 1967; 
and also Creole Corporation, Carta Semanal de Noticias, 
Caracas, 17 May 1968, p. 1. 
purposes of estimating them, the only data avail-
able, over and above the complete figures for 
Argentina, are those relating to the construction 
of gas pipelines in Mexico and Venezuela. 
Yearly estimates cannot be prepared, however, 
as these data cover only increases in the total 
length of the systems, and are based on the 
dates of entry into operation of various gas 
pipelines. 
On the basis of the costs of gas pipelines with 
diiferent diameters and of the auxiliary com-
pression plant, total investment in Mexico in 
1956-65 would seem to have been approximately 
150 million dollars. A similar estimate for 
Venezuela gives a total investment of 45 million 
dollars over the same period. 
For the other sectors of activity (storage and 
marketing) direct information is available only 
for Argentina. However, application of this 
country's standards of investment suggests that 
in Mexico annual investment may have amoun-
ted to approximately 20 million dollars and in 
Venezuela to about 5 million. 
8 . FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
Except in Argentina and Mexico, it was not 
until after the Second World War that domestic 
investment in the petroleum industry in Latin 
America began to make a significant contribu-
tion to the total, which was stepped up in 
1956-65. Foreign investment, mainly on the part 
of the United Kingdom and the United States, 
was responsible for the whole of the initial 
financing of the industry, except in Argentina. 
Cases of pioneer domestic investment in some 
countries can be cited, but they are of purely 
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Table 17 
ARGENTINA: INVESTMENT IN USE OF NATURAL GAS, 1959-65 
f Millions of dollars) 
Year Production Transport Storage Marketing Other in-vestment Total 
1959 3.4 2.9 •— 1.5 1.4 9.2 
1960 11.4 188.5 0.4 7.2 2.4 211.9 
1961 17.9 18.6 0.2 13,2 2.5 52.4 
1962 31,0 20.2 2.3 5.2 3.3 62.0 
1963 .. . 46.0 12.8 1.4 5.4 2.8 68.4 
1964 21.2 68.2 3.9 5.9 3.3 102.5 
1965 , , , . 17.5 66.0 7.4 5.8 4.2 100.9 
SOURCE: State Gas Enterprise. Conversion to dollars was based on the following ex-
change rates published by the International Monetary Fund in International Financial 
Statistics", which are as follows: 
Number of pesos 








historical interest, and lack the importance at-
tained by domestic investment in Argentina right 
from the beginning of the century, or in Mexico 
with the nationalization of the industry in 1938. 
Prior to 1914, investment was channelled 
almost in its entirety into the marketing of 
petroleum products, imported from the United 
States, except in Mexico and Peru. In 1914 the 
United States' extra-territorial investment in 
production of crude amounted to about 143 
million dollars, of which 110 million were 
placed in Latin America, the lion's share (about 
85 million) falling to Mexico. Another 15 mil-
lion dollars were invested in Peru, and only 
5 million in Venezuela.^® 
The United Kingdom had twenty-three pe-
troleum concerns in the region, twelve of which 
were in Mexico, while the others were spread 
over Cuba, Peru, Venezuela and Ecuador. Most 
of these enterprises devoted their energies to 
exploration and to the purchase and sale of 
properties and concessions; only a few—in 
Peru, Venezuela and Mexico—were actively en-
gaged in production.^® 
By the early nineteen-twenties, the United 
States had trebled its investment in production 
in Latin America, expanding it in Colombia and 
Venezuela, although Mexico was still the most 
favoured recipient, and absorbed 70 per cent of 
the 290 million dollars invested in the region.^'' 
Since then, petroleum investment in Latin 
America has been characterized by the pre-
ponderance of United States capital and by 
the growth of Venezuela's share, especially 
in the production sector. 
Nevertheless, the proportion of the United 
States' total cumulative investment in petroleum 
industries abroad that was placed in Latin 
America dropped from 55 per cent in 1929 to 
45 per cent in 1940, 42 per cent in 1950 and 30 
per cent in 1956. In 1965 it was 23 per cent.^ ® 
Venezuela's share in total United States invest-
ment in petroleum in the world as a whole 
covered around 20 per cent up to 1956, but 
by 1965 had dwindled to 13 per cent (see table 
15 Cleona Lewis, Americios Stake in International In-
vestment (Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1938). 
J. F. Rippy, British Investments in Latin America, 
1822-1949 (University of Minnesota Press, 1959). 
IT America's Stake in International Investment, op. cit. 
Based on data taken from L. M. Fanning, American 
Oil Operations Abroad (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1947) 
up to 1940 and from Foreign Oil and Free World (New 
York, McGraw-Hill, 1954) for 1950. For the other years 
the data given are based on figures from the United 
States Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business, September issues. 
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18). Of total investment in Latin America, 
however, the proportion absorbed by Venezuela 
still exceeded 50 per cent, and in 1957 and 
1958 climbed above 70 per cent; only in 1964 
and 1965 did it fall below 60 per cent. 
The United States' direct investment in plant 
and equipment in Latin America followed a 
downward trend in relation to its investment in 
petroleum in the world as a whole, since the 
proportion it represented declined from 32 to 
16 per cent between 1958 and 1965. According 
to provisional data, the corresponding figures 
for 1966 and 1967 are 10 per cent and 11 per 
cent respectively (see table 19) . 
In terms of annual averages, the United 
States' contribution to new investment decreased 
from 43.2 per cent in 1957-60 to 37.6 per cent 
in 1961-65 (see table 20) . 
It is di£Bcult to relate cumulative Latin 
American investment to direct foreign invest-
ment, because complete data on the latter are 
available only for Venezuela, and the figures 
obtainable from different sources show very 
marked discrepancies,^® under a wide variety 
of heads. 
If cumulative gross foreign investment (see 
table 21) is compared with the figures for 
cumulative investment in Latin America pre-
sented in table 6, it will be seen that foreign 
investment accounted for 80 per cent of the 
total in 1956 and 43 per cent in 1964. These 
proportions are not exact, because except in 
Venezuela's case the data do not incorporate 
foreign investment other than that of the United 
States; but they represent a fair approximation, 
since the investment placed in other countries 
is not on such a large scale as that effected in 
Venezuela. 
The figures are further distorted by currency 
conversion and accounting difficulties, apart 
from the fact that they do not reveal the true 
extent of foreign interests in the petroleum 
economy, inasmuch as the reports of the firms 
concerned give no indication of the real value 
of the petroleum discovered. 
Data on which to base a breakdown of foreign 
investment by types of activity are still more 
unreliable. Up to 1940, foreign investment was 
concentrated mainly in the marketing and pro-
duction sectors. Most of Venezuela's crude was 
1® For example, the figures given by the Chase Manhat-
tan Bank are 50 per cent higher than those published 
by the United States Department of Commerce. This 
discrepancy may be due to revaluations of assets, differ-
ences in methods of breaking down data, use of different 
exchange rates, etc. 
refined at the plants in Trinidad and in Aruba 
and Curasao. By 1940 Venezuela had already 
become the world's second largest petroleum 
producer after the United States, with about 
600,000 barrels daily, but its refining capacity 
in that year was 5 4 , 0 0 0 barrels daily, i.e., 
slightly more than half that of Mexico ( 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 
barrels) or Argentina ( 9 4 , 0 0 0 barrels), 6 0 per 
cent of that of Trinidad ( 7 9 , 0 0 0 barrels), and 
just over 10 per cent of that of Aruba and Cu-
ragao ( 5 0 5 , 0 0 0 barrels). Not until the nineteen-
fifties was there a considerable expansion of 
refining in Venezuela. 
The distribution of United States investment 
among the various sectors of Venezuela's pe-
troleum industry seems to have undergone little 
change in 1 9 5 7 - 6 4 . Of total net investment in 
production, refining and marketing in 1957, 
production absorbed 88 per cent, refining 11 
per cent and marketing 1 per cent. The share 
of refining decreased to 10 per cent in 1964, 
while that of marketing increased to 2 per 
c e n t . 2 0 
In the rest of Latin America, on the other 
hand, the distribution of United States invest-
ment altered substantially between 1957 and 
1964. In 1957, 55 per cent went into production, 
18 per cent into refining, and 27 per cent into 
marketing. In 1964, the corresponding propor-
tions were, respectively, 41, 36 and 23 per cent^^ 
9 . CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, 1 9 6 5 - 8 0 
(a) General remarks 
Long-term projections of capital forma-
tion in the petroleum sector of the economy 
are indispensable both for over-all development 
programmes and for the oil companies them-
selves, since the petroleum industry is so vast 
and complex that for management purposes 
something must be known of the trends it is 
likely to follow over the next ten or fifteen 
years. The petroleum industry is affected, how-
ever, by a number of economic, political and 
other exogenous factors for which long-term 
forecasting is a very hazardous business, apart 
from the lack of complete technical and sta-
tistical data on which to base the application 
of a model taking all identifiable variables into 
account. 
Accordingly, the projections presented here 
are based as a rule on the ratios between capital 
investment and increases in production (or 
domestic demand in the case of marketing) 
20 Chase Manhattan Bank, Balance of Payments of 




1956 19S7 1958 1959 mo 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965" 
Total, all areas 7,280 8,991 9,681 10,423 10,944 — 12,661 13,652 14,334 15,320 
1,768 2,154 . 2,410 2,465 2,667 — 2,834 3,134 3,187 3,320 
2,232 3,060 3,211 3,312 3,264 — 3,644 3,636 3,630 3,534 
Brazil 211 227 215 82 76 — 79 60 53 57 
Colombia 107 106 91 225 233 — 257 246 255 265 
Mexico 17 18 19 30 32 — 67 65 56 48 
Venezuela 1,411 2,179 2,302 2,164 1,995 — 2,202 2,166 2,139 2,033 
Other countries 486 530 584 811 928 — 1,039 1,099 1,127 1,131 
Europe 992 1,184 1,256 1,453 1,726 — 2,365 2,776 3,102 3,429 
Africa — 254 276 338 407 — 627 702 883 1,020 
Asia — 1,747 ' 1,864 1,662 1,655 — 1,761 1,920 2,054 2,384 
Middle East — 1,118 1,218 1,170 1,119 — 1,148 1,206 1,240 1,491 
Far Easi — 629 646 492 536 — 612 714 814 893 
Oceania — .— _ 355 372 — 462 496 453 499 
Cumulative investment in tank-
ers, international — • 593 664 838 851 — 968 988 1,064 1,133 
Table 18 
CMillions of dollars) 
¡ 5^ 
Canada 1,768 






















































SOURCE: United States Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Busi-
ness (September of each year). 
a I.e.. United States investment abroad. 
b Provisional figures. 
Including dependent territories in the western hemisphere. 
Table 16 
UNITED STATES: DIRECT INVESTMENT IN PLANT AND EQUIPMENT FOR FOREIGN 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRIES, 1957-65 
(Millions of dollars) 
1957 1958 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
Total, all areas 2,322 1,854 1,558 1,467 1534 1,628 1,889 2,079 2,267 
Canada 584 510 380 360 315 300 375 385 503 
Latin America^ 1,039 577 449 340 306 339 307 327 368 
Brazil — . — 5 5 5 4 3 4 3 
Colombia — — 25 25 30 32 30 58 35 
Mexico — — 1 1 2 2 10 5 2 
Venezuela — — 280 160 135 145 142 134 130 
Other countries — — 128 149 134 156 122 126 198 
Europe 275 422 399 345 438 494 642 645 603 
A frica — — 74 115 171 176 164 271 284 
Asia — — 172 176 195 178 297 280 430 
Middle East — _ 81 76 87 72 125 111 233 
Far East — — 91 101 108 106 172 169 197 
Oceania — — 44 66 64 76 64 65 74 
Annual investment in 
tankers, international . — — 100 65 45 65 40 100 66 
SODBCE: United States Department of Commerce, 
Survey of Current Business. 
a Including dependent territories in the western hemi-
sphere. 
over the last ten years. These findings were 
checked against direct information or invest-
ment budgets supplied by some of the com-
panies. Capital-output ratios largely depend upon 
the structure of production, which may vary 
widely from one period and/or from one area 
to another, but the special characteristics of the 
base period adopted for the projections, which 
Table 20 
LATIN AMERICA: NEW INVESTMENT IN THE 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, 1957-65 
(Millions of dollars) 
United States 
Year Total United States investment as investment a percentage 
of total 
1957 1,600 1,039 65 
1958 1,250 577 46 
1959 1,325 449 34 
1960 1,200 340 28 
1961 1,100 306 28 
1962 895 339 38 
1963 800 307 38 
1964 775 327 42 
1965 870 368 42 
SOURCES: For total figures. Chase Manhattan Bank; 
for United States, United States Department of Com-
merce, Survey of Current Business. 
exerted a marked influence on the structure in 
question, could not always be taken into con-
sideration. Nor was it possible, in every case, 
to account for certain anomalous variations in 
the data reviewed and, accordingly, to eliminate 
them or to asses the limits within which they 
may recur in the future. 
In view of the impossibility of taking into 
consideration all the variables needed for an 
ideal projection, it was decided to determine 
future investment on the basis of one selected 
factor which could be independently evaluated. 
The investment concerned was then estimated in 
accordance with the ratio between the time 
series for the factor chosen and the capital 
invested during the same period, this coefficient 
being applied to the projection series. Geological 
conditions and production potential in the Latin 
American countries, together with the growth of 
demand, were treated as decisive factors in the 
calculation of future investment. 
The viability of these projections might 
usefully be discussed in the light of investment 
theory. Such an analysis would have to take 
into account not only the views of the countries 
concerned but also those of the international 
enterprises operating in their territory, which 
are not always the same with respect to invest-
ment decisions. At all events, developments are 
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Table 21 
LATIN AMERICA: CUMULATIVE GROSS.FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 1956-64 
(Millions of dollars) 
Venezuela 
— ———• Ocker J . 
Vnilf Netherlands Total countries-
States Kingdom 
m e 2,610 475 L151 4^ 235 821 5,057 
1957 . . . . . . . . . 881 
1958 3,438 581 1,419 5,438 909 6,347 
1959 3,429 579 1,430 5,438 1,148 6,586 
1960 3,693 2,048 — 5,741 1,269 7,010 
1961 3,679 2,090 — 5,769 
1962 3,822 2,007 — 5,829 1,442 7,271 
1963 3,850 1,961 — 5,811 1,470 1,281 
1964 3,271 1,384 — 4,655 1,491 6,146 
SOURCES: For Venezuela, Central Bank revorts and papers; for other countries. United 
States Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business. 
" United States investment only. 
tending to bear out the hypotheses established ferent item. The resulting total formed the 
here. divisor of the investment coefficient. 
Ti u t^^^t Again, as a perfect correlation between ex-(b ) Unit investment , ° . ' i ^ i . . . .i i ploration and production is impossible, the 
World averages for investment in the petro- inclusion of exploration in the capital coeiEcient 
leum industry per barrel/day of output, with detracts from the latter's usefulness for projec-
the exclusion of the United States, Canada and tion purposes. The solution would be to ascer-
the socialist countries, usually vary as follows: lain the approximate cost of finding petroleum 
Dollars rcscrves, in order to estimate how much would 
Production 800 to 1,10022 have to be invested in exploration if a satisfac-
Refining 500 to 600 tory ratio was to be maintained between proven 
Marketing 550 to 650 reserves and the level of production selected. 
The following are the corresponding figures But, as was shown in the analysis of Latin 
for Latin America: American investment, expenditure on explora-
tion can scarcely ever be differentiated from 
Production 73D to 3,600 expenditure on production. Nor is precise in-
(weighted average 1,250) formation always available on what proportion 
Refining 500 to 1,400 of the increase in reserves is represented by 
(weighted average 820) new discoveries. It is therefore virtually impos-
Marketing 600 sible to evaluate the cost of proving reserves. 
rp, c 1 1 . 1 1 . The difficulty is not peculiar to Latin America. 
These figures were worked out by analysing that have long been 
annual investment over a fairly long period. troleum producers and have plenty of data 
In both cases, production includes expenditure ^^  j^eir d isposal - for example, the United States. 
on exploration. Presumably, on the basis of a company's cost 
The unit investment required to produce, accounting and records of reserves, and by 
process and market a barrel of petroleum is means of a chronological breakdown of the 
calculated on the basis of gross investment, as data, a representative figure for the cost of 
it is extremely difficult to break the latter down oil-finding per barrel of petroleum could be 
by replacement and new investment. Thus, the arrived at; but such information is never pub-
figures were obtained by adding to the volume lished.^® 
of production the probable volume of replace-
ment requirements, computed in accordance with „ See W. F. Lovejoy and Paul T. Homan, Methods of 
J • V- t X 1. j-r Estimating Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas, and 
current annual depreciation rates for each dif- (Resources for the Future, Inc., 1965); 
and W. D. Davis, "The Enigma of Oil and Gas Finding 
22 Including 180 dollars per barrel for non-capitalized Costs," Accounting Papers of the Eighteenth Annual 
expenditure on exploration. Conference of Accountants (Tulsa, Oklahoma, 1964). 
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A few examples will suffice to show how 
strong an element of fortuity is introduced into 
the projections by the inclusion of expenditure 
on exploration. In Ecuador, between 1938 and 
1950 two companies spent in the aggregate 
about 50 million dollars on continuous explora-
tion, without striking oil. Some ten companies 
secured exploration rights in the Sechura Desert 
in Peru; between 1953 and 1956, twenty-two 
wells were drilled at a cost of 20 million dollars, 
but no results were obtained on a commercial 
scale. In Brazil, about 100 million dollars were 
invested in the Amazon basin in 1955-63, and 
30 million in the Paraná basin; in neither case 
did the investment prove an economic propo-
sition. 
_ Despite all the objections to an over-all coeffi-
cient including expenditure on both exploration 
and production, it has to be adopted by force 
of circumstances, in default of a more accurate 
method. 
A comparison between unit investment figures 
in the various Latin American countries reveals 
wide disparities in investment costs in the re-
gion, attributable not only to differences in 
productivity per well, but also to the stage of 
development reached by the industry. Except in 
Venezuela's case, the petroleum industry in 
Latin America must be regarded as incipient 
in comparison with its counterparts in other 
regions. Its exploration costs are close to the 
world average for starting production of petro-
leum in a new area, which has been established 
at about 2,000 dollars per barrel/day;^^ its 
investment in refining, simple as is the plant 
installed, approaches the average cost of instal-
ling much more complex new refineries in other 
parts of the world; and only at the distribution 
stage is unit investment comparable to world 
standards. 
Unit investment decreases to a marked extent 
as the industry reaches higher levels of de-
velopment; but, setting aside Venezuela, the 
world average is approached in only very few 
countries, among them being Colombia and 
Mexico. 
In Brazil, investment figures still reflect such 
temporary initial components as investment in 
infrastructure. This situation may possibly be 
prolonged for a time, as the development of 
new oilfields is just beginning. The same is true 
of Bolivia, where unit investment is higher than 
in Brazil. The reason why unit investment is so 
heavy in Ecuador, Peru and Argentina is to be 
24 W. J. Levy, The Search for Oil in Developing 
Countries (New York), International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, 1960. 
found in the low rate of production per well 
and the resultant high level of drilling costs 
per unit of output. 
In the case of refineries, investment costs are 
determined by the complexity of the plants. As 
the complexity index is seldom high in Latin 
America, unit investment in new refineries 
works out at 700 to 1,000 dollars per barrel/ 
day. As refining develops, investment per unit 
of additional production capacity decreases, 
but as this activity is only recently growing 
up in the region, unit investment in refining is 
much the same as that required for new re-
fineries. 
(c) Investment projections, 1965-80 
Table 22 presents estimates of the capital 
likely to be needed for the development of the 
petroleum industry in Latin America between 
1965 and 1980, based on the assumption that 
demand for hydrocarbons will be met both 
with domestic production and refining and with 
imports. To define the relative contribution of 
each of these sources, use was made of of-
ficial data on the capacity for payment allocated 
to the petroleum sector and on the prospects 
for domestic production of hydrocarbons. 
The figures represent gross investment, or, 
in other words, they include the sums estimated 
for the replacement of depleted capacity, on 
the basis of the rates that were applied in 
calculating unit investment. 
It was not possible, however, to make al-
lowance for obsolescence, except to the extent im-
plicit in current depreciation. Nor was utiliza-
tion of the capacity existing in all sectors at the 
beginning of the projection period taken into 
account; this is largely justified by the fact 
that it was undoubtedly being fully utilized. 
Capital goods costs are affected by conflict-
ing factors: rising price trends are offset by 
lower total capital expenditure. The data for the 
most recent period were adjusted on the basis of 
available information regarding investment un-
der way. 
Table 23 shows the investment effected or 
projected from 1956 to 1980. The total for 
1961-65 is nearly 35 per cent higher than the 
corresponding figure for 1956-60. Although 
there is an increase of 30 per cent between 
1956-65 and 1966-75, the growth rate drops 
from 20 per cent in 1971-75 to about 15 per 
cent in 1976-80. This is due to the change in the 
composition of production by countries. While 
Venezuela accounts for 627,000 of the addi-
tional 889,000 barrels per day produced in 
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Table 16 
L A T I N A M E R I C A : T O T A L G R O S S I N V E S T M E N T I N P E T R O L E U M A N D G A S , 
1966-80 
(Millions of dollars) 
1966-70 197I-7S 1976-80 1966-80 
Exploration and production 3,850 4,560 5,200 13,610 
990 1,430 1,700 4,120 
Marketing 560 680 850 2,090 
260 80 80 420 
Maritime and inland waterway transport 120 80 100 300 
TOTAL, petroleum 5,780 6,830 7,930 20,540 
Natural gas» 580 600 700 1,880 
Liquid gasa 70 50 40 160 
TOTAL, gas and petroleum 6,430 7,480 8,670 22,580 
SOURCE: E C L A project ions, 
a Proportion not included under previous heads. 
1960-65, its share in the increment of 872,000 
per day projected for 1966-70 is only 413,000. 
As unit investment is always much lower in 
Venezuela than in the other Latin American 
countries, total investment by the other countries 
will increase. But in the course of the whole 
period, production increments are expected to 
revert to the same proportions as in the past, 
which explains the percentage decline in the 
subsequent five-year periods. 
There is little change in the percentage shares 
of the various sectors between 1956-60 and 
1961-65, but in the fifteen years covered by 
the projection, that of production follows a 
rising trend in relation to 1961-65. 
World projections covering the period 1966-
80 are not available for comparison with the 
estimates presented here. It may reasonably 
be assumed, however, that with the exclusion 
of the United States, Canada and the socialist 
countries investment in the world petroleum in-
dustry will amount to about 36,000 million dol-
lars in 1965-70. Latin America's share in this 
total will be 16 per cent, or 1 per cent less 
than in 1961-65. 
United States investment in Latin America 
will have totalled slightly over 1,100 million 
dollars in 1966-68,25 and in 1969 should not be 
less than 300 million.^® Since estimates from the 
same source as the latter figure fell 50 per cent 
short of the real figures for earlier years, it 
may be assumed that 1,000 million dollars will 
25 The 0Ü and Gas Journal, 16 October 1967. 
26 Engineering News Record, McGraw-Hill, 10 August 
1967. 
be invested in 1 9 6 9 - 7 0 . Thus United States in-
vestment alone should amount to 2,100 million 
dollars, i.e., 36 per cent of the total petroleum 
investment projected for Latin America in 
1 9 6 6 - 7 0 . 
The figures for investment requirements in 
1 9 6 5 - 8 0 are unprecedented in the development 
of the petroleum industry in Latin America, ex-
cept for Venezuela. Little is known of the capi-
tal formation situation in the various countries. 
Setting aside the more or less marked distor-
tions introduced by the inflation factor, the 
industry's sinking fund for depreciation would 
be able to contribute about 25 per cent of the 
amount of capital required. Given the foreign 
contribution indicated above the funds available 
would cover approximately 60 per cent of the 
investment needed. 
1 0 . METHODOLOGICAL NOTES 
(a) Appraisal of the data used 
The figures available are often inaccurate 
and are not always based on data supplied by 
the petroleum companies themselves, nor are 
they invariably comparable with the figures ob-
tained from other sources. 
For instance, the financial data furnished by 
the Chase Manhattan Bank are taken from a 
sample based on the annual reports of the petro-
leum companies and other sources of informa-
tion representing the bulk of the world petro-
leum industry. Where no first-hand information 
was available, the estimates were worked out 
by applying coefficients (obtained by comparing 
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Table 16 
LATIN AMERICA: ANNUAL GROSS INVESTMENT IN PETROLEUM AND GAS, 
1956-80 











Marketing Gas' Total 
1956 565 230 45 8 80 ... 928 
1957 811 245 95 15 90 1,256 
1958 820 160 135 34 110 1,259 
1959 785 170 205 20 115 9 1,304 
1960 691 171 147 51 125 212 1,397 
TOTAL, 1956-60 3,672 976 627 128 520 221 6,144 
1961 645 178 62 12 190 52 1,139 
1962 554 125 62 7 110 62 920 
1963 506 152 36 16 85 68 863 
1964 425 220 25 10 80 102 862 
1965 500 135 25 7 85 101 853 
TOTAL, 1961-65 2,630 810 210 52 550 385 4,637 
Projections 
1966-70 3,850 990 260 120 560 650 6,430 
1971-75 4,560 1,430 80 80 680 650 7,480 
1976-80 5,200 1,700 80 100 850 740 8,670 
SOURCE: E C L A p r o j e c t i o n s . 
» Natural gas and liquid gas not included under previous heads. 
the figures in the sample) to the physical data, 
which are easier to find.^'' 
This method, which is satisfactory as far as 
the major producing and consuming areas are 
concerned or for an analysis of the world situa-
tion, is much less useful if the petroleum indus-
try in Latin America (excluding Venezuela) is 
considered separately, since its conditions are 
not comparable with those of the major pro-
ducing areas. 
Apart from being inadequate in their cover-
age, the current financial data on the petroleum 
industry suffer from other shortcomings due to 
the industry's accounting practices, which may 
lead to erroneous conclusions when the area of 
analysis is narrowed down too much. 
The financial statistics are usually the by-
products of records whose form and substance 
are geared to the requirements of the law and 
are therefore more useful for legal purposes 
than as a guide to the definition of economic 
concepts. The different meanings attributed to 
the term "capital" and similar or derived con-
cepts are reflected in ledger entries, and are thus 
largely responsible for the lack of uniformity 
in the data presented.^® Petroleum data have 
other defects as well that stem from the fact 
that most of the major integrated petroleum 
companies are widely dispersed, both geogra-
phically and operationally.^® 
There are also commercial reasons for not 
observing a high standard of accuracy in the 
published data; this is true not only of financial 
aspects but of some of the physical data, such 
as those referring to proved reserves. These 
shortcomings are more pronounced, when, as 
in the case of petroleum, the market is highly 
27 A. G. Gols, "Postwar U.S. Foreign Petroleum In-
vestment". In U.S. Private and Government Investment 
Abroad, R. F. Mikesell, ed. (Eugene, Oregon, 1962), 
p. 415. 
28 See 0 . Morgenstern, On the Accuracy of Economic 
Observations (Princeton, New Jersey, 1963), p. 70; S. P. 
Porter, Petroleum accounting practices (New York, Mc-
Graw-Hill, 1965), chapter 15 in particular; Petroleum 
Accountants' Society of Western Canada, "Study of full 
cost accounting"; Arthur Andersen & Co., Accounting 
for oil and gas exploration costs (1963). 
29 On the Accuracy of Economic Observations, 
cit., p. 71. 
op. 
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concentrated.®® The greater the power of the 
monopolies and oligopolies, the less reliable will 
be certain statistics on the petroleum industry.® ^  
Even in the case of the so-called independent 
concerns the information is seldom wholly satis-
factory 
The same may be said of the government 
enterprises. Morgenstern, for instance, points 
out the discrepancies between the data published 
by United States government ofiSces and by the 
Bank of England, which are due to considera-
tions of security or economic policy.®® 
Where Latin American State petroleum enter-
prises are concerned, the discrepancies are more 
likely to be due to the difficulty of delimiting 
their powers of action as enterprises and their 
place in the public administration. These enter-
prises may, for example, enjoy certain invest-
ment privileges, such as tax exemptions, special 
exchange rates, and special terms for the pur-
chase of property which lead to a considerable 
difference between book and market values dur-
ing the period of investment. The effects of in-
flation are such as to render meaningless or 
highly conditional the conversion of expenditure 
in local currency into dollars, and the calcula-
tion of the figures in constant values poses 
serious accounting and statistical problems. The 
result is that investment is seemingly under-
estimated in the context of the prevailing eco-
nomic conditions in the petroleum industry and 
the country in general. Consequently, reliance 
on a simple comparison of the unadjusted book 
values in the companies' records must be ruled 
out. 
Investment requirements may also be pushed 
up by the need to purchase domestic equipment 
and use local services in the interests of pro-
moting the national economy, although their 
costs are often far higher. 
The records of the public enterprises possibly 
give a more faithful picture of the facts, since 
they include disbursements in allied social fields. 
as is the practice in such countries as the United 
States.®* 
In Latin America it is difficult to obtain the 
fund of information needed to prepare tables 
that are truly comparable. But if the limitations 
of the material are borne in mind and the 
discrepancies allowed for, it is possible to adjust 
the data so as to make the criteria as uniform 
as possible. 
The complexity of the problem of currency 
conversion is best illustrated by the case of 
Brazil. Book values in cruzeiros give a false 
idea of the volume of, investment, and the situa-
tion is much the same in Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay. The reason is that the special exchange 
rates applied to imports for the petroleum in-
dustry were set far below what may be con-
sidered the real rate. Moreover, the other official 
rates in 1953-61 are not representative, since 
that was the period when a system of public 
foreign exchange auctions was adopted, and the 
only fixed point was the minimum rate estab-
lished for each of the categories into which 
Brazil's imports were divided. The oiScial ex-
change rates are listed in table 24, where they 
are compared with the purchasing power parity 
rate during 1955-65.®® The special rate for the 
petroleum industry remained well below the 
other rates from 1955 to 1963. In the last few 
years, a single official rate of a more realistic 
kind has been applied to all imports, including 
those for the petroleum industry. 
The figures in cruzeiros are distorted by two 
factors acting in opposition. One is the yearly 
increase in investment and the quickening tempo 
of inflation, and the other is the reduction in 
the value of the import content of capital goods. 
By roughly calculating the percentage share of 
imports in total investment each year, it was 
On the mode and degree of the concentration in 
genera!, see M. de Chazeau and A. Kahn, Integration 
and Competition in the Petroleum Industry (Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1959). On the Middle East, see Issawi 
and Yeganeh, The economics oj Middle Eastern oil 
(New York, Praeger, 1952), pp. 58-59. 
.310/1 the Accuracy of Economic Observations, op. 
berry, Business cycles and economic growth (New York, 
McGraw-Hill, 1958). 
32 W. Leeman, The price of Middle East oil (Cornell 
cit., p. 18; "Oligopoly and investment". In J. S. Duesem-
University Press, 1962), p. 38. 
33 On the Accuracy of Economic Observations, op. 
cit., p. 20. On accounting manipulations, see Z. Mik-
dashi, A Financial Analysis of Middle Eastern Oil Con-
cessions: 1901-65 (New York, Praeger, 1966). 
34 R. Engler, La política petrolera (México, Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 1966), p. 162. 
85 In spite of the limitations to Cassel's theory, writers 
on the subject generally agree that there is a clear rela-
tionship between exchange rates and prices, which tends 
to maintain a certain equilibrium. This justifies its prac-
tical application in this study, mainly in relation to the 
high rate of Brazilian inflation during the period under 
consideration. See P. Samuelson, Economics (New York, 
McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 386. In addition a formula has 
been adopted to allow for the relationships between im-
port and export prices. Useful information on this sub-
ject can be obtained from: L. Federici, Tevria dei cambi 
(Milan, 1945); J. T. Walter, Foreign Exchange Equilib-
rium (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1951); J. W. An-
gelí, The Theory of International Prices (Harvard, 
1926); J. M. Keynes, A Treatise on Money (Lon-
don, 1958); A. Sampaio, Determinagdo numérica da taxa 
camvial (Rio de Janeiro, 1953); B. Balassa, "The pur-
chasing power parity doctrine: a reappraisal", The 




BRAZIL: EXCHANGE RATES, 1955-65 
(Cruzeiros per dollar) 
Year 
official exchange rate 













1955 73.97 _ 31.32 66.73 
1956 — 31.32 82.73 
1957 76.42 — 42.15 87.57 
1958 139.80 — . 63.83 104.44 
1959 184.10 — 100.00 139.65 
1960 195.00 — 100.00 166.92 
1961 307.00 — 214.50 241.10 
1962 475.00 — 318.00 411.39 
1963 620.00 .— 547.50 669.67 
1964 1,314.80 1,314.80 1,213.31 
1965 2,200.00 1,920.00 1,920.00 1,857.60 
SOURCES: The data on prices in Brazil have been taken from different issues of Con-
juntura Económica (Rio de Janeiro), United States price indexes have been taken from 
the Federal Reserve Bulletin. 
possible to deduct the cost of the imports in 
cruzeiros from the aggregate value, and then 
re-establish the original value of the imports 
in dollars by applying the special exchange rates 
to the cost estimates. Meanwhile, the value of 
investment in local currency was converted into 
dollars at the purchasing power parity rate 
given in table 24. The sum of the two is pre-
sented in table 25, which also shows the com-
position of investment. 
Up to 1955 about 50 per cent of the total 
investment was in local currency. Between 1955 
and 1965 this proportion shrank until it aver-
aged less than 30 per cent, and has probably 
decreased a good deal more in the last few 
years. 
Table 25 















1938 to 1945 . . . 19.3 
1946 to 1950 . . . 28.3 ... 
1951 to 1955 . . . 30.3 ... • • • 
1956 70.0 26.4 37.0 3.0 0.1 0.8 32.7 
1957 87.7 46.0 26.6 7.9 0.1 0.9 18.5 
1958 131.7 39.2 30.1 10.6 0.1 0.5 19.5 
1959 131.5 31.3 51.0 12.5 0.1 0.5 4.6 
1960 190.8 24.3 38.9 17.7 11.5 0.6 7.0 
1961 132.4 37.5 34.7 9.0 10.6 0.9 7.3 
1962 133.2 39.5 34.3 5.4 7.2 1.0 12.6 
1963 140.8 44.8 28.5 9.7 6.4 1.5 9.1 
1964 134.0 44.5 22.1 8.2 12.1 1.5 11.6 
1965 165.0 47.6 20.3 5.4 14.2 1.7 10.8 
SOURCES: Reports of the National Petroleum Council; Ministry of Planning, Petróleo-, 
various issues of Conjuntura Económica (Rio de Janeiro), 
a Including exploration. 
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The way in which to reconstruct missing links 
in the data has been demonstrated in the cases 
of Mexico and Venezuela. In the former, the 
sources used were total petroleum investment,®® 
total cumulative investment in exploration and 
production from 1947 to 1958,®^ and a number 
of investment in exploration only.®® The pro-
portion of the total that is accounted for by 
investment in exploration and production can 
be worked out from the cumulative figures for 
the latter. If the proportion is assumed to have 
remained steady from one year to another 
between 1946 and 1959, the probable annual 
total for investment in exploration and pro-
duction can be easily calculated with the aid 
of the exploration investment series. Data on 
investment in production in 1960-63 were ob-
tained from the Chase Manhattan Bank (see 
table 26). 
36 Nacional Financiera, S.A., La economía mexicana 
en cifras (México, 1966). 
A. J. Bermúdez, The Mexican National Petroleum 
Industry (Stanford University Press, 1963). 
^^Pemex en cifras (México, 1963). 
Table 26 
MEXICO: PETROLEUM INVESTMENT, 1946-65 


















1946 . . . 23 5 7 32.0 
1947 . . . 18 11 17 94.5 
1948 . . . 36 13 21 58.5 
1949 . . . 27 12 19 70.5 
1950 . . . 42 14 22 52.5 
1951 . . . 41 19 29 71.0 
1952 . . . 43 19 30 70.0 
1953 . . . 56 12 19 34.0 
1954 . . . 69 11 18 26.1 
1955 . . . 79 11 17 21.6 
1956 . . . 72 11 18 25.0 
1957 . . . 106 23 36 34.0 
1958 . . . 129 29 45 35.0 
1959 . . . 128 42 66 51.5 
1960 . . . 210 41 100 42.5 
1961 . . . 185 51 100 54.0 
1962 . . . 155 48 81 52.0 
1963 . . . 150 54 85 57.5 
1964 . . . 209 — 
1965 . . . 170 — — — 
Although data on the industry in Venezuela 
were plentiful, they had to be adapted for the 
purposes of this study. To begin with, the 
published figures on investment in exploration 
and production do not include expenditure on 
dry holes. Nor do they indicate how the invest-
ment is distributed between exploration and 
production. 
The data supplied by the Ministry of Mines 
and Hydrocarbons on the unit cost of drilling 
and the number of metres drilled annually in 
both exploratory and development wells were 
used to fill in the lacunae.®® The results are 
given in table 27. 
Investment in exploration was calculated by 
assuming the capital disbursements in explora-
tory drilling would be 80 per cent of total ex-
penditure on exploration^® (see again table 9 ) . 
Unfortunately, the only data to hand were for 
the years 1959 to 1963. 
In order to keep the series homogeneous, the 
data supplied by the Chase Manhattan Bank, 
Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons, Petróleo y 
otros datos estadísticos (Caracas). 
40 "Capital requirements of petroleum exploration and 
methods of financing", part I (E/3580-E/C.5/20); J. M. 
McKie, "Market structure and uncertainty in oil and 
gas exploration", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
vol. LXXV, No. 4 (November 1960), p. 551. 
Table 27 
VENEZUELA: INVESTMENT IN EXPLORATION 
AND PRODUCTION, 1946-65 
(Millions of dollars) 
SouKCEs: Nacional Financiera, S.A., La economía 
mexicana en cifras (México, 1966); PEMEX, Pemex en 
cifras (México). 
«The exchange rates used for converting Mexican 
pesos to dollars were as follows: up to 1948, 4.855 pesos 
per dollar; up to 1954, 8.65 pesos per dollar; for other 

















1946 . . . 200 • . • • • • . . . 
1947 . . . 214 
1948 . . . 298 
1949 . . . 182 
1950 . . . 110 . . . 
1951 . . . 164 
1952 . . . 235 
1953 . . . 203 
1954 . . . 223 
1955 . . . 256 
1956 . . . 252 
1957 . . . 390 
1958 . . . 372 
1959 . . . 287 17 24 328 
1960 . . . 178 13 10 201 
1961 . . . 138 13 13 164 
1962 . . . 117 5 10 132 
1963 . . . 131 5 12 148 
1964 . . . 134 4 13 151 
1965 . . . 163 ... ... 
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which include expenditure on dry holes, were 
used. For the same reason, payments for new 
concessions in 1956, 1957 and 1958 were cal-
culated from these figures, since they are not in-
cluded in Venezuela's official statistics. 
(b) Investment coefficients 
In tables 28 to 31, these financial data are 
linked with the volume of production, so as to 
give a clearer picture of the economic situation 
of the Latin Petroleum industry compared with 
those of other areas. 
Different methods of calculation were es-
sayed for obtaining investment coefficients for 
the product/capital ratio over the short, the 
medium and the long term. The capital/produc-
tion capacity ratio would actually be more 
representative, since it would show the full re-
turn on the investment. However, the difficulty 
of adjusting the concept of capacity to the data 
available made it necessary to use the first 
method for the production stage. There were no 
such drawbacks in the case of refining, so 
installed refining capacity can be taken as the 
denominator of the coefficient, so long as it 
is remembered that it differs slightly from real 
output. 
Three types of coefficient are determined: 
Type I is calculated by the following formula: 
Unit investment 
Gross cumulative investment up to the year "N" 
Total output in year "N" (1) 
Coefficients of this type obtained from the data 
available (Brazil and Venezuela only in Latin 
America) are presented in table 28. Their 
main disadvantage for use in Latin America 
derives from the limited number and inadequa-
cies of the data on total cumulative investment. 
Type II is calculated as follows: 
Unit investment 
Cumulative investment during the period "P" 
Total output during period "P" (2) 
This type of coefficient is illustrated in ta-
ble 29. Data for calculating type II is available 
for most of the Latin American countries, but 
the figures for some of them are only 
approximate. 
Table 30 contains the estimates of type III 
based on the following formula: 
Unit investment 
Investment in the year "N" 
Increase in output in year "N" ( 3 ) 
idea of the capital needed to launch, maintain 
and expand production. 
It is liable to fluctuate widely, however, and 
sometimes becomes negative, mainly because 
the investment yields cumulative returns which 
take some time to materialize. 
These difficulties can be overcome by modify-
ing formula (3) as follows: 
Unit investment 
Investment in the period "P" 
Increase in production in period "P" ( 4 ) 
This coefficient is based on information which 
is readily obtainable and gives an immediate 
The coefficients worked out for the Latin 
American countries on the basis of formula (4) 
are listed in table 31. 
It will be noted that there are marked dif-
ferences between countries with occasional varia-
tions within a single country over a period of 
some years. The former are due to differences 
in the natural conditions of the reserves, terrain 
and climate, which raise or lower the cost of 
exploration and drilling and lead to great 
disparities in the volume of yield per well or 
per linear metre drilled. Variations within one 
country indicate that production was at an early 
stage during the period under consideration or 
that new activities were embarked upon in the 
traditional petroleum-producing countries. 
The pronounced variations in the coefficients, 
especially over the short term, are mainly due 
to cumulative effects which have a greater in-
fluence at one time than at another. They are 
also due to the fact that investment in a given 
year does not yield full returns until a certain 
time has elapsed. For instance, a large sum in-
vested in increasing production capacity or even 
refinining capacity in a particular year cannot 
be calculated in terms of returns until some 
time later. 
In petroleum investment, the production (or 
refining) coefficients for a given year are un-
doubtedly more dependent on the cumulative 
process of earlier years than on the trend of 
investment in that one year. A glance at the 
coefficients will show how the unit investment 
required by the petroleum industry varies as the 
industry passes from the early to the inter-
mediate and finally to the fully mature stage 
and as economies of scale can be obtained. 
The absolute value of the coefficients for in-
tegrated operations, both on the production 
side and in subsequent activities, is declining 
throughout the world because more efficient ex-
ploration and development techniques are being 
adopted (which compensate for the high costs 
of working on the continental shelf and the 
spread of complex methods of secondary 
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Table 28 
G R O S S I N V E S T M E N T I N E X P L O R A T I O N A N D P R O D U C T I O N 
CoEFFiaENT TYPE I 
(Dollars per cubic metre) 
Year Latin America MiddU East United States Venezuela Brazil 
1947 2 3 . 0 9 .0 38 .2 18.0 1 ,780 .0 
1950 27 .0 8 .2 55 .7 20 .0 8 8 2 . 0 
1955 2 2 . 0 5 .0 60 .6 21 .0 2 7 3 . 0 
1960 31 .0 5 .2 7 7 . 0 27 .0 64 .0 
1963 32 .0 5 .8 92 .8 24 .0 82 .0 
Table 29 
G R O S S I N V E S T M E N T I N E X P L O R A T I O N A N D P R O D U C T I O N , 1946-63 
COEFFICIENT TYPE 11 
(Dollars per cubic metre) 
1946-50 19S1.S5 1956-60 1961-63 1946-63 
Latin America 3.1 0 .7 3 .2 1.9 1.9 
Middle East 1.6 0 .2 0 .5 0 .6 0 .6 
United States 6.7 3.5 3.7 7 .1 4 .8 
2 4 0 . 0 47 .0 15.4 10.8 13.0 
Chile < • • • . • . . « 8 . 8 » 
Colombia > • • • . . . . . 4.7I> 4.4® 
Mexico 1.8 1.7 2 .8 4 . 0 2 .4 
Venezuela 2.8 2 .0 1.9 0 .1 1.3 
Latin America, excluding 
Venezuela ... ... 7.9 6 .8 7 . 0 Í 
A 1961-65 . 
1960-64 . 
<= 1955-64 . 
D 1956-63. 
Table 30 
G R O S S I N V E S T M E N T I N E X P L O R A T I O N A N D P R O D U C T I O N 
COEFFICIENT TYPE I I I 
(Dollars per cubic metre) 




States Brazil Colombia Mexico Venezuela 
1947 . . . . 34 .0 11 .3 89 .5 780 .0 ... 29.0 
1950 . . . . 14 .0 3 .4 100 .3 200 .0 . .. . . • 11.0 
1955 . . . . 23 .0 4 .1 152 .2 84.0 .. . . • • 17.0 
1 9 5 6 . . . . 22 .0 14 .3 211 .6 77 .0 34.0 41 .0 14 .0 
1957 . . . . 31 .0 38 .9 ( - ) 49.0 41 .2 ( - ) 21.0 
1958 . . . . ( 1 0 5 . 0 ) 6 .5 ( - ) 38.0 119.5 60 .5 ( 3 7 . 0 ) 
1959 . . . . 51 .0 14 .3 192 .8 60.0 37 .3 81 .0 30.0 
1960 . . . . 64 .0 6 .4 74 ,700 .0 47 .0 81.0 2 0 8 . 0 37 .0 
1961 . . . . 64 .0 13 .4 471 .6 61.0 ( - ) 78.0 36 .0 
1 9 6 2 . . . . 27 .0 8 .5 462 .2 ( 2 4 8 . 0 ) ( - ) 146.0 7 .0 
1963 . . . . 86 .0 4 .2 300 .0 170.0 50.0 130.8 47 .0 
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Table 31 
INVESTMENT PER CUBIC METRE OF ADDITIONAL PRODUCTION 
(Dollars per cubic metre) 
Year Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Venezuela 
1951-55 149.4 
















recovery), production in low-cost areas is in-
creasing, and supertankers, huge but easily 
operable, have made their appearance. 
The coefficients given here merely indicate 
that the amount of investment required to raise 
production by one unit (m® per year) or to 
replace production capacity in the integrated 
complex or production or refining operations 
was such and such up to a certain year, or dur-
ing a given period or year. 
When comparing coefficients of investment 
in production, another important point to bear 
in mind is that the amount or value of the re-
serves discovered through the use of the invest-
ment has not been computed. This is liable to 
change the figures considerably, since the pub-
lished statistics show that present reserves in 
the Middle East are nearly nine times as much 
as in those of Latin America, twenty times those 
of Venezuela and eight times those of the 
United, States. 
All the tables show that the volume of capital 
invested in production is proportionately much 
larger in Latin America (or Venezuela) than in 
the Middle East, mainly because of the low 
capital/production capacity ratio in the Middle 
East and the high unit yield of the wells. 
The production coefficients for Venezuela are 
lower than for Latin America in general. This 
is due to the economies of scale achieved 
through the high level of output in Venezuela, 
which provides almost 75 per cent of the re-
gion's total output and to average well produc-
tivity, which is far higher than in any other 
Latin American country or in the region as a 
whole. 
The great difference between production co-
efficients in Brazil and in Venezuela derives from 
the fact that Brazil has invested large amounts 
of capital in exploration without achieving im-
mediate results in the shape of a production 
increase. 
The coefficients in table 29, which reflect the 
marginal product/capital ratio, show the new 
capital required as new oilfields and reservoirs 
enter into production. In Venezuela and the 
United States, unlike the Middle East, invest-
ment requirements have been gradually stepped 
up because the marginal product has decreased 
with the extension of production to poorer areas 
where the mining risks are greater. In the Mid-
dle East the initial costs for the development 
of the oilfields were relatively higher, but unit 
investment was subsequently reduced, thanks to 
the economies of scale obtained. 
Regional comparisons are rather more dif-
ficult to make with coefficients of the capital/ 
refining capacity ratio (see table 32) , since 
plant size and complexity varies immensely, 
as does the equipment for the different opera-
tions. Where there are large installations, as in 
the Middle East, Venezuela and Aruba and 
Curagao, less investment is needed per unit of 
capacity. Moreover, when the refining plants are 
fairly simple, as in Venezuela, and Latin 
America in general, and in the Middle East, 
where cracking and reforming account for only 
a small proportion of total capacity, less unit 
investment is needed in refining. The figure is 
under 20 per cent in Venezuela and the Middle 
East, in contrast to more than 85 per cent in 
the United States. 
Moreover, natural conditions do not affect 
refinery output as they do exploration and drill-
ing. This explains why the coefficients for Latin 
America are lower than for the United States 
and Western Europe. But, if the equipment 
and volume of output were the same, unit in-
vestment in Latin America might well be higher 
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States Brazil Venezuela 
Coefficient Type I 
1947 2 ,980 2 ,820 5 ,310 4 ,000 7 ,470 
1950 3 ,610 3 ,240 5 ,500 4 ,510 9 ,670 
1955 4,050 3 ,240 5 ,250 5 ,210 4 ,060 5 ,800 
1960 4 ,230 2 ,860 5 ,400 4 ,840 8 ,450 4 ,480 
1963 4 ,350 3 ,080 5 ,520 5 ,280 8 ,700 4 ,040 
Coefficient Type II 
1947-50 . . . 5 ,050 4 ,820 5 ,610 6 ,250 11,000 
1950-55 . . . 4 ,910 3 ,230 5 ,060 7 ,400 2 ,120 
1955-60 . . . 4 ,600 2 ,640 5 ,615 6 ,160 12,820 3,600 
1960-63 . . . 5 ,000 4 ,430 5 ,740 20 ,170 9 ,200 4 9 0 
1947-63 . . . 4 ,850 3 ,240 5 ,520 6 ,590 11,050 3,700 
Coefficient Type III 
1947 3,100 3 ,080 5 ,650 10 ,050 50 ,000 
1950 , , 2 ,530 73 ,500 69 ,100 1,990 
1955 , — 3,270 19,700 20 ,300 1 ,710 
1956 , , , 5 ,310 ( - ) 4,410 5 ,890 . . . 3 ,170 
1957 9,390 21 ,500 14 ,800 2 9 , 0 0 0 49 ,100 147,000 
1958 2 ,840 2 ,130 4 ,559 9 ,940 6 ,050 1,660 
1959 , 31,100 110 ,000 7 ,400 7 ,490 109,600 4 ,000 
1950 . , 3 ,360 9 , 3 6 0 4 ,210 15 ,100 8 ,070 1,300 
1961 4 ,410 13 ,130 4 ,600 13 ,100 3 ,130 1 ,800 
1962 3,500 1,980 9 ,800 ( - ) 1,440 
1963 7 ,700 7 ,170 4 ,100 15 ,850 740 
«Including the Netherlands Antilles, British Honduras (Belize), Puerto Rico and Aruba 
and Curagao. 
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SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
The three papers that follow represent stages 
in a continuing dual programme of studies of 
social policies in Latin America and of the 
social change processes to which both social 
and economic policies must relate themselves. 
A number of products of this programme have 
already appeared in the Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America and in other ECLA publications. 
A general frame of reference for the study of 
social policy questions was set forth in "Social 
Development and Social Planning: A Survey 
of Conceptual and Practical Problems in Latin 
America" {Bulletin, Vol. XI, No. 1, April 1966), 
and an analysis of the interplay between social 
structural changes and the evolution of social 
programmes was presented in Part One, chapter 
II, of the 1967 Economic Survey of Latin 
America. Published papers dealing with specific 
sectors of public social action include "Social 
Service in Latin America: Functions and Rela-
tionships to Development" {Bulletin, Vol. XI, 
No. 1, April 1966) and "The Housing Problem 
in Latin America in Relation to Structural De-
velopment Factors" {Bulletin, Vol. XI, No. 2, 
October 1966); the paper below on social se-
curity has the same objective of relating the sec-
tor to the central issues of development policy. 
Community development, which is treated in 
another of the papers below, has been the sub-
ject of two earlier explorations published in 
the Bulletin: "Popular Participation and Prin-
ciples of Community Development in Relation 
to the Acceleration of Economic and Social De-
velopment" (Vol. IX, No. 2, November 1964) 
and "Concepts and Methods of Area Program-
ming for Community Development" (Vol. XII, 
No. 1, May 1967). For a number of years ECLA 
has taken an active part in studies and interna-
tional meetings dealing with the complex rela-
tionships between education and development, 
and the findings of these studies have recently 
been revised and brought into closer correspon-
dence with the over-all approach to social policy 
in Education, Human Resources and Develop-
ment in Latin America (United Nations pub-
Hcation, Sales No.: (E.68.II.G.7). 
ECLA studies of social change in Latin 
America preceded the initiation of studies of 
social policy and in their earlier stages sought 
mainly to explain the social requisites and con-
comitants of economic development. Two major 
conceptual and historical discussions of social 
change were presented to ECLA's tenth session 
in 1963: "Sociological Considerations on the 
Economic Development of Latin America" ( E / 
CN.12/646) and "The Social Development of 
Latin America in the Post-War Period" ( E / 
CN.12/660). (Both of these studies were pub-
lished in Spanish by Ediciones Solar y Librería 
Hachette, Buenos Aires, 1964 and 1963, respec-
tively.) In these works and in a series of de-
mographic studies that were under way at the 
same time (see "The Demographic Situation 
in Latin America", Bulletin, Vol. VI, No. 2, 
October 1961; "The Geographical Distribution 
of the Population of Latin America", Bulletin, 
Vol. VIII, No. 1, March 1963; and "Rural 
Settlement Patterns and Social Change in Latin 
America", Bulletin, Vol. X , No. 1, March 1965), 
the phenomenon of rapid urbanization continu-
ally presented itself as a component and deter-
minant of social change of the highest impor-
tance, and as a particularly promising problem 
area around which to organize a broad study 
of the factors that underlie present change 
processes and condition the applicability of 
social and economic development policies. The 
inadequacy for this purpose of previous con-
ceptions of urbanization focused almost en-
tirely on the demographic and ecological aspects 
also became evident. The paper below entitled 
"The Urbanization of Society in Latin America" 
is a preliminary attempt to formulate a more 
adequate conceptual framework for the study 
of urbanization; it is now being followed by 
more detailed analyses of its main themes and 
by the testing of its hypotheses through studies 
of a few countries of the region that are pre-
sumed to represent different levels or stages 
of urbanization. 
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SOCIAL SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT: 
LATIN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
THE 
INTRODUCTION 
Few issues of public policy in Latin America 
today encounter such wide apparent consensus 
as the shortcomings of the social security sys-
tems.^ The Kafkaesque trials of the citizen 
seeking his rights from the social security 
bureaucracy and the plight of the retired em-
ployee as inflation erodes the purchasing power 
of his pension are described in similar language 
in conservative, reformist and revolutionary pe-
riodicals. Consensus on the desirability of social 
security is equally wide; for the most part, 
even the most exasperated critics take it for 
granted that social security has become a part 
of national life, that somehow and eventually it 
will be reformed and extended to ever wider 
strata of the population. Laws providing new 
social security benefits are supported by parties 
of the right as well as the left. Social security 
costs continue to edge upward in relation to the 
national product; in a few countries these costs 
have reached 12 per cent or more of the product 
and in many others they are in the same range 
(2-5 per cent) as the sums spent on education, 
the social sector making the largest direct claim 
on public resources.^ 
It is surprising to find that this area of 
public social action, in spite of its prominence 
in the expectations of the average wage-earner, 
the enormous sums channelled through it, and 
its complex influence on the labour force, has 
been practically untouched by the development 
1 The delimitation of "social security" in Latin Amer-
ica presents various difficulties. On the one hand, cer-
tain types of protection (e.g., workmen's compensation 
for accidents, indemnification for dismissal) are com-
monly treated as direct obligations upon the employer. 
On the other hand, as will be explained below, the 
social security institutions commonly engage in a variety 
of activities (health protection, housing, low-cost credit, 
social welfare, etc.), some of which fall outside a strict 
definition of social security and overlap with activities 
of other public institutions. For present purposes, it will 
be necessary to take into account what the social secu-
rity institutions actuaEy do, as well as their degree of 
correspondence to "social security" conceived as a sys-
tem of protection for defined population groups against 
defined contingencies. 
2 The International Labour Office, in The Cost of So-
cial Security, Sixth Intermfioml Inquiry, 1961-1963 
planning movement of recent years. All of the 
published plans and investment programmes 
of the Latin American countries specify social 
objectives, most generally in the sectors of edu-
cation, health and housing, but often also in 
income distribution, employment, food consump-
tion, water supply and sanitation, with oc-
casional mention of clothing and footwear con-
sumption and of community development. Only 
one or two plans discuss social security.^ Sec-
toral planning units linked to the national plan-
ning agency, such as most countries now possess 
for education and health, do not exist for social 
security. Social security was not included among 
numerous social objectives specified in the 1961 
Punta del Este Charter, and it was not until 
the June 1967 meeting of the Inter-American 
Economic and Social Council that a resolution 
was passed including among the objectives of 
(Geneva, 1967), presents the following data for tweleve 
Latin American countries (see comparative table 2) : 
RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES OF SOCIAL SECURITY SCHEMES 
















4.3 3.4 2.9 
11.1 9.6 7.9 
2.0 2.0 1.9 
3.3 2.0 1.7 
2.3 2.2 2.1 
1.8 1.8 1.7 
2.7 2.3 1.8 
2.2 1.7 1.6 
6.0 4.4 4.1 
3.0 2.3 2.0 
13.3 12.8 11.8 
2.4 2.4 2.3 
®The content of the plans and programmes is sum-
marized in chapter VIII of ECLA's Economic Survey 
of Latin America, 1964 (United Nations publication. 
Sales No.: 66.II.G.1). The only national plan to include 
a chapter on social security seems to be that of Uru-
guay, published after the above summary was made, 
and even here social security is allotted one of the 
briefest chapters in a multi-volume work. ("Reforma de 
la Seguridad Social", in tomo IV, Plan del Sector Pú-
blico, Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social 
1965-1974 (Montevideo, Comisión de Inversiones y De-
sarrollo Económico, 1965.) 
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the Alliance for Progress "the development of 
a social security policy integrally co-ordinated 
with the plans of economic and social devel-
opment". 
In the other social sectors, the inclusion of 
social security in published plans and the or-
ganization of sectoral planning machinery has 
been far from equivalent to effective sectoral 
planning, let alone incorporation into a really 
comprehensive strategy for the allocation of 
resources. Social and economic chapters have 
been juxtaposed in the plans rather than in-
tegrated. Relations between sectoral and over-all 
planning machinery remain ill-defined. In most 
of the social sectors, however, it is evident that 
both sides feel a need for inclusion and integra-
tion. The planners have come to see education 
and health as important components of devel-
opment strategy as well as peremptory claimants 
to major shares of public resources. The edu-
cators and public health specialists feel a real 
need for help from the planners toward the 
attainment of greater internal efficiency, and 
also a real need for a voice in planning so as 
to protect their claim to a share of public 
resources. The resulting dialogue shows good 
promise of practical results. Other social sectors 
such as housing are at earlier stages of the 
same process. 
In social security up to the present neither 
the planners nor the sectoral administrators 
seem to have been particularly anxious for 
dialogue. One might surmise that planners feel 
that they have enough problems without tackling 
a sector characterized by administrative auto-
nomy and compartmentalization, the focus of 
strong and complex political pressures, and the 
preserve of well entrenched bureaucratic in-
terests. Moreover, while the resources handled 
by the social security systems are enormous 
and of obvious importance for development 
policy, only a small fraction comes directly from 
the pool of public resources that the planners 
must try to allocate. From the other side, the 
social security administrations and the organ-
ized social forces that have been able to wring 
disproportionate benefits from the systems can-
not help being aware that subjection to planning 
would mean painful changes, the cutting back 
of special privileges and hypertrophied bureauc-
racies, and new principles for the obtaining, 
investing and distributing of social security 
resources—matters over which the national gov-
ernments now exert influence mainly through 
the negative device of evading their own legally 
required contributions. Meanwhile, the danger 
of upsetting the compromises on which their 
support is based and the continuing electoral 
appeal of social security promises has made 
the national political leaderships reluctant to 
intervene in the direction of rationalization. 
In view of the costliness of the social security 
systems, the popular discontent with their func-
tioning, and the irresistible pressures toward 
universalization, investigations of their problems 
and proposals for planning and reform were 
bound to come, but they have come mainly 
from directions other than the planning move-
ment. Individual economists and social policy 
specialists have for some years criticized the 
systems and proposed remedies.'' In a few coun-
tries, advisory bodies on social security have 
been set up by the national executive.® The 
international agencies concerned with technical 
advice and financial aid—^the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), the Organization 
of American States (OAS), and more recently 
the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance 
for Progress (CIAP)—after many years of pro-
motion of social security are now warning with 
increasing insistence that the systems as they 
are evolving are neither equitable nor viable. 
The main symptoms of crisis are sufficiently 
documented in recent reports of these agencies, 
although information on social security is re-
markably fragmentary, tardy and of doubtful 
comparability, considering that social security 
institutions by their very nature might be ex-
pected to give a good deal of attention to statis-
tics, record keeping and cost accounting. 
The present paper will deal very briefly with 
the historical evolution of social security in 
Latin America and with the present symptoms 
of malfunctioning, relying mainly on the docu-
mentation prepared by the various international 
agencies.® It will then turn to the processes of 
4 For example. Dr. Hernán Romero, La crisis del se-
guro social y la reforma de la salubridad (Santiago, 
Ediciones de la Universidad de Chile, 1958); Aníbal 
Pinto, "Alternativa para una reforma de los sistemas 
convencionales de Previsión Social", El Trimestre Eco-
nómico, No. 111 (July-September 1961); and Humberto 
Vieites Novo, "Sistema de previsión social del Uru-
guay", Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y 
de Administración de Montevideo, No. 22 (June 1963). 
5 In particular, Chile's Comisión de Estudios de Segu-
ridad Social which in 1963 published an Informe sobre 
la Reforma de la Seguridad Social Chilena in several 
volumes, and Argentina's Comisión Asesora Permanente 
de Seguridad Social. 
®The most extensive information on these symptoms 
is to be found in a report prepared by the International 
Labour Organisation for its Eighth Conference of Amer-
ican Member States (Ottawa, September 1966): "Papel 
de la Seguridad Social y del Mejoramiento de las Con-
diciones de Vida en el Progreso Social y Económico". A 
brief chapter entitled "New Orientations in the Field 
of Social Security" in the OAS, Social Survey of Latin 
America 1963-64 reached similar conclusions, as did a 
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social change and the pressures from within the 
social structures that have more to do with the 
lines of growth of all the sectors of pubhc social 
action than do official policies and plans. Finally, 
it will discuss the functions that might be ex-
pected of social security within a really com-
prehensive and vigorous strategy for develop-
ment, and will suggest some requisites if social 
security is to be linked with planning in more 
than a ritualistic sense. 
2 . HISTORY 
The evolution of the social security systems 
in Latin America has taken two main forms. 
Although most of the problems the systems now 
face are common to the region, their relative 
importance is affected by the age of each sys-
tem, by the lines of its evolution, and by the 
evolution of the national economy. 
(a) The first countries of the region to em-
bark on social security were those of the 
"Southern Cone". Argentina, Chile and Uruguay 
began in the nineteen-twenties or even earlier 
to establish separate funds {cajas) for specific 
categories of employees and workers, each with 
its own legally defined sources of income, con-
ditions of entitlement, range of benefits, and 
administrative apparatus. These systems have 
grown by accretion until most of the economi-
cally active population is now covered, at least 
in principle, rural workers, domestic workers, 
and the self-employed being quite recent addi-
tions. The proliferation of separate funds has 
been followed but not replaced by the setting 
up of broad institutions covering most wage-
earners not covered by pre-existing funds. The 
enactment of legislation regulating the working 
conditions and organizational rights of specific 
categories of employees and workers has fol-
lowed a similar course. 
While these countries show many dissimi-
larities, by the nineteen-twenties they were all set 
apart from the rest of the region by their rela-
document entitled "Pública y Administración de la Se-
guridad SocioT' (CIAP/331) submitted by the Inter-
American Council on the Alliance for Progress to the 
1966 Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and So-
cial Council at Buenos Aires. In 1962 the International 
Bank for_ Reconstruction and Development published a 
study, Financial Aspects of Social Security in Latin 
America. A document by Franco Reviglio, "The Social 
Security Sector and its Financing in Developing Coun-
tries", issued by the International Monetae Fund 
(IMF) for internal use, contains a good deal of informa-
tion on Latin America. The legal provisions governing 
the national social security system are summarized in 
a Manual de Instituciones de Seguridad Social, pub-
lished by the Secretaria General, Comité Permanente 
Inter-Americano de Seguridad Social, México 1967. 
tively high degree of urbanization, by the emerg-
ence of urban middle classes as decisive political 
forces, and by the growth of trade union move-
ments of some importance. The social security 
and labour protective initiatives derived from 
the conceptions of social justice held by the new 
political movements; they also represented prom-
ising means of strengthening the following of 
these movements among public and private em-
ployees and of winning over the organized 
workers from more revolutionary appeals. It 
deserves emphasis that Chile and Uruguay began 
to build up their social security systems well 
in advance of most countries of Europe and 
North America; in all three countries income 
levels were lower and the proportion of in-
dustrial wage earners much smaller than in the 
European countries that pioneered in social 
security. 
During the nineteen-twenties it would have 
seemed reasonable to expect that the income 
levels of these three countries would continue 
to rise, that incomes would become more evenly 
distributed, and that the ability of the economies 
to support social security systems would be 
strengthened. In fact, the countries have shared 
with the rest of Latin America the traumatic 
effects of the depression of the nineteen-thirties 
and the vicissitudes of export booms, import 
shortages and import-substitution industrializa-
tion that added up to apparently satisfactory 
rates of recovery and economic diversification 
up to the early nineteen-fifties. Since then, they 
have deviated from most of the other Latin 
American countries in the sluggishness of their 
economies. The reasons have been debated in an 
extensive literature and cannot be assessed here. 
One feature of this evolution has been the 
gaining of ability by population strata much 
wider than in the rest of the region to enforce 
demands for a larger share of the national 
product and for specific services from the public 
sector, through organizational strength and the 
vote. The ability of the political leadership to 
reconcile these demands and combine them into 
a whole compatible with dynamic development 
has been limited. Albert Hirschman has pointed 
to the function of the high rates of inflation 
characteristic of these countries since the nine-
teen-fifties or earlier as devices permitting the 
authorities to avoid direct confrontation be-
tween the size of resources and the size of 
separate claims on them.'^  Up to a point, the 
piecemeal growth of social security in response 
to pressures and competitive political appeals 
See chapter 3 of his Journeys to Progress (Wash-
ington, Twentieth Century Fund. 1963). 
seems to have served the same purpose, while 
the inflation has furthered a complicated jug-
gling of the burden of costs. 
Demographic trends have also set Argentina 
and Uruguay apart from the rest of the region. 
Declining birth rates and rising life expectancies 
have brought about age distributions closer to 
those of Western Europe than to the Latin 
American average, with relatively high per-
centages in the upper age groups. Chile seems 
to be at an earlier stage of this demographic 
transition. The cost of retirement pensions would 
thus have reached fairly high levels, even if 
these had been restricted to the age groups 
over 60 or 65. 
In Brazil, the evolution of social security, 
beginning in the nineteen-thirties, has been 
rather similar, although the greater dynamism 
of the Brazilian economy and the wide dis-
parities between one internal region and another 
in levels of income, degrees of urbanization 
and size of the strata able to exert effective 
political pressure introduce important differ-
ences, and the percentage of total population 
covered remains much lower than in the first 
three countries named.® 
During 1966 and 1967, Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay have all been forced by financial 
difficulties to initiate consolidations or curtail-
ments in social security. In Chile, the two most 
recent Presidents, Jorge Alessandri and Eduardo 
Frei, have both been strong supporters of social 
security reform. President Frei's annual message 
to Congress of May 1966 includes a particu-
larly forceful statement on the urgency of change 
and the obstacles in its way: 
"My Government has decided to tackle the 
integral reform of social security. The mul-
tiplicity, disparity, privileges, omissions and 
injustices of the present social security laws 
not only constitute a permanent source of 
insecurity and unrest, but also a paralysing 
obstacle to the carrying out of the plans of 
economic development and social reform in 
which we are embarked. 
"The proliferation of laws has reached in-
credible extremes, with legislation in favour 
of very small groups and sometimes of a 
single person, contradicting the whole spirit 
of universality that inspires modern social 
security and confusing its objectives with 
those of social assistance and public welfare. 
8 Social security contributors are estimated in the 
IMF document cited in footnote 6 to have amounted to 
6.5 per cent of the total population of Brazil in 1962, 
against 40-6 per cent in Uruguay (1962), 27.4 per cent 
in Argentina (1961), and 22.9 per cent in Chile (1960). 
"This is a young country. More than 50 peí 
cent of our population is under 21 years of 
age; in Europe less than 30 per cent. If in 
addition the trend is to reduce the active 
population so as to support an enormous 
mass of premature pensioners who in many 
cases end up competing in the labour market 
with those who are trying to enter the coun-
try's productive force, one cannot see how 
we are going to be able to endure. 
"I must tell the nation something that is 
no novelty, but that is a definitive fact: this 
system will lead inevitably either to the bank-
ruptcy of the social security funds or to the 
bankruptcy of the country. It is impossible 
to have such a large youthful population and 
at the same time such an extensive population 
of pensioners. No country in the world can 
support a system such as this. 
"The Ministry of Labour and Social In-
surance, with the collaboration of other 
bodies, has just now elaborated a general 
social security law, the objective of which 
is to modify integrally our present system. 
"I am conscious that a project of such 
importance is going to call forth opposition 
even stronger than in the case of the agrarian 
reform project. In social security questions, 
all sectors agree that the present norms are 
unsatisfactory and unjust; but when the mo-
ment of losing privileges is at hand, violent 
rebellions arise and all sorts of pressures 
come into play." 
The general law announced by President Frei 
in 1966 had not yet been presented to Congress 
at the beginning of 1968, and the process of 
piecemeal legislation had not been halted, 
although Chile has made a good deal of recent 
progress in rationalizing the separate funds and 
in providing up-to-date statistics. 
(b) Most of the countries that embarked on 
social security during the nineteen-thirties and 
nineteen-forties enacted legislation setting up 
a single institution to provide limited benefits to 
certain categories of urban workers and em-
ployees for a beginning, but with the intention 
of gradually expanding coverage in respect of 
occupations, geographical areas and types of 
coverage; such expansion by stages was- gen-
erally provided for in the basic legislation 
itself. Pre-existing pension systems for public 
employees and the armed forces generally re-
tained their separate administrations. During 
this period, the standards and recommendations 
adopted by the International Labour Organi-
sation and other international agencies exerted 
considerable influence, and the countries drew 
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óii expert advice from these agencies. The most 
important social security systems established 
along these lines are those of Colombia, Mexico 
and Venezuela. While these countries were 
urbanizing rapidly and industrializing some-
what less rapidly, the urban middle strata and 
wage earners constituted relatively small pro-
portions of total population during the forma-
tive period of social security, and political 
pressures for expansion were weaker than in 
the first group. During the past two decades 
the growth of national product has been con-
siderable, but its distribution has been ex-
tremely uneven. The numbers of urban wage 
earners and employees in the "modern" sectors 
of the economies have grown rapidly, but the 
gap between their incomes and those of the 
remainder of the population seems to have 
widened; except in Venezuela, the rural popu-
lation is still a majority. The social security 
systems have been able to expand only to a 
limited extent beyond the categories of urban 
workers and employees originally covered; the 
growth of the systems has depended mainly on 
the growth of these groups and on the provision 
of more extensive benefits to them.® 
Most of the smaller countries of the region 
also took the first steps toward social security 
through general enabling legislation, at intervals 
from the nineteen-thirties to the nineteen-fifties. 
Although trends in the individual countries 
have since been quite diverse, the relatively 
limited degree of urbanization and extent of 
urban salaried employment has restricted the 
expansion of social security in most of them. 
In several instances, the provision of social 
security is divided between a fund for public 
employees or public and private employees and 
a fund for some categories of urban workers, 
the latter offering much more limited benefits 
than the former. 
3 . PROBLEMS 
The crises of the social security systems at 
present involve their financing, their adminis-
tration, their capacity to meet their legal ob-
ligations for benefits and their capacity to 
extend protection to wider population strata: 
(o) Estimation of the costs of social security 
is complicated by the lack of internal co-
8 Social security contributors are estimated to have 
constituted 5.0 per cent of the total population of Mexico 
in 1963 ; 4.1 per cent of the population of Venezuela in 
1961; and 3.2 per cent of the population of Colombia 
in 1964. Peru, with a dual social security system for 
employees and workers, had a coverage of 7.0 per cent 
in 1961. 
herence of the larger systems and by the dis-
crepancies between legal obligations and actual 
payments by employers, workers, and the State. 
It is evident, however, that in the countries with 
systems of the first type they have reached levels 
found elsewhere in only a few European coun-
tries. The ratio of combined employer-employee 
contributions to the wage bill in covered oc-
cupations had climbed, according to one esti-
mate, to 42-49 per cent in Chile, 39-45 per cent 
in Uruguay, 12.5-33 per cent in Argentina, and 
22 per cent in Brazil. Contribution rates in the 
second group of countries are much lower, but 
in a few small countries with quite restricted 
occupational coverage they have reached anoma-
lously high levels: in Bolivia 35.5 per cent of 
the wage bill and in Paraguay 19 per cent.^ ® 
Employer contributions generally amount to 
two-thirds or more of the above totals. The 
economic implications of contributions on this 
scale and the real final distribution of the 
burden raise complex questions. It can be as-
sumed that a large part of the burden is shifted 
to the general public in the form of higher 
prices for goods and services produced in the 
sectors covered by social security. It can also 
be assumed that, to the extent that employers 
cannot pass on the higher labour costs, social 
security contributions of these dimensions 
constitute important stimuli towards the adop-
tion of capital-intensive techniques and hinder 
the absorption of the rapidly growing urban 
labour force. At the same time, a very large 
part of the burden is evaded, often by collusion 
between employers and workers; increased con-
tribution rates forced by the chronic deficits 
of the systems only increase the incentives to 
evasion. Moreover, under inflationary conditions 
private employers, by delaying payment of their 
own contributions and those of their workers 
to the social security fund are able to add 
significantly to their working capital with pay-
ment of only nominal interest on the "loan". 
In Argentina in 1960/61 employer evasion and 
delays in payments subtracted an estimated 
47 per cent from the total that should have 
been collected. In some countries this practice 
has become institutionalized through the periodic 
passage of laws permitting delinquent employers 
to consolidate their debts to the system and pay 
them in quotas over several years. Prompt 
payment thus tends to be penalized and more 
i^ o The above totals were derived from various sources by 
the IMF document cited in footnote 6. Other sources 
differ to some extent, depending on their delimitation of 
"social security", but do not significantly alter the order 
of magnitude. 
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and more employers wait for a consolidation 
law to regularize their situation. 
(6) In a good many countries, the State 
itself has succumbed to the same temptation 
as the private contributors and is in arrears on 
three kinds of payments: on direct obligations 
for subsidies under the tripartite systems of 
financing, on obligations as an employer to 
contribute sums related to the salaries of public 
employees, and also on contributions withheld 
from these salaries. Such arrears, sometimes 
covered by issuing government securities, are 
particularly large in some of the countries 
in which inflation is chronic. In Argentina in 
1963, the increase in the Government's non-
consolidated debt to the social security sector 
was equivalent to more than 30 per cent of 
social security receipts, and in Brazil it amounted 
to nearly 28 per cent. 
(c) The social security systems were orig-
inally expected to meet benefits from the returns 
on investment of their reserves. Such returns 
have generally been very low, and in the systems 
of the first type, inflation has practically wiped 
out the reserves themselves; one reason has been 
the obligatory purchase of bonds covering gov-
ernment budget deficits. In the maturer systems, 
income from contributions of the active popula-
tion no longer produces a significant surplus 
for investment; the system has to depend al-
most exclusively on such contributions to meet 
its current obligations. In Uruguay between 
1957 and 1965, the percentage of social security 
income from State contributions and special 
taxes fell from 10.9 to 6.4 and the income from 
interest from 7.4 to 1.5, while contributions of 
active insured rose from 77.7 to 90.3.^^ 
(d) It is generally agreed that administrative 
costs are excessive, although information on them 
is only fragmentary. The International Labour 
Organisation has pointed out that even where 
such costs are limited by law "certain devices 
have been adopted to hide some of these costs, 
imputing them to other accounts".^^ In Chile, 
the Comisión de Estudios de Seguridad Social 
concluded that in 1959 administrative costs 
amounted to 13.9 per cent of social security 
income, or 14.7 per cent of the amount distribu-
ted in benefits of all kinds; the ratio of adminis-
trative costs to benefits in a good many other 
systems of both the main types would probably 
be higher, mainly as a result of the pressures, 
11 Wan Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social, 
op. cit. 
12 "Papel de la Seguridad Social y del Mejoramiento 
de las Condiciones de Vida en el Progreso Social y 
Económico", op. cit. 
to be discussed below, for inflation of public 
employment. The result has been not only an 
important diversion of resources away from 
the supposed beneficiaries of the systems, but 
also extreme ineCBciency in their functioning. 
Lack of prior qualifications among the func-
tionaries has usually not been offset by training 
on the job, and in spite of their numbers ade-
quate records are not kept. (An ILO report 
concludes pessimistically that, without basic 
administrative reforms, the recent introduction 
of electronic data-processing in some of the 
systems will only increase the expense and 
confusion.) 
(e) The circumstances described above mean 
that the maturer systems are unable to meet 
in full their obligations to the population 
already covered for benefits that have legis-
lated for without any regard to actuarial realities 
or foreseeable resources. Even among the 
younger and smaller systems, a few seem to 
have reached that point. Frustrated applicants 
blame the long delays in the processing of 
benefits on bureaucratic lethargy and incompe-
tence, but it is apparent that several of the 
systems are forced to use delays, evasions and 
dilution of the quality of services as a means 
of bringing the real level of benefits down to 
the level of resources. The ILO survey cited 
above one institution with a waiting list for 
retirement pensions of 83,000 and an average 
processing period of more than three years; 
prompt action on applications would mean im-
mediate bankruptcy. Such situations force the 
applicants to compete for special treatment 
through the intervention of politicians or paid 
intermediaries. The Director of the Chilean 
Servicio de Seguro Social recently complained 
that some pensioners obligate themselves to pay 
up to 40 per cent of their first year's pension 
to illicit intermediaries who promise to expedite 
processing. Inflation has also functioned to ease 
the burden upon the systems; periodic readjust-
ments practically never restore the original pur-
chasing power of the pensions except for a few 
privileged categories of pensioners. 
( / ) All of the countries have endorsed the 
objective of gradual extension of social security 
to the whole of the low-income population, and 
it is generally agreed that without such an ex-
tension social security constitutes either a re-
distribution of income of limited importance 
within the lower-middle-income strata or an 
inadmissible redistribution of income towards 
these strata at the expense of the needier parts 
of the population. The two main types of social 
security system present different deficiencies in 
regard to capability of reaching this objective: 
37 
(i) In the maturer systems of the first type, 
rural workers, domestic servants, self-employed, 
etc., have in recent years been included. Dif-
ficulties in collection of contributions from these 
groups and their employers are naturally 
greater, and capacity to contribute much lower, 
than in the cases of the employees and workers 
previously covered. It can be assumed that the 
very wide gap between the size of these groups 
and the number of social security contributors 
among them cited by the International Labour 
Organisation for years around 1960 has since 
narrowed somewhat, but effective coverage re-
mains far from universal. Moreover, the systems 
have built-in inequities that are accentuated 
by the new accretions. A distinction between 
"employees" and "workers" is particularly clear-
cut in Chile, where it reflects an exceptionally 
wide gap in average incomes between the two 
categories. According to calculations made by 
the Comisión de Estudios de Seguridad Social 
and since cited repeatedly, a million and a 
half workers affiliated to the largest social 
security fund in 1959 received 33 per cent of 
total social security benefits provided by the 
country, while 550,000 employees afi&liated to 
other funds received 59 per cent.^ ® (Miscel-
laneous funds accounting for 8 per cent of 
benefits are excluded from the calculation.) In 
practically all of the countries certain funds or 
pension schemes (for officers of the armed 
forces, for members of legislative bodies, for 
bank employees, for railroad workers, etc.) 
command resources far superior to the others. 
The newer groups covered have either been 
added to the workers' social security institution 
or given a new fund of their own (e.g., the fund 
for rural and domestic workers in Uruguay). In 
the former case, the already inadequate funds of 
13 The Comisión de Estudios de Seguridad Social also 
made an interesting calculation of the percentage distri-
bution of direct costs, of real costs, and of benefits of 
social security in 1959. This calculation indicates that 
workers met about 85 per cent of the real costs of the 
benefits they received, while employees, with much 
higher incomes and benefits, met only 74 per cent: 
Workers 
Employers 
Receivers of income iron: 
real estate and enter 
prises 
Public treasury 
Community in general* . . 
Costs of administration 
and surpluses 
Direct Real 
costs costs Benefits 
6.0 21.8 25.6 





; 30.8 — — 
4.9 4.9 4.4 
27.0 
* Costs to eomniumty in general represent certain earmarked taxes 
not entering into the general revenue. 
the insured workers will have to be spread 
much thinner. In the latter case, the amount 
of protection that can be financed from the 
contributions of workers whose incomes are 
close to the subsistence level is bound to be 
small. If social security is to become a reality 
for the newly covered groups, the State will 
have to assume directly a large part of the 
cost, at a time when the State is unable to meet 
in full its previous social security obligations. 
(ii) In the countries with systems of the sec-
ond type, the legislative basis for planned 
expansion is more satisfactory and inequalities 
in social security rights within the systems are 
less complicated and less entrenched. However, 
the percentages of national population engaged 
in agricultural labour, self-employed, or inter-
mittently employed in urban marginal occupa-
tions are a great deal larger than in the first 
group and their per capita incomes are lower. 
At their present stages, the social security sys-
tems are particularly vulnerable to the charge 
that they are protecting urban minorities at the 
expense of the whole population, but the pos-
sibility of expanding contributory systems to the 
majority seems to be nil. 
To sum up, the systems of the first type are 
facing crises of inclusion, those of the second 
type crises of exclusion. 
4 . S T R U C T U R A L SOURCES O F T H E P R O B L E M S 
The difficulties summarized above are well 
known, and have been sufficiently documented 
in national and international reports not to re-
quire detailed discussion in a brief survey such 
as the present. The Chilean system, in particular, 
has been the subject of exhaustive studies and 
reform proposals since the nineteen-fifties. The 
fact that reforms are slow in coming or limited 
to details, and that piecemeal legislative grant-
ing of new benefits, hand-to-mouth financing 
and tortuous administrative procedures persist 
is certainly not due to unawareness on the part 
of governments or the public. 
The explanation must be sought in present 
processes of change in the economic and social 
structures of Latin America. Since 1961, when 
the ideal of planned and harmonious economic 
and social development was embodied in a series 
of commitments agreed to by the Governments 
of Latin America, economic growth has con-
tinued to be fitful and very unevenly distributed 
between countries, economic sectors and internal 
regions. Social change has been rapid and per-
vasive but subject to striking contradictions and 
discontinuities. The following phenomena are 
particularly conspicuous facets of the over-all 
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process of change: first, rapid and concentrated 
city growth, accompanied by a transformation of 
patterns of urban life under influences from in-
dustrialized high-income societies outside the 
region; secondly, rural unrest associated with 
stagnation of incomes and employment oppor-
tunities, widening rural contacts with urban 
forces of change, and weakening of the tradi-
tional systems of power relationships; thirdly, 
incapacity of the dynamic sectors of the 
economies to offer employment to a labour force 
with high rates of growth and low levels of 
qualification; fourthly, emergence and rapid 
growth of geographically and occupationally 
mobile "marginal" population strata with in-
creasingly insecure relationships to the national 
systems of production, consumption, and political 
participation. 
The objectives agreed upon in 1961 and sub-
sequent years included more equitable income 
distribution, with special emphasis on shifts 
in the incidence of the tax burden; agrarian 
reform; and full employment. Objectives of this 
kind imply far-reaching changes in power rela-
tionships and in the character of economic 
growth. They also imply strong and consistent 
political leadership backed by administrative 
structures able to cope with difiScult new func-
tions. It is not surprising that tangible progress 
in these areas has been limited or that the 
passage of legislation and the setting up of new 
administrative and planning machinery remain 
the chief reasons for optimism that can be cited 
by the regional bodies responsible for assess-
ment of progress. 
The commitments of 1961 also included 
specific targets in a number of sectors of public 
social action. Programmes in all of these sectors 
could present strong cases for their indispensa-
bility to the cause of development itself, under 
the conception of "human resource develop-
ment", and they also responded to strong popu-
lar demands. Objectives could be formulated in 
simple and politically appealing terms, and 
expansion of social programmes would not ex-
pect to meet the tenacious resistance sure to 
be encountered by agrarian reform and fiscal 
reform. It thus might be expected that the 
former would advance more rapidly and 
smoothly than the latter. 
In practice, trends since 1961 have been quite 
irregular, both between countries and between 
sectors of social action. For the region as a 
These questions are discussed in some detail, in 
ECLA's Economic Survey of Latín America, 1967 (in 
the press). 
whole the social programmes, taken together, 
seem to have barely maintained their previous 
share of the product in relation to other forms 
of public and private expenditure. The most im-
iressive quantitative gains have been made 
jy education, in which upward trends visible 
long before 1961 have attained a momentum 
making the educational systems key factors 
within present processes of social change, both 
as objects of pressures from within the societies 
and as sources of pressures upon the societies. 
The most disappointing experiences have been 
in housing, in which publicly financed pro-
grammes of low-cost construction and stimula-
tion of private initiative have proved almost 
irrelevant to the needs of the growing urban 
low-income population, so that uncontrolled 
shanty town expansion now threatens to over-
whelm the cities. In health, the easier gains 
associated with the control of mass diseases 
have already been realized, and the relatively 
expensive area of protection represented by 
water supply and waste disposal systems is 
progressing, under the stimulus of large-scale 
external aid. Increasing life expectancies have 
thus far not brought about any significant in-
crease in the percentages of population in the 
upper age groups in most of the countries be-
cause of continuing high fertility rates, but the 
fact that larger numbers of persons of all ages 
are now surviving under conditions unfavour-
able to their general levels of health and in 
urban settings that make them aware of the 
existence of modern medical services means 
that the demand for a wide range of curative 
services is rising rapidly—a trend that has 
important implications for social security. In 
regard to food consumption, although targets 
have been set forth in a number of national 
plans, public action remains fragmentary and 
self-contradictory, unable to reconcile pressures 
to raise agricultural prices and pressures to 
keep urban food prices low. Although reliable 
informaton is scarce, it is probable that the diet 
of large low-income strata has deteriorated in 
recent years. 
If one goes beyond the rather ambiguous in-
dications of trends aflforded by statistics that 
represent national averages, it is evident that the 
evolution of programmes in each of the social 
sectors has been influenced only to a limited 
extent by the publicly formulated objectives of 
social justice and human resource development. 
Rather, the lines of growth are the resultant 
of diverse pressures emanating from within 
the societies. This resultant cannot coincide in 
full with the aspirations of any one of the 
groups exerting pressure, or with the publicly 
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endorsed objectives of the programmes. The 
pressures come from the following directions: 
(a) The growing bodies of professionals and 
public functionaries employed in the social pro-
gramme. Each social sector has its own internal 
momentum and aspirations toward a larger 
share of public resources. This momentum de-
rives in part from the natural convictions of 
sectoral specialists—^backed by international 
recommendations and technical assistance of 
the overriding importance of their own pro-
grammes. It is hard to envisage the possibility 
that sectoral allocations can be too large, when 
the unmet needs are so obvious. At the same 
time, the rapid expansion of secondary and 
higher education and the limited capacity of 
the private sector to provide jobs meeting the 
expectations of educated youth have intensified 
previous pressures for expansion of public em-
ployment. All of the social programmes have 
suffered from a disproportionate growth of ad-
ministrative posts in relation to staff providing 
direct services. In social security, administra-
tive autonomy, sources of income not subject to 
central budgetary control, and political ap-
pointment of top functionaries have sometimes 
opened the way to padding the staffs on the basis 
of party recommendations rather than qualifica-
tions and have enabled the functionaries to 
determine their own share of social security 
resources without effective external control. Ac-
cording to a Spanish proverb "El que parte j 
reparte se queda con la mejor parte", that is, 
"He who divides and distributes keeps the lion's 
share for himself". (In an extreme case, an 
important part of the reserves of one social 
security institutions were "invested" during a 
period of inflation in low-interest loans for hous-
ing restricted to the functionaries of the sys-
tem.) Except in the countries with the older and 
larger social security systems, the functionaries 
constitute rather small percentages of the total 
number of public employees, and as pressure 
groups do not compare in importance with the 
teachers and public health employees. Their 
influence on the passage of new social security 
legislation seems to have been minor, but they 
undoubtedly have considerable ability to block 
reorganization and planning of the systems. 
Another kind of "internal" momentum has come 
from the legislative bodies, some of which have 
been remarkably generous in voting benefits to 
their own members and the better organized 
electoral blocs.^® 
President Jorge Alessandri of Chile stated in No-
vember 1962, after congressional passage over his veto 
of a bill granting special concessions to employees of 
public autonomous agencies: 
{b) The social strata constituting the prin-
cipal clienteles of the educational, housing, 
health, social security and social welfare services 
up to the present.^® These strata have been 
almost entirely urban, made up of employees 
and workers belonging to the "modern" sectors 
of the economies and with incomes enabling 
them to meet some part of the real costs of the 
services (through social security contributions, 
medical fees, housing amortization payments, 
maintenance of children during prolonged 
schooling and purchase of school supplies). 
While the characteristics of these strata vary 
widely according to national rate and stage of 
urbanization and industrialization, they seem 
to be growing not only in absolute numbers but 
also in relation to total population in all except 
a few small countries with stagnant economies. 
Their aspirations, under the influence of their 
own rising levels of education and the consump-
tion patterns and stimuli imported from the 
high-income countries of North America and 
Western Europe, are increasing faster than their 
abilities to satisfy them—a trend supported by 
their concentration in the larger cities. At pres-
ent, they are threatened on the one hand by 
rising costs of the services and durable con-
sumer goods they consider indispensable to 
their status, and on the other by rising taxes, 
since in practice the shift to progressive direct 
taxes strikes the salaried groups earlier and 
"It is an undeniable fact that the social security 
bodies are increasingly transforming themselves into 
entities designed to serve those who work in them 
rather than to meet the needs for which they were 
created, that is, to serve their contributors . . . In re-
gard to increases in benefits for the public sector, all 
kinds of laws originating in Congress have been mul-
tiplying. This situation is distorting our social security 
system more and more, and also contributes to the 
weeikening of its financial capacity to an extremely 
dangerous degree. . . . 
"The interest-group of employees of the social se-
curity funds constitutes an important voting bloc, 
much less numerous indeed than that of the contribu-
tors, but in contrast to the latter, who cannot organize 
themselves or make themselves heard jointly, it is 
organized in such a way that it is a clearly identifi-
able group with its own weight in the electoral strug-
gles. It is in this way that new privileged minorities 
are being created whose gains do not derive from 
their superior competence or from initiatives to pro-
mote the general welfare, but in many cases from the 
violation of the rights and interests of more numerous 
groups." 
i®It might be expected that the social welfare serv-
ices would concentrate upon the neediest strata of the 
urban population. To a very large extent, however, these 
services have evolved within social security systems, 
housing programmes, modem industrial enterprises and 
special programmes for public employees, the armed 
forces, etc. They have thus dealt mainly with social 
strata having relatively secure jobs and incomes rather 
than with the marginal population. 
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harder than the upper-income strata. Their ca-
pacity to absorb assistance from the public sec-
tor in meeting their social needs, particularly 
in education and housing, is practically un-
limited. Their views of social "rights" are in-
fluenced by comparison of their lot with that 
of the middle classes of other regions, much 
more than by comparison with the low-income 
strata of their own countries. Except among 
the youth, prior to absorption into employment 
and family formation, their willingness to make 
sacrifices in the name of social solidarity or 
development is small. As was previously indi-
cated, the salaried or "dependent" component 
of these middle strata is now the main benefi-
ciary of the social security systems, after the 
functionaries of the systems themselves, but 
with wide inequalities by occupational catego-
ries and with nearly universal dissatisfaction 
deriving from the gap between expected and 
real benefits. The past domination of social 
security by salaried employees, with job se-
curity but little capacity for individual savings, 
made it natural for the systems to concentrate 
on retirement pensions, with legal provisions 
as to pensionable age and years of service for 
entitlement becoming steadily more generous. 
The aspirations of the independent middle strata 
have been summed up rather cruelly in the fol-
lowing terms: "nacer becado, vivir empleado, 
morir jubilado", i.e., "to be born with a scholar-
ship, live on a salaried job, die on a pension." 
In public employment, relative advantages in 
pensions and years of service required for en-
titlement seem often to be the main considera-
tions behind choices of public careers.^^ For 
a time, the low ages for retirement suit the 
interests of the younger employees, by opening 
vacancies and opportunities for promotion, and 
by holding out the dream of early economic 
freedom. As the functions of the public sector 
expand, the burden of retirement pensions for 
individuals in their forties and fifties becomes 
more formidable; pension for school teachers. 
The struggle of public employees for pension privi-
leges seems to have been deeply rooted in some of the 
countries long before the introduction of contributory 
social security. In a work published in 1876, the Uru-
guayan statesman José Pedro Varela stated in a denun-
ciation of chronic budget deficits: "We see among us 
men in full vigour of age and health receiving fat re-
tirement pensions; others that have served the nation 
only a few years and who have nevertheless been pen-
sioned, counting as years of service years passed abroad 
or in other occupations, on the pretext that during these 
periods they were unjustifiably separated from their 
posts. The widows reproduce themselves with astound-
ing fertility . . . ; the minors keep themselves in a 
:)erpetual infancy . . ." (Quoted by Aldo Solan, in 
Estudios sobre la Sociedad Uruguaya, Tomo I, Monte-
video. 1964.) 
for example, threaten to consume an unman-
ageably high proportion of educational alloca-
tions. At present, under the need to finance 
pensions out of current income, the clash of 
interests between the "active" contributing em-
ployed groups and the "passive" pensioners is 
coming to the fore. The former try to evade 
contributions and the latter depress salary levels 
by seeking new jobs to supplement their pen-
sions. The financing of middle-income housing 
through social security reserves can also be 
attributed to the domination of the systems by 
the urban middle strata. 
The urban wage earners in the better or-
ganized activities—in large-scale manufacturing, 
mining, and basic services—while in other re-
spects they differ widely from the salaried 
middle strata just described, are similarly able 
to exert effective pressures for social security 
and other social services. Some groups of or-
ganized workers have gained protection match-
ing or surpassing that of the public employees, 
while others are far behind, but all of them 
have some acquired rights to protect. It should 
be mentioned also that in a good many instances 
the original initiative for the entry of the 
workers into this competition came less from 
their own ranks than from national administra-
tions trying to strengthen their hold on office 
by calling forth new sources of organized 
support. 
(c ) The urban and rural low-income strata 
that constitute the majority in most Latin 
American countries. Until quite recently these 
strata received only token benefits from public 
social action—at most, a year or two of ele-
mentary schooling and some protection against 
mass diseases. Urbanization, coinciding with 
the gradual breakdown of previous sources of 
minimal security from the family, the com-
munity, or the paternalistic landlord is chang-
ing the meaning of "deficits" in social security 
as well as education, housing and health. As 
long as the cities were small and the rural 
majorities were controlled and isolated by the 
hacienda system, the obvious deficiencies meas-
urable by statistical indicators did not amount 
to real demands exerting pressure on the public 
sector. The demands are now real and poten-
tially overwhelming in their political implica-
tions, although they have no more backing than 
before in terms of private or public purchasing 
power, and although the capacity of the more 
marginal strata to relate demands to immediate 
needs is erratic. The governmental commit-
ments to universalize and equalize the social 
services, however far from realization, have 
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contributed to a widening awareness of social 
rights. Movements contending for political 
power now have to bid for the support of masses 
that a few years ago could be ignored or 
counted on to vote as directed by the landlord 
or local caudillo. The few relevant investiga-
tions of urban marginal groups suggest that 
their aspirations are not directed towards revo-
lutionary overturn of existing institutions but 
toward a measure of security and access to 
the jobs and services enjoyed by other urban 
strata. The faith in education as a channel 
towards white-collar positions for their children 
revealed by some inquiries is striking, and 
quite out of keeping with the limited real op-
portunities opened up by the kind of education 
their children receive. The occasional violent 
outbreaks in which these strata take a leading 
part almost always derive either from quite 
specific frustrations, particularly price increases 
in staple foods and transport, or from the down-
fall of populist leaders whose promises have 
fed their hopes. 
The low-income masses are insecure in many 
different ways and the promise of protection 
against risks has a powerful appeal to them, 
but their priorities are likely to be quite differ-
ent from those of the previous beneficiaries of 
social security, and their adaptability to sys-
tems based on insurance principles and com-
pulsory savings quite limited. Retirement pen-
sions probably fall outside the scope of their 
immediate aspirations, and their forms of em-
ployment as well as their low life-expectancies 
would make such pensions hardly relevant. 
Although their response to preventive health 
measures may be apathetic, free medical care 
is of crucial importance to them. Family allow-
ances have an obvious appeal to groups with 
high fertility and subsistence levels of living. 
Secure tenure of a dwelling or even of a space 
on which to erect a shack is anxiously sought. 
The most basic and intractable problem of 
the low-income strata, however, is employment 
security. Up to the present, makeshift ways of 
livelihood supplemented by informal mutual aid 
among relatives and neighbours have shown 
remarkable resilience in keeping measurable 
urban unemployment from reaching crisis di-
mensions, but there are symptoms that this 
resilience may be reaching its limit. Meanwhile, 
in the rural population, despite the movement 
to the towns of about half the population in-
crement resulting from natural increase, the 
most precariously situated elements—cultivators 
of dwarf holdings needing additional wage in-
come to meet minimum subsistence needs, and 
landless migratory workers dependent on sea-
sonal labour—seem to be growing in numbers. 
Unemployment insurance would be completely 
inapplicable to the situation of these strata and 
the financing of direct measures for the support 
of minimum family incomes would be out of 
the question, even if the State becomes able to 
capture and redistribute a much larger share 
of the national income. While the resources 
already allocated to social programmes could 
undoubtedly support health care, family welfare 
and housing measures much better adapted to 
the needs of the low-income masses than at 
present, the underlying deficiencies and frustra-
tions will remain until these masses can be 
drawn into employment with a reasonable degree 
of continuity and with incomes supporting an 
adequate level of living. Such employment is an 
obvious precondition for the functioning of 
any contributory system of social security. 
Moreover as long as family incomes remain 
highly insecure as well as inadequate, depend-
ing on a succession of temporary expedients, the 
families are unable to make effective use of the 
educational services that are counted on to 
raise the future employment qualifications of 
their children. 
In all of the social sectors the State confronts 
pressures from previous beneficiaries for more 
and from potential beneficiaries for equal rights. 
Until recently bargaining over the allocation of 
public resources was restricted to urban minori-
ties. Now, ever wider population strata are find-
ing political channels through which to enter 
the bargaining. Even when the inability of the 
"normal" political process to satisfy contend-
ing interest groups brings in the armed forces 
as arbiters or guarantors of the status quo, the 
problem remains and the search for expedients 
to attract wider popular support without threat-
ening existing privileges is soon resumed. 
In this process, the ability of the State to 
implement existing plans and schemes for ra-
tionalization of the social services is restricted 
by the low degree of consensus and confidence 
in its impartiality as arbitrator of the allocation 
of resources. 
5 . CRITERIA FOR SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 
What should be the guiding principle for 
reform and planning of social security under 
the circumstances outlined above? Plausible 
answers to this question do not call for much 
originality; they have been set forth in several 
of the regional and national studies cited above. 
The more intractable problem lies in the secur-
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ing of popular understanding and support for 
the difficult choices that must be made: 
(a) Costs must be kept compatible with per 
capita income levels and with the whole range of 
claims on public resources. Latin American 
experience demonstrates that when costs rise 
above a certain point, neither the direct con-
tributors nor the State can really assume the 
burden; in the process of evading or shifting 
it, economic distortions and social injustices 
proliferate. The fixing of practicable top limits in 
terms of percentage of national income would 
depend on many factors peculiar to the country 
and its ways of obtaining and using social 
security revenue, but it would seem undesirable 
to allow employer-worker contributions to rise 
above 20 per cent of the wage bill. 
(b) Financing and distribution of benefits 
must be made compatible with national ob-
jectives for income redistribution. It is probably 
desirable that whatever social protection the 
country can afford should continue to be 
financed mainly from a special tax based on 
earned incomes; whether this is formally con-
tributed by the employer or the employee may 
not aifect the real incidence of the burden very 
much. The objective of income redistribution 
implies, however, that an important share of 
social security income will have to come from 
general public revenue and that a much higher 
proportion of the tax sources of this revenue 
will have to be shifted to the high-income 
strata. It also implies that benefits financed in 
this way will have to be distributed in accord-
ance with need, and that the better-off con-
tributors to the system should not expect benefits 
matching the size of their contributions. Ad-
ditional social insurance for employed groups 
with income levels permitting them to save for 
their own future security may also be desirable, 
but should not be subsidized by the community 
at large, either directly or through higher costs 
of goods and services produced by the insured 
groups. 
(c) The relevance to Latin American condi-
tions of the traditional principles of insurance 
and financing of benefits through capitalization 
must be re-examined. These principles have 
broken down in all of the maturer social se-
curity systems of the region. The idea that 
future benefits for wage-earners can be paid for 
through investment of part of their current 
earnings may in itself be an economic fallacy, 
since such benefits will always be a claim on 
production at the time they are paid. Ideally, 
however, social security surpluses should consti-
tute a valuable source of compulsory savings 
for development investment and a tool of anti-
inflationary policy through limitation of current 
spending. The investment potential has been 
squandered in the past, and it is doubtful 
whether the future record can be better, in view 
of economic vicissitudes, pohtical pressures, and 
the problems of extension to social strata less 
able to contribute than the groups previously 
covered. Statistics on the contribution of social 
security to domestic investment can be mislead-
ing in view of the peculiar distribution of such 
"investment". Expenditure on social security 
headquarters buildings are hardly relevant to 
developmental objectives, and expenditures on 
hospital buildings and middle-income housing 
have to be evaluated in relation to over-all 
social needs and priorities. The meaning of the 
high proportion of social security surpluses used 
to purchase Government bonds in some coun-
tries would depend on the use made of these 
funds by the Government; in the main, they 
go to meet deficits in current expenditure.^® 
The countries with chronic inflation have been 
unable to use the contributions to control con-
sumption, in view of the dimensions of evasion, 
and by now the social security systems constitute 
sources of inflationary pressure. Most countries 
of the region seem to have no practicable alter-
native to the treating of social security as a 
redistribution of part of the current national 
income to meet certain defined contingencies. 
If capitalization is to be retained, however, the 
public authorities must make really determined 
and coherent efforts through the planning 
machinery to reconcile two objectives that pull 
in different directions: (i) channeling of invest-
ment to projects with high development priority; 
(ii) a satisfactory and assured rate of return 
on investment. Renunciation of the principle of 
capitalization would not mean abandonment 
of the contributory principle. If the systems are 
freed from the obligation to accumulate reserves, 
however, the immediate burden can be lightened 
somewhat, and, incidentally, the systems will 
be less tempted to spend on imposing buildings 
and to enter into services that should be 
provided by other organs of the State. 
In Panama, a relatively young and well-adminis-
tered social security system has made a particularly 
important contribution of this kind. By the end of 1966 
it held 46 ner cent of the national Government's inter-
nal debt. The 1967 report of the CIAP secretariat on 
Panama, however, warns that the Caja de Seguro Social 
"is under pressure to expand its coverage and increase 
its benefits as well as to enlarge its hospital facilities. 
It is anticipated, therefore, that it will be of declining 
importance in the future as a residual purchaser of 
public debt." (CIAP/169, 11 October 1967.) 
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[d) Social security provisions must be made 
compatible with national objectives for full 
employment and for higher productivity. This 
criterion requires that interference with the 
mobility of the labour force should be kept to 
a minimum and that social security costs should 
not constitute an artificial stimulus for em-
ployers to reduce their labour force and turn 
to capital-intensive techniques.^® It also requires 
that premature retirement from the labour force 
should be discouraged and that the active popu-
lation should not be saddled with an exces-
sive burden for support of the retired. The 
agricultural labour force presents special prob-
lems in relation to these criteria. The regionally 
endorsed objectives of agrarian reform imply 
far-reaching changes in occupational structures 
and the emergence of a new class of family 
farmers producing for the market. The alter-
native means by which the beneficiaries of 
agrarian reform can be helped to provide their 
own security cannot be discussed here, but there 
seems to be a danger that the introduction of 
traditional forms of social security for rural 
wage earners, prior to agrarian reform, will 
introduce employment rigidities hindering the 
wider transformation that is needed. 
(e) Uniformity, consistency and simplicity in 
legislative basis, administration and conditions 
of entitlement must be sought within a single 
institution responsible for the entire social 
security sector. As long as this requisite is not 
met, little progress can be expected toward the 
income redistribution and full employment ob-
jectives. Aside from the hindrances to labour 
mobility introduced by differential legislation 
and the important share of resources eaten up 
by administrative costs, administrative com-
plexities inevitably mean that the system is 
manipulated for the benefit of the better edu-
cated and more influential middle-income con-
tributors. Administrative unification, of course, 
will offer small advantage unless supported by 
uniform and equitable laws and procedures. 
The argument commonly heard in the countries 
with fragmented systems to the effect that unifi-
cation would produce a bureaucratic leviathan 
even more costly and impervious to the interests 
of the contributors than the present funds serves 
19 This also applies to the whole range of labour-
protective legislation which often has consequences the 
opposite of those intended, when applied to employment 
situations characteristic of Latin America. For example, 
laws prohibiting dismissals of workers or providing 
generous compensation for dismissal after a minimum 
period of employment commonly motivate employers to 
dismiss workers prior to completion of the minimum 
period for entitlement. 
as a convenient cover for the interests that 
stand to lose by any change, but the danger 
is real. 
( / ) The whole range of activities carried out 
by social security institutions at present should 
be reviewed so as to bring them into closer 
correspondence with the more urgent needs of 
the population to be covered and at the same 
time eliminate duplication with other social 
sectoral programmes. In general terms, this 
should mean more emphasis on protection of 
the family as a unit rather than the insured 
worker as an individual, and in particular on 
strengthening of family capacity to provide for 
the children on whom future development 
depends. The practicability and desirability of 
generalized family allowances in Latin America 
at present are questionable, but they would 
respond to more urgent social needs and should 
have more positive developmental consequences 
than do the retirement pensions. 
Public agencies (and even sub-divisions of 
agencies) in all of the social sectors tend to 
function in isolation and to set up services 
paralleling those of other agencies, whether in 
ignorance of the latter or on the plea that the 
existing services are not meeting needs that 
impinge on their own direct responsibilities. 
The social security systems, with their admin-
istrative autonomy and restricted clienteles, have 
been particularly subject to this temptation, 
and their earlier stages, when contributions 
provided large surpluses, made it easy to indulge 
the temptation. 
The financing of health services through a 
social security tax is legitimate, and this should 
be one of the most promising ways for a 
system with limited resources to afford some 
protection to families of contributors as well 
as the population at large. Up to the present, 
however, the large expenditures of the social 
security agencies on health services have entailed 
various anomalies and sources of inefficiency. 
It has not been uncommon for the social security 
system (or several separate social security funds) 
and the ministry of health to engage in parallel 
hospital-building programmes, with neither 
agency able to recruit sufficient physicians and 
auxiliary personnel to provide effective services 
for the masses of the population. In a good 
many systems the families of insured workers 
are entitled to only limited medical benefits, or 
none. Moreover, the attempts of the population 
strata newly incorporated into social security 
to make use' of the medical services to which 
they are entitled faces them with new sources 
of insecurity deriving from the insufficient 
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resources, and bureaucratization of these ser-
vices: long waits for attention, perfunctory-
treatment, arrogance of personnel, sudden clos-
ing down of services by strikes. This is probably 
now the most prominent and neuralgic aspect 
of social security to the groups covered other 
than the better-off salaried employees. Several 
workable alternative means of financing and 
administering public health services, inside or 
outside of social security, could no doubt be 
introduced; what is essential is that the services 
be unified and rationalized, one way or another. 
The housing activities of the social security 
institutions have generally vacillated between 
the objective of income-earning investment of 
reserves and the objective of providing low-cost 
housing for members, without accomplishing 
either. The cost of housing constructed by the 
social security funds has placed it out of 
the reach of the majority of the contributors, 
inflation and rent freezes have wiped out the 
returns, and functionaries have found a tempt-
ing source of illicit gains in their ability to 
obtain and dispose of such housing. While the 
housing needs of the low-income masses are 
desperate, other means of mobilizing resources 
to meet these needs seem likely to be more 
effective than social security. 
Future relationships between social security, 
social assistance and social welfare (social ser-
vice) deserve more careful consideration than 
can be given here. Many social security institu-
tions have set up their own social welfare units 
and these now constitute a leading source of 
employment for graduates of schools of social 
work. Their main function, however, is to help 
applicants through the administrative labyrinth 
constructed by the social security systems them-
selves. Simplification of the systems and awaken-
ing of a disposition to serve the public among 
administrative personnel would eliminate most 
of the need for this function. At the same time, 
extension of social security to the marginal 
strata, with their manifold difficulties in gaining 
a secure foothold in the kind of urban society 
now evolving in Latin America, should open 
up a large and challenging area for the functions 
more legitimately expected of trained social 
workers, while attempts can be expected to 
invest social security with responsibilities more 
properly belonging to social assistance. Outside 
the social security systems, one finds a wide 
variety of small-scale public agencies and private 
agencies receiving public subsidies that are 
charged with social assistance and social welfare 
functions. The establishment of such agencies 
has responded to many separate initiatives and 
to the disposition of the public authorities to 
provide at least a token solution to glaring 
social evils—such as the large numbers of 
abandoned and vagrant children—-when they 
have no clear ideas as to how the larger problem 
can be solved within the limits of the resources 
at their disposal and when the problem itself 
does not generate strong enough pressure to 
force them to allocate larger resources. The 
pressures are sure to become stronger and 
the future planning of social security will have 
to be accompanied by the working out of clear 
principles for the kinds of social assistance 
that can be afforded, the sources of its financing, 
and the administrative channels for its dispens-
i n g . 2 o 
(g) The social security systems must begin 
to plan and evaluate their operations in the light 
of full and reliable statistical information. In 
all of the social sectors the informational basis 
for planning remains lamentably weak, and 
social security is probably the worst off of all. 
This deficiency has several aspects: 
First, practically all of the systems have 
neglected the opportunity to organize and dis-
seminate information that should be an auto-
matic by-product of their own activities. The 
lack of records concerning contributors and of 
full data concerning costs is striking. One of the 
first stages in reform will have to be the system-
atic collection of internal statistics and their 
prompt dissemination in a form intelligible to 
the public. 
Second, neither the legislative bodies nor 
the social security administrations have taken 
advantage of the information already at hand 
that would throw light on the practicability 
and future implications of specific benefits and 
measures of financing. This refers particularly 
to demographic statistics on age distribution 
and rates of growth of different age groups, and 
to statistics on composition of the labour force. 
In some of the systems there is reason to believe 
that this neglect has been deliberate; actuarial 
calculations have been kept confidential because 
of the non-viable position they would reveal. 
Third, existing demographic information is 
far from adequate, and information on family 
composition, employment and unemployment, 
wage levels and income distribution much less 
so. Quantitative generalizations and forecasts on 
these latter topics can be found, but for the 
See Virginia A. Paraiso, "Social service in Latin 
America: functions and relationships to development", 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. XI, No. 1 
(April 1966). 
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most part they rest on very shaky foundations. 
It is probable that underemployment and con-
cealed unemployment are growing in importance 
and that levels of living of some of the marginal 
groups are deteriorating, but very little is 
known concerning the dimensions and specific 
characteristics of these problems. Rational social 
security policies—as well as over-all develop-
ment policies—will require much more com-
prehensive and reliable information, informa-
tion that can be obtained only through system-
atic sample surveys. 
6 . SOCIAL SECURITY AND PLANNING 
In view of the nearly universal endorsement 
by public authorities in Latin America of the 
indispensability of comprehensive long-term 
planning for development, it would seem 
obvious that social security should be incor-
porated into such planning, along with the 
other sectors of social policy. For many reasons, 
however, the inclusion of social security chapters 
in plans and the setting up of sectoral planning 
units would be only a first step, and not neces-
sarily a decisive one. 
The entire planning movement is now going 
through a stage of rethinking as a result of 
its confrontation with the realities of the societies 
and economies since 1961. The planning ma-
chinery created in these years and the ac-
cumulated experience in application of plans 
represent assets of great potential value, but 
the experience has included a great deal of 
frustration stemming from "general lack of po-
litical support for planning, inadequate over-all 
development strategies, absence of effective co-
ordination between policy and operational ma-
chinery and more specific drawbacks".^^ Plan-
ning has not been able to substitute for vigorous 
and consistent policy directives, and it cannot 
be affirmed that the planning structures have 
yet functioned as effective frameworks for 
policy in any of the social sectors. 
The following hypotheses, most of which have 
been suggested in preceding pages, go far to 
explain the limited effectiveness of development 
planning: 
(1) When new governmental mechanisms of 
programmes are introduced into a country the 
functions that they actually perform will depend 
more on the structure of its society and the 
directions of change in that structure than on 
21 "Planning in Latin America" (E/CN.12/772, 2 
March 1967). This is the most recent in a series of 
studies in which the ECLA secretariat has analysed the 
achievements and problems of development planning. 
their overt objectives. In most Latin American 
countries the planning bodies themselves as well 
as the sectoral programmes have been affected 
by pressures toward bureaucratization and by 
the needs of governing coalitions for expedients 
to evade or postpone dangerous decisions on 
the allocation of resources and the distribution 
of incomes. 
(2) The processes of economic growth and 
social change in Latin America at present 
unavoidably involve the wholesale adoption by 
part of the population of the most recent con-
sumption patterns, cultural norms and expecta-
tions for social services that emanate from the 
high-income industrialized countries. The same 
processes contribute to a specific kind of "mar-
ginalization" of the rest of the population. This 
marginalization is not simply equivalent to ex-
clusion or poverty; it combines increasing 
attraction to and dependence on the modern 
urban society with increasing insecurity and 
frustration. 
(3) The main determinants behind these 
processes are the patterns of Latin American 
involvement in the world system of economic 
and cultural inter-dependence, rapid population 
growth, insufficient ability to mobilize resources 
for development, and low capacity of the sup-
posedly "dynamic" economic sectors to generate 
employment. The countries of Latin America, 
like those of the rest of the world, are in the 
grip of forces that, on the one hand, urge upon 
them the necessity of quick solutions to the 
problems of development and social justice 
and, on the other, make it extremely difficult 
for them to apply coherent policies or to 
plan for the long term. 
In social security, with its array of vested 
interests entrenched behind legislative and ad-
ministrative entanglements, the preparation by 
a planning agency of a consistent programme 
embodying the criteria suggested above, with 
time-tables and specifications of the share of 
public resources to be devoted to social security, 
is likely to have no immediate effect at all. 
In fact, as experience in other sectors indicates, 
planning can easily become one more device 
for evasion or postponement of policy decisions 
that would endanger the existing political com-
promise, and one more means of satisfying the 
pressures for public employment of profes-
sionals. The slowness of progress towards im-
plementation of the recommendations made 
several years ago by social security reform 
commissions and international experts demon-
strates the difficulty of crossing the gap between 
planning and action. The more elaborate and 
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abstruse the techniques introduced for social 
security programming, the smaller the likelihood 
of any practical effect. 
The potential utility of planning, however, 
can be viewed from another and more op-
timistic direction. John Friedmann has made 
a very interesting distinction between "manifest" 
and "latent" functions of planning, with special 
reference to Venezuela.^^ The former comprise 
the use of certain techniques for the allocation 
of resources in order to reach quantitative 
targets. The latter include the focusing of public 
attention on the creation of a "development 
society" and the rationalization of political 
debate over economic and social issues within 
a common understanding concerning limitations 
of resources, priority objectives, the need to 
choose between alternatives and the need to 
weigh relative costs and benefits of different 
measures. These latent functions can be of great 
value even if circumstances outside the control 
of the planners bring about wide divergencies 
between their calculations and the actual direc-
tions of economic and social change, but they 
cannot be realized unless public opinion has 
some faith in the capacity of planning to ac-
complish its manifest functions. 
In social security the latent functions can 
be of crucial importance. The process of piece-
meal expansion without regard to resource 
limits, equitability or economic by-effects is 
bringing unpleasant practical consequences that 
make millions of people aware of the need for 
some kind of change. Up to a certain point, 
the very deficiencies of the social security 
systems have been useful to professional poli-
ticians who could trade influence in expediting 
pension applications for party loyalty and 
votes. At a later stage, even this kind of use-
fulness is transformed into an embarrassment 
that should force the need for reform on the 
22 John Friedmann, Venezuela: From Doctrine to Dia-
logue, National Planning Series I (Syracuse University 
Press, 1965). Another of Friedmann's conclusions is 
equally relevant to the probable opportunities for the 
application of planning to social security: 
". . . planning typically occurs—and receives political 
backing—under conditions of crisis. The rationality of 
planning practice must therefore be a rationality 
adapted to its conditions; it must sacrifice compre-
hensiveness to the urgency of overcoming specific 
bottlenecks; it must be more problem- than goal-ori-
ented; it must be piecemeal and fragmented rather 
than coordinative. Unfortunately, many would-be plan-
ners regret this passing of functional rationality to 
the point where they fail to see the rationality in 
successful adaptive behaviour to crisis situations . . . 
For crises always occur when there is rapid change 
and this, of course, is precisely the condition of 
modern economic development." 
attention of even the most "practical" machine 
politician. This political function of the social 
security system has reached its highest degree 
of institutionalization in Uruguay, and a recent 
study vividly describes the result: 
"In the first stages, those recommended by 
the system are relatively few, the recommen-
dation is effective, the parties generally obtain 
the expected compensation. On the one 
hand, the very efficacy attracts more persons; 
on the other, the country's economic stagna-
tion compels delay in the granting of pen-
sions. Consequently, the politically supported 
applicants multiply and their possibilities 
continually decline. . . . [Finally] each Direc-
tor of a Fund has to have several secretaries 
to attend to the inflow; but these are in-
sufficient because no one is capable of re-
membering such a large number of persons 
and the state of their applications. Thus 
each Director must keep a file of all the poli-
tically recommended applicants. Then the 
efficacy of the system continually declines. 
The normal bureaucratic delays are replaced 
by the delays of the bureaucracy that has 
been erected to overcome the former, without 
any advantage to the citizen. In practice, a 
rising proportion of the political recommen-
dations sleep in the files just like the applica-
tions lacking a recommendation. Moreover, 
this situation leads to the differential recom-
mendation. A distinction begins to be made 
between simple recommendations, squared rec-
ommendations, cubed recommendations, etc. It 
is easy to understand that little by little the sys-
tem loses all relevance to the objectives that 
brought it into being. A high proportion of the 
persons recommended feel cheated, the equali-
tarian function that the system had [in provid-
ing a source of help for applicants who lack 
money and .influential friends or relatives] dis-
appears, and its value for the formulation of 
e ectoral obligations along with it.^ ® 
The social security systems cannot be made 
to function better until strong popular demands 
that they function better offset the more selfish 
and short-sighted pressures. The emergence of 
such demands requires a degree of confidence 
that the public authorities are acting in good 
faith, that they are capable of planning, and 
that they are trying to meet the real needs of 
the people affected by their plans. Effective 
application of planning to social security will 
require presentation of the factual bases and the 
objectives of such planning in language that 
Aldo Solari, El Desarrollo social del Uruguay en la 
postguerra (Montevideo, Editorial Alfa, 1967). 
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can be readily understood, the widest possible 
publicity for these presentations, and formal 
representation of all groups affected by social 
security in the planning process. 
This last requisite presents obvious difficulties. 
"Popular participation in planning" has become 
a slogan of increasing attractiveness to political 
leaders and planners, but there are no simple 
recipes for its translation into practice in socie-
ties with rigid social stratification, low consensus 
and intense political competition. Paternalistic 
traditions predispose even the most socially-
oriented administrators to assume that they 
know what people need without asking them. 
Conversely, the low-income masses understand-
ably try to escape from their pervasive in-
security by transfer of decision-making to any 
figure who seems to have sufficient power to 
produce solutions—whether employer, public 
official or populist leader. The strength and 
representativeness of the organizations represent-
ing different classes and occupational groups 
vary widely; many of these organizations are 
ideologically committed to intransigent opposi-
tion to the present public authorities, and the 
greater part of the low-income population can 
make its voice heard only by voting for populist 
candidates, if at all. 
Nevertheless, the recent growth of peasant 
unions and of organizations for defense of local 
interests among the urban marginal popula-
tion—^phenomena that are only beginning to be 
studied—indicate that the ability of the different 
strata to express themselves in an organized 
way through leadership from their own ranks 
is likely to be more evenly distributed in the 
future. For the present, planners have to be 
prepared to swallow considerable portions of 
disorder, waste, and diversion of resources to 
meet demands quite different from their own 
conceptions of priorities. However, if they pre-
pare themselves to enter into a frank dialogue 
with the people on development objectives, 
resources and social needs, there are grounds 
for hope that the present crises can be over-
come and that forms of social security capable 
of contributing both to development and to 
social justice can be evolved. 
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INTEGRAL LOCAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES 
!N LATIN AMERICA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Social tensions and unrest are today promi-
nent in most Latin American societies. Dif-
ferent social strata look increasingly to the 
institutions of government to advance their 
separate interests, raise or protect their levels 
of living, and at the same time provide the 
impetus for rapid national development. De-
mands are heard that the State transform the 
social and economic systems according to their 
own conceptions of the requisites of progress. 
This instrumentalist view of the State in con-
temporary Latin America puts public agencies 
to the test: an era has begun in which the 
performance of ministries and organisms of 
the State are being judged by their contribu-
tions to the development process in addition to 
their capabilities of providing services to their 
regular clienteles.^ 
These new activities, which may be inter-
preted as essentially productive, are increasingly 
1 See Charles W. Anderson, Politics and Economic 
Change in Latín America (New York, Van Nostrand 
and Co., 1967), for an analysis of the role of the Latin 
American nation-State ". . . the idea of the nation-
State's economic role was reformulated to account for 
the fact that Latin America's economic tasks were in 
some measure different from those of the advanced 
Western nations. At first inchoate and somewhat inar-
ticulate in the nineteen-thirties and nineteen-forties, and 
then with growing clarity and precision in the nineteen-
fifties and nineteen-sixties the idea of the Western na-
tion-State was reworked and reinterpreted around the 
new ideological framework of economic development. 
The policy instruments of the Western nation-State were 
to be refashioned to fit this new conception of the 
State's task, and extended to fit the peculiar require-
ments of the region. Economic development became the 
standard against which the performance of the nation-
State was to be measured, and on the basis of which the 
Western political economic system was to be justified" 
(p. 45). Claudio Velez writes, "But in Latin America 
the central government is the pressure group which has 
been steadily growing in power and influence during 
the past decades and which alone appears to have the 
capacity to bring about the generalized modernization 
of these economies. Further, this trend is very much in 
keeping with the character of the Hispanic political and 
cultural complex". Claudio Velez, ed., The politics oj 
conformity in Latin America (London, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1967), p. 9. 
being demanded by social strata and areas which 
were iormerly neglected. The universalization 
of development action to cover such groups 
as one means of enabling them to participate in 
national progress obliges the public agencies 
to find new resources, adjust their functions 
and reorganize their operational systems. A s a 
result, the programmes which are being created 
in the public sector on the one hand buttress 
the paternalistic centralism of governmental 
institutions, while on the other they fragment 
into a great variety of separate initiatives as 
the agencies try to come to grips with many 
variable factors and heterogeneous local situa-
tions which include the fo l lowing: 
1. Physical division of Latin America into 
a large number of zones offering widely differ-
ing ecologies and potentialities f o r human 
settlement;^ 
2. Very uneven geographical distribution of 
population, with main concentration in some 
2 In classifying these geographical characteristics of 
Latin America, Schmeider identified thirty-three land-
scapes ¡paisa/es). Some of these are so extensive that 
they can in turn be subdivided into regions or zones. 
See Oscar Schmeider, Geografía de América Latina 
(México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965). The im-
portance of physiographic and geoeconomic considera-
tions in the development of strategies of economic de-
velopment is now the subject of intensive study: Felipe 
Herrera has stated that a strategy for the development 
of integrated geoeconomic areas would appear to be 
essential if the economic development and social change 
required in the developing countries are to reach a level 
of effectiveness which is high enough to counterbalance 
rapid population growth allied with an uncontainable 
expansion of social expectations (Institute for Latin 
American Integration, Inter-American Development 
Bank, Boletín de la Integración, No. 22 (Buenos Aires, 
September 1967), p. 470 (Spanish only)). For a theo-
retical discussion of the problems of regional science in 
Latin American planning, see John Friedmann, Regional 
Development Policy: a Case Study oj Venezuela (Cam-
bridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1966), and Walter Stohr, 
"The Definition of Regions in Relation to National and 
Regional Development in Latin America", paper sub-
mitted to the first Inter-American Seminar on the Defini-
tion of Regions for Development Planning, organized by 
the Regional Geography Committee of the Pan Ameri-
can Institute of Geography and History in Canada, Sep-
tember 1967 (mimeographed). 
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parts of the periphery of the continent and in 
some highland regions;^ 
3. Many rural settlements dispersed in very 
small nuclei—whether of haciendas or of small 
cultivators—in which the compact agricultural 
village community is typical of only some 
zones 
4. High rates of natural increase of rural 
population and considerable geographical mo-
bility with strong currents of migration to new 
settlement areas, to towns and to large cities;® 
5. Insufficient employment opportunities in all 
of these settings 
6. Accumulation of marginal population in 
the slums and shantytowns of the large cities 
7. Increasing penetration of the countryside 
by urban influences and of the cities by popula-
tion groups culturally rural or traditionally 
small-town; 
8. Politico-administrative systems over-con-
centrated at the centre and typically traditional, 
inefficient and unrepresentative at the lower 
levels;® 
9. Political processes of decision-making that 
too frequently ignore national planning, co-
ordinating mechanisms and developmental pri-
orities in setting policy and allocating re-
sources.® 
3 J. P. Cole, Latin America: an Economic and Social 
Geograjyhy (London, Butterworth's, 1965), figure 2.1, 
p. 13. For a more complete analysis, see United Nations, 
The Economic Development of Latin America in the 
Post-War Period (E/CN.12/659/Rev.l, New York, 1964), 
jp. 74-78, and ECLA, "The demographic situation in 
jatin America" (Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 
vol. VI, No. 2, October 1961). 
* ECLA, "The rural settlement patterns and social 
change in Latin America . . ." Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America, vol. X, No. 1 (March 1965), p. 1 et seq. 
5 The Economic Development of Latin America in the 
Post-¡far Period, op. cit. See also John Friedmann, "The 
future of urbanization in Latin America: some observa-
tions of the role of the periphery", paper presented at 
the Congress of the Inter-American Planning Society 
(Lima, October 1968). 
6 ECLA, Economic Survey of Latin America, 1967 
(Santiago, 1968), Part One, chapter II (in the press). 
Ibid.; see also Francis Violich and Juan B. Astica, 
Community Development and the Urban Planning Proc-
ess in Latin America (Los Angeles, UCLA, Latin Ameri-
can Center, 1967), and John F. Turner, "Uncontrolled 
urban settlement: problems and policies". Working Pa-
per No. 11, agenda item 4, Inter-Regional Seminar on 
Development Policies and Planning in Relation to Ur-
banization (University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania, October-November 1967). 
^Politics and Economic Change in Latin America, op. 
cit., and Economic Survey of Latin America, 1967, op. 
cit., "Patterns of rural settlement . . .". 
9 United Nations, Report on the World Social Situa-
tion, 1967 (New York, 1968), especially the chapter 
"The social evolution of Latin America"; United Na-
The problems of programme organization 
tend to become more complex as public agencies 
seek to adapt their activities to fit the require-
ments and situations at the local level, and as 
they gradually see the need to enlist the orga-
nized participation of groups, communities and 
associations.^® This search for new institutional 
forms—even though it runs counter to the 
tendency toward further centralization and 
bureaucratization—has appeared as one of the 
motivating forces in revision and reorganization 
of programmes of integral local development. 
In the following pages some of the common 
elements of such programmes of the sectoral 
and special agencies in Latin American coun-
tries are reviewed in relation to the principles 
of community development, with the aim of 
studying their contribution to national develop-
ment processes. 
2 . A BRIEF COMPENDIUM OF INTEGRAL LOCAL 
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES 
Before attempting an analysis of the manner 
in which community development and related 
programmes have been adapted to fit the wide 
range of local developmental situations in the 
Latin American countries, it will be useful to 
list the principal actions falling into this general 
category. There is good precedent for consider-
ing all of the wide range of specialized tech-
nical activities which are directed by govern-
ments and private bodies at improving economic 
and social conditions at the local level. During 
the course of the past fifteen years a number 
of comparative studies of programmes in the 
different countries have presented general fea-
tures of their organization and content, and 
have attempted to classify them according to 
various criteria.^^ The Economic Commission 
tions. Committee for Development Planning, Report on 
the Second Session (Official Records of the Economic 
and Social Council, Forty-third Session, Supplement No. 
7, New York, 1967), p. 11 et seq.; ILPES Discusiones 
sobre Planificación, Textos del Instituto Latinoameri-
cano de Planificación Económica y Social (México, 
Siglo XXI, 1968), p. 25 et seq.; Rubén D. Utria, "La 
planificación como técnica del desarrollo en América 
Latin,<¿', pp. 21-25 (document submitted to the sixth 
Pan American Congress of Social Service, Caracas, 
Venezuela; 15-22 June 1968). 
This topic has been discussed in Desarrollo nacio-
nal, participación popular y desarrollo de la comunidad, 
notas de clase by Rubén D. Utria, Regional Fundamen-
tal Education Centre for Community Development in 
Latin America (CREFAL), Patzcuaro, Mexico, 1968. 
See also Politics and Economic Change in Latin Amer-
ica, op. cit., pp. 118-128, and Amitai Etzioni, "Toward a 
theory of social guidance", American Journal of Soci-
ology, vol. 73, No. 2 (September 1967), p. 173 et seq. 
11 In 1958 an international working group used the 
following criteria in preparing a compendium of com-
50 
for Latin America did so in 1964, using the 
criteria of popular participation and the prin-
ciples of community development as the basis 
of a compendium of programmes.^^ 
Our purpose here is to bring that listing up 
to date and to analyse the current information 
in order to describe actual trends and recent 
changes in policy and concepts. The great 
number of public and private programmes now 
active at the local level in urban and rural 
areas of Latin America and the frequent re-
organizations and additions, however, make it 
very difScult to complete a listing and keep 
it current. The present compendium thus does 
not pretend to completeness; it is rather a 
selection of programmes on which information 
permitting classification is at hand. 
(a) Criteria for the selection of integral local 
programmes 
Earlier inventories of local action programmes 
have usually attempted to bring the entire 
spectrum of such activities within the definition 
of "community development programmes". In 
following this procedure, one encounters the 
difficulty of discriminating between programmes 
which are: 1, intentionally created as "com-
munity development programmes" in accord-
ance with a government policy; 2, essentially 
identifiable with community development pro-
grammes as a generic type but fall outside the 
area of community development policy; or 3, 
excluded for reasons of motivation, methods 
or objectives from the category of "community 
development programmes". It seems necessary to 
frame a set of criteria for selecting the appro-
munity development programmes in the region of Mex-
ico, Central America, Panama and the Caribbean: 
(a) the existence of national plans; (b) an integral 
approach in the application of national services; (c) ad-
ministrative organization and co-ordination of the na-
tional services; (d) training personnel; (e) community 
participation in the programmes. Naciones Unidas, "In-
forme de la Segunda Sesión de la Junta Interagencial 
sobre el Desarrollo de la Comunidad en México, Cen-
troamérica, Panamá y el Caribe", CREFAL, Mexico 
1959 (mimeographed). In an earlier publication, the 
Bureau of Social Affairs based an international survey 
of programmes on ten "basic elements" of community 
development (United Nations, Social Progress through 
Community Development, ST/SOA/26, New York, 
1955). These criteria were summarized and presented as 
principles of community development in a later report 
(United Nations, Economic and Social Council, "Report 
on concepts and principles of community development 
and recommendations on further practical measures to 
be taken by international organizations". New York, 
1957) (mimeographed). 
12 EC;LA, "Popular participation and principles of 
community development in relation to the acceleration 
of economic and social development". Economic Bulle-
tin for Latin America, vol. IX, No. 2 (November 1964). 
priate programmes while leaving aside those 
which should not be included in this classifi-
cation. 
In this paper we have used the term "integral 
local development programmes" to refer to 
programme types 1 and 2. The programmes 
included in the compendium have been selected 
keeping in mind the following criteria: 
(i) Significance. The programmes in the list 
are generally the more important efforts in each 
of the countries in the sense that they: (a) exist 
as instruments of policy with government sup-
port of their activities, with the responsibility 
for execution assigned to major institutions 
often receiving material or technical assistance 
from international or bilateral agencies; (b) 
normally possess resources and coverage of 
areas and populations to make a measurable 
impact; and (c) show a degree of continuity 
over the years. 
(ii) Substantive complexity. In keeping with 
the principles of community development and the 
operational characteristics of a large number 
of local development actions, programmes have 
been included in the list only if they display 
technical activities which are substantively com-
plex or multisectoral. Programmes confined to 
a single sectoral field (such as education, health, 
social welfare and agricultural extension) have 
been excluded because the application of com-
munity development principles would naturally 
imply the articulation or amplification of these 
activities in an intersectoral manner. However, 
this criterion refers to already existing "am-
plified" programmes. It should not be inter-
preted as implying that activities of a specific 
sectoral agency ought to be excluded from 
integral local development programmes in the 
future. 
(iii) Principles of community development. 
To avoid an indiscriminate listing of all forms 
of local action, some guideline must be used 
in making the selection of programmes. For this 
purpose the principles of community develop-
ment have been utilized here in a flexible way, 
since these are widely diffused and generally 
applied intentionally or unintentionally by scores 
of agencies at the local level. It should be 
remembered that these elements of action, or 
principles as they have later come to be called, 
existed as methodological guidelines for a num-
ber of years before the formulation of the 
body of techniques formally identified with 
community development. As our listing discloses, 
programmes utilizing these action principles 
existed in some Latin American countries in 
the nineteen-twenties. 
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The ten principles cited in United Nations 
documents can be synthesized in the following 
points: 
The local development activities will correspond 
to the basic needs of communities or other 
local associations expressed through their 
leaders and institutions; 
Government and people will act jointly through 
multipurpose programmes to achieve goals 
which are balanced in their effect and signifi-
cant both locally and nationally; 
Popular participation in the programme will be 
characterized by stimulating positive attitudes 
toward development, will involve conscious 
and organized action for mobilizing social 
solidarity and resources, and will insure im-
portant roles for women and youth; 
Operational organization of the activities will 
reflect public policy stated in development 
plans, rationalized inputs of resources for 
specific programmes or projects as instru-
ments of the policy, and adaptation of ad-
ministrative arrangements of technical ser-
vices to fit local ecological and socio-economic 
requirements. 
(b) The list of programmes 
Local and community development pro-
grammes of an integral type have emerged in 
all of the Latin American countries. In the 
compendium we have included twenty-three 
countries: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicara-
gua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela, broken down 
into four sub-regional groups. 
The list presents factual and generalized in-
formation about the programmes. It indicates 
first the designation of the programme and the 
names of the executing agencies. Those agencies 
whose activities include a multipurpose approach 
at the local level are included when these 
functions have been amplified beyond those of 
a single sectoral service, include integral com-
prehensive activities, or involve co-ordination, 
articulation or joint action among various tech-
nical services. 
Since we are interested in identifying the 
recent trends of organization, content and policy 
in the countries as these may be expressed in 
the kinds of programmes recently created or 
reorganized, a third column includes the legal 
basis and date of organization of the pro-
grammes. Unfortunately, the information about 
the changes of structure within agencies gen-
erally becomes available only some months after 
the modifications are made. Hence cases may 
occur in which the compendium does not reflect 
the most up-to-date facts about the legal authority 
for a given programme. 
The fourth column, on coverage, refers to the 
territorial scope of the programme as national, 
regional or local, indicating whether the pro-
gramme has been aimed at a rural or an urban 
copulation. A programme which covers several 
ocal areas has been considered regional in 
coverage, while a programme which includes 
two or more zones or regions (usually located 
in different provinces or states) has been 
classified as national. 
The column on administrative hierarchy of 
programmes refers to the kinds of divisions 
or units into which operations have been de-
centralized. Since it is quite common for plan-
ning to cover delimited geographical areas in 
both rural and urban programmes, another 
column has been included to indicate the scope 
of the area covered. 
An attempt has also been made to capture 
the essential intersectoral or substantive com-
plexity of each programme. The terminology 
used in this column presents some difficulties, 
because bureaucratic organizations tend to evolve 
by a continuous adjustment of their structure 
and function to meet new requirements. These 
changes are reflected in the programme which 
the agency carries out, and pari passu such 
changes in programme result in further modifi-
cations in the organizational make-up of the 
agency. The terminology used here describes 
broad features and does not exclude the pos-
sibility that the same programme might fit into 
more than one type if other characteristics are 
regarded as being more significant. The four 
kinds of categories used here do tend to over-
lap, yet the way in which the substantive com-
plexity of the programme can be correlated 
with agency organizational forms may be distin-
guished on the basis of : (i) special purpose 
agencies with integral activities; (ii) co-ordinat-
ing mechanisms which articulate the activities of 
a number of agencies; (Hi) sectoral agencies 
which co-ordinate activities by mutual agree-
ment; and {iv) sectoral agencies with amplified 
activities. 
Finally, in the last column is indicated the 
extent to which training activities are carried 
out as permanent functions of the agency at 
the professional level, and in-service training on 
an occasional basis. The training of local leaders 
has not been included because this is considered 
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to be a function of all such programmes con-
sistent with the application of community de-
velopment principles. Since most international 
or bilateral technical assistance activities are 
closely related to training, mention has been 
made of these in this column also. 
3 . CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROGRAMMES 
LISTED 
A comparative study of the descriptive infor-
mation compiled in the columns of the tables 
above suggests a number of generalizations on 
two important questions—the nature and scope 
of the programmes, and their relationships to 
each other within the context of national de-
velopment. 
(a) Description of the programmes 
The outstanding characteristics of such pro-
grammes in most countries are their number, 
their variety and their limitations. The exuberant 
plurality of the programmes was already noted 
in a 1961 study of community development 
programmes in Mexico, Central America, Pa-
nama and the Caribbean. In that year thirty-six 
programmes were identified and compared. At 
present the number in Mexico exceeds thirty, 
and Colombia has over fifty. One purpose of 
an analysis of the programmes will be that 
of finding an explanation for this proliferation. 
Another obvious feature of the programme 
is their scattered territorial and substantive 
distribution. They appear in both rural and 
urban areas. They are located among all kinds 
of agencies in both the public and private 
sectors. Their capacity is usually incomplete 
and limited by absence of important substantive 
elements and by constriction of territorial scope. 
Of equal interest—and perhaps directly related 
to the interest of sectoral agencies in creating 
their own internal multisectoral activities—is 
the accelerating rate of programme reorganiza-
tion and the creation of new kinds of agency 
activities in the past several years. About one-
half of all the programmes listed have been 
created, modified or reorganized since 1963. 
The listing also reveals that the kinds of pro-
grammes, the types of agencies administering 
them, and the legal authority for their creation 
are extremely varied. No one policy can be 
discerned. Instead, the decision about when to 
create or reorganize, and what form the new 
instrument should take seems to reflect a large 
number of different policies quite unrelated 
to each other. Programmes are set up on the 
basis of Presidential decrees, acts of Parliament, 
ministerial decrees, agency fiats or administra-
tive dispositions. Behind these varied and some-
times contradictory decisions appear many kinds 
of motivations or objectives. 
The majority of the programmes in the listing 
are rural. Combined shortages of funds and 
relative ease in mobilizing local popular re-
sources often lead to an extension of programmes 
there. National agencies not operating in such 
zones in the past may wish to enlarge their 
territorial coverage without having obtained 
(or as a means of obtaining) a commensurate 
allocation of funds. Such agencies have a legal 
basis for assuming a national scope but are 
unable to begin new or amplified activities 
in the entire country. The expansion takes 
place gradually by adding operating units in 
scattered areas. Coverage is rarely complete 
throughout the nation, even when these agencies 
have obtained funds from external lending 
sources. As the agencies offer broader services, 
they tend to apply community development 
methods in organizing local self-help for con-
structing material works as a way of providing 
visible benefits and evidence of their coverage 
in communities. It is common to find agencies 
with similar activities working in adjacent local 
areas, avoiding duplication by "gentlemen's 
agreements" not to contend for the same clien-
teles. However, competition among agencies oc-
curs in local areas where concentration of rural 
population, accessibility from an urban base of 
operations, social structure and attitudes in 
villages facilitate an extension of coverage. 
The programmes in our list reveal similar 
patterns of territorial coverage throughout the 
continent. Dispersed rural populations and 
frontier regions have been neglected in large 
parts of Latin America. Where opposition of 
landowners impedes work, agencies rarely at-
tempt to provide services in haciendas, planta-
tions or large commercial farms unless these 
are expropriated or affected by agrarian re-
form. The patchwork coverage by many agen-
cies may be found concentrated among small-
holder populations (owners of minifundios) 
and low-income shantytown dwellers (marginal 
populations) of urban areas. Mexico, Vene-
zuela and Chile have made notable efforts to 
provide more balanced coverage of most rural*, 
areas. 
In spite of the rapid shift of populations to-
urban areas and the grave social and economic-
problems which have appeared in relation tO' 
urbanization and industrialization, urban pro-
grammes do not appear to be keeping pace with 
the expansion of rural ones. The material! 
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Table 
MEXICO, CENTRAL AMERICA, PANAMA, 
Country Piogramme 
Costa Rica National Community Devel-
opment Programme 
Agrarian Reform and Settle-
ment Programme 
Housing, Urbanism and So-
cial Service Programme 
Cuba Agrarian Reform Programme 
El Salvador Fundamental Education Bri-
gades 
Urban Housing Programme 





Programme of Rural Socio-
educational Development 
and Literacy Campaign 
Programme of Agricultural 
Extension and Development 
of the Indian Economy 
Programme of Mobile Units 
for Rural Areas 
Land Reform and Settlement 
Programme 













Presidency of the Republic 
Institute of Lands and Settlement 
(ITCO) 
National Housing and Urbanism In-
stitute (INVU) 
Institute of Agrarian Reform 
(INRA) of the Ministry of 
Agrarian Reform 
Fundamental Education Department, 
Ministry of Education 
Urban Housing Institute 
Rural Settlement Institute 
Salvadorean Company for Coffee and 
Administration of Rural Welfare 
Ministry of Social Welfare 
Organized 1963 
Law 2,825 of 1961, re-
vised 1964, 
Law 1,788 of 1954 
Agrarian Reform law 
of 1959, revised in 
1963 
Legislative decree 29 
of 1950 
Decree 296 of 1964 
National Indian Institute and De-
partment of Fundamental Educa-
tion, Ministry of Education 
General Bureau of Agricultural Re-
search and Extension and its In-
dian Economic Development Ser-
vice, Ministry of Agriculture 
General Bureau of Public Sanita-
tion, Ministry of Public Sanita-
tion and Social Assistance 
National Institute of Agrarian Trans- Law of 1962 
formation 
National Institute of Housing and Law 345 of 1965 
Urbanism 
SFEI organized 1 9 5 3 , 
reorganized 1967 
Organized 1963 
National Agrarian Institute Law of 1962 
Indian Co-ordinating Centres National Indian Institute, Presiden- Law of 1948 
cy of the Republic 
Cultural Missions 
Literacy Programme 
Ministry of Public Education 
Ministry of Public Education 
Organized 1921, sus-
pended in 1936 and 

















National rural and Central and local 
urban 
National rural Central and local 
National urban and Central and local 
rural 
National and local 
National and local 
National and local 
National rural Central, regional National, regional 








Central and local 
Central and local 
Central and local 
Central and local 
Central and zonal 
Central and local 
Central and zonal 
National and local 
National and local 
National and local 
National and local 
National and local 
National and local 



































National rural Central and zonal National and local Sectoral ministry: am-
plified activities 
National rural Central and zonal 






National and local 





Central and local 
Central, regional 
and local 
Central and zonal 
Central and zonal 
National and local Autonomous agency: 
integral activities 
National, regional Autonomous agency 




National and local Sectoral agency: am-
plified activities 

















Mexico (cont'd) . . Indian Welfare Brigades Ministry of Public Education 
Agricultural Promotion Bri- Ministry of Education 
Rural Welfare Centres Ministry of Health and Assistance 
Co-ordinated Health Services Ministry of Health and Assistance 
Social Security Centres Mexican Institute of Social Security 
Integral Agrarian Reform and Department of Agrarian Affairs and 
Settlement Programme Settlement 
Community Development Pro- Plan Lerma for Technical Assistance 
grammes 
Community Development Pro- Papaloapan River Commission 
gramme 
Organized in 1922 
Organized in 1959 
Organized in 1953 




Lerma - Chapala - San-
tiago Commission or-
ganized 1950; C.D. 
programme organized 
1966 
Nicaragua Community Development Pro- Nicaraguan Development Institute Organized 1966 
gramme (INDE) 
Community Development and Ministry of Public Education 
Adult Ediication Programme 
Rio Coco Pilot Project in Ministry of Public Education 
Fundamental Education 
Organized 1954 
Agrarian Reform Programme Nicaraguan Agrarian Institute (IAN) Law of 1963; IAN cre-
ated 1964 
Panama Community Development Pro- Ministry of Labour and Social Wei- Organized in 1957, re-
gramme fare and Public Health organized 1963 
Community Development Pro- National Association of Economic Organized in 1965 
gramme Development, Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Commerce and Industry 
Community Development Pro- Institute of Housing and Urbaniza- Organized in 1966 
gramme tion 
Rural Waterworks Programme Institute of Waterworks and Sewer-
age, Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Social Welfare 
Agrarian Reform Programme Agrarian Reform Commission 
Co-ordinating Commit-
tee formed 1965 
Law 37 of 1962 
Dominican Republic Community Development Pro- National Council of Community De- Organized 1962 




























Central and zonal National and local 
Central and zonal National and local 
Central and local National and local 
Central, zonal and National, state and 
local local 
Central and local National and local 
Central, regional National, regional 
and local and local 







































Central and local 
Central and local 
National and re-
gional 
Central and regional 
National and local Autonomous agency: 
integral activities co-
ordinated with IAN 
National and local Sectoral agency: am-
plified activities 
Regional and local Sectoral agency: am-
plified and co-ordi-
nated activities 
National and local Autonomous agency: 
integral services co-
ordinated with INDE 






Central and local National and local 
Central and local 
Central and local 
Central and local 
National and local 
National and local 














sistance by contract 






Central and local 
Central and zonal 
National and local 










E N G L I S H - S P E A K I N G 
Responsible Legal basis 
Country Programme agency and date 
(1) W (3) 
Barbados Community Development Pro- Ministry of Health and Community 
gramme Development 
Guyana Community Development Pro- Community Development Division, Organized 1966 
granmie Office of the Prime Minister 
Jamaica Hundred Village Programme Social Development Commission, Organized 1963 
Ministry of Youth and Commu-
nity Development 
Community Development Pro- Sugar Industry Labour Welfare Organized 1949 
gramme Board 
Trinidad and Better Village Programme Community Development Division, Organized 1963 











Bolivia Community Development Pro-
gramme 
Land Settlement Programme 
Community Development and Rural 
Extension Service (SEDEX), Min-
istry of Agriculture 
Settlement Institute, Ministry of 
Agriculture 






Colombia Popular Integration Pro-
gramme 
National Council of Popular Integra-
tion, Presidency of the Republic 
Decree 2263 of 1966 
National Programme of Com-
munity Action 
Division of Community Action, 
Ministry of the Interior 
Law 19 of 1958 reor-
ganized in 1959, 1960 
Special District Programme 
of Community Action 
Office of the Mayor of Bogotá Agreement No. 4 of 
1959 
Cundinamarca Departmental 
Programme of Community 
Action 
Division of Community Action 
Programme of Community 
Action and Public Services 
Antioquia Departmental Pro-
gramme of Conmiunity Ac-
tion 
Autonomous Regional Corporation of 
the Savannah of Bogotá 
Departmental Council of Community 
Action and Governor's Office 
Law 3 of 1961 
Departmental Decree 






















I National rural 
Central and local National and local 
Central and district 
(local) 
Central and local 
Central and local 
Central and local 
National and local 
National and local 
National and in 17 
areas 





























Administrative Levels of Substantive Training 
Coverage hierarchy planning complexity media 
Í4J (5) (6) (7) (S) 
National rural Central and local National and local Sectoral agency: am- International and bi-
plified activities lateral technical as-
sistance 
National rural Central and local National and local 
National rural and Central and local National and local 
urban 







Municipal (local) Local 
Central and re- Regional and local 
gional 
Regional Regional and local 













tion of municipal 
services 
Sectoral agency: am-






ity: integral activities 






In-service courses with 
university assistance 
In-service training 














Colombia (cont'd) Medellin Municipal Pro-
gramme of Community Ac-
tion 
Cali Community Action Pro-
gramme 
Municipal Community-Civic Action 
Office 
Municipal Department of Com-
munity Action, Cali 
Urban Housing Programme 
Integral Applied Nutrition 
Programme 
Village Roads Programme 
Community Action Pro-
gramme 
Agrarian Reform Programme 
National Indian Programme 
Territorial Credit Institute, Ministry 
of Development 
National Nutrition Institute, Min-
istry of Health 
National Village Roads Fund, Min-
istry of Public Works 
National Federation of Coffee 
Growers 
Colombian Land Reform Institute 
(INCORA) 
Division of Indian Affairs, Ministry 
of the Interior 




Decree 1650 of 1960 
Organized 1963 
Law 135 of 1961 
Reorganized 1960 
Development programme for 
the upper and middle Gua-
jira 
Division of Indian Affairs, Ministry Organized 1967 
of the Interior 
Ecuador Programme of Rural Develop-
ment, Project of Indian In-
tegration 
Andean Mission of Ecuador, Minis-
try of Social Welfare and Labour 
Organized in 1956, re-
organized by Decree 
193 of 1964 
Peru 






Manabi Rural Health Pro-
gramme 
Programme of Agrarian Re-
form and Technical Assist-
ance to Smallholders 
Joint Action Project for In-
dian Integration 
National Land Reform and Settle-
ment Institute 
Committee for Rehabilitation and 
Urbanization of the Suburban 
areas of Guayaquil (CRUBS) 
Ministry of Public Education 
Ministry of Health and Manabi 
Rehabilitation Centre 
Ecuadorian Centre of Agricultural 
Services (CESA) 
National Council of Community De-
velopment (CACD) and 11 agen-
Organized 1957, reor-
ganized by Decree 
1480 of 1964 
Organized by Law 102 
of 1967 
Organized 1966 by 
agreement with 
UNESCO 








Pro- Ministry of Development and Public 
Works 





























National urban and 
rural 













mental and local 
Central and zonal 
Central and zonal 
Central and re-
gional 
Central and zonal 
Central and zonal 
Central and 
central 
National and local 
National and zonal 
National and local 
National and local 
National and local 
National, regional 
and local 
Regional and local 
Co-ordinating agency: 
























National and local Autonomous agency: 
integral co-ordinated 
activities 




local National and local 
Regional and local Regional and local 












































National rural and 
urban 
Central and zonal 
Central, zonal and 
local 
National zonal and 
local 

























Peru (continued) Community Research and 
Handicraft Development 
Programme 
Community Organization and 
Property Enrolment Pro-
gramme 
Agrarian Reform and Credit 
Programme 
Peruvian Indian Institute 
General Bureau of Communities, 
Ministry of Labour and Com-
munities 
National Agrarian Reform Office 
Reorganized 1966 
Reorganized 1966 
Law 15037 of 1964 
Agricultural Extension Pro-
grammes 




Development National Co-operative Institute 
Venezuela 
Public Health and Sanitation 
Programme 
Rural education and "nu-
clear" schools programme 




Community Organization and 
Development Programme 
Community Development and 
Municipal Development 
Programme 
Agrarian Reform Programme 
Organized 1965 
National Fund for Health and Social 
Welfare 
Ministry of Education 
National Housing Council 
Executed by public institutions at 
national, state and local levels, co-
ordinated and planned by Com-
munity Development Division, 
Central Office of Planning and 
Coordination of the Presidency 
(CORDIPLAN) 
Ministry of Sanitation and Social 
Assistance 
Foundation for Community Devel-
opment and Municipal Develop-
ment 
National Agrarian Institute (IAN) 
Decree No. 492 of 1958 
Decree No. 711 of 1962 
Agrarian Law of 1960 
Venezuelan-Colombian Border 
Integration Programme in 
the Guajira 
National Indian Commission and Organized 1962, reor-
Indian Affairs Office of Zulia ganized 1966 
State 
Table 
BRAZIL AND THE SOUTHERN 
Country 
Responsible Legal basis 
Programme agency and date 
(1) (2) (3) 
Argentina Andean Project, Puna of Provincial Executive Committee for Decree 13411 of 1962 
Jujuy the Andean Project 
Community Promotion and National Secretariat for Community Organized in 1967 
Assistance Programme Promotion and Assistance Minis-




















Central and zonal 
Central and zonal 
Central and zona] 
National rural Central, depart-
mental and zonal 
National urban and Central, depart-
rural mental and zonal 
¡National rural Central, depart-
Í mental and zonal 
National rural Central, depart-




National, rural and 
urban 
'National urban 
Central and local 
Central, state, mu-
nicipal and local 
Central, state and 
local 
National, zonal and 
local 
National and zonal 
National and zonal 
National and zonal 
National and zonal 
National, depart-
mental and local 
National and local 
National and local 
National, regional, 
state and local 
National, state and 
local 
Central and local National and local 
Autonomous agency: 
integral activities co-
ordinated by CNDC 
Sectoral agency: am-
plified activities co-
ordinated by CNDC 
Autonomous agency: 
integral activities co-
ordinated by CNDC 
in some zones 
Autonomous agency: 
integral activities co-
ordinated by CNDC 
Autonomous agency: 
integral activities co-
ordinated by CNDC 
Autonomous agency: 
integral activities co-
ordinated by CNDC 
Sectoral agency: am-
plified activities co-







dinated activities at 
national, state and 
local levels 
Sectoral agency: am-






















ing in CIADEC, in-
ter-agency training 
centre 
Courses in CIADEC 
and international 
technical assistance 
Courses in CIADEC 
National rural 
Regional rural 
Central, state and 
local 
Regional and local 









assistance: courses in 
CIADEC 
International technical 


















National, rural and 
urban 

























Argentina (cont'd) Agricultural Extensión and National Institute of Agricultural Decree 21680 of 1956 
Community Development Technology 
Programme 
Brazil Brazilian Rural Co-operative 
Extension Programmes 
Agrarian Reform Programme 
Brazilian Association of Credit and Organized 1948 
Rural Assistance (organized by 
states) 
Brazilian Institute of Agrarian Decree II of 1962 
Reform 
Chile Rural Development 
gramme 
Pro- Agricultural Development Institute Law 15020 of 1962, re-
(INDAP) vised in 1967 by Law 
16640 
Agrarian reform programme Agrwian 
(CORA) 
Reform Corporation Law 15020 of 1962, re-
vised in 1967 by Law 
16640 
Community Development Pro- Corporation of Housing Services Organized in 1966 
gramme of CORHABIT (CORHABIT), Ministry of Hous-, 
ing and Urbanism 
Community Development Pro- National Health Service (SNS), Law 10383 
gramme of SNS Ministry of Health 
Fundamental and Adult Edu- Ministry of Education 
cation Programme 
Rural Leadership Training Institute of Rural Education 
Programme 




Pro- National Council for Popular Pro-
motion, Presidency of the Re-
public 
Organized by Presiden 
tial Authority ir 
1964 
Agrarian Reform Programme Institute of Agrarian Promotion 
(INPROA) 
Community Development Pro- Arica Development Board 
gramme 
Punitaqui Area Project 
Paraguay Settlement Programme 
Departmental Consultation and Co-
ordination Committee for Puni-
taqui executed by Ministry of 
Agriculture and other agencies 
Institute of Rural Welfare 
Organized 1962 Pri 
vately (INPROA) ^ 
Organized 1961, reor 
ganized 1965 to in 
elude Andean Pro 
gramme 
Organized 1963 b; 
agreement with PMAj 
ONU 
Organized 1965 
First Integral Rural Develop-
ment Pilot Project 
National Council of Social Progress, Organized 1967 






















National urban and 
rural 
National urban and 
rural 
National rural 
National, urban and 
rural 
National rural 




State and local 
National, provincial 
and locsil 





Federal, state and National, state and Autonomous agency: 
local local integral activities 
Central, depart-







Central, depart- National, regional 
mental and local and local 
Central, depart- National, depart-
mental and local mental and local 
Central, depart- National, depart-
mental and local mental and local 
Central and local National and local 
Central, depart- National and local 
mental and local 
Central, regional National and local 
and local 










nation by projects 
Sectoral agency: am-
plified activities with 
inter-agency co-ordi-
nation by projects 
Sectoral agency: am-
plified activities 
Sectoral private agency: 
specialized activities 
by contract or agree-













training by ICIRA 
National training insti-
tute for agrarian re-
form created in 1964: 
regularly scheduled 
training by ICIRA 
Occasional training 
courses in services 
Training activities 
co-ordinated with 























Regional and local 
Central 
gional 



























Nutrition; and Education Pro-
gramme 
Integral Community and Re-
gional Development Pro-
gramme 
Municipal Programme to Pro-
mote Health and Develop-
ment 
Ministries of Health, Education and 
Agriculture 
OfiSce of Community and Regional 
Action, Ministry of Agriculture 
Bureau of Health and Development, 




available indicates that there are fewer new 
urban programmes, and that the total coverage 
of populations in urban areas by integral ac-
tivities remains relatively limited. This, rather 
strangely, has occurred in spite of the fact that 
rural programmes cluster in regions having 
urban growth centres which serve as bases of 
operations for work in rural areas. Rural and 
urban activities are almost totally dichotomized: 
an agency engaged in one rarely acts in the 
other, in spite of the fact that most organisms 
are eager to amplify the scope of their work. 
Hence the number of agencies on the list, hav-
ing both rural and urban coverage, is very 
small, even though the needs for local action 
programmes in the smaller cities are great. 
Rural integral programmes are becoming 
standardized in content. Agrarian reform pro-
grammes include a wide range of substantive 
activities centred in the resettlement and ra-
tionalization of land tenure; consequently, their 
coverage is often localized in areas or zones. 
Rural development programmes have wider ter-
ritorial coverage but in their complex activities 
lack authority to resolve the problems of ex-
treme fractionalization of farm units in the 
areas of minifundia in which they normally 
operate. The same may be said of the similar 
programmes referred to as "Indian integration 
projects", which are territorially limited to 
regions of indigenous populations. Other 
coverages in rural areas include fishing villages, 
as in Cuba or Chile, and areas of agro-economic 
specialization, such as the sugar-producing areas 
of Jamaica and Cuba or the coffee-growing 
areas of Colombia and El Salvador. 
Urban programmes generally concentrate on 
the kinds of substantive activities related to 
housing and urbanization. Perhaps because the 
standard social services are well established 
in the large cities, with their own facilities, per-
sonnel and clienteles, they do not see the need 
for integrating or co-ordinating their activities 
in joint action systems. Some urban agencies 
seem interested in resorting to self-help activities 
and the mobilization of popular participation 
as a "cheap" means of increasing their re-
sources; however, when the urban social ser-
vices attack the problems of the shantytowns 
and marginal groups, they resort to community 
development methods. Although considerable 
experimentation has been done in Lima, Cara-
cas, Mexico City, Guayaquil, Cali, Bogotá, 
Medellin, Santiago and Montevideo, a standard 
formula or "model" has not yet emerged in 
Latin America for integral local programmes 
in urban areas. 
The information summarized in the compen-
dium indicates that both administrative or-
ganization and levels of planning of the pro-
grammes remain highly centralized. It is quite 
clear that national planning has had little effect 
on the functional co-ordination of ministries and 
agencies that carry out multisectoral activities 
in local areas excepting in Venezuela. In most 
countries except Chile planners have not con-
ceived the regionalization of development activi-
ties as a joint effort by multiple agencies. Little 
attention has been given to the integration of 
sectoral activities in national planning. In most 
cases the sectoral programmes are packaged into 
separate chapters of a "plan" which have very 
little substantive relationship with each other, 
or with the economic parts of the plan. A few 
integral or multisectoral programmes have been 
included in the plans as though their activities 
did not interfere with or duplicate many of the 
sectoral progranames, but most of the integral 
programmes are not included at all. 
Since the programmes remain unrelated to 
each other organically, provision has seldom 
been made for the deliberate creation of mecha-
nisms for co-ordination of joint action. The 




















Central and local National and local 
Central 
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ganizational hierarchy and operating units 
without any thought of collaboration with re-
lated services. DifiFerent administrative standards 
lead to widely diverging practices in planning, 
decision-making and operations within and 
among agencies. It is quite common to find that 
several diflFerent services of the same ministry 
have parallel or overlapping activities. Several 
examples may be found in the compendium. 
It is also common to find that new programmes 
or executive instruments are created by parlia-
ment or executive authorities without reference 
to the national plan. One concludes that the 
rationale of planning is little understood or 
applied in an attempt to establish coherent sys-
tems of policies and instruments for promoting 
local development. 
Training activities among the progranunes of 
integral local development may be characterized 
generally as too irregular, impoverished and in-
adequate to make an effective impact in im-
proving the quality of activities. Only Chile and 
Venezuela have taken steps to create training 
institutions which include action research and 
regularly scheduled intensive training pro-
grammes at a high level. The governments are 
generally unconcerned about the importance of 
training, even in countries which have been mak-
ing large allocations (on a piecemeal basis among 
many different agencies) for integral local de-
velopment activities. Perhaps one of the reasons 
for this unconcern is the failure to tabulate a 
national total of funds allocated to such pro-
grammes, and to see that their executing agen-
cies could use common training facilities. 
(b) Analysis of the programmes 
Up to this point our interpretation of the 
compendium has been descriptive. Is it possible 
to go further in classifying the programmes, 
indicating their relationships with each other, 
or charting the direction of reorganizations? 
The need for a tool to analyse programme mor-
phology and evolution has become evident in 
order to supplement empirical experience with 
methods leading to predictive insights. 
For this purpose an instrument was created by 
crossing two principal variables appearing in 
all of the programmes listed, i.e., territorial 
coverage and substantive complexity. These 
variables, each of which forms a continuum 
of programme characteristics, were subdivided 
into three descriptive grades. In this way a nine-
cell model was created. In the horizontal dimen-
sion of "substantive complexity" are located 
sectoral programmes, integral programmes and 
co-ordinated programmes. These are postulated 
as progressively more complex in their organiza-
tional form. In the vertical dimension of "ter-
ritorial coverage" are shown local-area pro-
grammes, regional-zonal programmes and na-
tional programmes. These also show degrees of 
scope which can be correlated with the number 
of administrative units and operational factors. 
The simplest type of local action programme 
appears as the work of a sectoral agency in one 
village or localized area. This form of pro-
gramme appears in the lowest left-hand cell of 
the model. Diagonally opposite, in the upper-
most right-hand cell appears the most complex 
form of programme, which consists of a number 
of substantive activities co-ordinated at the 
national level. Other programme types fall be-
tween these two extremes as indicated in the 
other cells of the model. 
As a coherent matrix for typing programmes 
and locating them in relation to each other, the 
model enables us to make a number of observa-
tions which should be fairly obvious, and can 
be helpful in planning and policy-making at 
the national level: 
(i) Any number of programmes within a 
nation must be considered as one set; 
(ii) All programmes within this set may have 
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Table 16 
A MODEL OF PROGRAMME TYPES BASED ON TERRITORIAL COVERAGE 
AND SUBSTANTIVE COMPLEXITY 
Substantive complexity 
Sectoral programmes Integral programmes Co-ordinated programmes 
National programmes of sectoral 
departments and agencies 
Examples: Cultural Missions 
Programme of the Ministry 
of Public Education, Mex-
ico; Popular Co-operation 
Programme of the Ministry 
of Development and Public 
Works, Peru; Social Pro-
gramme, Institute of Terri-
torial Credit (Housing), 
Colombia 
National programmes of inter-
sectoral action administered by 
an integral agency in regions, 
states or zones 
Examples-. Project for the In-
tegration of the Indian 
Population, Andean Mission 
of Ecuador; National Agrar-
ian Reform Programme, 
Corporation of Agrarian Re-
form, Chile; Programme of 
Community Development in 
17 areas. Sugar Industry 
Labour Welfare Board, 
Jamaica 
National programmes carried out 
by co-ordination of ministries 
or departments 
Examples: Joint Action Project 
for the Integration of the 
Indian Population in 7 
Zones, National Council of 
Community Development, 
Peru; National Community 
Development Programme, 
CORDIPLAN, Venezuela 
Regional programmes of national 
departments or agencies or of 
state or provincial sectoral 
bodies 
Examples: Programme of Com-
munity Action, Departmental 
Bureau of Public Health, 
Antioquia, Colombia; State 
Programmes of Rural Exten-
sion; ABCAR System of 
Credit and Rural Extension,. 
Brazil 
Regional development schemes or 
programmes of integral agen-
cies 
Examples: Departmental De-
velopment Programme, Arica 
Development Board, Chile; 
Programme of Community 
Development and Public 
Services, Autonomous Re-
gional Corporation of the 
Savannah of Bogotá, Colom-
bia 
Regional or state programmes of 
co-ordinated agencies 
Examples: Departmental Pro-
gramme of Community Ac-
tion, Departmental Council 
of Community Action, Antio-
quia, Colombia; Integral 
Pilot Project for Rural De-
velopment, National Council 
for Social Progress, Para-
guay ;. Lerma Scheme, Lerma 
Development Commission, 
Mexico 
Local or area programmes or 
projects of national depart-
ments or agencies or of local 
sectoral bodies 
Examples: Fundamental Edu-
cation Pilot Project on the 
Coco River, Ministry of 
Education, Nicaragua; Muni-
cipal Programme to Promote 
Health and Development, 
Bureau of Health and De-
velopment, Municipality of 
Montevideo, Uruguay 
Local development schemes or 
programmes of integral agen-
cies (and hence special or 
pilot projects) 
Examples: Programme of the 
Committee for the Rehabili-
tation and Urbanization for 
the Barrios Suburbanos of 
Guayaquil, Ecuador 
Co-ordinated projects at the local 
level (often pilot efforts) 
Examples: North Clarendon 
(Rural) Development Pro-
ject, Inter-Agency Executive 
Committee initiated by Ja-
maican Agricultural Society; 
Punitaqui (Area) Scheme, 
Departmental Committee of 
Consultation Co-ordination 
for Punitaqui, Chile 
NOTE: AS used here, the term "integral" refers to single agencies with intersectoral authority. 
some eventual relationship with each other as 
they expand and evolve; the relationships can 
be harmonious and efficient, or conflictive and 
therefore inefficient as a result of overlapping 
and duplication; 
(ii i) Any number of local or regional pro-
grammes can be complementary so long as they 
do not overlap territorially; 
( iv) Within a nation, region or local area, 
the programmes of a set (two or more) can be 
harmonious and efficient only if the substantive 
activities of the several programmes are com-
plementary; 
(v ) It follows f rom the points above that 
amplified sectoral programmes and integral 
programmes will be conflictive if they cover the 
same territories and /or the same substantive 
activities. Resolution of this conflict can be 
achieved in three ways: ( o ) by rationalizing 
the substantive content of programmes in order 
to make the technical activities complementary; 
ib) by rationalizing the territorial coverage of 
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the programmes in order to prevent overlapping 
of the substantive activities within the same 
area; or (c) by doing both at once; 
(vi) The formulation of a policy regarding 
the creation or expansion of any programme 
either substantively or territorially should be 
considered in the light of its possible effect on 
other programmes and their relative eificiency, 
and should be an element of national, regional 
and local planning. 
Theoretically it is possible to construct a 
model in which the sectoral programmes which 
have not been amplified may be distinguished 
from those which have been. In the present 
model, only amplified, integrated and co-ordi-
nated programmes have been included. To do a 
full analysis of all programmes in a national 
set, however, the normative (unamplified) sec-
toral programmes would have to be considered. 
It should be possible, through the analysis of 
the evolution or reorganization of programmes 
by this model, to indicate their relation to each 
other substantively and territorially. In most 
countries, the evolution of programmes his-
torically has resulted in a number of mutations 
•of type which may move them vertically, hor-
izontally or diagonally within the cells of the 
model. 
If they have not been amplified, the sectoral 
programmes of the central ministries should be 
complementary. Historically the creation of am-
plified and integral programmes of the kinds 
indicated in our study occurred for two reasons: 
to provide for new combinations of substantive 
activities, and to provide for substantive activi-
ties not previously covered. In the first case, the 
integral actions are in effect a multisectoral 
programme. These types appear in the model 
in the second column. They include, notably, 
the programmes of community development, 
agrarian reform, rural development and of 
Indian integration. In the second case, the addi-
tional substantive activities may result in the 
creation of a new programme which is carried 
out by some sectoral agency, in which its own 
former programme becomes substantively am-
plified. 
The sectoral amplification of programmes or 
creation of integral programmes may tend to 
produce inter-agency substantive conflicts in the 
long run. As the number of national pro-
grammes of the integral type increases, the 
likelihood of substantive conflict among these as 
a group or between these and sectoral amplified 
programmes also increases. Programmes in the 
first and second columns of the model are thus 
potentially conflictive. It is relatively easier for 
governments to find policy solutions to the con-
flicts of agencies within the first column of the 
model, or to co-ordinate these in joint action 
programmes of the third column, than it is to 
resolve conflicts of integral agencies with each 
other or with sectoral agencies. 
4 . TRENDS IN THE EVOLUTION OF POLICIES AND 
CONCEPTS 
The compendium and analysis of programmes 
presented above provide an over-view of the 
main aspects of integral local development pro-
grammes in Latin American countries. Using 
these sources of information, we are able to 
bring the main trends of programme evolution 
and the relevant policy issues into sharper focus. 
Even though there has been relatively little 
contact among the national agencies and officials 
engaged in these actions at the Latin American 
regional level, the governments are giving at-
tention to a number of problems which are 
shared by most of the countries. These ten-
dencies have usually been discussed in the sub-
regional meetings sponsored jointly by the gov-
ernments and the Organization of American 
States for Mexico and Central America, the 
Andean countries, and Brazil and the southern 
cone countries. The United Nations sponsored 
a workshop in which eight countries participated 
in 1962, a regional seminar in 1964, and a 
sub-regional training workshop for the English-
speaking countries of the Caribbean in 1968. 
The Andean Indian Programme held a number 
of meetings of international personnel, and col-
laborated in the Congresses of the Inter-Ameri-
can Indian Institute. FAO and the Institute for 
Training and Research in Agrarian Reform 
(ICIRA) have sponsored several seminars on 
agrarian reform in the Latin American region. 
These meetings, in addition to the services of 
CREFAL as a clearing house for information 
and the publication of papers and documents 
by the United Nations, represent the principal 
channels for the international transference of 
experiences, concepts and technical information. 
The Latin American trends and policy issues 
in community and local development, therefore, 
tend to form a regional body of more or less 
homogeneous approaches, problems and experi-
ments having characteristics which set them 
apart from the experience of other regions of 
the world. 
In this study we have given particular at-
tention to the organizational features of the 
programmes in an attempt to identify some of 
the common organizational and technical ele-
ments. While the types and interrelations of 
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programmes are important in understanding the 
recent trends of policy formation and changes 
of concept, they must be supplemented by con-
sideration of the relation of integral local 
actions to regional development, the substantive 
content of the programmes in terms of com-
munity development principles and methods, 
and the implications of recent trends on research 
and training in this field. In this section we 
shall briefly review all of these aspects of the 
programmes as they relate to current trends 
and policies in the countries. 
(a) Organization and interrelation of 
programmes 
Study of the trends of growth and nature of 
programmes in the compendium and the model 
of analysis indicates that in the future the sec-
toral agencies will continue to be the preferred 
instruments for the execution of local integral 
activities. Many of the sectoral agencies have 
only begun to do so. For this reason the infer-
ence may be drawn from the information pre-
sented here that the sectoral agencies will con-
tinue to reshape and retool themselves for these 
tasks. Much of the current ferment in creation 
and reorganization of programmes represents 
the efforts of these agencies to readjust their 
territorial and substantive coverage so that they 
can contribute more effectively to national 
development through the mobilization of popula-
tion institutions and resources at the local level. 
As these agencies within the ministries am-
plify their functions, they tend on one hand 
to eliminate the reasons for the creation of addi-
tional integral programmes executed by special-
purpose agencies (community development, 
agrarian reform, rural development, Indian in-
tegration), while on the other they strengthen 
the bureaucratic bases and the complexity of 
operations of the central government ministries. 
It is clear that the ministries and their agencies 
are in a position to absorb many of the special-
purpose agencies and their programmes, and 
that they are quite disposed, in most cases, to 
accept the methods and approach of community 
development if they have not already done so. 
Governments of a number of countries are be-
ginning to have second thoughts about the 
creation of new autonomous or semi-autonomous 
agencies which interfere with the activities of 
the technical services. In the past few years 
national parliaments and international lending 
agencies have begun to change their attitudes 
about the need for creating autonomous organ-
isms, and have accepted the semi-autonomous 
status of funding bodies or operational agencies 
within sectoral services. Examples may be 
found in Peru (SIPA, National Fund of 
Health and Welfare, Peruvian Indian Institute), 
Brazil (ABCAR), Guatemala (SFEI), Chile 
(CORHABIT) and Panama (Institute of Water-
works and Sewerage). Furthermore, some rural 
and community development agencies having 
integral programmes are being reintegrated into 
sectoral agencies without their former autono-
mous status as in the cases of Cooperación 
Popular in Peru and the Rural Development 
Institute in Bolivia. Policy discussions about 
the future of similar agencies in several other 
countries lead one to conclude that this trend 
towards the reduction of the number of single 
agencies having integral programmes will con-
tinue. 
The result will be an increase of amplified 
programmes by sectoral services which will 
create special mechanisms for co-ordinated pro-
grammes of joint action. Peru recently took 
this step by organizing the National Council 
for Community Development. Guatemala and 
Ecuador are considering the possible advantages 
of creating similar organisms. On the other 
hand, the multisectoral programmes based on 
the co-ordination of a few agencies by written 
agreement seems to be disappearing, as in the 
case of the Puente Alto Project in Chile and 
the applied nutrition programmes in several 
countries. 
Hence the total number of programmes will 
continue to increase in number. There are a 
number of reasons for this tendency. The 
physical and ecological factors in the region 
demand that programmes be fitted both sub-
stantively and operationally to heterogeneous 
conditions. The political changes in Latin 
America are an important incentive for creation 
or reorganization of programmes.^® As has been 
13 The 1964 ECLA study ("Popular participation and 
principles of economic development . . .", op. cit., 
p. 255) called attention to the inclination of reformist 
or nationalistic political leaders and their governments 
to create or reorganize programmes mobilizing and 
channelling the forces of popular participation. These 
programmes have proved to be key policies of a number 
of new governments. In 1958 a newly-installed govern-
ment created Acción Comunal in Colombia. In 1959 
the new political generation of Venezuela initiated the 
Community Development Programme of CORDIPLAN. 
In 1964 political success by a new party in Peru led to 
the organization of Cooperación Popular. In the same 
year a new government in Guatemala initiated the "Joint 
Action" National Programme of Community Develop-
ment, while Chile began its experiment with Promoción 
Popular for the same reason. In 1966 the inauguration of 
a new government in Colombia led to the establishment 
of Integración Popular as a modification of the earlier 
Acción Comunal. Agrarian reform laws in several coun-
tries were promulgated primarily on the basis of poli-
tical considerations. 
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shown, the processes of socio-economic change 
will require continuing expansion of activities 
of all kinds of technical services adequately 
to cover the low-income rural and urban popu-
lations not yet benefiting from development 
programmes. As the national programmes be-
come more complex, they will have to be 
decentralized increasingly in the larger coun-
tries to the regional level. This important recent 
trend merits attention as a special topic of dis-
cussion below. 
These organizational changes may be summed 
up, then, as a trend toward greater complexity 
of sectoral activities and the practice of com-
bining these at the national level into a "pro-
gramme of programmes". For this reason, gov-
ernments are more concerned about relating 
the already existing actions into co-ordinated 
systems than they are in creating additional 
new agencies. This accounts for the fact that 
fewer integral programmes have been created 
recently—as we noted above in commenting on 
the compendium—while the number of national 
co-ordinating mechanisms has increased. In this 
connexion, it seems that the governments have 
recognized that the integral programmes are 
structurally unstable, and tend to replace or-
ganisms combining executive responsibilities 
with co-ordinating authority. A number of or-
ganisms of this type have been discontinued 
or reorganized. A trend seems to be emerging 
to give co-ordinating bodies clearly defined re-
sponsibilities, such as surveys, planning, chan-
nelling of financial resources, administration 
and evaluation. The new agencies of this kind 
have their own budget and staff. In contrast, 
those co-ordinating bodies not having specific 
legal powers and specialized planning personnel 
tend to vanish. 
(b) Integral local programmes in development 
regions 
In view of the heterogeneity of the climate, 
physical features and ecology of Latin American 
countries, it is rather curious that planners 
and policy-makers have only recently begun to 
give close attention to the spatial factors in 
national development. The concept of the "de-
velopment region" has not yet crystallized among 
Latin American planners. A number of insti-
tutions, including ECLA-ILPES, are studying 
the definition of this concept and its integration 
into global economic and social planning. Fried-
mann suggests that the concept should be con-
sidered as one in which "development regions 
simply have maximum closure with respect to 
a given problem set".^^ Regionalization of a 
country (or the continent) implies the identifi-
cation of areas in which development pro-
grammes have maximal substantive similarity. 
Available information indicates that the tech-
nical services in most countries have organized 
their administrative hierarchy internally down 
to the local level without taking into account 
the principles of regionalization. The agencies 
seldom conduct diagnostic studies by regions, 
and do not generally yet see the need for joint 
substantive programming within regional terri-
torial units. In community and rural develop-
ment programmes activities are usually organ-
ized on a village-by-village basis, as the com-
pendium indicates, or by aggregating a number 
of local actions as administrative or operating 
areas. The present techniques of programming 
do not yet reflect the use of "problem sets" as 
the essential concept of development regions.^® 
A new trend is now appearing. Central plan-
ning organisms are expressing a strong concern 
for the inclusion of regional policies in national 
planning in many countries. This tendency may 
be observed in the current interest of planners 
for techniques of regional analysis, study of 
regional resources and interrelation of regions 
in the elaboration of national development 
strategies. 
Two cases merit special attention because of 
their significance in restructuring local pro-
grammes on a regional basis. They represent 
two different types of regional mechanisms for 
co-ordinating the activities of sectoral or in-
tegral programmes. In both cases they indicate 
the practicability of disaggregating national pro-
Regional Development Policy . . . , op. cit., pp. 
43-44. 
16 Participants in a recent Caribbean workshop agreed 
that, "in the context of the social structure in the re-
gion, the concept of a self-sufficient village community 
was not realistic; a closer blending of community de-
velopment and area development was indicated" (ECLA, 
"Preliminary Report of the Regional Training Work-
shop on Community Development and Local Govern-
ment", Port-of-Spain, 1968, p. 14). International experts 
at an inter-agency meeting reached the conclusion that 
". . . the creation of integral regional development 
projects is a positive trend which can resolve many of 
the problems of planning and co-ordination of local 
activities^ when they grow out of the strategies and di-
rectives of national plans and when agencies are in 
harmony about criteria for the definition of regions". 
ECLA, Regional Inter-Agency Meeting on Community 
Development, final report, Santiago, 1968 (mimeo-
graphed), p. 7. The technical aspects of programming by 
zones are discussed in "Concepts and Methods of Area 
Programming for Community Development", Economic 
Bulletin for Latin America, vol. XII, No. 1 (May, 1967), 
pp. 2-31. Special attention has been given there to the 
techniques of social surveys, diagnosis and policy for-
mulation by areas. 
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grammes into smaller sets which are coherent 
at the regional and local level. 
In Mexico the application of these principles 
of regional planning has made possible the 
breakdown of a programme covering parts of 
a number of states which lie in the Lerma 
River basin into integral local joint actions 
based on inter-agency co-ordination. In the 
Huicot area project, for example, the instru-
ments of action will be local "development 
centres" organized to provide multisectoral 
services by the Lerma Commission, National 
Indian Institute ( INI) , state governments and 
private agencies. The functions of PLAT will 
include research, planning, promotion, co-
ordination and administration. Execution of 
the sectoral activities will be left to INI and 
state governments.^® Funds for this programme 
come from a number of sources, but principally 
from the federal government, the Commission's 
revenues and a loan of the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank. 
In Chile the integration of local development 
activities into regional systems will be achieved 
primarily through decentralization of public 
administration, giving greater authority and 
power of decision to regional offices. The co-
ordinating mechanisms at the regional level 
will be improved through participation of re-
gional organisms with those of the central gov-
ernment. Where required, autonomous regional 
development agencies will be created consistent 
with policies of national integration. Regional 
planners have completed studies leading to pri-
orities of action, definition of growth-poles for 
integrated urban-regional development, and 
identification of resources which will to a large 
extent determine the complex of activities to 
be undertaken in the eleven regions in Chile.^^ 
These policy developments respond to the 
requirements of the federal governmental system 
of Mexico and the unified system of Chile. In 
the Lerma basin the regional commission has 
chosen to take the role of planning, co-ordinating 
and administrative body. In doing so, it has 
avoided the problems which often appear when 
an agency simultaneously executes integral ac-
tivities and attempts to co-ordinate the work 
of other agencies. In the Chilean case, the re-
gional co-ordinating mechanisms can be created 
by establishing a "programme of programmes" 
through decentralization of sectoral activities 
and planning for their substantive complemen-
i«Plan Lerma de Asistencia Técnica (PLAT), Opera-
ción Huicot (México, 1966), pp. 179-195. 
iT^  Presidencia de la República, Oficina de Planifica-
ción Nacional (ODEPLAN), Política de Desarrollo Re-
gional (Santiago, 1968), p. 31. 
tarity at the regional level. Both of these pro-
gramme types appear in the third column of 
our model as two alternatives for breaking 
down complex national programmes on a re-
gional territorial basis. 
(c) Community developmentmethods as 
substantive activities 
The trend toward the use of community de-
velopment principles and methods by sectoral 
agencies is a widespread feature of integral 
local development programmes in Latin America. 
We have seen in this study that such methods 
have been used as an amalgam or common 
denominator to bind various kinds of substan-
tive activities together as elements of a local 
joint action system. Although this practice has 
become common-place, the substantive content 
of the community development methods differs 
among programmes and among countries. It is 
not yet a standardized body of skills. It has 
been diffused in part by transference and adap-
tation of international technical assistance 
agencies, and in part by the professional or 
sectoral usages within countries. Although a 
good deal has been written about the relation 
of the technical services to community devel-
opment, relatively few substantive explanations 
can be found of the community development 
methods component itself.^ ® 
Theoretical discussions of community devel-
opment programmes usually begin with two 
18 In addition to the document Community Develop-
ment and Related Services (Official Records of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council, Twenty-fourth Session, An-
nexes (Geneva, 1957), agenda item 4) the United Na-
tions Secretariat has recently circulated the paper 
"Policy issues concerning the future evolution of com-
munity development" (ACC/WGRCD/XV/Working Pa-
per No. 2, New York, 1968), which contains a discussion 
of the methods of community development (pp. 28-41). 
Another United Nations publication, The Social Train-
ing of Front-Line Rural Development Workers (ST/ 
SOA/46, New York, 1962), also enumerates a number of 
substantive activities included in community develop-
ment methods. Nevertheless, it is more common to find 
publications which incorporate community development 
methods as activities for introducing social change and 
development at the local level into the various sectoral 
disciplines. The role of outside agents of change of all 
kinds in the introduction of social change and develop-
ment at the local level was discussed in the 1965 Report 
on the World Social Situation (United Nations publica-
tion: Sales No. 66.IV.7). The role of the technical 
services as sectors, as well as strategic or integrative 
approaches in social planning and development were 
presented in " 'Social development' and 'social plan-
ning' : a survey of conceptual and practical problems in 
Latin America", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 
vol. XI, No. 1 (April 1966). The Venezuelan Centre for. 
Training and Applied Research in Community Develop-
ment (CIADEC) has begun studies of methods and 
techniques in the last few years. 
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basic assumptions. First, village communities 
are considered a predominant and widely dis-
tributed social module for integral local devel-
opment activities. Secondly, it is taken for 
granted that the various technical services at 
the village level can be most effectively pro-
vided by an integral programme centred in a 
single agency to which other sectoral activities 
may be related in some way. From these prem-
ises a number of organizational and meth-
odological guidelines have been derived, not 
altogether appropriate to the Latin American 
setting. 
In most under-developed regions, these pro-
grammes utilize a number of multipurpose 
village-level workers, animateurs or leaders. The 
essential difference between the approach of 
local integral programmes in Latin America 
from those of other parts of the world lies 
in the rejection of the use of the polyvalent 
change agent. As we have seen, Latin American 
agencies are willing to accept the need for a 
wide range of comprehensive technical activities, 
but they prefer to organize the local action 
system as an interdisciplinary team of profes-
sionals or technicians, all of whom are qualified 
to apply the community development methods 
as practical skills for working with local groups. 
When it is necessary to amplify the substantive 
content of the sectoral programmes, the agencies 
simply add personnel from other professional 
disciplines to their staff. In doing so, the or-
ganisms practice internal substantive co-ordina-
tion, scheduling the activities of their personnel 
to fit the needs of local areas and balancing 
the numbers and kinds of technicians required. 
The agencies responsible for the employment 
of community development principles and meth-
ods can be organized as integral special-service 
agencies, or the activities can be assigned to a 
number of sectoral agencies. In either case, the 
community development methods are regarded 
as a body of supplementary professional skills. 
The training of personnel for these activities 
usually has followed the pattern of teaching 
the substantive skills used by other disciplines 
in addition to the general concepts and prin-
ciples of community development. 
The substantive content of such methods is 
usually regarded as including (i) social surveys 
and diagnoses; (ii) microplanning and pro-
gramming of operational processes at the local 
level; (iii) improvement of communications 
among local associations, local governments and 
technical agencies; (iv) community organiza-
tion and institution-building; (v) training of 
leaders and sub-professional technicians of vari-
ous kinds, and (vi) evaluation and review.^® 
However, there is little evidence in the com-
pendium that the technical services have con-
sidered these specific substantive activities in 
the division of labour among sectoral agencies. 
The two countries which have made sustained 
attempts to do so are Venezuela and Peru. In 
the first case, the National Community Devel-
opment Programme has been based on the op-
erational concept of interinstitutional promotion 
at all levels by interdisciplinary teams whose 
functions are specifically assigned by a division 
of labour among agencies.^® In the application 
of these techniques, CORDIPLAN, with the tech-
nical assistance of ECLA, has developed a pro-
gramming method based on operational se-
quences of substantive activities. The model 
by which this co-ordination may be achieved 
in a complex system involving local groups, 
technical services and private agencies has been 
tested in agrarian reform settlements and is now 
being applied more widely by CORDIPLAN.^i 
This technique permits the programmers to in-
dicate the specific activities to be carried out 
by each agency and its technicians. 
The policy followed by the National Council 
of Community Development in Peru is similar. 
The Council was formed by the technical ser-
vices themselves, and it has defined the sub-
stantive activities of each member agency in 
the seven zones of joint action. Zonal co-
ordinating councils resolve the problems of 
substantive co-ordination round the table in 
monthly meetings on the basis of policies estab-
lished by the national Council. In the Peruvian 
Indian Integration Project, the specific com-
munity development activities mentioned above 
have been assigned to several agencies. The 
Peruvian Indian Institute conducts surveys, 
research and evaluation studies. Microplanning 
and leadership training are the functions of 
Cooperación Popular. The General Bureau of 
Communities is charged with the administrative 
organization of communities.^^ 
In the joint action approach of Peru and the 
co-ordinated approach of Venezuela, it is un-
necessary to assign the responsibility for com-
munity development methods as a substantive 
19 "Policy issues . . .", op. cit. 
20 CORDIPLAN, La participación popular como re-
curso del desarrollo e instrumento de integración nacio-
nal (Caracas, 1967), p. 35. 
CORDIPLAN, Algunos elementos para la progra-
mación de actividades de desarrollo de la comunidad y 
participación popular en la consolidación de asentamien-
tos campesinos (por Rubén Utria), Caracas, 1965. 
22 Lawrence B. Moore, Hacia un modelo de evalua-
ción para proyectos de desarrollo comunal (Pan Ameri-
can Union, Washington) (in the press). 
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activity to any one agency. They can be shared 
by a number of organisms. However, an alterna-
tive approach would be that of creating an 
agency to carry out these functions in national 
and regional joint action programmes. A United 
Nations evaluation mission to Colombia recom-
mended that the substantive role of Acción 
Comunal be redefined in this way.^ ® That agency 
in the Ministry of the Interior would then have 
specific responsibilities, for microplanning, com-
munity organization and leadership training. 
Training and research would be the functions 
of a special institute to be created for this pur-
pose as in Venezuela. If this policy is followed 
in Colombia, it will be the first country to have 
a sectoral agency whose major functions are the 
application of community development methods 
as a substantive field within comprehensive local 
development programmes. 
(d) Research and training 
Integral local development with the applica-
tion of community development principles in 
such programmes is not some "other kind" of 
development. As we have shown, it consists in 
localizing the comprehensive set of national de-
velopment actions so that communities, groups 
and associations may participate directly and 
in organized fashion. This conceptual approach 
implies that specialized personnel should be 
available for planning and execution of tech-
nical activities in this field. 
Only two countries have created special insti-
tutions for training such specialists. As shown 
in the compendium, most programmes have 
carried out occasional training courses, usually 
with the active assistance of international and 
bilateral agencies. But in Venezuela the agencies 
responsible for substantive activities at the local 
level have joined with CORDIPLAN and the 
United Nations Special Fund in organizing the 
Centre for Training and Applied Research in 
Community Development (CIADEC) in the 
Universidad del Oriente (Jusepín). Chile has 
established the Institute of Training and Re-
search in Agrarian Reform as a joint project 
of the Agrarian Reform Corporation and the 
United Nations Special Fund. Both centres pro-
vide a variety of courses for specialization, 
advanced training and research in agrarian 
reform, rural and community development, and 
related fields.^i 
23 United Nations, "De la acción comunal al desarrollo 
de la comunidad; informe de la misión evaluadora de 
las Naciones Unidas sobre desarrollo de la comunidad 
en Colombia" (Bogotá, 1967) (mimeographed). 
24 ECLA, Regional Inter-Agency Meeting on Commu-
nity Development, final report (mimeographed), pp. 7-11. 
Additional training courses-were provided for 
more than a decade at CREFAL, the UNESCO 
Regional Fundamental Education Centre for 
Community Development, in Mexico. The Or-
ganization of American States offered courses 
for several years in Bolivia, Mexico and several 
European countries. At present the Latin Ameri-
can Institute for Economic and Social Planning 
is considering courses in social planning for 
1969 and in regional and local development for 
1970, in which integral local development pro-
grammes would be included. 
The Latin American experience in commu-
nity development training has not been alto-
gether satisfactory to the countries or to the 
international agencies. CREFAL found that its 
work over some fourteen years demonstrated 
that the differing situations of the countries 
would not admit of a single generalized treat-
ment. The development activities at the local 
level for limited geographical coverage or small 
numbers of people did not bring about the 
structural changes required for a "take-off". It 
was concluded that better results could be 
achieved by attempting to integrate activities at 
the local or sectoral levels by linking these with 
more comprehensive schemes. As a result, the 
community development approach—which had 
been conceived as universally effective—should 
be regarded as a method of action to assure 
popular participation and its co-ordination with 
efforts of the public sector, rather than as auto-
nomous programmes with inter-sectoral ob-
jectives.^® 
Consequently, in the organization of the Vene-
zuelan training programme greater emphasis 
has been placed on the comprehensive methods 
of introducing social change and development 
at the local level by agencies working in co-
ordinated programmes whose basic concern is 
popular participation. Special attention has been 
given to action research and experimentation 
in the field in studies of areas, institutional 
factors and techniques. The activities of the 
Centre are closely tied into the work of 
CENDES, the Centre for Development Studies, 
in reseach on guided social change, the work 
of the various technical services and the ongo-
ing planning and co-ordination of programmes 
by CORDIPLAN. Moreover, the Jusepin Centre 
has been training personnel for both rural and 
urban programmes. 
Unlike the training programmes of the past, 
which stressed the eclecticism of community 
development and formation of multipurpose 
practitioners by integrating a variety of tech-
25 Ibid., p. 9. 
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nical skills, the trends in current instruction 
at both CIADEC and ICIRA emphasize greater 
specialization in survey and analysis of local 
areas, planning, operational administration and 
evaluation of programmes. Personnel receive 
a more thorough preparation in the social 
sciences, techniques of co-ordination and inter-
sectoral programming. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Adapted in diiferent ways to the heteroge-
neous physical, socio-economic and administra-
tive conditions of Latin American countries, 
many programmes have emerged in the recent 
past having the common characteristics of (o) 
localized territorial coverage by the operational 
units; (¿)) multisectoral activities; and (c) 
working methods based on the principles of 
community development. A study of these pro-
grammes revealed several trends and policy 
issues. The proliferation of such programmes 
is likely to continue for some years more. The 
principal types of programmes sharing in this 
expansion will be the programmes of sectoral 
services of central government, co-ordinated or 
joint action programmes at the national and 
regional level, and local urban programmes. 
The dichotomy of rural and urban pro-
grammes does not appear to be breaking down, 
although the study indicates that an integration 
of these may be desirable within regions. Rural 
programmes are increasing more rapidly than 
urban programmes. Integral programmes carried 
out by autonomous agencies may be expected 
to decline in number and importance as they 
are absorbed by ministerial agencies. As the 
tendency to create co-ordinating mechanisms 
continues, some agencies specialize in specific 
aspects of community development methods as 
substantive activities. It appears likely that this 
practice will become more common, thus creat-
ing a demand for a large number of specialists 
in these fields. The continued growth of integral 
local programmes, especially at the regional level 
within countries, should therefore lead to the 
creation of interdisciplinary national training 
and research centres patterned on CIADEC, 
in Venezuela, and ICIRA, in Chile. 
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THE URBANiZATION OF SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA 
The development of social research in Latin 
America is increasingly hampered by the in-
ability of the scientific techniques in use to 
capture the essence of the social situation and 
its historical background in Latin America, not 
only because they were generally elaborated in 
and for different societies and historical con-
texts, but also—and chiefly—because their basic 
assumptions are inappropriate. They are in-
tended to deal with a set of problems which 
are no longer fully relevant, and the question 
at issue is the historical significance and scienti-
fic effectiveness of a system of investigating the 
social situation. 
In these circumstances, the present situation 
and the development of research are creating 
a new set of problems. These problems are as 
yet vague and ill-defined, and if they are to 
be clearly seen, the isolated attempts to formu-
late them must be co-ordinated and integrated. 
These attempts should not consist solely or 
mainly in revising specific research concepts and 
techniques, although that may also be necessary. 
The basic task is to develop a way of looking at 
the situation which is capable of prompting 
questions and systems of questions that will 
effectively capture its shifting and complex 
nature. 
This problem is particularly acute in research 
on the process of change in society. The specific 
questions elicited by the approaches generally 
adopted, which are essentially analytical in 
nature and lay most emphasis on stability and 
maintenance of the status quo, mean that the 
dialectic' of history can be treated only in an 
allusive and totally ineffective way. 
Studies on urbanization in Latin America 
come up against this difficulty. Although it is 
generally admitted that urbanization can be 
understood only as part of the over-all process 
of change in society, it is still studied in isola-
tion, and although reference is made to possible 
connexions with other phenomena of change, 
these phenomena are also studied separately. 
The admission is, therefore, purely a formal 
one, and the intention to investigate urbaniza-
tion from the standpoint of over-all social 
change is trammelled by the very nature of the 
reasoning 'underlying the approaches now in use. 
It is, therefore, worth while to explore other 
possible approaches to urbanization which will 
make it possible to investigate its formal aspects 
in the context of the over-all process of change 
in Latin American societies. 
A. URBANIZATION IN SOCIETY OR URBANIZATION OF SOCIETY? 
The point of departure for this discussion is 
that there are at least two basic problems in 
research on urbanization in Latin America which 
have not yet been sufficiently considered: 
(1) Although it is increasingly asserted that 
urbanization is a multidimensional process— 
with references to demographic, economic, socio-
cultural and other "aspects"—it is not yet clear 
how these "aspects" are interrelated, or how, 
taken as a whole, they are related to the over-
all process of change in society; 
(2) In practice, the concept is still restricted 
to a specific phenomenon: the trend towards 
the predominance of the urban (and particu-
larly city) population over the rural population. 
At the same time, attention is drawn to the de-
velopment of a "way of life" in the cities which 
is different from that of the rural localities and 
which recently has to some extent been prop-
agated among the rural population itself, al-
though only in certain aspects. This latter pheno-
menon is frequently equated with "moderniza-
tion", a concept so ambiguous and ill-defined 
that it can hardly be used effectively in research. 
The shift in the relation between the urban 
and the rural population and the development 
of an urban way of life thus appear to be the 
two most important conceptual elements in the 
process of urbanization, although it has not yet 
proved possible to integrate them in one coher-
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ent body of theory. The mere superposition of 
one element on the other, sometimes within the 
same approach, sheds little light on the nature 
of the phenomenon. Consequently, research 
cannot go beyond the analytical; it cannot re-
construct the true place of urbanization in 
particular within the over-all process of social 
change, nor can it aspire to explain and inter-
pret the historical significance of urbanization 
within a society, except allusively. 
Starting from an essentially analytical system, 
the phenomena of change can only be taken in 
isolation, despite formal recognition that the 
phenomena of change affecting the basic pattern 
of social life are essentially interdependent and 
all have the same type of relationship to society 
as a whole. Thus, in the prevailing conception, 
i.e., in the conception which actually guides re-
search, urbanization appears as one process 
among others, whether it is a question of the 
trend towards the predominance of urban over 
rural population or of the development of a 
way of life, as yet ill-defined, proper to urban 
settlements, and particularly cities. Urbaniza-
tion is thus separated from changes in the 
economic, social, cultural and political struc-
ture, although linked to them, and includes only 
a small proportion of the changes in the eco-
logical and demographic structure. Therefore, 
it cannot be isolated only from the analytical 
and methodological standpoint, but also in ac-
tual research, i.e., in the systematic reconstruc-
tion of its place, characteristics, function and 
significance in society. In short, urbanization is 
a process which takes place "in" society, rather 
than a process "o f " society. 
The difference between a process which takes 
place "in" society and one which is " o f " society 
is the difference between: (a) a process which 
takes place in one of the basic structural or-
ders, which affects society either wholly or in 
part but which does not necessarily depend on 
one of the other basic structural orders fin other 
words, a process which affects one of the urban-
rural poles of a society, but with only indirect 
implications for society as a whole); and (b) 
a process which takes place in the whole fabric 
of society, i.e., through each of its basic struc-
tural orders, which are broken down into speci-
fic sub-dimensions in each case, but which in 
actual fact constitute a single process. 
An example will help to make the distinction 
clear. If a new technological element is intro-
duced in an area of economic activity, the con-
sequences of this innovation will take the form 
of changes of greater or lesser importance in 
the industry in question, which will have re-
percussions on other spheres of activity and on 
the social relationships between groups and be-
tween individuals. However, changes of this 
type and dimension do not depend on cor-
responding alterations in the other basic struc-
tural orders, although over the long term an 
important technological innovation could gen-
erate processes of change in the whole fabric of 
society. In such a case, the changes are changes 
" in" society as a whole. 
Despite its importance and the range of its 
effects, the application of a land reform pro-
gramme, however radical it might be, could not 
be considered as a process " o f " society as a 
whole, unless the dimensions of the reform in-
volved the political, social, cultural, demo-
graphic and other orders even though the re-
form might lead to important changes in 
society, some of which would be direct effects 
and others indirect, i.e., linked to land reform 
only through intermediate processes. Urbaniza-
tion of the economy, demographic and eco-
logical urbanization, socio-cultural urbanization 
and political urbanization, on the other hand, 
are not separate processes, despite the specific 
form each dimension of urbanization may take, 
but processes whose elements are key trends 
are directly interrelated. In other words, it is 
inconceivable that one dimension of urbaniza-
tion could take place without the others, what-
ever the degree and particular features of the 
process in each dimension. 
Starting from the mainly analytical ap-
proaches to urbanization, research on the in-
terdependence of urbanization and other specific 
processes is obliged to consider these processes 
as "consequences" or "factors" of urbanization, 
which to some extent presupposes treating the 
urban phenomenon as social statics rather than 
as social dynamics. Once again, this is an analy-
tical approach which tends not only to maintain 
the formal, analytical and methodological isola-
tion of urbanization, but also to transform the 
historical phenomena practically into fixed data, 
despite their dynamic character. 
It is not easy to find a substitute for this type 
of conception and research, and the purpose of 
the present paper is merely to explore other pos-
sibilities to the extent allowed by the present 
development of research. 
Nevertheless, even within the limits of the 
theoretical and methodological model in ques-
tion, the scope and depth of the traditional 
field of research is constantly being extended, 
incorporating problems or phenomena which 
used to be considered as "consequences" or 
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"factors" external to urbanization itself, and 
abandoning the narrow limits of the urban sub-
society — ecologically and demographically 
speaking—to study the mterdependence of the 
processes taking place in the city and in the 
rural areas, within the process of urbanization. 
In this continually expanding field of research, 
a number of basic mechanisms relating to the 
interdependence of the various dimensions of 
urbanization are now becoming apparent, and it 
is possible to grasp the nature of the process 
itself in a way which is more closely integrated 
with the over-all process of change in society 
as a whole. It is thus now possible to attempt 
a reconsideration of urbanization on the basis 
of society as a whole. 
B. URBANIZATION AND THE OVER-ALL PROCESS OF CHANGE IN 
SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA 
There are two fundamental conceptual ques-
tions which arise in connexion with urbaniza-
tion in Latin America, from the standpoint of 
society as a whole: the nature of urbanization 
and its relationship to the dependent situation 
of the different Latin American societies. 
1. URBANIZATION AND OVER-ALL SOCIAL CHANGE 
When attention and research were first di-
rected towards urbanization in Latin America, 
there was a tendency to explain the process 
primarily through the high rates of population 
growth in the societies of the region, and the 
concept of "super-urbanization" was born to 
stress the idea that population growth in the 
urban areas was to a large extent unconnected 
with changes in the economic structure and, in 
particular, in the urban economy. It now seems 
undeniable, however, that the present trends of 
ecologico-demographic change would have been 
substantially the same, even if the population 
growth rates had followed a neutral pattern. 
In other words, although high population 
growth rates in the context of a society with a 
rural economy in a critical state and a slow-
growing urban economy help to explain the 
dramatic and extreme nature of the growth of 
the urban population in many Latin American 
countries, the fact remains that the shift in the 
relationship between the urban and rural popu-
lation is linked to the changes in the relation-
ship between the urban and rural economies, 
and that urbanization includes, above and be-
yond these two specific processes, all the changes 
in urban-rural relationships and most of the 
changes taking place at each of these levels or 
in each of these sectors of society as a whole. 
Hence, urbanization should not be considered 
as merely one of the processes of change in 
urban-rural relationships, nor as covering only 
those changes taking place in the strictly urban 
environment. On the contrary, each of these 
processes is but one dimension of the general 
process of the urbanization " o f " society as a 
whole, and it is society as a whole that must 
be taken as the point of departure in order to 
explain and interpret the general process of 
urbanization properly. 
From this standpoint, urbanization is not 
viewed as a specific process which is separate 
and distinct from the socio-economic, cultural, 
political, and ecologico-demographic processes, 
despite their interdependence. It is a dimension 
of the over-all process of change in society, 
which is expressed through the processes taking 
place in each of the various structural orders 
into which, for analytical purposes, society as a 
whole can be divided. Society as a whole, 
for its part, can be thought of as a fabric made 
up of the different structural orders: the 
economic, social, cultural, political, and eco-
logico-demographic. All these basic structural 
orders are interdependent in relation to each 
other and to society as a whole, but at the same 
time they all have a relatively autonomous 
existence and pattern of change. Hence it is not 
possible to assume that the different basic struc-
tural orders of society are "systematically"— 
i.e., level by level and element by element— 
interdependent. In the constitution of each of 
these orders a part is played not only by func-
tionally necessary elements, but also by elements 
which have their roots in particular develop-
ment in the history of the society and which 
play or may play a decisive role in the actual 
historical process. 
When society as a whole embarks upon a 
period of historically significant change, the 
process is channelled through each of its basic 
structural orders and is affected by the specific 
characteristics of each of those orders at each 
moment of the historical process. Over-all 
change is, therefore, a single process, but one 
that takes the form of a number of different 
processes linked together according to the 
particular circumstances characterizing each of 
the basic structural orders and the historical 
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circumstances of the society as a whole. This 
means that the specific processes corresponding 
to each of these orders may take place at levels 
very different from those corresponding to the 
remaining orders. 
In this context, if it is accepted that the eco-
logico-demographic changes implicit in urbaniza-
tion are related to changes in the urban-rural 
economic relationships and to shifts in urban-
rural relationships in each of the basic struc-
tural orders, and also to changes occurring 
in these orders within the urban and rural sub-
societies, it is possible to advance an over-all 
explanation of the process of urbanization and 
to check that explanation empirically. Urbaniza-
tion can thus be viewed as a process " o f " society 
as a whole, taking place through each of its 
basic structural orders and as a dimension of 
the process of change occurring in each of those 
orders. 
In other words, in the process of change tak-
ing place in the economic structure there is an 
"urbanization" dimension, just as there is in the 
processes of change in all the other structural 
orders. There is, therefore: (1) urbanization of 
the economic structure; (2) urbanization of the 
social structure; (3) urbanization of the eco-
logico-demographic structure; (4) urbanization 
of the socio-psychological cultural structure; 
and (5) urbanization of the political structure. 
In practice, all these dimensions are interrelated 
to the extent that the basic structural orders of 
society and their processes of change are inter-
related, according to the particular framework 
of society as a whole and each of its structural 
orders. The over-all process of urbanization is 
the result of the specific ways in which the 
various dimensions of the process in each of 
these orders are interrelated or linked in prac-
tice. 
This way of looking at the phenomenon of 
urbanization in Latin America makes it possible 
for research to highlight the multidimensional 
nature of the process, its mechanisms and the 
specific ways in which the various dimensions 
are related to each other and, together, to society 
as a whole. To the extent that the different basic 
structural orders are relatively autonomous, 
within this fundamental interdependence, the 
process of urbanization may take place at very 
different levels and with different characteristics 
in each of the structural orders. 
In most Latin American countries, for exam-
ple, the growth of the urban population and 
its trend towards predominance over the rural 
population is much more apparent than the 
growth of the urban economy, and massive 
inter-urban and rural-urban migration affects 
the development of an urban, socio-cultural 
structure. This would seem to indicate that 
the growth of the urban population bears 
very little relation to what is happening 
in the urban economy and in urban and 
rural society. Nevertheless, a more detailed 
consideration of the urban population's growth 
trends and its unequal distribution among the 
different areas and cities in all Latin American 
countries immediately reveals that these trends 
closely follow the growth of the urban economy 
and the concentration of that economy in cer-
tain areas or cities, with the result that the large 
concentrations of urban population and, conse-
quently, the target of migratory flows, are pre-
cisely those areas and cities where the urban 
economy is growing most rapidly and under-
going the most intensive process of change. 
It is evident, therefore, that there is a clear 
relationship between the processes of growth and 
change of the urban economy and the rural-
urban economic relationships implicit in that 
process, on the one hand, and the growth of the 
urban population and the consequent changes 
in urban-rural ecologico-demographic relation-
ships, on the other. It is clear, however, that in 
every case the latter process far outstrips the 
former in scale and pace. This is not because the 
two processes are not linked historically, but 
because they take place at different levels ac-
cording to the particular characteristics and 
development of each of the respective structural 
orders. 
Thus, because of the progress made in sanita-
tion and medicine, over-all death rates have 
shown a relative decline in the Latin American 
countries, but, given the prevalent social and 
cultural characteristics in most of these coun-
tries up to the present—a predominantly rural 
population, pre-industrial norms and values, the 
hegemony of Catholicism in religion, etc.—there 
has been no similar trend in the birth rates. 
Consequently, the over-all population growth 
rates continue to climb in most of the countries, 
and particularly in those which embarked rela-
tively late on the path of development of the 
urban industrial economy. 
In most of these countries, moreover, the 
organization of production and general economic 
activity in most of the rural areas are, as the 
result of a number of familiar factors and 
historical situations, still at an economic and 
technological level that is very backward in rela-
tion to the economic system of which they form 
a part. Because of this situation, when a real 
process of expansion and modification of the 
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urban economy is under way, with its usual 
tendency towards concentration in certain areas 
and cities and with the technological and entre-
preneurial trends observable of late in industrial 
development, changes in the economic and non-
economic urban-rural relationships are, under 
present conditions, inevitably weighted in favour 
of the urban areas. Consequently, the rural 
population tends to be pushed outside the former 
economic structure as a result of the impact 
on the rural areas of the expansion of the urban 
economy, and large numbers of the rural popula-
tion seek to become part of the urban economy 
and society, although only very few succeed in 
doing so. 
Thus, the extremely high over-all population 
growth rates, together with the effects of the 
expansion and modification of the urban 
economy on the rural economy and society, 
push to a dramatic extreme the growth of the 
urban population generated by changes in the 
urban-rural economic relationships in the proc-
ess of expansion and modification of the urban 
economy. The growth of the urban population, 
as such, is a correlative of urban economic 
growth. The imbalance between the two pro-
cesses is mainly the result of the factors men-
tioned above, but this imbalance should not 
obscure the close relationship between them, and 
the only way to keep sight of this relationship 
is not to consider either of them separately. For 
this purpose, the point of departure must be 
society as a whole and the over-all process of 
change in society through each of its basic 
structural orders. 
Naturally, if consciously or unconsciously the 
traditional functional and structural approach 
is maintained and society is envisaged as a 
"systematic" structure, functionally integrated 
level by level and component by component, 
the disparities between the dimensions of the 
same process in each of the basic structural 
orders will be inexplicable or could only be 
explained for each one separately. 
It is worth noting that urbanization, like 
many other problems, has gradually become a 
subject of research because of the striking na-
ture of one of its dimensions, i.e., population 
growth in the cities, with its present economic, 
social and political repercussions: the formation 
of "marginal" populations, unemployment and 
under-employment, and the provisional political 
status of the new urban settlers who have no 
place in the socio-economic structure created by 
industrial development. Consequently, prime 
importance in research has been given to this 
particular aspect of the urban phenomenon. 
In view of the slight development of the urban 
economy, particularly of industry, the tendency 
has been to regard urban population growth as 
a phenomenon that is apparently unrelated to 
the urban economy, or to the corresponding 
changes in the rural economy, the changes in the 
urban and rural societies, the changes in society 
as a whole in its relations with other societies, 
etc. From this standpoint the first and most 
obvious explanation could only be the huge in-
crease in the growth rates of the total popula-
tion. Because of certain characteristics of the 
process, it was forgetten that urban growth had 
already been a feature of some Latin American 
societies whose over-all population growth rates 
were quite low or tending to decline, as in the 
case of Argentina. 
In Argentina, other demographic factors such 
as heavy immigration from Europe, combined 
with the particular way in which the country 
was placed in a dependent situation in the post-
colonial era, indicate that this is an exceptional 
case. Nevertheless, the huge population shift 
from the interior to Buenos Aires in the period 
immediately preceding Perón's régime—-when the 
over-all population growth rates remained low 
—and the subsequent growth of cities such as 
Córdoba fostered by an intensive process of 
industrial development (under the national 
demographic conditions for the country as a 
whole) show that Argentina's urban population 
increased in spite of the relatively low rates of 
total population growth. It was the same in 
Uruguay. 
The huge scale of internal migration, which 
has led to an urban population explosion in the 
Latin American countries, is attributable not 
only to changes in the structure of urban-rural 
economic relations, the expansion and modifica-
tion of the urban economy and the correspond-
ing changes in the rural economy, but also to the 
high rates of total population growth in the 
socio-economic framework of under-develop-
ment. Nevertheless, the present ecologico-demo-
graphic process of urbanization in these coun-
tries would probably have followed the same 
pattern even if the over-all population rates had 
been different—as is shown by Argentina and 
Uruguay—if the nature of the process and the 
specific problems encountered had been dif-
ferent, and if some of those problems had never 
existed. 
Urbanization of the economy, in terms of an 
expansion and modification of the urban 
economy and an alteration in urban-rural eco-
nomic relations, is necessarily accompanied by a 
process of ecologico-demographic urbanization, 
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such as an expansion of the urban population 
and a change in the urban-rural ecologico-
demographic relations. Nevertheless, if the ur-
banization of the economy coincides with high 
rates of total population growth, extremely 
backward rural economies, and rural societies 
rooted in a pre-industrial and pre-"modern" 
tradition, the problems and specific charac-
teristics of the urbanization process in the 
economy, in relation to the demographic charac-
teristics of that society, will be determined by 
the other factors with which it coincides. It is 
not the trend in itself—i.e., the direction taken 
by a particular process—which is different, but 
its specific forms and manifestations, which in 
turn are the outcome of the historical frame-
work in which the trend is developing. 
Migration will take place whether the popula-
tion is one hundred or one thousand; but while 
sixty would migrate in the former case, six hun-
dred would do so in the latter, and the related 
problems would not only be greater, they would, 
in all probability, be of a different kind. Let us 
now consider an advanced rural economy and 
society. In this case, the migrating population 
will have different characteristics and different 
problems, but the urban economy will not be 
affected by the present-day disparities and 
problems. If, in addition, this situation arises 
in an independent country, which can deal with 
its problems in accordance with its own needs 
and resources, instead of in a dependent society 
where the problems have to be handled in ac-
cordance with the interests and conditions im-
posed by its dependent status, the results them-
selves cannot but be diflferent. 
In brief, it is not the nature of the phenome-
non which changes, but the historical context 
and the particular circumstances in which it 
occurs. In the analysis the necessary distinction 
must be made between those circumstances and 
the phenomenon itself. 
2 . URBANIZATION AND DEPENDENCE 
The various structural orders are not only 
interrelated among themselves, they are also 
related with and through society as a whole. 
Hence, a given society must not be studied in 
isolation but in relation to all the others with 
which it is linked and which form with it a 
specific unit within the world system of inter-
dependence that is emerging. 
The trend of events in a given society is not 
merely the product of its own history, but, 
within its particular context, is shaped by that 
society's mode of relationship at any given 
moment with other societies, and more espe-
cially those with which it is directly linked. 
This leads to the second of the key problems 
that must be considered if an integrated picture 
of the general process of change, and of urban 
development in particular, is to be obtained, 
that is, the relations of one society as a whole 
with other societies and its place in the nexus 
of interrelationships. 
In Latin America, the national societies com-
prised in the region are all, in one form or 
another, dependent societies within the eco-
nomic and social system of contemporary capi-
talism, which, in its turn, is part of the world 
system of interdependence that is now taking 
slaape. In other words, national societies in 
Latin America are characterized by belonging 
to a specific interdependent unit and, within 
that unit, by the fact that they are dependent 
on other societies. Their very origins and the 
process by which they have emerged as national 
entities are bound up with the development of 
this particular system of interdependence and 
their history with the history of the whole sys-
tem, not only in so far as their economic char-
acteristics but also, to an increasing extent 
—especially since the Second World War—as 
regards their fundamental structures and proc-
esses of development. It is therefore impossible 
to separate the internal processes of these so-
cieties from those that are inherent in their 
situation within the system of interdependence 
to which they belong. Consequently, in order 
to understand the process of urbanization in 
Latin America, it is essential to start from the 
idea of dependence. 
It is not easy nowadays to form a clear idea 
of the meaning of dependence, since this phe-
nomenon is modifying many of the elements 
with which it has been and still is associated 
in Latin American thinking, and an effort is 
being made to revise and restate it; moreover, 
this is not the appropriate place for a full 
examination of the question. For the purposes 
of the present article, it will be necessary to 
begin by taking a fresh look at some assump-
tions, which are deeply rooted in Latin Ameri-
can thinking and research, and which make it 
difficult to appreciate fully the closeness of the 
ties between dependence and the process of 
change in Latin American societies. 
To begin with, in most studies of Latin 
American problems and especially those con-
cerned with "development", dependence is con-
sidered an external factor. It follows, then, 
that dependence is the relationship between two 
independent elements of different kinds. It is 
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only when thus defined that dependence can be 
regarded as an "external obstacle" to the de-
velopment of the Latin American societies, in 
individual cases or in the region as a whole. 
It must be remembered, however, in the con-
text of dependence (and with certain reserva-
tions) that although the centres of power that 
hold sway over the dependent societies are 
geographically outside them, and, in that sense, 
are external, their interdependence moulds and 
determines existing structures and events within 
the dependent societies, and the centres of power 
therefore have interests and support within these 
societies, and some similarities with them. 
Hence not all that exists or takes place in a 
dependent society is simply a reflection of the 
adjustments and problems that stem from the 
struggle with external obstacles; it is the direct 
and indirect result of the dependence manifest-
ing itself from within, with an impact that is 
" in", not merely "on" , the internal organiza-
tion of the weaker societies. Dependence does 
not affect a dependent society, only, or even 
mainly, external y. It acts within, shaping and 
directing the society's fundamental trends and 
the nature of its power structures, which thus 
form part of the pattern of dependence. 
Far from being a set of "external factors" 
blocking the independent development of a so-
ciety or group of societies, dependence is there-
fore a nexus of relationships which are estab-
lished by virtue of the close correspondence 
between the basic structural orders of the de-
pendent society and the one that has come to 
dominate it because of circumstances in their 
past history (which have been or can be de-
termined) . More specifically, this means that 
in its basic traits and outward features, the 
structure of power and conflict in a dependent 
society is weaker than that of the dominant so-
ciety and is also basically derived from and 
part of the dependent society's relations with 
the dominant society in the past. 
Thus, the economic and social structures that 
exist in any one of the Latin American coun-
tries, whatever the specific differences between 
them, are so constituted as to conform to the 
characteristics, requirements and trends of that 
country's relations with the dominant societies 
and they change pari passu with the changes 
in those relationships. 
The idea of dependence as an external factor 
would be valid if the relationships in question 
were those of an independent but undeveloped 
society with an equally autonomous but power-
ful society. Cuba's present relationships with 
other countries are a case in point. The eco-
nomic blockade of Cuba is an external obstacle 
to its development, while its current economic 
and social structure no longer corresponds to 
such structures in the other countries. De-
pendence is thus not merely a set of factors ex-
ternal to a particular society, but the whole 
web of the connexions between the basic struc-
ture of a weaker society and that of a more 
powerful society. In this sense it is equally an 
"internal" phenomenon. 
The second point, which is closely linked to 
the first, is that dependence is usually taken 
to mean a group of unilateral actions and beliefs 
or attitudes in one or more powerful societies 
which exert an influence over other weaker 
nations. Thus, what is generally understood by 
the term "economic imperialism" is a body of 
unilateral actions by virtue of which a powerful 
society dominates a weaker one. The economic 
and social systems constituting contemporary 
capitalism are not only a way of organizing pro-
duction and social power in general. One of 
its distinguishing features is precisely the domi-
nation—not only in the economic sphere—of 
the less developed by the more advanced capi-
talist societies. Viewed from this angle, depen-
dence is a system of "interdependence" between 
two levels of capitalist societies, in which the 
more advanced plays the dominant role, and its 
essence is thus the very system as such of 
power relationships between the different levels 
of society and not the unilateral domination 
of the weak by the powerful. 
As in all power relationships, dependence 
posits an exchange of actions between two end 
)oints, the actions of the dominated societies 
seing directly conditioned and controlled by 
those of the dominant or metropolitan societies. 
But it also happens that events and develop-
ments in the weaker countries have direct or 
indirect repercussions on the dominant societies 
themselves, although the latter's independent 
position prevents such repercussions from hav-
ing an immediately decisive effect. 
If they did not take place within a system 
of reciprocity and correspondence between the 
rulers and the ruled, relationships between capi-
talist societies at different stages of development 
would not be dependency relationships. They 
would simply be relationships between two auto-
nomous societies, however incompatible and 
unequal these might be. The characteristic pat-
tern of the interdependence between a domi-
nating and a dominated body within the same 
structural unit also presupposes that specific 
changes at either end of the relationship will 
be followed by corresponding modifications in 
82 
J 
the relationship itself. So long as one pole re-
mains supreme, any changes that take place 
in it will tend to preserve its supremacy through-
out the variations in the interrelations of the 
two. Nevertheless, changes in the dominated 
society will generally lead to changes in the 
system of relationships, and may go so far as 
to end the state of dependence altogether. 
When the balance of power between the 
dominant societies shifts as a result of historical 
circumstances, or of technological progress and 
the specific characteristics of the organization 
of production and social power in each one, 
the role of the dominated societies in the sys-
tem of interdependence alters in obedience to 
the new requirements and patterns. In the same 
way, the changes that take place in the organi-
zation of production and its corollary, social 
power, in response to modifications in the domi-
nant system alter the weaker societies' mode of 
participation in the system of dependence. 
In Latin America, all the national societies 
(with the exception of Cuba) form part of the 
system of interdependence that is characteristic 
of contemporary capitalism, although in dif-
fering ways and degrees. Nevertheless, they do 
not fit into the system in the same way or at 
the same level. Hence, each one's mode of par-
ticipation is contingent not only on the demands 
of the dominant system, but on its own interna] 
situation, which is a product of its past history 
and former mode of participation in the system 
of dependence. 
It would be wrong, therefore, to regard de-
pendence as being merely a set of unilateral ac-
tions whereby one society dominates another, 
since that would mean that the dependent so-
ciety is united in its opposition to the dominat-
ing society. This is far from being the case; as 
the variables and major trends of the dependent 
society's internal structure are conditioned by 
its dependent role and the changes that have 
occurred in this role throughout its history, 
they embody fundamental conflicts which do 
not derive solely from the general system of 
social domination but are inherent in the cor-
respondence between the dominant internal in-
terests and the broad interests of the system of 
dependence. Thus, the inner tempo of the de-
pendent society parallels that of its relations 
with the society on which it is dependent, or, 
in other words, the profile of the dependent 
society as a whole depends on the profile of its 
relations with the dominating society or, more 
specifically, with its centres of power. 
Because dependence has been considered an 
"external factor", the studies that have been 
made of the basic processes of change in Latin 
America, and in this particular case, of urban-
ization, have failed to attach sufficient import-
ance to the system of dependence and the 
changes in it as one of the main reasons for 
the trend pursued by the processes of change. 
It also explains the deep-rooted tendency in 
Latin American countries to study those changes 
as if they were taking place in autonomous so-
cieties and urbanization had very little to do 
with their dependent status. 
Nevertheless, the increasing complexity of the 
problem has led to deeper investigation, which 
has brought to light the fact that the main 
elements in the trend of change are closely 
bound up with the changes in the system of 
dependence in each country and in Latin Amer-
ica as a whole. 
In seeking the mechanisms by which the pro-
cesses of ecologico-demographic urbanization 
are interwoven with those of economic urbaniza-
tion, it was found that the latter also were af-
fected by the changes in the relationships of 
economic dependence. Similarly, the processes 
of socio-cultural urbanization involved in the 
development and transformation of urban so-
cieties and cultures were associated as much 
with the growing dependence of the Latin Amer-
ican nations on the dominant metropolitan so-
cieties as with the increasing correspondence 
between the dominant culture and social or-
ganization in those societies and in Latin 
America. 
Hence, if the processes of change in Latin 
America are not to be misrepresented by an 
incomplete and therefore distorted interpreta-
tion of the facts, they must necessarily be studied 
as part of the sociology of dependence. This 
applies to certain questions of detail as well 
as to the key factors underlying the specific 
trends that mark the tide of change. If this is 
to be done, social research must be constantly 
aware of the past. To a great extent, the history 
of the Latin American countries may be re-
garded as the history of their dependence. This 
explains why current developments in these 
countries in terms of the social processes that 
are taking place are unintelligible without re-
ference to the development of their dependence 
from past to present. 
For instance, one of the main sources of 
problems in latter-day urban development is the 
relationship between the growth of the towns 
and the growth of industry. Although manu-
facturing industry began to develop towards the 
end of the nineteenth century in Latin America, 
it did not get into its full stride until after the 
83 
First World War, and more particularly in the 
post-Depression era. Moreover, it did not de-
velop at the same tempo in all the Latin Amer-
ican countries, and its pattern of growth bore 
little resemblance to the form in which indus-
tries are now being established or expanded in 
those same countries. 
What is known as the process of import sub-
stitution took place mainly in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico and Uruguay, though in differing 
degrees. It was largely due to a deterioration in 
the economic dependency relationships between 
those countries and the United States. The sharp 
contraction in commodity exports to the United 
States and European markets, as a result of the 
financial crises there, led to a severe cutback 
in the consumer manufactures imported for 
what was already a fairly sizable urban popula-
tion. The development of the towns in the Latin 
American countries had formerly been attribut-
able to the development of a commercial urban 
economy, which was concentrated in a few 
centres so as to make for the growth of trade 
with the metropolitan centres—first Europe and 
then the United States. These trading relations 
had originated in the pattern of European in-
dustrial and financial capitalism at the end of 
the eighteenth century, and in the special posi-
tion of the Latin American countries in that 
system when Spain and Portugal were forced to 
give up their colonies. 
In the last twenty years or so of the eighteenth 
century, the shifts in the balance of power be-
tween the metropolitan capitalist countries of 
Europe that accompanied the growth and trans-
formation of the capitalist system of production 
from a mercantile and financial economy to an 
industrial, financial and mercantile economy 
weakened and ultimately broke up the colonial 
system built up by Spain and Portugal and 
destroyed their trading monopoly in the colo-
nies. Thanks to the changes in the trade routes 
linking Europe and Latin America and the 
technical progress of communications and tran-
sport, the countries on the Atlantic seaboard 
and Chile—or, to be more exact, certain centres 
and areas in those countries—were able to take 
a more direct and effective part in the new 
system of dependence that arose out of the de-
colonization. The countries on the Pacific coast, 
however, not only lost their hegemony in trade 
with Europe, but had to remain on the fringes 
of the new system of dependence until well on 
into the nineteenth century. 
In this context of dependence, the colonial 
towns that were in direct touch with the trade 
routes (usually ports, such as Rio de Janeiro 
and Buenos Aires, or towns such as Santiago 
that were close to a port) developed economic-
ally and demographically as commercial towns 
and their population was drawn into the con-
sumption pattern of an industrial society and 
its markets, thus making for the general modern-
ization of those countries, although in an un-
equal and highly concentrated way. The huge 
flow of immigrants from Europe to Argentina 
and Uruguay in particular, and later to Brazil 
and Chile as well, were a factor in urban de-
velopment and modernization, and, to a great 
extent, formed part of the same over-all process. 
It thus appears that the post-colonial process 
of urbanization which first developed in Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay was 
not shaped by the internal characteristics of 
those societies considered individually, but by 
the new dependency relationships they entered 
into as a result of decolonization and of the 
subservient position of the metropolitan societies 
themselves in the context of European capital-
ism. 
As those countries' ties with the metropolitan 
centres of power became more strained towards 
1930, and they already had a fairly large urban 
population that had become accustomed to 
certain patterns of consumption based on trade 
with metropolitan countries, they were com-
pelled to find substitutes for the principal con-
sumer goods imported for their urban popula-
tion. Import substitution had to be financed 
almost entirely by national capital, the level 
of technology was relatively low and the prevail-
ing forms of business organization and manage-
ment were of the traditional family type, which 
are reflected in the type of bureaucracy that 
grew up, the way in which labour relations were 
handled and production itself organized. 
The expansion of industry gave a further 
impetus to urbanization in those countries, and 
began, in one degree or another, to transform 
the economic relations between the towns and 
the rural areas. The result was that the urban 
population and the major towns grew far more 
rapidly than elsewhere in Latin America. 
In Ecuador and Peru, for instance, import 
substitution was later in starting, and took place 
mainly after the Second World War, although the 
first plants were set up in the nineteen-thirties. 
The circumstances were very different too. First, 
import substitution coincided with a period in 
which the ties of dependence were becoming 
stronger rather than weaker, and, for that 
reason, the substitution process was relatively 
independent of national capital. Its funds were 
largely foreign in origin, whether in the form 
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of direct investment capital, loans or financial 
control. It also had access to a highly-developed 
technology and a monopolistic type of business 
organization associated with international con-
sortia, with the kind of labour relations and 
production processes that are needed for a 
monopolistic set-up and the demands of an 
advanced technology. In short, the growth and 
diversification of manufacturing industry in 
these countries sprang from certain modifica-
tions in their economic dependence and the in-
creasing flow of investment towards the second-
ary and tertiary sectors of the economy, 
although the primary sector was not wholly 
neglected. The ensuing picture is thus one of 
expansion and consolidation juxtaposed with 
changes in the system of economic dependence. 
This expansion of the urban industrial 
economy and its far-reaching effects on eco-
nomic relations between urban and rural areas 
in these countries have led to the growth of the 
urban population and, above all, of the major 
towns, which were strategically placed for de-
veloping along modern lines during the previous 
stage of dependence, or are located in areas that 
have sprung into prominence as a direct result 
of the new conditions of dependence, e.g., Gua-
yaquil in Ecuador and Chimbóte in Peru. 
Meanwhile, radical changes have been taking 
place in the urban-rural ecologico-demographic 
relationships that are a concomitant of the 
growth of the urban population and urban econ-
omy and of shifts in he economic relationships 
between the two poles of the national society. 
As these countries were at a disadvantage 
during the first major stage of the post-colonial 
system of dependence, the factors underlying 
the economic and social stagnation that was ap-
parent throughout most of their territory were 
responsible for the economic and social relations 
and institutional set-up of the colonial era be-
coming even more firmly entrenched in large 
areas of those countries. The development of 
the sectors most closely connected with foreign 
trade and external financing—particularly in the 
early stages of industrialization when their de-
pendence was increasing and taking on different 
forms—was so much greater in the modern 
and developing areas, both urban and rural, 
than it was in the backward rural and urban 
areas that the growth of the urban population 
was much more rapid in these countries than 
in those which had undergone the same process 
earlier. Given the nature of the trends in the 
growth and change of the urban economy, 
particularly in the process of industrial develop-
ment, the growth and change of the urban 
societies in Peru and Ecuador present a much 
thornier problem than in the urban societies 
of the countries where industrial and urban 
growth began earlier. The form which de-
pendence has taken in the Latin American coun-
tries and the changes in this relationship are 
thus indissolubly linked with each stage and 
each trend of urban development in every one 
of these countries at all the decisive moments 
in their history. 
If the urbanization of the economy in Peru 
(which is a determining factor in ecologico-
demographic urban growth) is assumed to stem 
from the current changes and general increase 
in the country's dependence, it may be argued 
that dependence has been a secondary factor 
in the urbanization of the economies of Argen-
tina and Brazil where urban and industrial de-
velopment alike have been carried on with na-
tional capital and by national enterprises. But 
in certain cases dependence has continued to 
play a key role. It has at times prepared the 
national matrix to take advantage of a turn 
of events such as a deterioration in its state 
of dependence to start its industry on the road 
to development, involving intensive sales to 
the home market, the existence of already es-
tablished entrepreneurial groups with the neces-
sary capital and expertise to set up industries, 
and the formation of large urban centres founded 
on an urban commercial economy that provided 
a market for industry and make demands on it. 
In other instances, dependence has the effect 
of channelling investment capital into industry, 
modifying the modest industrial base already 
in existence, diversifying urban industrial pro-
duction and stepping up sales, all of which speed 
up and change the growth trends of the urban 
population which, habituated to the new in-
dustrial patterns of consumption, form a market 
for the growing output of industry. 
Thus, in studying the relationships that make 
up the state of dependence, it is essential to 
place them in a historical perspective, to define 
clearly the different stages of dependence and 
its social impact on the individual countries at 
each stage, and to correlate it with the shifts 
in the balance of power between the metro-
politan countries themselves, as a result of 
changes in the structure of production or of 
world markets in the capitalist system, to men-
tion only two factors. 
As the truth of an actual situation is never 
abstract it is wholly academic to speak of "the"' 
dependent relationships, "a" process of indus-
trialization, or "a" process of urban develop-
ment. It is always necessary to state exactly 
85! 
what those relationships are with regard to a 
particular country and what types of industrial 
and urban development are under consideration. 
In short, it is not enough to sketch in the whole 
historical background; each process must be 
dealt with factually in relation to a particular 
time and setting. In other words, a general 
process must be described in terms of its 
specific nature and particular history at a given 
moment in space and time. 
It is by no means superfluous to dwell on 
these problems, since they are not so obvious 
as they appear to be. If they were, there would 
not be so many studies on "the" industrializa-
tion of Latin America that do little more than 
record the contrasts and similarities in the in-
dustrial growth of the different countries, with-
out relating them to any recognized body of 
problems and, hence, without mentioning any 
factor other than quantitative differences in 
output productivity and investment the magni-
tude of whose various components may vary 
without there necessarily being any significant 
differences in the structure of industrial de-
velopment. 
C. URBANIZATION AS ONE OF THE MAJOR DIMENSIONS OF THE PRESENT 
PROCESS OF CHANGE IN THE LATIN AMERICAN SOCIETIES 
Since the urban phenomenon can be traced 
back in Latin American history to pre-colonial 
times, it would be as well to eliminate the 
ambiguity implicit in the term "urbanization 
process". This ambiguity arises from the two 
different concepts which the term conveys: first, 
the process whereby towns emerge and develop 
in a given society, and, second, the process 
whereby the urbanization of a society has de-
veloped and changed in the past. 
The Latin American societies are at present 
undergoing a process of urban expansion and 
change parallel with a process of contraction 
and change in rural areas. In the first sense 
of the term, the assertion that an urbanization 
process is under way would be valid for a rural 
locality or a group of rural localities considered 
separately within a particular national society, 
and this is undoubtedly occurring. It only oc-
curs, however, as part of the expansion and 
change of a process which already has a long 
and eventful history behind it in the national 
society itself. 
Without denying its importance as an 
academic exercise, it would be unrealistic, 
therefore, to begin by laying down a universal 
definition of what is urban and what is rural. 
It is much more important for the purposes and 
real possibilities of research to indicate what 
the present process of urbanization actually in-
volves, and to describe its characteristics and 
trends, and the factors underlying it, rather 
than to go into the original meaning of the 
term. In other words, a scientific theory regard-
ing the present urbanization process in these 
'Countries should not be built on the formulation 
•of a general theory of the urbanization of 
•society, because it operates at a different level. 
The specific purpose of this theory is to present 
a systematic picture of the elements involved 
in a specific process, of its changing pattern, 
its general trends and its implications in an 
actual society, not in society in the abstract 
sense. In this context, one of the forms taken 
by the process of change in the Latin American 
societies is the expansion and modification of 
the urbanization process, that is, of a form of 
social organization which is becoming pre-
dominant in some countries and is being con-
solidated in others. 
What distinguishes urban from rural is that 
they are two different systems of ecological and 
socio-economic organization of human life, and 
besides coexisting and being juxtaposed, these 
systems are permanently interdependent. This 
means that they cannot be considered as two 
extremes in a continuum, but rather as two 
sectors of a single structural unit. Therefore, it 
is impossible to study what is happening in one 
of those sectors without first establishing where 
it coincides and where it conflicts with the 
other. Expansion and change in one of these 
systems of organization of human life involve 
a simultaneous contraction and change in the 
other. The whole question of urban expansion 
and change in any society is, first of all, a 
process of change in the society's urban-rural 
relationship, giving pre-eminence to the de-
veloping urban way of life. That is to say, 
urbanization is one of the forms taken by 
the general process of transformation of these 
societies, and it represents changes in the urban-
rural relatonships in every basic structural or-
der of society, through expansion of the urban 
system. If an entirely rural society were being 
urbanized, the process would primarily involve 
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the emergence and development of urban pat-
terns affecting some portion of the basic struc-
tural orders in that society (for example, the 
emergence of urban-type settlements, secondary 
and tertiary economic activities, forms of social 
relationships deriving from these factors, and 
incipient urban sources of political power). 
In the real case of a national society in Latin 
America or any other part of the present-day 
world, a developed and consolidated urban or-
ganization, actively interdependent with the 
rural, already exists for each of the basic 
structural orders of the national society, i.e., 
it is already one of the basic modes of existence 
and development of the over-all structure of 
society. Thus the process directly involves a 
modification of urban-rural relations in the 
society, as a consequence of the trends of change 
and expansion in the urban system of the cor-
relative changes in the rural. 
Accordingly, from the standpoint of the di-
mension of the general process of change in 
these countries, the present "urbanization 
process" may be considered as a process of 
expansion and transformation of the urban 
systems existing in each of the basic structural 
orders of the whole society, with, as a part 
and a result of this process, an alteration of the 
interdependent rural systems and, consequently, 
of the entire structure of urban-rural relation-
ships in the society as a whole, all this being 
largely conditioned by the changes that are 
taking place in the dependency relationships of 
the national society as a whole. On this basis, 
the methodological problem is to differentiate 
between the dimensions of the processes of 
change which each basic structural order of 
society is undergoing, to study the mechanisms 
of interdependence in each of those dimensions, 
and to reconstruct the general process in terms 
of its general trends and its implications for 
society as a whole. 
One of the risks involved in considering the 
urbanization process as a dimension of the over-
all process of change in the Latin American 
societies seems to be that urbanization might 
tend to be regarded as synonymous with over-
all change. This risk cannot be avoided without 
first establishing and then working on the basis 
of the fact that this dimension covers everything 
in the over-all change which is directly or im-
mediately linked to the alteration of the relations 
and limits between urban and rural in each 
major institutional order of society. If this ap-
proach is taken as the point of departure, the 
above-mentioned risks can be reduced or elimi-
nated. To that end, it is necessary to establish 
what is the nature of this changing trend in 
urban-rural relations in each basic structural 
order and what are the factors determining it. 
The kind of interdependence between the various 
sub-dimensions of the process depend on the 
kind of interdependence that exists between the 
actual orders of each society in each specific 
historical context, which only specific research 
can reveal and determine. 
1. URBANIZATION OF THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
Broadly speaking, this process can be de-
scribed as the tendency for economic activities 
in urban centres to predominate in the over-all 
structure of economic activity in society, and the 
tendency for urbanized forms to become wide-
spread in the whole structure of economic ac-
tivity, particularly the structure of production. 
In this process, there is a change in the struc-
ture of the previously existing urban economic 
activity and, as a result of the impact of this 
change on the national economy, a change also 
takes place in the rural economic structure 
itself, all of which gradually alters the urban-
rural economic relationships. 
Inasmuch as, in the structure of over-all 
economic activity in a society, primary activities 
are mainly a feature of the rural area, in the 
present situation urbanization of the economy 
means that secondary and tertiary activities are 
expanding, becoming more diversified and as-
suming a key role in the national economy as a 
whole. Assuming, further, that the basic sec-
ondary and tertiary activities are located in 
urban centres, not only those activities but the 
urban centres as well will tend to hold economic 
sway over the rural localities. For this to come 
about, it is not necessary that all the secondary 
and tertiary activities of the economy should 
shift to an urban ecological setting, since artisan-
type activities, for example, and commerce may 
be found also in rural areas. It is obvious, how-
ever. that as the urban centres gain and con-
solidate their economic predominance, the arti-
san-type activities in those branches of produc-
tion which are dominated by the urban centres 
will gradually lose their importance and their 
ecological and demographic scope, although 
other rural artisan-type activities may subsist 
and even develop for a time. 
If all this is to become possible, the urban 
economy, besides expanding, must be techno-
logically diversified and developed, so that the 
relations between the actual branches and levels 
of urban economic activity will gradually alter 
in favour of predominance by the technoloeically 
more developed branches and levels. This is 
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perhaps what is happening between manufac-
turing and artisan-type activity in urban centres, 
or between industries manufacturing consumer 
products and those producing intermediate or 
capital goods. Moreover, as the urban economy's 
growth is consolidated during this process, its 
characteristics will be gradually incorporated 
even in primary activities, whose functions, 
technological processes and entrepreneurial or-
ganization must be adapted progressively to the 
requirements and conditions of the urban 
economy. Thus agriculture becomes more and 
more mechanized and industrialized to serve 
the needs of the industrialized urban areas. At a 
very advanced stage in the urbanization of the 
economy, primary activities can be considered 
as rural only in so far as they remain eco-
logically rural, but in nature they are "ur-
banized" as a productive process. 
While the urbanization of the economy is only 
just beginning, urban centres at different levels 
may not be very closely linked and they may 
enjoy comparative independence, particularly 
in countries where the population centres are 
very far apart and the communications and 
transport systems are little-developed. With the 
intensification of the process and the definitive 
predominance of the urban economy, however, 
an economic system emerges and is consolidated, 
and the rural area is gradually absorbed into 
this system as economic urbanization spreads 
to it. This is normally an uneven and sometimes 
a discontinuous process in the various coun-
tries, and in the various regions of a country. 
Similarly, in the initial stages of the urbaniza-
tion of the economy, the direct day-to-day 
economic relations between the countryside and 
the city may be relatively unstable and tangen-
tial, although in the over-all historical context 
the relations between the two must be all-
encompassing and continuing, since they both 
form part of the same structural unit, within 
which they act upon and are dependent on each 
other. With the expansion of the urban economy 
—which also implies urbanization of the 
economy of rural areas as a result of urban 
products entering the rural markets and of the 
technological and functional urbanization of 
primary activities—the isolation of the city 
and the countryside from each other in their 
day-to-day economic relations diminishes and 
eventually disappears. Thenceforward, the eco-
nomic relations between town and country, 
Tirban and rural, become closer and more direct. 
The rural economy comes to depend on the 
urban economy, and urban centres hold eco-
nomic sway over country towns and villages, 
just as the urban areas do over the rural 
areas. 
From this standpoint, the urbanization of the 
economy of a society may also be regarded as a 
process of homogenization of the whole eco-
nomic structure and of direct and complete 
integration of the population in the context of 
the economy, production and the urban market. 
In the long run, this presupposes the disap-
pearance of urban-rural differentiations in the 
economy, a stage which some modern societies 
may be about to attain. 
In most of the Latin American countries, the 
process of expansion and change of urban 
economic activities within the national economy 
is in full swing, and in some countries urban 
economic activities are already predominant. 
Nevertheless urban-type economic activity does 
not yet seem to have imposed itself on the 
whole national economy even of those Latin 
American countries where the process has gone 
furthest. The trend is probably in this direction, 
however. 
2. URBANIZATION OF THE ECOLOGICO-DEMO-
GRAPHIC STRUCTURE 
This is essentially a process of expansion and 
modification of the urban ecologico-demo-
graphic characteristics of society, with the cor-
responding modification of urban-rural relations 
in this structural order, including the changes 
that take place in each of the terms of this 
relationship. Since the most visible sign of this 
process is the growth of the urban section of 
the society's total population, especially as a 
result of the growth of the population living in 
the cities, it is often confused with the process 
itself, and for many it is still "the process of 
urbanization of society. 
Although this is the most striking feature of 
the ecologico-demographic urbanization process, 
it is not the only important one, nor does it 
occur independently of what is happening in 
the rest of the ecologico-demographic structure 
of the society. Urban population growth does 
not take place in the cities alone, although it is 
mainly concentrated there in Latin America 
and the rest of the developing world; to a lesser 
degree it is also observable in smaller towns 
and villages. Moreover, the number of cities 
and smaller towns and villages tends to increase 
in the course of urban population growth, 
which implies an expansion of the urban eco-
logical forms of settlement and a relative reduc-
tion of the rural, although the latter may in-
crease in absolute terms. The two interconnected 
processes reveal a change in the balance of the 
urban-rural relationship in the ecological and 
demographic structure of society in favour of 
the urban areas. 
In the same process, the urban ecological 
characteristics gradually change. First, because 
the cities and minor towns and villages increase 
in size, in terms not only of the number of in-
habitants but also of the ecological space in-
habited. Secondly, because a change takes place 
in the internal ecological structure of the cities 
and in the smaller towns and villages, which at-
tain the status of cities. Thirdly, because with the 
increase in the number, size and importance of 
urban population nuclei, which are relatively 
scattered throughout the territory of the society 
concerned, the tendency is for an urban eco-
logical system to become established, together 
with a network of communications and real and 
direct interdependent relationships. 
The rural ecological and demographic sector 
cannot remain unaffected in this complex of 
changes, because it and the urban sector are 
interdependent within the over-all structure of 
the society. The migration of the rural popula-
tion to the urban sector is already a tangible 
sign of change in the rural sector. Furthermore, 
with the progressive establishment of an urban 
system, the rural towns and villages are incorpo-
rated in the network of communications and in-
terdependent relationships which that implies; 
consequently, the isolation of the town from the 
country and of one rural area from another 
becomes less or disappears. 
From a strictly demographic standpoint, the 
growing urban predominance in the urban-rural 
demographic relationship is not the only signifi-
cant change that takes place, although it may 
be the most obvious and perhaps the most im-
portant. Neither can the rural population drain 
resulting from migration to the cities fail to 
introduce substantive changes in the rural 
demographic structure, particularly since most 
of the migrants are those of the younger sections 
of the population who are best fitted for urban 
life, most susceptible to urban influence, best 
educated, etc. Correlatively, the demographic 
structure of cities, and to a lesser degree of the 
smaller urban centres, feels the full impact of 
the overwhelming influx of a population with 
very difi'erent cultural values and traditions. 
One of the most obvious results is that the 
sharp increase in the younger strata in the urban 
population is accompanied by a parallel re-
duction in the same strata in the rural popula-
tion. 
To sum up, the trend towards urban ecological 
and demographic predominance in the society 
of any of the Latin American countries, but 
particularly those in which this process is com-
paratively recent, means not only urban popula-
tion growth but a whole set of broader and 
more complex phenomena involving the trans-
formation of all the basic elements of the urban-
rural relationship in this structural order. 
Clearly, rural-urban migration may be a process 
of urbanization of the population, but not of 
society. Even so, until such time as other struc-
tural orders are incorporated in the process, this 
is an urbanization of the population only in its 
ecological sense. 
3 . URBANIZATION OF THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
The term social structure is used here in the 
sense of the structure of social power relation-
ships, i.e., the stratification of basic social 
groups that constitute the matrix within which 
exist the many interrelated groups and types of 
groups that may go to make up a society. From 
this point of view, the process of urbanization 
of the social structure consists in the expansion 
and alteration of the urban patterns of organi-
zation of social power existing in the society 
concerned, and, consequently, in the modifica-
tion of urban-rural relationships within this 
basic structural order and of the actual rural 
patterns of social power structuration which 
form part of the national society as a whole. 
The expansion of urban patterns of organization 
of social power implies an increase in the popu-
lation incorporated into the society's total sys-
tem of urban stratification, together with an in-
crease in the population incorporated into each 
of the classes and strata making up the urban 
system of social power within the national 
society. 
Since ecologico-demographic urbanization in-
volves the demographic expansion of the urban 
population, the population drawn into the urban 
ecological framework likewise joins the whole 
social order existing within it. Hence, an in-
crease takes place both in the population in-
cluded in the entire urban system of social 
power and in the population forming each of 
its social sectors. 
The changes in the patterns governing the 
urban system of social power in the national 
society in question—deriving partly from the 
population increases in the system as a whole 
and in each of its sectors, and primarily from 
the alterations brought about in the structure 
of the urban economy—consist chiefly in modifi. 
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cations of the specific relationships between 
the various classes and strata forming the urban 
sub-society and changes in the internal compo-
sition of each of those groups. The structural 
diversification and metamorphosis of urban eco-
nomic activity gives rise to new occupational 
and vocational groups and to new sources of 
status-roles within the economy and correlatively 
within the social structure. These changes affect 
the existing sources of power and, to some 
extent, the specific population groups which 
control them. 
Thus, the urban social power structure 
changes, gains in flexibility or becomes diversi-
fied, when new strata and classes are generated, 
the internal composition of each of these is 
altered, and the volume of population comprised 
in them increases. 
The expansion of the demographic frame-
work of the urban system of social power 
structuration—not so much as a result of the 
internal increase in the urban population itself, 
as in consequence of migratory shifts of the 
society's total population towards the urban 
ecological framework or of the urbanization of 
rural localities and areas themselves in the same 
respect—implies the development of a trend 
towards the transfer of increasing numbers of 
the national population to the urban sub-society, 
with all its inherent consequences. The one of 
interest here is the progressive incorporation 
of the country's population into the urban social 
power system. 
This latter process constitutes a mechanism 
whereby urban-rural relationships are altered 
within this basic structural order, not only 
because changes occur in the proportional dis-
tribution of the population between the two 
sub-systems, but also because the dependency 
relationships between the two forms of organi-
zation of social power tend to undergo modifi-
cation. One of the reasons for this is that the 
predominance of the urban social power system 
makes itself felt not only in demographic but 
also in social terms. If the alteration referred 
to is really to take place, the rural sub-system 
of organization of social power must also 
change. In this case the changes are brought 
about because forms of economic activity which, 
historically speaking, are of urban origin infil-
trate into the countryside, and because the func-
tion and specific nature of rural economic ac-
tivity in relation to urban activities undergoes 
modification. 
Thus, at the present time, while the urban 
economy and population are expanding and the 
urban economy is "in process of change and 
diversification, under the impact of the wide-
spread introduction of new technologies", the 
compositions and function of each of the classes 
and strata in which social power is organized 
in the urban centres are changing at a pace 
whose speed varies from one country to another 
and from one area to another within each 
country. 
In the first place, the traditional ruling classes 
—mainly landowning bourgeoisies in most of the 
countries—are gradually altering in content and 
function with the changes in the economic 
sources of their social power. Alongside this 
development, the middle-level groups are ex-
panding, not only demographically but also 
from the standpoint of their specific functions 
in society, the scope and range of their influ-
ence, and their access to the market and to 
concrete forms of political power, etc. The 
working-class population, both industrial and 
non-industrial, is increasing in number, and 
while in the urban economy industrial devel-
opment is taking place and the relative impor-
tance of tertiary activities is growing, under 
each country's specific dependency conditions, 
a whole stratum of population is emerging 
which is marginal to the new socio-economic 
structure associated with industrial expansion. 
In the rural sub-society, the composition and 
specific nature of the ruling social groups is 
undergoing decisive modification as more and 
more products of urban origin trickle into the 
market, changes occur in the function of the 
crop and livestock farming economy in relation 
to the needs of industrial development and of 
the urban market, and the former bases of the 
rural economy gradually disintegrate. A case 
in point is the decline of the land owning stratum 
linked to the "traditional hacienda" system, and 
the conversion of part of it into an entrepre-
neurial sector. At the same time, the sectors 
formed by the rural petty bourgeoisie—which 
in most of these countries used to constitute a 
set of relatively scattered, and isolated groups— 
are expanding, and so is the rural proletariat. 
In other words, the structure of social power 
is changing not only in the urban sub-society, 
but also in the rural areas. In so far as all these 
internal changes in each of the sub-societies 
cannot but affect their interrelationships within 
the over-all structure of power, dominance and 
conflict in the national society as a whole, the 
implication is that the specific patterns and 
content of the over-all power structure are tend-
ing to change, although not the basic nature 
of this structure as a whole. 
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Thus the urbanization of the social or social 
power structure stems from the urbanization of 
the economic and ecologico-demographic struc-
tures of society, and in its turn influences each 
of these processes. 
4 . URBANIZATION OF THE CULTURAL STRUCTURE 
In the abstract, the concept of culture adopted 
here covers the whole of the ideological super-
structure of a society, together with the symbols, 
institutions and objects by which it is served 
and in which it finds expression. The term 
therefore relates both to the images of itself 
and of others which the population of a given 
society entertains or develops, and to the images 
of the ruling, subordinate and alternative nuclei 
of formal and real axiological orientation. It 
includes the over-all objectives pursued by the 
society or imposed by its ruling groups upon 
its other members; its systems and levels of 
aspiration; the formal and informal institutions 
which symbolize and put into effect its axiolo-
gico-normative models, etc. What is more, this 
interpretation of culture also embraces the per-
ceptive structures and the content of perception 
of society and nature which exist in a given 
society at a given time. 
Both by its very nature and by virtue of the 
quality of the scientific instruments at its dis-
posal, culture is one of the most elusive aspects 
of the historico-social situation. Accordingly, 
the problem of the urbanization of culture in 
Latin American societies is considered here 
mainly with reference to some of its more 
perceptible dimensions. 
Broadly speaking, like all other specific 
processes or sub-dimensions, the urbanization 
of culture in existing Latin American societies 
consists first and foremost in the expansion of 
the demographic radius of influence of the cul-
ture characterizing the urban sub-society of a 
given national society at a given time, and in 
the changes brought about in it during the 
process. This involves both the alteration of 
urban-rural relationships within the cultural 
structure of the society, and internal changes 
in the rural culture predominant in the national 
society. 
In all the countries under discussion, the con-
tents and symbols of urban culture are clearly 
acquiring or beginning to acquire an increasing 
radius of influence, not only from the territorial 
or ecological standpoint, but, to much greater 
effect, from the demographic angle. Thus, the 
process under discussion consists in the expan-
sion of the influence of urban culture within a 
society. Clearly, too, urban culture itself is un-
dergoing constant and increasingly rapid modi-
fication. Urban culture nuclei of the past are 
dwindling and disappearing or gradually chang-
ing and adopting different patterns; others 
that are completely new are being introduced 
or developing from within, with the ensuing 
quantitative enrichment of the culture in ques-
tion. The relations between the axiologico-
normative circles co-existing in the society con-
cerned—whether they consist in subordination 
and conflict or in competition between alterna-
tives—alter likewise as the social groups forming 
each of these circles change their position and 
their specific relationships with one another and 
with the society as a whole. 
As the urban ecological and demographic 
framework broadens, as the urban economy 
becomes predominant and infiltrates into the 
countryside itself, and as the structure of social 
power is urbanized, urban culture too expands, 
not only inasmuch as its predominance makes 
it of greater importance within the whole, but 
also because even the co-existing rural culture 
is permeated and modified by it in many re-
spects. This spread of urban culture beyond 
the limits of the town, this tendency for many 
of its components to spill over into population 
sectors which are not incorporated in the spe-
cifically urban framework, is a phenomenon 
noted by all students of current change in Latin 
America, although not much has been written 
on the subject. Observers are unanimous in 
pointing out that in each individual country the 
rural population is subjected to the sectoral 
influence of contemporary urban culture through 
many channels and in a variety of ways. This 
is tantamount to saying that urban-rural rela-
tionships within the society's over-all culture 
are undergoing a vigorous process of change, 
although it differs in level and intensity among 
the various regions and localities within a given 
country, or from one Latin American country 
to another. 
As urbanization of the economy and of the 
ecologico-demographic structure proceeds, the 
changes occurring in the actual composition of 
the rural sub-society show that situations, ac-
tivities, institutions and symbols of urban origin 
in that particular national society are making 
their way into rural areas. With the ground 
thus prepared, not only the value-normative 
nuclei, the specific motivations and the content 
and direction of aspirations, but also the images 
of society and of nature that stem from the 
urban world may find fertile soil in which to 
take root and grow. 
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Comments on the spread of urban culture 
in the countryside often give the impression that 
the process is simply an overflow, as if the 
contents of one vessel were to be poured into 
another, without modification of the latter in 
order to receive it rather than merely on receiv-
ing it. Basically, however, the current process 
of diffusion of elements of urban culture among 
the rural sectors would not have been possible 
unless the rural society itself had previously 
undergone radical modification, or had been 
passing through a phase of more or less in-
tensive change. 
Only in so far as urban society changes does 
its real culture also change. Similarly, only 
inasmuch as rural society changes in itself and 
in respect of its relationships with urban society 
can its culture veer in the direction of urbaniza-
tion. As the urban and rural sub-societies are 
not a continuum, but two interdependent sectors 
within a single structural unit, it is not only 
the diffusion of urban culture throughout the 
countryside that is implied by the modification 
of urban-rural relationships within the culture 
of the society as a whole. In addition, in the 
national society, elements of rural culture are 
disseminated in the urban culture that has 
been established and developed as an outcome 
of the whole urbanization process. This rural-
urban diffusion which is effected through the 
migration of cultural elements from the country-
side to the town—a form of migration not nec-
essarily identical with population shifts, although 
superimposed upon them—is one of the most 
active processes. The scale on which it takes 
place depends upon the urban-rural relation-
ships previously existing, upon the degree to 
which the migrant population was previously 
influenced or bedazzled by urban culture, upon 
the cultural disparities existing between the two 
sectors and upon the types of cultural conflicts 
by which the total population of a national so-
ciety is affected. 
It is therefore possible that what is called 
rural culture in a given country at a given time 
is the backwash of the urban culture of the past 
and of its influence on the rural population. By 
the time migration to the towns takes place, 
a different urban culture has grown up, and 
the culture brought in by the migrants is rural 
only by comparison with the urban culture of 
the day. This does not apply, however, to coun-
tries whose rural sub-cultures are basically dif-
ferent from the prevailing national culture and 
undergo constant change in the course of his-
tory. Argentina and Peru may perhaps serve 
to exemplify each of the two possibilities. 
5. URBANIZATION OF THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE 
When urban-rural relationships are examined 
from the point of view of political structure, 
it will be noted that in every Latin American 
country the town has always been the ecological 
matrix of the principal institutions of political 
power, despite the fact that town and country-
side are relatively cut off from each other as 
far as direct day-to-day relationships are con-
cerned. Suffice it to recall the real and ideolog-
ical significance of politico-administrative cen-
tralism in the history of Latin America. 
This image, however, must be accepted with 
many reservations if the problem is to be 
analysed on a somewhat more concrete basis. 
From the standpoint of abstract historical re-
lationships, the town has been the dominant 
sector of society since the very earliest days 
of colonial capitalism in the Latin American 
countries. This is true in practice of those 
societies which were dependent from the outset, 
where the town was and still is the keystone of 
dependency relationships. Nevertheless, the po-
litical dependency of the rural sector has not 
unvaryingly existed at the same level or with 
the same characteristics during each significant 
historical stage in the development of the Latin 
American countries. 
As long as the structure of production, and 
the structure of economic activity in general, 
were based essentially on primary activities, 
the rural sector had the upper hand in urban-
rural relationships of this kind, notwithstanding 
the fact that the institutions controlling the 
society's over-all economy were established in 
the town, and the latter constituted the me-
chanism whereby the national economy was 
linked to the most important international 
market. As long as the majority of the popula-
tion was concentrated in the countryside, and 
the town constituted a relatively isolated entity 
within the ecologico-demographic structure of 
the society, there too the rural sector was 
predominant. As long as the social power 
structure was based mainly on sources deriving 
from the primary economy, here again the rural 
sub-society was preponderant, although the 
agents of the power institutions lived in 
the town. Today, in contrast, whatever the 
specific levels of change reached in the in-
dividual Latin American countries, the trends 
observable are largely favourable to the urban 
sector in all these spheres. 
Against the background of a matrix of rural 
predominance in the over-all power structure 
of a society, the political predominance of town 
over country was more formal and apparent 
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than real in the earlier stages of Latin America's 
history. While it is true that the most important 
institutions of the political structure, and often 
their agents as well, were established in the 
town, it is equally undeniable that the sources 
of the power of those institutions and of their 
agents were to be found not so much in the 
urban as in the rural areas. Thus, the oligar-
chical hegemony which was so familiar a feature 
of the over-all political power structure of the 
society, and which in recent times is being 
laboriously reduced and broken down, made 
use of formal power institutions and mechanisms 
set up in the town and belonging to a structure 
whose historical origin was urban—political 
liberalism, for example; but the access obtained 
by agents (groups and individuals) to the 
control of those formal institutions, with the 
ensuing all-too-well-known distortions, was pri-
marily based on their control of sources of 
economic and social power which were rural 
in location and content. 
It was by virtue of their ownership of land 
or their association with the landowning class 
that the ruling groups in the political structure 
controlled the political institutions ecologically 
located in the town. The same thing happened 
later, in so far as—despite the fact that their 
power was directly based on secondary or 
tertiary economic sources—they maintained 
their social and political ties with the traditional 
landowning classes. Herein has always lain the 
reason for the relative autonomy of the rural 
sector as regards the real effects of the integrat-
ing mechanisms of the town-based central poli-
tical powers, the endemic caciquismo (bossism), 
and the inconsistencies of the process of in-
corporating the rural population into the politi-
cal institutions of the Nation-State which are 
all still to be found in many of the Latin 
American countries. 
Nevertheless, in so far as urban-rural relation-
ships are undergoing intensive change in each 
of the various structural spheres, the process of 
political integration of the society as a whole— 
i.e., the process of incorporating the population 
into the national political institutions—is gain-
ing strength at all levels and in all parts of 
the national territory, and in the course of it 
urban-rural relationships are being modified in 
the political order of the society. During the 
process in question, the political hegemony of 
the town is gradually becoming real instead 
of merely formal, since the whole of the State 
machinery pivots upon the political institutions 
and power mechanisms. Access to the control 
of these real institutions and mechanisms of 
political power is becoming mainly the pre-
rogative of agents who are urban by virtue not 
only of their ecological background but also 
of their socio-economic sources of power. Even 
in the countryside itself, it is precisely the 
groups that are growing up as a result of 
the urbanization of the rural sector which are 
becoming the real leading agents of these politi-
cal institutions. 
Thus, as far as the political structure of the 
society as a whole is concerned, urban-rural 
relationships have been or are undergoing 
radical and intensive change, and there is a 
trend towards the total hegemony of the urban 
sector in the politico-administrative system 
nowadays characteristics of these societies. 
Urban political power is predominant not only 
in the pattern and location of political institu-
tions, but in the sources from which access can 
be obtained to control of these, and in the 
origin and sources of power of their agents as 
such. 
Thus, the urbanization process under way 
implies the emergence of a new ecological 
matrix of the structure of political power, rural 
dependence, and the expansion and alteration 
of the content and urban patterns of the struc-
tural institutions and mechanisms of the Nation-
State. The "populistic" phenomenon in Latin 
America, for example, corresponds to the 
transitional character of the society, and of its 
political machinery in particular, as it moves 
from one period of its history to another. 
Similarly, the urbanization of the society also 
finds its own expression in political terms. 
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RECENT ACTIVITIES OF ECLA 
The twelfth session of the Committee of the Whole 
(Santiago, Chile, 23-25 April 1968) 
The twelfth session of the Committee of the 
Whole was attended by delegations from Ar-
gentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guate-
mala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, the 
Netherlands, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad 
and Tobago, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States 
of America, Uruguay and Venezuela. Represen-
tatives of Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Japan, Poland and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics were also present, and 
the Federal Republic of Germany sent an 
observer. 
The Committee of the Whole began its work 
with a special meeting to commemorate the 
twentieth anniversary of the Commission. On 
the occasion of the anniversary, the representa-
tive of Brazil made a gift of a mural for the 
United Nations building on behalf of his Govern-
ment, The representatives of the States members 
of the Commission adopted a declaration in 
which they recognized the valuable work done 
by ECLA and declared the intention of their 
Governments to continue, through the Economic 
Commission for Latin America, their efforts to 
speed up the economic and social development 
of the region, with a view to increasing the 
material and spiritual well-being of the Latin 
American peoples, forging closer economic links 
between the Latin American countries and be-
tween them and the other nations of the world, 
and thus helping to strengthen the regional 
economic integration process and to buttress in-
ternational co-operation; and expressed their 
appreciation of the valuable technical contribu-
tion made by the secretariat of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America to the develop-
ment of the Latin American countries. 
The Committee of the Whole adopted only 
one resolution, on the admission of the West 
Indies Associated States as an associate member 
of the Commission. 
The following were the main topics of discus-
sion: the economic and social situation in Latin 
America; the Commission's activities in relation 
to the second session of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) ; Latin American regional integra-
tion; the report of the secretariat on the activi-
ties of the Commission; the Latin American 
Institute for Economic and Social Planning; 
and technical assistance activities in Latin 
America. 
The review of the economic and social situa-
tion in Latin America was based on the excerpt 
from the Economic Survey for 1967 and the 
Executive Secretary's statement at the opening 
meeting. 
In 1967 the per capita product for the region 
as a whole grew by only 1.5 per cent, which 
reflects the unsatisfactory results achieved by 
the Latin American economy. This general ap-
praisal allows for appreciable differences from 
one country to another. With regard to the 
external sector, in 1967 the upward trend of 
exports came to a stop, their value remaining 
at practically the same level as in 1966, while 
imports of goods increased by 4 per cent. All 
this meant a reduction in the trade surplus and 
a greater disequilibrium in the balance of pay-
ments, with the deficit rising from 1,080 million 
dollars in 1966 to 1,600 million in 1967. The 
unfavourable evolution of exports was largely 
determined by the decline in world prices of 
most primary commodities, which cancelled out 
the increase in volume, and by the loss of 
dynamism in the world economy and a further 
reduction in Latin America's share of world 
trade. In addition, intraregional trade was rela-
tively stagnant in 1967 for the first time in 
the present decade. In turn, the maintenance 
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of a higher level of imports without a cor-
responding rise in exports involved a sizable 
increment in net external financing in 1967, 
including direct foreign investment. 
With regard to regional integration, despite 
the loss of impetus in intraregional trade there 
were a number of important developments on 
the institutional plane, in particular, the pro-
posals put forward at the Meeting of American 
Chiefs of State in April 1967 and the con-
siderable progress achieved in sub-regional in-
tegration schemes. 
In addition to their concern to speed up 
domestic growth and improve international 
trade, the countries were preoccupied with con-
trolling inflationary pressures and with combat-
ing the depressive effects of certain types of 
anti-inflationary policy. 
It was pointed out that a number of highly 
important international events would affect the 
Latin American economy both directly and 
indirectly. They include the Kennedy Round and 
the second session of UNCTAD. Attention was 
drawn, moreover, to the difliculties encountered 
by the international monetary system, and the 
programmes introduced in some of the major 
countries to overcome them. 
When ECLA's activities in relation to the 
second UNCTAD session were discussed, 
the secretariat summarized the main results 
achieved. They related, ¿níer alia, to commodity 
trade, exports of manufactures, financing, ship-
ping, the expansion of trade, economic co-
operation and integration among developing 
countries, the World Food Programme, special 
measures in favour of the relatively less de-
veloped countries, the position of land-locked 
countries, trade relations between countries with 
different economic and social systems, and 
measures to facilitate fuller agreement on the 
principles which should govern international 
economic relations and trade policies aimed at 
development. It was deemed useful that the 
secretariat should further analyse the results 
obtained, for consideration at the next session 
of the ECLA Trade Committee. 
The Committee of the Whole also considered 
the progress of the Latin American integration 
movement, mainly in the context of the prob-
lems of the economically relatively less de-
veloped countries and the Central American 
Economic Integration Programme. 
In connexion with the first of these questions, 
the secretariat presented the report of the 
Meeting on the Problems of Regional Integra-
tion of the Economically Relatively Less De-
veloped Countries (E/CN.12/AC.61/3) which 
had been held at Guatemala City from 23 to 
28 October 1967. The recommendations adopted 
on that occasion were briefly reviewed. 
As regards the Central American Economic 
Integration Programme, it was stated that a 
significant proportion of the resources of the 
ECLA Mexico OfiSce was being devoted to 
the preparation of background documents for the 
meetings of the Central American Trade Sub-
committee and of the working groups on ports, 
electric energy, and transport statistics. The in-
tegration movement of the Central American 
countries had given rise to significant regional 
development and an expansion of trade within 
the area and with third countries. 
The measures which the English-speaking 
countries of the Caribbean were adopting to 
promote closer economic and social co-operation 
with one another and with the rest of the Latin 
American region were also reviewed. On 1 May 
1968 the Caribbean free trade area entered into 
operation. The Caribbean Free Trade Associa-
tion (CARIFTA) had been established to that 
end. It would urgently need technical assistance 
from ECLA and other United Nations agencies 
in solving problems relating to the equitable 
distribution of the benefits deriving from the 
free trade area and to preferential treatment for 
the economically relatively less developed 
countries. 
The Committee of the Whole reviewed the ac-
tivities of the Latin American Institute for 
Economic and Social Planning in the fields of 
training, advisory services and research, and 
suggested that, without neglecting the research 
work it had been asked to undertake, it should 
place greater emphasis on the practical aspects 
of development policy and planning, in close 
contact with the competent authorities of the 
countries concerned. 
An account was given of the main technical 
assistance activities undertaken by ECLA 
throughout its existence. For 1968 and subse-
quent years, the plan was to provide advisory 
services in various development programmes, 
and to set up a group of experts in regional 
planning, industrial development, natural re-
sources, agricultural development, market studies 
and transport, and of other experts who would 
be attached to ECLA and would be mainly at 




Seminar on the Organization and Conduct of Population and Housing Censuses for 
Latin America 
{Santiago, Chile, 20 to 31 May 1968) 
The Seminar was organized by the United 
Nations Economic Commission . for Latin 
America, Statistical Office and Office of Techni-
cal Co-operation, in co-operation with the Inter-
American Statistical Institute, the Latin Ameri-
can Demographic Centre (CELADE) and the 
United States Bureau of the Census. 
It was attended by participants and observers 
from Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, British 
Honduras (Belize), Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Guayana, Haiti, Hondu-
ras, Jamaica, Mexico, tbe Netherlands, Panama, 
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States of 
America, Uruguay and Venezuela, and by repre-
sentatives of the Latin American Institute for 
Economic and Social Planning, the International 
Labour Organisation, the World Health Or-
ganization/Pan American Sanitary Bureau, the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations and the Inter-American 
Statistical Training Centre (CIENES). 
The idea of co-ordinating population and 
housing censuses on an international basis, 
which dates from the nineteenth century, finally 
took concrete form with the first World Popula-
tion Census Programme, which was prepared for 
execution around 1950. Subsequently the 1960 
Population Census Progranune was carried out. 
The Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations has approved a more detailed pro-
gramme for the censuses to be conducted around 
the year 1970. 
In the Americas, the Inter-American Statistical 
Institute has actively participated in the promo-
tion of the Programme for the Census of 
America (COTA) and population and housing 
censuses were conducted throughout almost the 
entire region of the Americas in 1950 and 1960. 
The Programme for the 1970 Census of America 
is now being carried out. Handbooks containing 
methodological principles and international 
recommendations have been updated on the basis 
of fresh experience and the views expressed by 
international bodies and national authorities. 
The Seminar provided an opportunity for a 
discussion of problems relating to the organiza-
tion and conduct of population and housing 
censuses, and enabled the officials responsible 
for those tasks in the various countries to ex-
change ideas and information on the subject. 
The discussions covered the following main 
items: planning of population and housing 
censuses; co-ordination between housing cen-
suses and population censuses and of those 
censuses with other statistical inquiries and 
compilations; geographic work for census pur-
poses and preparation and use of census control 
lists; selection of census topics and preparation 
of a census tabulation programme; preparation 
of the census questionnaire and of instructions 
for enumerations; the enumeration; checking, 
coding and editing of census questionnaires; 
electronic processing of census data; design 
and execution of a census publication pro-
gramme; methods of evaluating the reliability of 
population and housing census data; use of sam-
pling in population and housing censuses; and 
census tests and the experience of American 
countries in carrying out pilot censuses and sur-
veys in connexion with the 1970 censuses. 
The first item covered the main points of 
census planning, and the problems and prin-
ciples of census organization and administra-
tion. The participants reported on the census 
plans of their countries. Of the countries repre-
sented, fifteen have fixed provisional or final 
dates for their censuses, three have not yet fixed 
a date for financial reasons, although they will 
probably conduct a population census only in 
1970, and one country is quite unable to conduct 
a census during 1970. 
The Seminar's attention was drawn to the fact 
that the decision on census taking is not the 
responsibility of the statistical authorities, and 
that therefore Governments have to be convinced 
of the necessity of census taking since the census 
is the basis for economic and social develop-
ment planning and provides the analytical basis 
for many kinds of research. 
The Seminar recognized the importance of as-
sistance from international organizations in 
census taking; it was felt that such assistance 
might take the form of specialized technical 
assistance, especially the provision of experts 
in sampling and electronic data processing, and 
the organization of training courses for na-
tional experts. 
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The Seminar agreed that, since the careful 
planning of censuses is of crucial importance 
for their success, it must be a continuing ac-
tivity of the national statistical agency. The 
preparation of a census normally takes two or 
three years; however, if modern census tech-
niques, especially electronic data processing, are 
used, it takes much longer. 
The Seminar found the draft census calendar 
submitted to it acceptable. The calendar divides 
census work into four main phases: preparatory 
work, pre-enumeration work, enumeration work 
and post-enumeration work. A new method used 
for census planning, known as the critical path 
method, was examined. 
The critical path method breaks down each 
census operation into its smallest components 
and shows, for each component, the next step 
into which it feeds, the minimum amount of 
time needed to finish each step and the latest 
date by which it must be completed in order 
not to interfere with any part of the operation. 
The method may be used to test the proposed 
timing of each of the operations included in the 
census plan. Before a critical path analysis can 
be carried out, each task must be linked both to 
the tasks which must be completed before it can 
begin and to those which cannot begin until it is 
completed. The relationships between the various 
operations are not always clear and it is es-
sential to determine them if the analysis is 
to yield valid results. 
Regarding the legal basis of the census, 
the Seminar agreed on the need for general 
census (or statistical) legislation which should 
at least cover the obligation to take periodic 
censuses, determine the authority responsible 
for census taking, and establish the obligations 
of the individual and the confidential nature of 
the personal information obtained through the 
census. It was also agreed that special legisla-
tion should be enacted for each census, specify-
ing the date of the census and authorizing its 
organization and administration. 
The administrative organization of the census 
was also considered and the problems at dif-
ferent levels were discussed in detail. It was 
agreed that a permanent organization should be 
responsible for the preparation and execution 
of national censuses for the following reasons: 
trained and experienced staff would be available, 
records could be maintained, there would be 
continuity of census work between censuses, 
the censuses could be better prepared, and a 
nucleus of processing equipment and office 
space would be available. In most countries 
this organization is usually a central census 
office forming part of the national statistical 
office. Experience shows that the territorial 
census organization should come directly under 
the central office, although local administrative 
authorities should also participate in the census 
work. 
The difficulties of staff recruitment for census 
work were discussed since it is not always 
easy to find the trained and experienced staff the 
census offices need in the coimtries of the region. 
In addition, it is very difficult for the offices to 
retain staff. In this connexion, the need to or-
ganize training courses at different levels and in 
different subjects, and to have international as-
sistance for the training of technical personnel, 
especially in the sampling and data processing 
fields, was stressed. 
When considering the question of co-ordina-
tion between housing censuses and population 
censuses and of those censuses with other 
statistical inquiries and compilations, the Semi-
nar first took up the relationships between hous-
ing censuses and population censuses. An es-
pecially close association exists between the two 
censuses, which should not be considered in-
dependently of each other because essential 
elements of each census are common to both. 
If the two are carried out as a combined opera-
tion, close co-ordination is essential at all 
stages, especially during cartographic work, 
the preparation of census control lists, enume-
ration and data processing. 
Population and housing censuses and agri-
cultural censuses, on the other hand, are not 
so closely linked. Moreover, the information 
obtained from agricultural censuses is often 
not comparable, since different definitions are 
used and the units of enumeration are not the 
same. 
While it is sometimes considered that simul-
taneous enumeration of the two censuses is ad-
vantageous because it may help to relate some 
characteristics of the agricultural holdings to 
characteristics of the population and of house-
holds associated with such holdings, this proce-
dure is not recommended, because of the amount 
of time and resources required, and the risk 
of impairing the quality of the data. 
Nevertheless, it was suggested that the final 
decision in each country would depend on the 
capacity of the census organization to plan and 
successfully carry through all three censuses at 
the same time. 
With respect to geographic work for census 
purposes, the points brought up in the discus-
sion were the need of maps for census opera-
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tions, the functions of a geography office, census 
map requirements, map acquisition, operational 
steps in a mapping programme, and map and 
graphics publication. 
Attention was drawn to the most common 
mistakes in the construction of enumeration 
maps, which are generally related to the way in 
which the maps are made since those that are 
available are not prepared specially for census 
purposes. A three-year period would seem to 
be required for mapping work; however, maps 
should in any event be available at least three 
months before the census is to be taken. 
It was observed that aerial photographs could 
be of great assistance in the preparation of maps 
since they show physical and cultural features 
in their correct perspective; it was pointed out, 
however, that their use was limited because of 
the constraints imposed by time and cost. 
Mention was made of the map requirements 
of census offices at the central, regional and local 
levels; for local offices, the maps needed by 
supervisors, crew leaders and enumerators were 
indicated. 
Interest was expressed in the delineation of 
statistical areas in accordance with criteria 
established by the national statistical office. The 
criteria are usually based on some sort of 
cultural or economic homogeneity. Several dif-
ferent types of statistical areas were distin-
guished, including areas with similar social 
characteristics and market functions, economic 
areas and sub-regions having similar socio-
economic conditions, large urban areas whose 
boundaries are determined on the basis of urban 
land use, and small homogeneous portions of 
cities which are also defined for data-gathering 
purposes. 
The manifold advantages of having statistical 
areas were emphasized. For example, since the 
areas are homogeneous, it is possible to obtain 
a more meaningful series of data. This is im-
portant mainly in those countries in which 
boundary changes of administrative areas are 
common. 
With respect to map acquisition, mention was 
made of the various national agencies and their 
departments at diííerent levels and of the re-
gional and international development agencies 
and private companies from which maps could 
be obtained. 
It was found that the most appropriate way 
to improve this aspect of census work would 
be, first, to take an inventory of the existing 
map collection; subsequently, all available 
sources would have to be used to complete the 
collection. 
Census control lists serve to ensure that all 
the living quarters in the territory concerned 
and/or their occupants are included in the 
censuses. They have many uses. For example, 
they can assist in achieving complete coverage 
in carrying out censuses of population and 
housing, as a control or frame for other 
statistical inquiries, for certain aspects of census 
planning, for the collection of statistical data, 
and as a means of providing advance census re-
sults. The lists can also serve as a means of 
supervising and controlling the work of enu-
merators and of furnishing advance information 
on population and housing, and as a frame for 
subsequent sample inquiries. Attention was also 
drawn to their usefulness for the collection of 
information to serve as a basis for a subsequent 
census of agriculture. Another function is to 
provide a list of names of household heads 
from which a preliminary selection of candi-
dates who might serve as enumerators could 
be made. 
During discussions on the selection of census 
topics and the preparation of a census tabula-
tion programme, it was pointed out that, in 
order to define the topics to be investigated, 
consideration should be given, inter alia, to the 
following points: requirements for national and 
international data; level of the country's 
statistical development, organization of the 
services that would be responsible for planning 
and taking the censuses, census experience, 
availability of trained personnel and suitable 
teams for processing the data gathered; financial 
resources available to cover the expenditures 
of all phases of the censuses; cultural level of 
the respondent and his ability to provide re-
quired data; and procedure for the selection of 
topics. An important aspect in determining the 
topics is the availability of both material and 
financial resources. The former include elec-
tronic data-processing equipment which is essen-
tial for obtaining data which are difficult to 
obtain by other methods and for making the data 
available to the user as soon as possible. 
In discussing the tabulation programme, the 
following points were considered: the statistical 
tables that should be obtained as the final prod-
uct of the investigation; priority for the tabula-
tions themselves; time periods for the com-
pletion of the tabulated material; and data-
processing methods. 
In the course of the discussion on the prepara-
tion of the census questionnaire and the instruc-
tions for enumeration, it was agreed, in the 
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first place, that the best type of questionnaire 
for population and housing censuses is that 
which simultaneously assembles data on all the 
members of a single household or all the oc-
cupants of a single set of living quarters, since 
it presents the following advantages: it is 
quicker to enumerate, edit and codify; it gives 
clearer information on household and family 
composition; and it facilitates the collection of 
geographical data. It was recognized, however, 
that the individual questionnaire has its ad-
vantages too. It is small and therefore easier 
for the enumerator to handle; more informa-
tion can be included; and it is readily adaptable 
to more advanced processing techniques, such as 
optical reading devices. A list of the members 
of the household or the occupants of the set 
of living quarters, or a subsidiary question-
naire, can be appended to it to provide a check 
on the reliability of the individual schedule and 
to facilitate the coding of household and housing 
characteristics. The latter task can also be made 
easier if the questions on living quarters and 
households are set out on the opposite page 
of the head of the household's individual ques-
tionnaire and a common code number is used 
to identify the members of the household or the 
occupants of the living quarters and to define 
their interrelationships. 
The view was expressed that it would be 
desirable for all countries to use roughly similar 
questionnaires, in which the questions and the 
pre-coded answers would be in the same logical 
order. 
It was thought that different types of census 
instructions should be given to census personnel 
at different levels. Besides the instructions for 
respondents, enumerators and supervisors, sepa-
rate instructions should be prepared for the 
census ofiSce's field staff at the various levels. 
Stress was laid on the desirability of prepar-
ing a training manual for enumerators as a 
basis for the verbal pre-census instruction. 
The discussion of enumeration covered the 
immediate pre-enumeration operations, such as 
the recruitment and training of field staff and 
census publicity. It revealed that in most coun-
tries field staff (enumerators and supervisors) 
are recruited primarily from the ranks of 
teachers, civil servants, university students and 
pupils in the higher secondary school grades. 
In most cases such personnel receive no direct 
payment for their services. 
The major problem is the difficulty of train-
ing properly, in a short time, the large number 
of persons required for an enumeration which 
takes no more than a few days, and only one 
day in certain instances. When a comparison 
was drawn between the advantages of central-
ized and decentralized training, it was recog-
nized that although it would be desirable to 
provide centralized training for a special group 
of trainees who would then go into the field 
to train all enumerators, supervisors and other 
field personnel, this system is difficult to apply 
in the larger countries, where the census staff, 
in particular enumerators, have to be trained 
in small local areas. 
The discussion of enumeration procedures 
was focused on the method, period, and place 
of enumeration, in relation to the difficulty of 
training personnel. The two methods of enu-
meration cited were self-enumeration and the 
interview technique, and it was felt that the 
most feasible way of combining them would 
be to adopt complete self-enumeration in some 
urban areas, or to use self-enumeration in such 
areas for some questions and enumerators for 
others. Although there was a consensus of opin-
ion to the effect that the number of enumerators 
should be reduced so that they could be more 
adequately trained, concern was expressed inas-
much as such a measure would lengthen the 
enumeration period. 
Another subject discussed was the basis on 
which data should be collected: the place of 
usual residence or the place where each person 
was at the time of the census. It was felt that 
tabulations based on the place of usual residence 
were more useful, but that in Latin America 
it was not yet possible to collect data on such 
a basis. However, as this method would proba-
bly have to be adopted in the future, its fea-
sibility should be investigated by means of 
census tests. The concept of usual residence, 
however, is not a simple one to apply, since it 
involves not only a question of fact but also 
the intention to remain in a given area. Con-
sequently, its successful use demands definitions 
of usual residence, temporary absence and in-
ternal migration, none of which has yet been 
recommended at either the world or the regional 
level. 
The Seminar agreed upon the necessity of 
using the most simple and automatic methods 
of checking, coding and editing. In addition 
to mechanical checking and editing, many coun-
tries have used manual operations in their 
most recent censuses. Not only the computer 
technique but also the use of sampling in these 
census operations facilitates and speeds up data 
processing. 
It was felt that the use of pre-coding was a 
great help in post-enumeration operations, and 
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as a general rule experience in that method 
had been very favourable. In connexion with 
the electronic processing of census data, the 
advantages and disadvantages of using com-
puters were analysed at some length. The advan-
tages described in the background document 
include the computer's tremendous potential for 
speed, versatility and accuracy, which far ex-
ceeds that of previous methods of processing 
census data. It is possible to transfer to the 
computer many manual operations, such as 
editing and correcting data, and assigning 
values when information is omitted in a ques-
tionnaire or when the information given Js 
inconsistent or impossible. The computer can 
perform these operations with strict consistency 
and uniformity, and by recording its actions 
it provides a means of measuring the quality 
of the enumerated data, besides making it pos-
sible to prepare more detailed and more in-
formative statistics. At reduced cost, it can pro-
duce key ratios and relationships as incidental 
by-products of tabulations; it can handle more 
variables by means of more detailed cross-
classifications; it can match census data with 
those from other sources; it can prepare final 
tables for printing by offset printing processes; 
and, if magnetic tape is used, only a fraction 
of the space needed for the storage of punch-
cards is required. 
The use of computers may provide a means 
of reducing transcription errors if direct input 
of data can be accomplished through optical 
scanning of the original questionnaires. Since 
data of this type can also be produced by re-
gional centres, there is no need to send all 
material to the central office. 
Over against these advantages must be set 
the need for earlier planning, since the use of 
computers calls for more systematic data or-
ganization, and the preparation of highly de-
tailed and explicit instructions before any op-
eration can be started. Failure to consider all 
contingencies may bring the computer to a 
halt or result in the rejection of large numbers 
of records. For this reason, the programming 
and supervisory staff must be well trained and 
highly competent. 
The capacity, speed and configuration of the 
computer greatly affect the processing plan, 
and in many cases will dictate the approach 
to the design of the enumeration form, field 
work, coding, input preparation, editing and 
tabulation. 
The expanded use of new electronic data-
processing equipment poses many problems for 
the census authorities. Among these are the 
following: while the computer opens up great 
possibilities for the improvement of statistical 
systems, its mere presence will not solve prob-
lems, but will in fact create new ones which 
will require the attention of technically trained 
personnel. The use of computers does not im-
mediately reduce the costs of data processing 
or the time it takes. Because more time is 
needed to train programmers and to write pro-
grammes than is generally available, the im-
portance of early decisions with respect to the 
purchase or rental of a computer was stressed, 
and mention was made of the possibility that 
it may already be too late to decide upon using 
computers for censuses to be taken in 1970. 
The training of programmers should be begun 
as early as possible. Computer manufacturers 
usually provide only initial training, and if 
training in programming and systems analysis 
is not available in special institutions or uni-
versities, an endeavour should be made to secure 
training fellowships or grants. 
In the discussion of the census publication 
programme, it was established that a publica-
tion plan is indispensable, and as the publica-
tion and tabulation plans are interrelated, ques-
tions of publication must be decided during 
the early stages of the over-all plan. Thanks 
to modern data-processing and reproduction 
techniques, census results can now be published 
more rapidly and at less cost than in the past. 
The first stage of publication is that of the 
preliminary results, which are based on check 
lists or other information provided by the enu-
merators and are generally subjected to prelimi-
nary revision and editing. 
The publication of final census results is the 
primary objective pursued. Timing and content 
should be determined in accordance with con-
sumer needs and the country's possibilities. 
It is also advisable to publish an evaluation 
of the quality of the data, together with a 
description of the census methods, procedures 
and organization, and, as far as possible, a 
complete historical account of the census. The 
publication of a scientific analysis of the data 
and a comparison with earlier census results 
would also be extremely useful. 
Another item on the agenda related to meth-
ods of evaluating the reliability of population 
and housing census data. An understanding 
of the sources and causes of error in the census 
data is of great value for the improvement of 
future censuses. The bulk of the errors in census 
results stem from the enumeration. Coverage 
errors are attributable to omission or under-
enumeration, duplication or over-enumeration. 
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and erroneous inclusions. Errors of content in-
clude mistakes in reporting and/or recording 
information concerning the characteristics of 
living quarters, households and individuals. 
These are errors which afiect the quality of the 
results, in contrast with quantitative errors 
which affect their magnitude. 
There are both direct and indirect methods 
of evaluation. The direct methods (those which 
involve the checking of census returns against 
independently obtained records) include field 
checks, comparison with records from various 
registers, and internal checks of duplication. 
The indirect methods consist in critical analysis 
of the internal consistency of the census results 
and of the way in which these results conform 
to expected values obtained from other sources. 
Great interest was displayed in the indirect 
methods of evaluation used by the Latin Ameri-
can Demographic Centre and in the corrections 
it is applying to population census results in 
attempting to use them for purposes of demo-
graphic research. 
Sampling was another of the topics discussed. 
The discussion paper divided sampling uses 
into two categories, namely, sampling as an 
integral part of the census, and the use of the 
census as a sampling frame for subsequent 
inquiries. In the first of these categories, stress 
is laid on the saving in time and money achieved 
through sampling. In national censuses sampling 
techniques are used mainly to prepare samples 
of census respondents in order to obtain replies 
to other census questions; to carry out post-
enumeration checks in order to examine the 
quality of the census data; to check the quality 
of census data processing by means of quality 
control plans; to prepare provisional estimates 
of the census results; and to prepare other 
studies on the basis of special tabulations from 
a sample of census records. 
While the sampling processes may be simple, 
they often entail the work of large numbers of 
persons, and for this reason serious biases may 
be (and often are) introduced. It is therefore 
essential to set up and use controls of these pro-
cedures to detect and correct the more serious 
defects introduced by some of the staff. 
Attention was drawn to the necessity of ob-
taining the services of sampling experts. Several 
ways of meeting this need were suggested, in-
cluding the following: a seminar on sampling 
procedures might be organized; greater em-
phasis should be placed on the practical aspects 
of university training in statistics; more im-
portance should be attached to sub-regional co-
operation, such as that now existing in Central 
America; existing training programmes should 
be more efficiently utilized; and attempts should 
be made to solve the problem at the national 
level, through support for students at the na-
tional universities or at the Inter-American 
Statistical Training Centre, or by sending them 
to study in other countries. The shortage of 
sampling personnel with practical experience 
was also mentioned. Training courses in the 
practical aspects of sampling are needed, and 
steps should be taken to retain competent statis-
tical personnel, once trained, by offering them 
special financial inducements. The same applies 
to computer programmers. 
Lastly, census tests were discussed, with ref-
erence to the experience of some Latin Ameri-
can countries (in particular, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Cuba and the Dominican Republic) in the con-
duct of census tests and pilot inquiries in con-
nexion with the 1970 censuses. The term "census 
tests" is applied to all types of tests connected 
with a census, whether a questionnaire test 
only, a field trial or a pilot census. A distinction 
can be drawn between general and special types 
of census tests, according to the purposes served. 
General tests are intended to try out the three 
main stages of the census, i.e., the preliminary 
work before the enumeration, the enumeration 
itself and the post-enumeration work. Special 
census tests are for trying out one or more 
stages of the census operation, as well as new 
methods. 
Census tests represent a valuable means of 
applying theoretical knowledge. Because of the 
long interval between population and housing 
censuses, this practical experience is essential 
for the staff of national census offices about to 
take a full-scale census. Census tests are also 
useful for the purpose of evaluating alternative 
methods of framing questions and determining 
the best sequence. As a rule, it is preferable to 
make several special tests rather than one gen-
eral test, although the latter may be necessary 
in countries with little experience of taking 
censuses. 
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